CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 11 janvier 2022

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page-break-inside:avoid } .sE5C1F6E3 { width:3.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sADD4F530 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5830ECD9 { width:0.2pt; display:inline-block } .sC9D6F765 { width:209.11pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s77C3FB1E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; font-size:10pt }   FOURTH SECTION CASE OF EKIMDZHIEV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA (Application no. 70078/12)       JUDGMENT Art 8 • Private life • Correspondence • Inadequate legal safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse for secret surveillance, retention and access of communications data   STRASBOURG 11 January 2022   FINAL   11/04/2022     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION THE FACTS RELEVANT BULGARIAN LAW AND PRACTICE I.   SPECIAL MEANS OF SURVEILLANCE A.   Meaning of the term “special means of surveillance” and most common types of surveillance techniques B.   General outline and evolution of the relevant legislation C.   Situations which may trigger the use of special means of surveillance D.   Persons who or objects which can be subjected to secret surveillance 1.   General rules 2.   Rules relating to lawyer-client communications E.   Authorisation procedures 1.   Authorities entitled to request secret surveillance 2.   Content of an application for secret surveillance (a)   The application itself (b)   Materials supporting the application 3.   Authorities competent to issue secret surveillance warrants 4.   Manner of examination of secret surveillance applications (a)   Relevant statutory provisions and case-law (b)   Information about the courts’ practices relating to the examination of secret surveillance applications emerging from the National Bureau’s annual reports (c)   Other official accounts of the courts’ practices (i)   In the Sofia City Court in 2013-17 (α)   Criminal and disciplinary proceedings against the President of the Sofia City Court (β)   April 2017 report by the Vice-Presidents of the Sofia City Court (γ)   Examples of surveillance warrants issued by the Sofia City Court in 2012-13 (ii)   In the Specialised Criminal Court in 2015-19 (iii)   Generally (d)   Public reporting requirements 5.   Further vetting by the authorities deploying special means of surveillance 6.   Retrospective authorisation in urgent cases F.   Maximum duration of secret surveillance G.   Situations in which secret surveillance must be stopped H.   Processing of information obtained through special means of surveillance 1.   Purposes for which the information may be used 2.   Means of acquiring electronic communications 3.   Stages of processing (a)   “Primary recording” and “derivative data carrier” (b)   Evidentiary material (c)   Destruction of irrelevant information 4.   Rules on the permissible uses of surplus surveillance information 5.   Relevant provisions of the Protection of Classified Information Act 2002 I.   Authorities supervising the use of special means of surveillance 1.   Judges who have issued the surveillance warrants 2.   National Bureau (a)   Manner of election and term of office of the National Bureau’s members (i)   Statutory provisions (ii)   Members of the National Bureau in 2013-18 and since 2018 (b)   Powers of the National Bureau (i)   To access materials (ii)   To give instructions and set standards (iii)   To bring irregularities to the attention of the competent authorities (iv)   Number of inspections by the National Bureau 3.   Parliamentary committee (a)   Manner of election of the Committee’s members (b)   Powers of the Committee J.   Notification of persons placed under secret surveillance K.   Civil liability of the authorities for unlawful secret surveillance L.   Criminal liability of officials for unlawful secret surveillance II.   DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS III.   RETENTION AND ACCESSING OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA A.   General evolution of the legal regime B.   The regime as it stands at present 1.   Types of communications data subject to retention 2.   Purposes for which that data is retained 3.   Rules on the processing of the retained data by the communications service providers 4.   Destruction of retained data which has not been accessed by the authorities 5.   Authorisation procedure (a)   Authorities entitled to seek access (b)   Content of the access application (c)   Authorities competent to issue access warrants (d)   Manner of examination of access applications (e)   Retrospective authorisation in urgent cases 6.   Procedure for accessing retained data 7.   Storage of retained data accessed by the authorities 8.   Destruction of retained data accessed by the authorities 9.   