CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 21 juillet 2022

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font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sFABD3260 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:62.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-19.8pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sFF8BF293 { width:8.05pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sD11CFAB7 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15.01pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .s543FF837 { width:151.1pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }   FIRST SECTION CASE OF KATSIKEROS v. GREECE (Application no. 2303/19)     JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Relevant and sufficient reasons for imposing restrictive contact schedule between applicant and his daughter, not overstepping respondent State’s margin of appreciation • Applicant’s intended relationship with biological child not attracting protection under “family life”, where lack of established family relationship attributable to applicant Art 6 (civil) • Access to court • Court of Cassation’s rejection of applicant’s additional grounds of appeal on points of law as being lodged out of time neither disproportionately hindering very essence of right nor transgressing national margin of appreciation   STRASBOURG 21 July 2022   FINAL   14/11/2022     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Katsikeros v. Greece, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Marko Bošnjak, President,   Péter Paczolay,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Alena Poláčková,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Davor Derenčinović, judges, and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   2303/19) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Greek national, Mr   Panagiotis Katsikeros (“the applicant”), on 4 January 2019; the decision to give notice to the Greek Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning the contact schedule set by the domestic courts between the applicant and his daughter, the complaint concerning the rejection of the applicant’s additional grounds of appeal on points of law, and his complaint concerning his right to have his case heard by an impartial tribunal, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 21 June 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the domestic courts had set a very restrictive contact schedule with his daughter, not allowing him to establish a relationship with her. He also complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the additional grounds of appeal on points of law that he had lodged with the Court of Cassation were rejected on formalistic grounds, and that his appeal on points of law was not examined by an impartial tribunal. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Nea Ionia. He was represented by Mr V. Chirdaris, a lawyer practising in Athens. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent’s delegates, Mrs   A.   Dimitrakopoulou and Mrs A.   Magrippi, Senior Advisor and Legal Representative A at the State Legal Council. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant met K.P. at the end of 2013 and soon started a relationship with her. They started living together in January 2014. The applicant ended their relationship in June 2014, approximately a month before their scheduled wedding in July 2014 and while K.P. was pregnant with their child. 6.     On 1 December 2014 K.P. gave birth to M., their daughter. In the months following the birth of their child, communication between the applicant and K.P. was non-existent and every attempt in that respect failed. On 26   January 2015 the applicant voluntarily recognised the child as his own through a declaration before a notary, although without the consent of K.P. Proceedings for parental responsibility and contact with M. 7.     On 18 March 2015 the applicant lodged an application for interim measures, requesting that the situation be temporarily resolved until a final judgment was delivered, and specifically that he should exercise parental responsibility of M. jointly with K.P., or alternatively, that he should be given contact rights. By judgment no. 6821/2015 of 5 August 2015, his application was accepted as to its second part, and he was allowed to see M. every Saturday for three hours at K.P.’s house, in her presence and in the presence of one of her relatives until such time as a final judgment was delivered. 8.     In the meantime, on 30 March 2015, 8 May 2015 and 25 May 2015, the applicant lodged applications for a provisional order ( αιτήσεις για προσωρινή διαταγή ) with the President of the Court of First Instance to have a temporary contact schedule set. However, as his paternity had not been established either judicially or before a notary, because of the mother’s lack of consent, his applications were rejected. 9.     The applicant additionally lodged an application with the One ‑ Member Court of First Instance requesting that a final judgment be delivered and repeating the same requests as previously. 10 .     