CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 28 septembre 2021

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sE485344B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:28.6pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:0.6pt; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sC6C7C49B { margin-left:7.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .s6DB91820 { text-align:center } .s8BB62139 { margin-right:auto; margin-left:auto; border-collapse:collapse } .s938C1CCA { padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top } .s598389F9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sF7610474 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:36.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF920FE69 { font-family:Arial; color:#f8f8f8 } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7AF9E746 { width:20.69pt; display:inline-block } .sAE29CAC3 { width:157.53pt; display:inline-block } .s64406319 { width:11.68pt; display:inline-block } .s2753FA3F { width:163.53pt; display:inline-block }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 31691/14 Ivan PINTARIĆ against Croatia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 28   September 2021 as a Committee composed of:   Péter Paczolay, President,   Gilberto Felici,   Raffaele Sabato, judges, and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 15 April 2014, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Mr Ivan Pintarić, is a Slovenian national, who was born in 1947 and lives in Celje. He was represented before the Court by Ms   G. Brnić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 2.     The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms S. Stažnik. 3.     The Slovenian Government did not make use of their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention). The circumstances of the case 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5 .     On 14 March 1991 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Zagreb Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Zagrebu ) against M.K. and K.K. (“the defendants”) seeking to have a gift agreement concluded in 1989 between his late father and the defendants declared null and void. In his claim the applicant indicated 35,000 Yugoslav dinars (YUD) as the value of the subject matter of the dispute. 6.     On 23 December 1991 Croatia introduced its own currency, the Croatian dinar (HRD). The Yugoslav dinar was replaced by the Croatian dinar at an exchange rate of YUD 1 to HRD 1. 7 .     On 13 May 1994 the Croatian kuna (HRK) was introduced as the Croatian currency. The Croatian dinar was replaced by the Croatian kuna at an exchange rate of HRD 1,000 to HRK 1. 8 .     On 1 July 2004 the applicant changed his civil claim and asked that the gift agreement be annulled as void. 9.     On 20 May 2005 the Zagreb Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and annulled the gift agreement. On 7 December 2008 the Zagreb County Court ( Županijski sud u Zagrebu ) upheld the first-instance judgment. 10 .     On 27 January 2009 the defendants lodged an appeal on points of law against the second-instance judgment. They argued that their remedy should be declared admissible because it had been allowed at the time the civil proceedings had been instituted. They challenged the lower courts’ findings on the merits and asked the Supreme Court to quash their judgments. 11 .     On 11 September 2009 the applicant submitted a reply to the defendants’ appeal on points of law, asking the Supreme Court to declare it inadmissible ratione valoris. The relevant part of his reply reads: “The value of the subject matter of this dispute when lodging the claim on 14 March 1991 was set at YUD 35,000, and therefore having regard to the latter value of the subject matter of the dispute the [applicant] deems that the requirements for lodging an appeal on points of law by the defendants have not been met, even though they are trying to make it seem that their appeal on points of law should be allowed.” 12 .     On 26 September 2012 the Supreme Court allowed the defendants’ appeal on points of law, overturned the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed the applicant’s claim. It found that the applicant’s claim to have the gift agreement concluded in 1989 annulled had been lodged in 2004, which had been outside the three-year objective statutory time-limit for lodging such a claim. It gave no reasoning on the issue of the admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law. 13 .     On 13 June 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, contending that his right to a fair hearing had been violated because the Supreme Court, without providing any reasoning as regards the issue of admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law, had overturned the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed his claim. He submitted that the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 1999 had raised the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law to HRK 100,000 and that such a requirement had been applicable in his case. The latter had been confirmed by the Constitutional Court’s decisions nos. U-III-2742/2004, U ‑ III-810/2005, U-III-3987/2005 and U-III-4633/2005. He stated that he had been aware of the fact that the Constitutional Court had subsequently changed its case-law, but that the latter had not changed the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision had violated his rights. The applicant asked the Constitutional Court to quash the Supreme Court’s judgment. He did not submit any argument or complaint concerning the Supreme Court’s conclusion that his civil claim had been lodged outside the three-year statutory time-limit. 