Authorities supervising the retention of and the access to communications data (a)   Judges who have issued the respective access warrants (b)   Commission for Protection of Personal Data (i)   Manner of election and term of office of the Commission’s members (ii)   Powers of the Commission under the 2007 Act (α)   To obtain information (β)   To give instructions and recommendations (γ)   To impose sanctions (c)   Parliamentary committee (i)   Manner of election of the Committee’s members (ii)   Powers of the Committee under the 2007 Act (α)   To obtain information (β)   To give instructions (iii)   To bring irregularities to the attention of the competent authorities 10.   Notification arrangements (a)   In cases of unlawful access or attempted access (b)   In cases of a personal data breach IV.   RELEVANT DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS A.   Field of application B.   On the processing of personal data by private persons 1.   Limitations on the rights of data subjects 2.   Remedies C.   On the processing of personal data by the competent authorities for law-enforcement purposes 1.   Conditions on which such processing is lawful 2.   Possible limitations on the rights of data subjects 3.   Supervisory authorities 4.   Remedies RELEVANT DECISIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION LAW I.   E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE II.   DATA RETENTION DIRECTIVE III.   GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IV.   LAW-ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE V.   CJEU CASE-LAW ON ARTICLE 15 § 1 OF THE E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE THE LAW I.   SECRET SURVEILLANCE A.   Admissibility 1.   The parties’ submissions (a)   Victim status of the applicants (i)   The Government (ii)   The applicants (b)   Exhaustion of domestic remedies 2.   The Court’s assessment (a)   Whether the complaint is “substantially the same” (b)   Whether the Court is prevented from examining the complaint by Article 46 of the Convention (c)   The applicants’ victim status and exhaustion of domestic remedies (d)   Conclusion about the admissibility of the complaint B.   Merits 1.   The applicants’ victim status and the existence of an interference (a)   The parties’ submissions (b)   The Court’s assessment (i)   General principles (ii)   Application of those principles (α)   Scope of the relevant law (β)   Availability of an effective remedy (γ)   Conclusion 2.   Justification for the interference (a)   The parties’ submissions (i)   The applicants (ii)   The Government (b)   The Court’s assessment (i)   General principles (ii)   Application of those principles (α)   Accessibility of the law (β)   Grounds on which secret surveillance may be resorted to and persons who can be placed under surveillance (γ)   Duration of secret surveillance measures (δ)   Authorisation procedures (ε)   Procedures for storing, accessing, examining, using, communicating and destroying surveillance data (στ)   Oversight arrangements (ζ)   Notification (η)   Remedies (θ)   Conclusion II.   RETENTION AND ACCESSING OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA A.   Admissibility 1.   The parties’ submissions (a)   Victim status of the applicants (i)   The Government (ii)   The applicants (b)   Exhaustion of domestic remedies 2.   The Court’s assessment B.   Merits 1.   The applicants’ victim status and the existence of an interference (a)   The parties’ submissions (b)   The Court’s assessment (i)   Retention of communications data by communications service providers (ii)   Accessing of retained communications data by the authorities (α)   Scope of the relevant law (β)   Availability of an effective remedy (γ)   Conclusion 2.   Justification for the interference (a)   The parties’ submissions (i)   The applicants (ii)   The Government (b)   The Court’s assessment (i)   General principles (ii)   Application of those principles (α)   Accessibility of the law (β)   Protection of retained data by communications service providers (γ)   Grounds on which retained data can be accessed by the authorities (δ)   Procedure for obtaining access (ε)   Amount of time for which the authorities may store and use accessed data not subsequently used in criminal proceedings (στ)   Procedures for storing, accessing, examining, using, communicating and destroying data accessed by the authorities (ζ)   Oversight arrangements (η)   Notification (θ)   Remedies (ι)   Conclusion III.   APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION A.   Damage 1.   The applicants’ claims and the Government’s comments on them 2.   The Court’s assessment B.   Costs and expenses 1.   The applicants’ claims and the Government’s comments on them 2.   The Court’s assessment C.   