By decision no. 2884/2016 of 13 June 2016, the One-Member Court of First Instance held that the applicant’s relationship with K.P. was tense because of the applicant’s selfish and aggressive behaviour. According to the evidence produced during the hearing, the applicant easily lost his temper during his disputes with K.P., throwing and smashing various objects, and once even hit K.P. The court further recognised that the applicant was the father of M., who was ten months old at the time of the hearing, but rejected his request for shared parental responsibility, because of the tense relationship he had with K.P. It set the applicant’s contact schedule with his daughter as follows: for the first year following the judgment, the applicant could see his daughter on the first and third Saturday of each month and the second and fourth Sunday of each month, from 12 noon to 5 p.m. The meetings would take place at K.P.’s residence, in her presence with the additional presence of one of her relatives, given the tension and worry that the applicant’s presence caused to the defendant. For the second year following the judgment, the contact schedule would be extended from 12 noon to 7 p.m., and the applicant would pick M. up and drop her off at her mother’s house. When setting the schedule, the domestic court took into account the complete lack of closeness between the applicant and his daughter, as he had only met M. once; the young age of the child, who had been used to the exclusive care of her mother; the lack of a specially adapted place for the child in the applicant’s residence; and the help that the applicant was going to need in taking care of M., at least at the beginning . The court further stated that M. should not yet spend the night at the applicant’s residence until at least some minimum communication was established between them. 11 .     Following appeals lodged by both the applicant and K.P., the Athens Court of Appeal delivered judgment no. 2798/2017 of 8 June 2017. By that judgment, the appellate court rejected the applicant’s appeal in so far as it concerned parental responsibility, as that decision was susceptible only to an appeal on points of law. It accepted that the relationship between K.P. and the applicant had been tense mostly because of the selfish behaviour of the applicant, who lost his temper easily and acted in a condescending way towards K.P., throwing objects and even, in one incident, acting violently towards her.     The court took note of the fact that the applicant had chosen not to make use of the contact schedule set by the first-instance court and had only seen M. once, on 7 March 2015, when she was about three months old. He had sent two extrajudicial messages to K.P. criticising the first-instance decision, and had not made any child maintenance payments. The same lack of interest had been demonstrated by the applicant’s relatives. Nevertheless, the child’s best interests dictated that she should have contact with her father so that a bond could gradually form between them. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had by choice only met his daughter once and that, owing to her young age, M. had been used to the exclusive care of her mother, the Court of Appeal ruled that, at least for the first period, the applicant’s contact with his daughter should be regular but limited. In particular, M. should not spend the night at the applicant’s house until the latter’s interest became clear and unquestionable and until their natural bond was gradually strengthened, otherwise it would have damaging effects on M.’s emotional and mental development, given that the applicant was completely unknown to her. In addition, the meetings during the same period should take place in the presence of K.P. and one of her relatives. In her turn, K.P. should try to facilitate the applicant’s contact with their daughter being meaningful. Both parents should avoid putting M. in the middle of their dispute and should encourage a relationship of love and respect towards the other parent. 12.     In view of the above, the Court of Appeal considered that, for the time being, the most appropriate contact schedule for the applicant to have with M. would be as follows: for the first six months following the judgment, the applicant would meet M. on the first and third Saturday of every month from 12 noon to 3 p.m., and on the second and fourth Sunday from 12 noon to 5   p.m. at K.P.’s residence, in her presence and that of one of her relatives. For the second six months following the judgment, the schedule would remain the same, but the contact on Saturdays would also be until 5 p.m. The meetings would take place alternately at K.P.’s residence or in an internal or external playground. For the second year following the judgment, the applicant’s contact with M. should take place on the first and third Saturday of each month and on the second and fourth Sunday of each month from 12   noon to 7 p.m. The applicant would pick the child up from K.P.’s residence, where he would return her after the end of the scheduled contact. 13 .     Following the above judgment, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law requesting that judgment no. 2884/2016 of the Athens One-Member Court of First Instance be quashed, in so far as it concerned the rejection of his request to jointly exercise parental responsibility over M., and that judgment no. 2798/2017 of the Athens Court of Appeal be quashed in so far as it concerned the contact schedule for him and M. He argued, inter alia , that the appellate court had erroneously interpreted the best interests of the child when setting the contact schedule, as it was excessively restrictive and had given undue priority to the mother over him. On 23   March 2018 he lodged additional grounds of appeal on points of law in a separate document. 14 .     On 13 July 2018 Section A2 of the Court of Cassation delivered judgment no.   1286/2018, by which it rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It also rejected the additional grounds put forward in the separate document as having been lodged out of time. It specifically held that under Article 569 § 2 and Article 577 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the lodging of additional grounds of appeal on points of law, and their service on the other party, should take place at least thirty full days before the initially scheduled hearing. Referring to its previous case-law, it reiterated that that time-limit referred to both action time-limits and to preparatory time-limits such as the one in the present case, and that if the thirtieth day was a holiday, the additional grounds would not be submitted in time. In the applicant’s case, the thirtieth day following the lodging of his additional grounds of appeal on points of law and their service on K.P. was a Sunday, and thus the time-limit was extended to Monday which, however, coincided with the scheduled hearing date. The additional grounds were therefore rejected as having been lodged out of time. 15 .     