14.     On 2 October 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as manifestly unfounded. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 15 October 2013. Relevant domestic law and practice Civil Procedure Act 15 .     Section 382(1) of the Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 4/1977 with subsequent amendments, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 53/1991 with subsequent amendments), as in force at the material time, provided that parties could lodge an appeal on points of law against a second-instance judgment if the value of the subject matter of the dispute of the contested part of the judgment exceeded a certain amount of money (the statutory threshold). The statutory threshold in civil (that is to say, non-commercial) cases, was changed as follows:   Currency Value Period YUD 5,000 1 July 1977 – 26 November 1982 YUD 50,000 27 November 1982 – 21 November 1987 YUD 800,000 22 November 1987 – 6 October 1989 YUD 8,000,000 7 October 1989 – 31 December 1989 YUD 800 1 January 1990 – 10 April 1990 YUD 8,000 11 April 1990 – 22 December 1991 HRD 8,000 23   December 1991 – 7 January 1993 HRD 3,000,000 8 January 1993 – 12 May 1994 HRK 3,000 13 May 1994 – 5 November 1999 Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 16 .     On 6 November 1999 the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 1999 (Official Gazette no. 112/1999) entered into force. They raised the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law from HRK   3,000 to HRK 100,000. Section 10 of those amendments provided that an appeal on points of law lodged against a second-instance judgment rendered before the entry into force of those amendments had to be decided under the previous rules. 17.     The 2003 and 2008 Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act, brought significant changes to section 382 of that Act but retained HRK   100,000 as the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law. 18.     The transitional provisions of the 2003 Amendments (Official Gazette no. 117/2003), which entered into force on 1 December 2003, provided that those changes applied to civil proceedings in which the main hearing had been closed after the entry into force of those amendments. 19.     The transitional provisions of the 2008 Amendments (Official Gazette no. 84/2008), which entered into force on 1 October 2008, provided that the changes applied to pending civil proceedings in which a second-instance judgment had been rendered after the entry into force of those amendments. 20.     On 2 June 2013 the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 2011 (Official Gazette no. 57/2011) entered into force, raising the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law to HRK 200,000. The transitional provisions of those amendments provided that previous rules were to apply to civil proceedings in which a second-instance judgment had been rendered before the entry into force of those amendments. Constitutional Court’s case-law 21 .     In decision no. U-III-2646/2007 of 18 June 2008, the Constitutional Court found violations of the complainant’s constitutional rights to equality before the law and to a fair hearing and quashed the Supreme Court’s decision declaring the appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris, in a case where the plaintiff, who had lodged her civil claim in 1987 asking to be declared the co-owner of a real-estate, had set the value of the subject matter of the dispute at YUD 120,000. The decision was published in the Official Gazette no. 104/08 and on the Constitutional Court’s website. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The Supreme Court declared the complainant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible on the basis of section 382(2) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act, under which ... the value of the subject matter of the dispute must exceed HRK 100,000. Having regard that in the proceedings, it was established that the value of the subject matter of the dispute at the time the appeal on points of law was lodged and after the entry into force of sections 4 and 10(3) of the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 1999 amounted to HRK 0.12, the Supreme Court deemed the appeal on points of law inadmissible ... The disputed decision violated the plaintiff’s right to equality before the law ... When the civil proceedings have lasted for twenty years, and the value of the subject matter of the dispute in those proceedings is being determined according to the nominal amount and not according to the real value [of the amount sought], then such a long lapse of time always benefits one party [.] The outcome in that party’s favour is due solely to the protracted nature of the proceedings, which upsets the other party’s equal status before the law ... ... in several of its earlier decisions concerning an identical or similar matter (in cases nos. U-III-2742/2004, U-III-810/2005, U-III-3987/2005, U-III-4348/2005 and U-III-4633/2005) the Constitutional Court accepted the