Default interest In the case of Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Tim Eicke, President ,   Yonko Grozev,   Faris Vehabović,   Iulia Antoanella Motoc,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges , and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar , Having regard to: the application (no. 70078/12) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Bulgarian nationals, Mr Mihail Tiholov Ekimdzhiev and Mr Aleksandar Emilov Kashamov, and by two non-governmental organisations, the Association for European Integration and Human Rights and the Access to Information Foundation (“the applicants”), on 19 October 2012; the decision to give the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) notice of the complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention concerning (a) the system of secret surveillance in Bulgaria and (b) the system of retention of communications data in Bulgaria and its subsequent access by the authorities, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 7 December 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the compatibility of the Bulgarian laws and practices relating to (a) secret surveillance and (b) the retention of and access to communications data with Article 8 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The four applicants are two lawyers and two non-governmental organisations related to them. 3 .     The first applicant, Mr Ekimdzhiev, was born in 1964 and lives in Plovdiv. He is a lawyer whose practice includes acting as counsel in various domestic cases and representing applicants before this Court. 4 .     The second applicant, the Association for European Integration and Human Rights, was founded in 1998 and has its registered office in Plovdiv. The first applicant, Mr Ekimdzhiev, is the chairman of its board. 5 .     The third applicant, Mr A.E. Kashamov, was born in 1971 and lives in Sofia. He is also a lawyer whose practice includes acting as counsel in various domestic cases and representing applicants before this Court. 6 .     The fourth applicant, the Access to Information Foundation, was set up in 1997 and has its registered office in Sofia. The third applicant, Mr   A.E.   Kashamov, is the head of its in-house legal team. 7 .     The first and second applicants were initially represented before the Court by Ms S. Stefanova and Ms G. Chernicherska, lawyers practising in Plovdiv, and then by, respectively, Ms T. Ekimdzhieva and Ms   M. Dokova-Kostadinova , likewise lawyers practising in Plovdiv. 8 .     The third applicant was represented by Mr A.A. Kashamov, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The fourth applicant was represented by the third applicant, Mr A.E. Kashamov. 9.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimitrova of the Ministry of Justice. 10.     The applicants asserted that the nature of their activities put them at risk of both secret surveillance and of having their communications data accessed by the authorities under the laws authorising that in Bulgaria. They did not allege that they had in fact been placed under surveillance or had had their communications data accessed by the authorities. RELEVANT BULGARIAN LAW AND PRACTICE SPECIAL MEANS OF SURVEILLANCE Meaning of the term “special means of surveillance” and most common types of surveillance techniques 11 .     In Bulgaria, the umbrella term “special means of surveillance” comprises electronic or mechanical devices enabling the preparation of evidential materials (video and audio recordings, photographs and marked objects) and the covert techniques for using those devices (section 2(1) and   (2) of the Special Surveillance Means Act 1997 and Article 172 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Those techniques are (a) visual surveillance, (b) eavesdropping and tapping, (c) tracking, (d) covertly intruding (into vehicles or premises), (e) marking and checking correspondence or computerised information, (f) controlled delivery, (g)   pseudo-transactions, and (h) the use of undercover agents (section 2(3) of the 1997 Act and Article 172 § 1 of the Code). Sections 5 to 10c define each of those techniques. Section 6 in particular clarifies that tapping and eavesdropping include the interception of both telephone and electronic communications. 12 .     According to the annual reports published by the National Bureau for Control of Special Means of Surveillance (see paragraphs 14, 16 and   108 below) since 2014, the techniques which are used most often are (a) visual surveillance and (b) tapping and eavesdropping: Year Visual surveillance Tapping or eavesdropping 2014 2,773 (24.94%) 4,927 (44.33%) 2015 1,417 (20.25%) 3,848 (54.97%) 2016 1,865 (21.56%) 4,717 (54.80%) 2017 1,699 (21.23%) 4,470 (55.86%) 2018 1,669 (19.39%) 5,124 (59.53%) 2019 1,628 (19.22%) 5,076 (59.92%) 2020 1,372 (18.27%) 4,594 (61.19%) General outline and evolution of the relevant legislation 13 .     Special means of surveillance were first regulated in Bulgaria with the Special Means of Surveillance Act 1994, in force until 1997. Currently, the law governing special means of surveillance is chiefly set out in the Special Means of Surveillance Act 1997, as amended, Articles 172-177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended, sections 304-310 of the Electronic Communications Act 2007, as amended, and the internal rules of the National Bureau for Control of Special Means of Surveillance, whose most recent version was adopted in October 2016. 