As regards the applicant’s arguments, the Court of Cassation considered that the One-Member Court of First Instance had included sufficient reasoning and had adequately taken into account the evidence before it when it had decided to award parental responsibility solely to the mother. It further considered that the Court of Appeal had taken various elements into consideration when setting the restrictions on the applicant’s contact with his daughter, including but not limited to, the biosocial superiority that a mother has when taking care of such a young child. The judgment was finalised on 13 September 2018. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 16 .     In his observations to the Court, the applicant informed of the following developments. K.P. had lodged an application for interim measures with the Athens One-Member Court of First Instance, which had delivered judgment no.   5114/2018 of 25 July 2018. By that judgment, the presence of a relative of K.P.’s choice during the applicant’s contact with M. had been lifted. In addition, the contact between the applicant and M. would take place alternately at the mother’s residence, at a playground and at the office of a child psychologist jointly chosen by both parents. 17 .     Following a new application for interim measures by the applicant, the Athens One-Member Court of First Instance had delivered judgment no.   9127/2018 of 31 December 2018. By that judgment, it was held that for three months the applicant should meet K.P. and their daughter, M., at the office of a child psychologist and at K.P.’s residence with the applicant’s father or mother; for the next three months, the applicant would meet M. once a week alone and after that, M. would spend one night a week at the applicant’s house. 18.     Lastly, by decision no. 8853/2020 of the Athens One-Member Court of First Instance of 29 May 2020, M. could spend the first and third weekend of every month at the applicant’s house without the presence of any other person being required, as well as one week in the Easter and Christmas holidays, and fifteen days during the summer. According to the applicant, K.P. had never complied with that decision. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT 19.     On 2 and 23 March 2017, the lawyer representing K.P. in the domestic proceedings submitted a report and request to the President of the Inspection Council of the Court of Cassation . By that report, the lawyer informed the President that the applicant had possibly committed disciplinary offences in the proceedings relating to M. 20.     Following an investigation conducted by a member of the Court of Cassation, on 23 October 2017 a disciplinary action was lodged against the applicant under Article 91 of the Code on the Organisation of the Courts and the Status of Judges, for undignified or inappropriate behaviour. On the grounds of the pending disciplinary action and another pending disciplinary action for undue delay in drafting certain penal decisions, the applicant was excluded from promotion to appellate judge by decision no. 149/2017 of the Supreme Judicial Council, which consists of eleven judges of the Court of Cassation. He had already been excluded twice for the same reasons, by decisions nos. 25/2017 and 56/2017 of the Supreme Judicial Council. The applicant lodged an appeal against decision no. 149/2017 with the plenary of the Court of Cassation, which by decision no. 1/2018 of 18 January 2018, finalised on 2 February 2018, rejected the applicant’s appeal, even though it noted that the applicant had completed the penal decisions for which there had been a delay. The applicant was later promoted to appellate judge by decision no. 5/2018 of the Supreme Judicial Council. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK Civil Code 21.     The relevant provisions of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time, read as follows: Article 1510 Parental responsibility “Responsibility for a minor child is the parents’ duty and right (parental authority), and shall be exercised jointly. Parental authority shall include custody of the child ( επιμέλεια ), the administration of the child’s property, and the representation of the child in any legal matter, action or trial concerning him or her or his or her property. In the event that parental responsibility ceases by reason of death, declaration of absence or forfeiture of parental responsibility by one of the parents, parental responsibility shall belong exclusively to the other parent. If one of the parents is unable to exercise parental responsibility for factual reasons, or because he or she lacks or has limited legal capacity, then it shall be exercised solely by the other parent. Custody of the child shall however also be exercised by a parent who is a minor.” Article 1511 “Any decision made by the parents regarding the exercise of parental responsibility must aim at the promotion of the best interests of the child. The best interests of the child must also be the aim of a court decision when, according to the provisions of the law, the court decides on an award of parental responsibility or on the way in which it will be exercised. The court’s decision shall additionally respect equality between the parents and shall not discriminate on the basis of sex, race, language, religion, political or other convictions, nationality, ethnic or social origin, or property. Depending on the child’s maturity, his or her view shall be sought and shall be taken into account before any decision relating to parental responsibility is made, to the extent that that decision concerns his or her interests.” Article 1512 In the event of disagreement “In the event of the parents’ disagreement in the exercise of parental responsibility, and the interests of the child require that a decision be made, the court shall make the decision.” Article 1515 Child born out of wedlock “Parental responsibility of a minor child who was born and remains without his or her parents being married, shall be exercised by his or her mother. In the event that the child is acknowledged by his or her father, the father shall also have parental responsibility but shall exercise it if there is an agreement between the parents under Article 1513 or if the mother’s parental responsibility has ceased or if the mother is unable to exercise it on legal or factual grounds.   