Supreme Court’s decision ..., determining the value of the subject matter of the dispute in such way that it drastically fell below the statutory threshold for admissibility of an appeal on points of law set out in section 4 of the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 1999. However, revising such case-law, the Constitutional Court finds that the principle of monetary nominalism foreseen ... as a guarantee of fairness in exchange of economic goods, could not act as a guarantee of fairness in judicial proceedings in circumstances of inflation and [where the amount had been] denominated in dinars. In particular, the judicial proceedings must be conducted in compliance with the constitutional principle of the rule of law as the highest value of the Croatian Constitution. [The proceedings] cannot be [conducted] only with regard to the lawfulness of the State authorities’ actions, but regard must be had to the requirement that the effects of the law meet the legitimate expectation of parties in each particular case ... Such expectations undoubtedly also include the expectation that the dispute will be resolved by application of legal standards applicable at the time it was instituted ... Since the complainant in the particular case could have had a legitimate expectation that her case could be brought before the [Supreme Court to decide on an appeal on points of law] (the plaintiff had brought the civil claim against the complainant’s predecessor before the court on 9 April 1987, that is to say before the procedural legislation applicable at the time increased the threshold for appeals on points of law from YUD 50,000 to YUD 800,000 ...), the described breach of the principle of the rule of law also violated the constitutional principle of a fair hearing enshrined in Article 29 of the Constitution. Application of these constitutional principles obviously supersedes the formalistic interpretation of the provisions of the provisions on admissibility of an appeal on points of law.” Supreme Court’s case-law 22 .     The relevant part of decision no. Rev-x 211/09-2 of 16 July 2009 reads as follows: “The appeal on points of law is well-founded. The lower-instance courts declared inadmissible the appeal on points of law ... by stating that the value of the subject matter of the dispute did not exceed HRK 100,000. ... The civil claim in this case was lodged on 6 February 1984 and the value of the subject matter of the dispute was indicated in the civil claim as YUD 50,500, which would by recalculation now amount to HRK 0.005. However, in the present case, the plaintiff could have had a legitimate expectation that her dispute could be brought before the court competent to adjudicate on an appeal on points of law, because at the time of lodging her civil claim the statutory threshold for admissibility of the appeal on points of law in property law disputes amounted to YUD 50,000[.] Therefore, declaring the plaintiff’s appeal on points of law inadmissible in this case violates the constitutional principle of fair trial enshrined in Article 29 of the Constitution.” 23 .     The relevant part of decision no. Rev-x 724/09-3 of 29 December 2009 reads as follows: “The first- and the second-instance courts found ... that the appeal on points of law lodged by the plaintiff was inadmissible in that the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in the civil claim lodged in 1987 amounted to YUD 60,000, an amount which does not exceed HRK 100,000 as the relevant threshold for an appeal on points of law to be heard ... However, in this particular case, it should be taken into consideration that the civil claim was lodged in 1987 and that the value of the subject matter of the dispute was indicated in the amount of YUD 60,000, the then valid currency in Croatia. Owing to inflation and denomination the value of dinar drastically dropped below the threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law set by the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 1999 ... In circumstances such as those of the specific case, the court should start from the applicant’s justified expectations concerning the admissibility of the appeal on points of law, having regard to the realistic value of the subject matter of the dispute at the time of lodging the civil claim, as indicated in the Constitutional Court’s decision no.   U-III-2646/07 of 18 June 2008. Therefore, the appeal on points of law in this case should be declared admissible.” 24 .     The latter approach was confirmed in the Supreme Court’s decisions nos. Rev-x 61/12-2 of 4 September 2012; Rev-x 1202/11-2 of 14 November 2012; Rev-x 314/13-2 of 19 June 2013; Rev-x 477/12-2 of 16 October 2013; Rev-x 1173/13-2 of 11 February 2014; and Rev-x 129/13-2 of 23   December 2014. 25 .     The applicant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision no. Rev-x 1150/2013-2 of 9 January 2014. By that decision the Supreme Court declared the plaintiff’s appeal on points of law inadmissible on the grounds that the value of the subject matter of the dispute did not reach the statutory threshold for accessing that remedy. It explained that the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 2011 had raised the statutory threshold to HRK   200,000 and that those amendments had been applicable to all civil proceedings in which a second-instance judgment had been rendered after their entry into force (2 June 2011). Having regard to the fact that the second-instance judgment in the plaintiff’s case had been rendered on 28   May 2013, and that the value of the subject matter of the dispute had been set at HRK 190,000, the plaintiff’s appeal on points of had been inadmissible ratione valoris . COMPLAINT 26.     