14 .     In December 2008, following the Court’s judgment in Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria (no.   62540/00, 28 June 2007), in which the Court found breaches of Article   8 and 13 of the Convention, the 1997 Act was extensively amended. The explanatory notes to the amendment bill referred to that judgment and the need to bring the Act into line with the requirements of the Convention. Along with a host of other changes, the amendment created a National Bureau for Control of Special Means of Surveillance (“the National Bureau”), an independent authority whose five members were to be elected by Parliament and whose task was to oversee the use of special means of surveillance and the storing and destruction of material obtained through such means, and to protect individuals against the unlawful use of such means. 15 .     In October 2009, however, before the National Bureau could start operating, Parliament enacted further amendments to the 1997 Act, abolishing the Bureau and replacing it with a special parliamentary subcommittee. The amendments came into effect in November 2009. For further details on these amendments and the committee’s work in 2011, see Hadzhiev v. Bulgaria (no. 22373/04, §§ 26-28, 23 October 2012), and Lenev v. Bulgaria (no. 41452/07, §§ 81-83, 4 December 2012). 16 .     A further amendment to the 1997 Act which came into effect in August 2013 re-established the National Bureau as an “independent State authority” (see paragraphs 108 to 123 below). Its five members were elected by Parliament in December 2013, and it began its work in the beginning of 2014. The special parliamentary subcommittee became a full committee and continued to exist alongside the Bureau (see paragraph 125 below). 17.     The relevant provisions of all enactments cited in paragraph 13 above, and of all other relevant provisions mentioned in the text, are set out below as they stood on 7 December 2021. Situations which may trigger the use of special means of surveillance 18 .     Special means of surveillance may be used if that is necessary to prevent or detect one or more of the “serious intentional offences” (Article   93 § 7 of the Criminal Code defines a “serious” offence as one punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment) listed in an exhaustive manner in section 3(1) of the 1997 Act and Article 172 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which refer either to the chapters in the Criminal Code in which the provisions defining those offences are contained or to the provisions themselves. [1] Those include various offences against the Republic (such as attempted coup d’état , treason, espionage and sabotage); terrorist offences, including preparatory ones; murder; causing grievous bodily harm; abduction; rape and some other sexual offences; human trafficking; vote buying and some other electoral offences; theft; robbery; embezzlement; fraud; blackmail; dealing in stolen goods; money laundering; various economic, credit and customs offences; aggravated forgery; aggravated misuse of public office; perverting the course of justice; bribery; being the leader or member of a criminal gang; some aggravated computer offences; arson; some transport offences; some ecological offences; various narcotic drugs offences; disclosing official secrets; desertion in wartime and various military offences; unlawfully dealing in nuclear materials; and various offences against peace and humanity. 19 .     According to the National Bureau’s annual reports, the two offences which have given rise to the highest number of instances of surveillance since 2014 were those under Article 321 of the Criminal Code (being the leader or a member of a criminal gang, which, regardless of its place of commission within Bulgaria, has been within the jurisdiction of the Specialised Criminal Court since that court’s creation in 2011-12 – see paragraph 46 below) and under Article 354a of the Code (dealing in narcotic drugs, which, if committed by criminal gangs, has likewise been within the jurisdiction of the Specialised Criminal Court since its creation in 2011-12): Year Criminal gangs Narcotic drugs 2014 20.90% 29.30% 2015 34.15% 19.00% 2016 42.05% 14.00% 2017 43.52% 14.63% 2018 53.17% 14.28% 2019 48.78% 14.91% 2020 51.11% 13.86% 20 .     The additional condition is that special means of surveillance may be used to prevent or detect one or more of those offences only if the requisite intelligence cannot be obtained by other means, or if doing so would entail exceptional difficulties (section 3(1) in fine of the 1997 Act). 21 .     When deployed to prevent or detect such offences, special means of surveillance are to be used to obtain evidence about them (section 3(2)). 