On an application by the father, the court may award him the exercise of parental responsibility or part of it to the extent that it is required by the interests of the child. ...” Article 1520 Personal communication “The parent who does not reside with the child shall have the right of personal communication with him or her. The parents do not have the right to obstruct the child’s communication with his or her ancestors unless there are serious grounds for doing so. In cases contemplated in the preceding paragraphs, the means of communication shall be regulated by the court.” CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 22 .     The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as applicable at the material time, read as follows: Article 52 Recusal of judges and registry staff “1. Judges, prosecutors or registry staff, acting in any capacity, may propose their recusal or be exempted from any proceedings: (a) if they are parties or are connected to the parties as joint beneficiaries, are jointly liable, or are liable for compensation or have a direct or indirect interest in the proceedings; (b) if they are the direct relatives of one of the parties, either through a blood relationship, or a relationship by marriage or by adoption; if they are indirect relatives through a blood relationship of up to the fourth degree, or through a relationship by marriage of up to the second degree if they are or were the spouse or fiancé of one of the parties; (c) if they are blood relatives, or relatives by marriage, either directly or related by adoption, or blood relatives or relatives by marriage of up to the second degree, of a person who receives a salary or other payment with a monetary value for services provided or for any other reason, from a natural or legal person or any kind of company that has a direct or indirect private interest in the outcome of the proceedings; (d) if in the same case they were examined as witnesses or participated as lawyers or in general as proxies, or have participated or may participate as representatives of one of the parties; (e) if they conducted the case from which the dispute arose, or acted in the trial as experts or consultants or arbitrators or drafted the document being challenged or were part of the composition of the court whose decision was appealed against or against which an appeal on points of law had been lodged; (f) if they caused or could cause a suspicion of bias, especially if they had with one of the parties a special friendship, a special relationship of duty or dependence, or a dispute or a hostile relationship. 2. Prosecutors may not be exempted when acting as parties.” Article 53 “An application for the exemption of all the members of the Court of Cassation or of its prosecution service or for the exemption of so many members of the Court of Cassation that it would no longer be lawfully composed, shall be inadmissible. ...” Article 55 “If there is a reason for them to be exempted, judges of multi-member courts and prosecutors must declare it to the president of the court. ...” Article 57 “1. An exemption shall be put forward by the relevant party five days before the relevant hearing, however [it may be put forward] at the latest before the end of the hearing, only if it is likely that the event or the reasons for exemption will take place or became known to the party after the end of the five-day time-limit ... ... 3. An application for exemption which is not submitted in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be inadmissible and shall be rejected by the same court from which the exemption is requested ...” Article 58 “An application for exemption that is submitted up until the start of the hearing shall be made by submitting a document to the registry of the relevant court. The request shall include the reasons for exemption and shall be inadmissible if it does not do so.” Article 59 “When the application for exemption is submitted during the hearing, it shall be made by a statement that shall be recorded in the court record and shall refer to the reasons for exemption. In multi-member courts, the application shall be heard immediately, without the presence of the member in respect of whom the application was submitted. The latter shall be obliged to abstain from any action from the moment that he or she learns that an application for exemption has been submitted, unless there are any risks arising from the abstention.” Article 144 “1. The time-limits that are set by law or by the courts shall commence from the day after notification or after the relevant fact that constitutes the commencement of the time-limit, and shall end at 7 p.m. of the final day, and if that day is by law a day that must be exempted ( εξαιρετέα ), at the same time of the next non-exempted day. 2. A time-limit that commences by the notification of documents shall also run against the person who ordered the notification. 3. Saturday shall be considered for the purposes of the present Code as an exempted and non-working day.” Article 568 “... 