The applicant complained that the Supreme Court’s failure to address his arguments as regards the admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law had violated his right to a fair hearing, in particular the right to a reasoned judgment. THE LAW 27.     The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” The parties’ arguments The Government 28.     The Government contended that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1. The very fact that the Supreme Court had examined the defendants’ appeal on points of law on the merits had meant that the Supreme Court had considered its admissibility and had found it admissible. 29.     In the Government’s view, in the present case there had been no need to explicitly provide reasons on the admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law since (1) under the domestic courts’ case-law that remedy had clearly been admissible, and since (2) in his reply to the defendants’ appeal on points of law the applicant had not submitted any argument which would have required the Supreme Court to explicitly reply. 30.     The applicant’s case had been factually and legally different from the case in which the Supreme Court had rendered decision no. Rev-x 1150/2013-2. In particular, the value of the subject matter of the latter dispute had been indicated in Croatian kuna, and the proceedings in that case had been instituted after the entry into force of the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act 1999. 31 .     In the Government’s view, the Supreme Court’s judgment in the applicant’s case had prevented a manifestly erroneous application of substantive law by the lower courts, which the applicant had not challenged in his constitutional complaint. The applicant 32.     The applicant contended that the Supreme Court’s decision in his case had not contained any explanation whatsoever as to the admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law. An explanation had been necessary because that court had decided not to apply a clear and precise 1999 provision setting the threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law at HRK 100,000, and had decided to depart from the case ‑ law valid at that time, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court’s decisions nos. U-III-3548/2003 and U-III-4146/2005. 33 .     At the time of lodging the appeal on points of law, he and the defendants had been unaware of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 18   June 2008, and both had explicitly invited the Supreme Court to examine the admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision no. Rev-x 1150/2013-2 of 9 January 2014, by which the appeal on points of law had in similar circumstances had been declared inadmissible, meant that the case-law on the matter was inconsistent. 34 .     The applicant lastly challenged the Supreme Court’s judgment on the merits, submitting that the reason for which that court had overturned the lower courts’ judgments had never been put forward by the defendants. In fact, the issue of his civil claim being lodged outside the three-year statutory time-limit had never been raised in the proceedings. The Court’s assessment 35.     The Court has acknowledged in its case-law that however clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation (see Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no.   21906/04, § 141, ECHR 2008). 36.     The Court has further stated that the requirement of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations do not involve the right to an established case-law (see Unédic v. France , no. 20153/04, § 74, 18   December 2008). Case-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice since a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk hindering reform or improvement (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 58, 20 October 2011, and Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no.   76943/11, § 116, 29 November 2016). While case‑law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice, in previous cases where changes in domestic case-law had affected pending civil proceedings, the Court was satisfied that the way in which the law had developed had been well‑known to the parties, or at least reasonably foreseeable, and that no uncertainty had existed as to their legal situation (see Petko Petkov v. Bulgaria , no. 2834/06, § 32, 19 February 2013; Legrand v. France , no. 23228/08, § 40, 26 May 2011; and C.R. v. the United Kingdom , 22 November 1995, § 41, Series A no. 335 ‑ C). 37.     In the present case, the Court observes that under the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act, which entered into force in the course of the proceedings, the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on points of law was set at HRK 100,000 (see paragraph 16 above). Pursuant to the transitional provisions of the Amendments, the latter threshold should have been applicable in the applicant’s proceedings. In the civil claim lodged in 1991 the value of the subject matter of the dispute was set at YUD 35,000 which, after the currency changes, equalled HRK 35 (see paragraphs 5-7 above), hence less than HRK 100,000. 