22 .     Special means of surveillance may also be used for activities relating to national security (section 4 of the 1997 Act). [2] The Government submitted that in practice national security was never cited as a standalone ground for surveillance, and that surveillance applications were always also based on the need to prevent or detect an offence. They cited two statements drawn up by the National Bureau and the State Agency for National Security for the purposes of the present proceedings. In its statement, the Bureau said that in its inspections it had found that authorities seeking the use of special means of surveillance always referred to a relevant offence. In its statement, the State Agency for National Security said that owing to the manner in which section 14(1) and (3) of the 1997 Act (see paragraphs 39 and 41 below) was to be construed, surveillance applications always had to refer to a relevant offence. Persons who or objects which can be subjected to secret surveillance General rules 23 .     By section 12(1) to (3) of the 1997 Act, special means of surveillance may be used with respect to (a) persons suspected of, or unwittingly used for, the preparation or commission of one or more of the above-mentioned “serious intentional offences”; (b) persons or objects related to national security; (c) objects necessary to identify such persons;   (d) persons who have agreed to being placed under surveillance to protect their life or property; or (e) a witness in criminal proceedings who has agreed to being placed under surveillance in order to expose the commission of one of the offences listed in section 12(3) by another (those include terrorist offences, hostage holding, human trafficking, taking and giving a bribe, and being the leader or member of a criminal gang). 24 .     According to the National Bureau’s annual reports, the number of persons placed under surveillance each year since 2011 were as follows: Year Persons placed under surveillance Of those, of their own volition 2011 8,184 not specified 2012 5,902 not specified 2013 4,452 not specified 2014 4,202 162 2015 2,638 79 2016 2,749 73 2017 2,748 55 2018 3,046 62 2019 3,310 not specified 2020 3,042 not specified 25 .     According to the National Bureau’s annual reports, the number of cases in which the authorities had placed under surveillance objects with a view to identifying persons (see paragraph 23 (c) above) were as follows: Year Number of cases in which objects were placed under surveillance for identification purposes 2014 645 2015 299 2016 340 2017 261 2018 279 2019 259 2020 172 Rules relating to lawyer-client communications 26 .     By section 33(1) of the Bar Act 2004, lawyers’ papers, files, electronic documents, computer equipment and other data carriers are “inviolable” and are not subject to inspection, copying, checks or seizure. By section 33(2), correspondence between lawyers and clients, regardless of the means of communication, electronic or otherwise, is not subject to inspection, copying, checks or seizure either. By section 33(3), conversations between a lawyer and a client cannot be intercepted and recorded, and any possible recordings of such conversations cannot be used as evidence and are subject to immediate destruction. By Article 136 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the use of special means of surveillance with respect to lawyers is subject to the requirements of the 2004 Act. The Supreme Court of Cassation has held that in spite of the literal terms of section 33(3) of the 2004 Act, the prohibition which it lays down is not necessarily absolute in all cases, in view of, among other things, the public interest in detecting offences committed by lawyers (see реш. № 211 от 08.04.2019 г. по н. д. № 1009/2018 г., ВКС, III н. о.). The 1997 Act does not contain any provisions specifically dealing with the surveillance of lawyers or the interception of their communications as a result of the surveillance of their clients. 27 .     The issue appears to have been touched upon solely in an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor on 11 April 2011 in the exercise of his power under section 138(4) (since August 2016, section 138(6)) of the Judiciary Act 2007 to make instructions governing the work of the prosecuting authorities. The instruction’s preamble said that its issuing was necessary to halt inconsistent practices and avert breaches of section 33 of the 2004 Act (see paragraph 26 above). 28 .     Point 12 of the instruction says that special means of surveillance can be used with respect to lawyers only if there is information which can provide grounds for a reasonable suspicion that they have, alone or with others, committed an offence. The surveillance request must expressly mention that the surveillance will be directed against a lawyer. 29 .     