2. The registry of the Court of Cassation shall submit the documents that have been submitted, without delay to the President of the Court of Cassation, who shall assign the relevant section, and to the president of the section with a note on the copy of the appeal on points of law stating: a) a date for the hearing of the case; b) the time-limit within which the notification of the hearing has to be served; c) the judge rapporteur of the Court of Cassation to whom the case file shall be transmitted for the purposes of Article 571. ...” Article 569 “1. Additional grounds of appeal on points of law shall be admissible, even if the appeal on points of law does not contain a reason that is admissible and specific. 2. Additional grounds of appeal on points of law concerning the same parts of the challenged decision and the parts that are obligatorily connected with them, shall be lodged only by a document that is submitted to the registry of the Court of Cassation, at least thirty full days before the hearing of the appeal on points of law, as provided for by Article 281, under which a report shall be drafted. A copy of the document containing the additional grounds of appeal on points of law shall be served before the [expiry of] the same time-limit on the person against whom the appeal on points of law has been made and on the other parties ...” Article 577 “1. The court shall first consider the admissibility of the appeal on points of law. 2. If the appeal on points of law has not been made lawfully or if one of the conditions of admissibility is missing, the Court of Cassation shall reject the appeal of its own motion. 3. If the Court of Cassation considers the appeal on points of law to be lawful and admissible, it shall examine the admissibility and well-foundedness of [each of] its grounds.”   Code on the organisation of the courts and the status of judges 23.     The relevant provisions of the Code on the Organisation of the Courts and the Status of Judges read as follows: Article 91 Disciplinary Offences “1. A disciplinary offence shall consist of a culpable and imputable ( υπαίτια και καταλογιστή ) act or omission of a judge, inside or outside the service, which is contrary to the obligations stemming from the Constitution and the relevant provisions or which is incompatible with his or her office and harms his or her reputation or the reputation of justice. 2. Disciplinary offences of a judge shall be: ... d) undignified or improper behaviour inside or outside the service; ...” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 24.     The applicant complained that the limitations imposed by the domestic courts when setting his contact schedule with his daughter violated his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility The parties’ arguments 25.     The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the available domestic remedies. In particular, in his appeal on points of law to the Court of Cassation, the applicant had failed to rely on his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. His only reference to the provision of the Convention had been included in the additional grounds of appeal on points of law that had been rejected as having been lodged out of time. 26.     The applicant denied this allegation by arguing that he had relied on the domestic provisions of the Civil Code having the same effect as Article   8 of the Convention. He had additionally cited several of the Court’s judgments that he had considered pertinent for his case. Moreover, he had submitted additional grounds in his appeal on points of law, including as a separate ground a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; however, the Court of Cassation had rejected the additional grounds as inadmissible. The Court’s assessment 27.     The Court reiterates that the purpose of the rule on the exhaustion of domestic remedies is to afford Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right violations that they are alleged to have committed before those allegations are submitted to it (see, among many other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR   1999-V, and Remli v.   France , 23   April 1996, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions   1996-II). 28.     The rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. At the same time, it requires, in principle, that the complaints intended to be made subsequently at international level should have been aired before those same courts – at least in substance, and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law (see, among many other authorities, Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, § 72, 25 March 2014, and Gherghina v.   Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, §§ 84-87, 9 July 2015). 29.     It is not necessary for a Convention right to be explicitly raised in domestic proceedings, provided that the complaint is raised “at least in substance” (see Fressoz and Roire v. Franc e [GC], no. 29183/95, §   39, ECHR 1999-I, and Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, §   38, ECHR   2004 ‑ III). If the applicant has not relied on the provisions of the Convention, he or she must have raised arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to have given the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach in the first place (see Gäfgen v.   Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 142, ECHR 2010, and Karapanagiotou and Others v. Greece , no. 1571/08, § 29, 28 October 2010). 30.     In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did provide the Court of Cassation with a complete account of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and presented arguments that were in substance relevant to Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, in the initial document by which he had lodged his appeal on points of law, the applicant argued that the contact schedule set by the appellate court had been very restrictive and had impeded him from bonding with his daughter (see paragraph 13 above). The Court of Cassation, for its part, examined (to the extent of its powers) the applicant’s arguments and dismissed them (see paragraph 15 above). 