38.     However, the Court notes that on 18 June 2008 the Constitutional Court rendered a decision in which it departed from its case-law on the matter and adopted a new approach concerning admissibility ratione valoris of appeals on points of law lodged in proceedings in which the value of the subject matter of the dispute had been set in Yugoslav dinars, the currency previously in use in Croatia (see paragraph 21 above). In particular, the Constitutional Court held that in such proceedings, admissibility ratione valoris of an appeal on points of law should be examined according to the statutory threshold for lodging that remedy valid at the moment the proceedings were instituted. It explained that to do otherwise, owing to the protracted length of proceedings and the changes of currency, would mean the parties would lose their right to lodge an appeal on points of law. The Court notes that the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court was followed by the Supreme Court in all its future similar cases (see paragraphs 22-24 above). 39.     The Court further observes that on 27 January 2009, when the defendants lodged an appeal on points of law against the second-instance judgment (see paragraph 10 above), the Constitutional Court’s decision in question had been in force for more than seven months. By the time the applicant submitted a reply to the defendant’s appeal on points of law (11   September 2009, see paragraph 11 above), the Supreme Court had issued a decision in which it had followed the Constitutional Court’s new approach (see paragraph 22 above). On 26 September 2012, when the Supreme Court allowed the defendants’ appeal on points of law (see paragraph 12 above), the latter case-law had already been in effect for more than four years, with the Supreme Court having rendered two further decisions on the matter (see paragraphs 23-24 above). The fact that the parties in the particular case might not have been aware of this case-law at the moment of lodging of, and submitting a reply to, the appeal on points of law, as argued by the applicant, cannot be deemed relevant. The Court notes that the Constitutional Court’s decision of 18 June 2008 had been published in the Official Gazette and on the Constitutional Court’s website (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant also admitted in his constitutional complaint that he had been aware of the changes to the Constitutional Court’s case-law (see paragraph 13 above). 40.     As to the Supreme Court’s decision no. Rev-x 1150/2013-2 of 9   January 2014 relied on by the applicant (see paragraph 25 above), the Court reiterates that different outcome in two disputes cannot be considered to give rise to conflicting case-law when this is justified by a difference in the factual situations at issue (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others , cited above, § 116; Hayati Çelebi and Others v. Turkey , no. 582/05, § 52, 9 February 2016; and Ferreira Santos Pardal v. Portugal , no.   30123/10, § 42, 30 July 2015). The Supreme Court’s decision in question concerned proceedings in which the value of the subject matter of the dispute in the civil claim had been set in Croatian kunas. Hence, there were no issues in respect of the changes of currency, which was the case when the value of the subject matter of the dispute in a civil claim had been set in Yugoslav dinars, such as in the applicant’s case. 41.     Accordingly, the case-law development regarding admissibility ratione valoris of appeals on points of law lodged in civil proceedings in which the value of the subject matter of the dispute had been set in Yugoslav dinars was well‑known and no uncertainty existed as to the parties’ situation. 42.     The Court notes that on 14 March 1991, when the civil claim was lodged in the present case, an appeal on points of law was admissible if the value of the subject matter of the dispute was higher than YUD 8,000. As the applicant in his civil claim set the value of the dispute at YUD 35,000, the defendants’ appeal on points of law under the Constitutional Court’s and the Supreme Court’s case-law was clearly admissible. In his reply to the defendants’ appeal on points of law, the applicant did not put forward any argument disputing such a conclusion (see paragraph 11 above). 43.     In these circumstances, no issue arises in relation to the fact that the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the question of admissibility of the defendants’ appeal on points of law, before deciding the case on the merits. 44.     The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the complaint concerning lack of reasons in the Supreme Court’s judgment is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 45.     As to the applicant’s complaint that the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed his claim on the basis of an argument which had never been raised by the defendants (see paragraph 34 above), the Court notes, as did the Government, that the applicant did not put forward such a complaint in his constitutional complaint (see paragraph 13 above). 46.     Accordingly, this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 21 October 2021.   {signature_p_2}   Liv Tigerstedt   Péter Paczolay   Deputy Registrar   President