Point 13 of the instruction says that if in the course of a surveillance operation the authorities record the conversation of a lawyer with a client or with another lawyer, and that conversation touches upon a client’s defence, they must not prepare evidentiary material on its basis, unless the surveillance reveals that the lawyer has him- or herself engaged in criminal activity. 30 .     It does not seem that the instruction has been published by the Prosecutor’s Office. On 13 April 2011 the Chief Prosecutor did, however, send a copy of it to the Supreme Bar Council, and in June 2011 the Supreme Bar Council published it in issue 5-6/2011 of its journal, “Lawyers’ Review” ( Адвокатски преглед ) ( link ). Authorisation procedures Authorities entitled to request secret surveillance 31.     Only a limited number of authorities may seek the use of special means of surveillance and draw on the intelligence obtained thereby, within the spheres of their respective competencies. 32 .     Outside the framework of already pending criminal proceedings, the use of such means may only be sought by: (a) various directorates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (national police, fight against organised crime, border police, internal affairs, regional directorates and various specialised directorates); (b) the territorial directorates and units of the State Agency for National Security; (c) the military-intelligence and military-police services attached to the Minister of Defence; (d) the Intelligence Agency; (e)   regional prosecutor’s offices (only in relation to serious electoral offences); and (f) the specialised anti-corruption directorate [3] (section 13(1) of the 1997 Act). 33 .     In the course of criminal proceedings, that may be done by the public prosecutor in charge of supervising the pre-trial investigation (section   13(2) of the 1997 Act and Article 173 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 34 .     For the prevention of terrorist offences (including preparatory ones), the request may be made by the Chief Prosecutor, the head of State Agency for National Security, the head of the Intelligence Agency, the head of the military intelligence service (or their duly authorised deputies), or the chief secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (section 13(4) of the 1997 Act). 35 .     Special rules govern offences alleged to have been committed by court presidents, judges, public prosecutors or investigators (section 13(3) of the 1997 Act and Article 174 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 36 .     No other authorities may seek the use of special means of surveillance (section 13(6) of the 1997 Act). 37 .     The application must originate from the head of the respective authority; if it is made by a public prosecutor, he or she must notify the head of the respective prosecutor’s office (sections 13(5) and 14(1) of the 1997   Act and Article 173 § 1 in fine of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 38 .     According to the National Bureau’s annual reports, the respective share of surveillance applications were as follows: Year Ministry of Internal Affairs State Agency for National Security Prosecuting authorities Other authorities 2014 43.40% 31.50% 24.90% 0.20% 2015 50.29% 19.16% 30.05% 0.51% 2016 56.22% 10.08% 33.39% 0.32% 2017 56.50% 6.41% 36.94% 0.15% 2018 60.78% 4.82% 34.27% 0.66% 2019 53.73% 5.69% 37.95% 2.63% 2020 51.12% 7.28% 36.98% 3.70% Content of an application for secret surveillance (a)    The application itself 39 .     Surveillance applications made outside the framework of already pending criminal proceedings must be duly reasoned and set out (a) a full account of the circumstances giving cause to suspect that a relevant offence is being prepared or committed or has been committed, including when it comes to national security within the meaning of section 4 of the 1997 Act (see paragraph 22 above); (b) a full account of the steps already taken and the results of any previous preliminary inquiries or investigations; (c) data permitting the identification of the target (person or object); (d) the intended duration of the surveillance and reasons why that duration is necessary; (e)   the intended surveillance techniques; (f) reasons why the intelligence cannot be obtained by other means or an account of the exceptional difficulties which that would entail; and (g) the official who will be informed of the results of the surveillance (section 14(1) of the 1997   Act). 40 .     Surveillance applications made in the course of criminal proceedings must also be duly reasoned and set out (a) information about the offence under investigation; (b) an account of all earlier investigatory steps and their results; (c) data permitting the identification of the target (person or object); (d) the intended surveillance techniques; (e) the intended duration of the surveillance and reasons why it is necessary; and (f) reasons why the intelligence cannot be obtained by other means or an account of the exceptional difficulties which that would entail (Article 173 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 41 .     Surveillance applications relating to terrorist offences (including preparatory ones) must set out (a) the circumstances which give cause to suspect that a relevant offence is being prepared or committed or has been committed; (b) if available, data permitting the identification of the target (person or object); (c) the intended duration of the surveillance; (d) the intended surveillance techniques; and (e) the official who will be informed of the results of the surveillance (section 14(3) of the 1997 Act). 42 .     Renewal applications must additionally contain a full account of any surveillance results obtained so far (section 21(3) of the 1997 Act and Article   173 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 43 .     Applications concerning the surveillance or people for their own benefit, or of cooperating witnesses (see paragraph 23 (d) and (e) above), must be accompanied by their written consent (section 14(2) of the 1997   Act and Article 175 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). (b)    Materials supporting the application 44 .     For applications made outside criminal proceedings, the rule is that the requesting authority must enclose all materials on which its application is based (section 15(3) of the 1997 Act). [4] For applications made in the course of criminal proceedings, the rule is that the judge competent to issue the surveillance warrant may request those materials (Article 174 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). [5] It is unclear whether there is a difference in practice. 45 .     The National Bureau’s annual report for 2017 – the only one to have touched upon the point – said (at p. 19) that in that year 2% of the applications made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 4% of those made by the prosecuting authorities, and 4% of those made by the State Agency for National Security had been refused because they had not presented all materials on which those applications had been based. According to the same report, the percentage of applications refused for that reason during the two preceding years had been 2.5% for the Ministry and 5% for the Agency in 2015, and 6% for the Agency in 2016. Authorities competent to issue secret surveillance warrants 46 .     As a rule, surveillance warrants may be issued only by the presidents of the Sofia City Court, of the respective regional or military courts, and of the Specialised Criminal Court (which was created in 2011 and started its work in the beginning of 2012), or an expressly authorised deputy (section   15(1) and (2) of the 1997 Act and Article 174 §§ 1-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The word “respective” – specifically added to section   15(1) of the 1997 Act in 2013 to prevent the risk of forum-shopping by the relevant authorities – has been construed by the courts to mean the court which would be competent ratione materiae , personae and loci to try the alleged offence in relation to which surveillance is being sought (see реш.   №   262304 от 07.04.2021 г. по гр. д. № 8701/2019 г., СГС, unclear whether final). 47 .     Special rules govern offences allegedly committed by judges, public prosecutors or investigators: in those cases the warrant may be issued by the presidents of the Sofia Court of Appeal, the Military Court of Appeal or the Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal, or a duly authorised deputy, depending on which court would be competent to try the criminal case (section 15(4)(1) of the 1997 Act and Article 174 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If the offence is alleged to have been committed by one of those presidents or deputies, the warrant may be issued by the Vice ‑ President of the Supreme Court of Cassation in charge of its Criminal Division (section 15(4)(2) of the 1997 Act and Article 174 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 48 .     Compliance with those jurisdictional rules has been held to be an essential safeguard against unlawful surveillance (see реш. № 365 от 14.02.2014   г. по в. н. о. х. д. № 653/2013 г., САС, upheld by реш.   №   189 от 03.02.2015 г. по н. д. № 515/2014 г., ВКС, II н. о.). 49 .     According to the National Bureau’s annual reports (and, for the period 2011-14, the annual reports of the respective courts), the surveillance warrants issued by the presidents or vice-presidents of the four courts which had issued the largest number of those in 2015 were as follows: Year Sofia City Court Specialised Criminal Court Plovdiv Regional Court Stara Zagora Regional Court 2011 6,008 (44.10%) not applicable [6] not specified 872 (6.40%) 2012 5,556 [7] 550 not specified 498 2013 4,324 687 not specified 332 2014 2,298 (41.01%) 1,011 (18.04%) not specified not specified 2015 837 (21.38%) 1,049 (26.79%) 461 (11.78%) 240 (6.13%) 2016 90 (1.91%) 2,179 (46.25%) 485 (10.30%) 385 (8.17%) 2017 196 (4.24%) 1,