31.     In view of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that through the arguments that he raised before the Court of Cassation, the applicant did complain, albeit implicitly, that his right to respect for his family life had been breached. In doing so, he raised, at least in substance, a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention before the Court of Cassation, and the court examined that complaint. It follows that he provided the national authorities with the opportunity that is in principle intended to be afforded to Contracting States by Article   35   §   1 of the Convention – namely, the opportunity to put right the violations alleged against them (see Muršić v.   Croatia [GC], no.   7334/13, §   72, ECHR 2016). The Government’s objection concerning the alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed. 32.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill ‑ founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ arguments (a)    The applicant 33.     The applicant submitted that pursuant to the Court’s case-law, he had had a family bond with M. despite the fact that she had been born out of wedlock. In any event, he had a right protected under Article   8 of the Convention to have a contact schedule defined which would allow for the creation of a strong emotional bond with his daughter. Nevertheless, the domestic authorities had failed to do so and had instead consolidated the applicant’s alienation from his daughter. 34.     In particular, the domestic courts had imposed excessive limitations on his contact rights with M. with regard to the place, the time and the manner of that contact, thus violating Article 8 of the Convention. The hours defined by the domestic courts had been very few, ranging from three to seven hours per week; the contact would take place only in the mother’s residence or a playground, thus excluding his residence, which had included a nursery, or the residence of his relatives who had been willing to assist in raising M.; and the mother and one of her relatives had had to be present during all contact between the applicant and M. That fact alone had been an indication that the domestic authorities had taken the parents’ relationship into account when defining the applicant’s contact rights with his daughter, which should not have been the case. In addition, K.P. had chosen Ms   Ch.P. as the relative to be present, who had testified against him in the proceedings and who was his hierarchical superior at work. Both K.P.’s and Ch.P.’s presence could, therefore, only have made the applicant’s contact with M. more difficult. 35.     None of those limitations had been justified by the evidence before the domestic courts or by the applicant’s personality, and had not served M.’s best interests. M.’s young age and her dependence on her mother should have been taken into account in the opposite way, that is to say the applicant should have been allowed more contact with her so that she could develop a closeness with her father. In addition, the domestic courts had counted against the applicant the alleged violence that he had inflicted on K.P. which, however, had not been proven, but the courts had failed to properly consider the behaviour of K.P., who had refused to consent to the recognition of the applicant’s paternity in respect of M. The courts had counted against the applicant the fact that he had not adhered to the contact schedule set by the first-instance court, without acknowledging that contact under those restrictions would not have been beneficial for the child and had been, in general, impossible. 36.     The fact that those domestic decisions had been erroneous was proven, in the applicant’s view, by interim decisions nos. 5114/2018 and   9127/2018 of the Athens One-Member Court of First Instance, which had amended the restrictive conditions set by the earlier decisions (see paragraphs   16-17 above). In particular, the first of those decisions had found that there was no need for one of K.P.’s relatives to be present during the applicant’s contact with M., and that those meetings could take place at the mother’s residence, at a playground or at the office of a jointly chosen child psychologist for a few months, at the end of which the applicant could meet M. at his residence. The second decision had allowed for the presence of a relative of the applicant at the meetings and had decided that the meetings would take place for the first three months of 2019 at the mother’s residence or at the office of a child psychologist chosen by the applicant. From April   2019, the applicant would meet M. at his residence and from June onwards, M. would be able to spend the night at her father’s house every weekend. Nevertheless, K.P. had refused to comply with that decision. In any event, even the new decisions could not compensate for the fact that the former decisions had been erroneous and had managed to alienate the applicant from his daughter for five years. (b)    The Government 37.     The Government submitted that given the fact that the applicant and K.P. had never married or lived together after M.’s birth, there had never been ipso jure or ipso facto a relationship between the applicant and his daughter that had broken because of the court decisions. On the contrary, it had been through the domestic court decisions that such a relationship had begun. The task of the judges had not been easy, but they had managed to achieve a balance between the parents’ competing interests, after considering the child’s best interests for the first two years of her life. 38.     More specifically, the limitations to the contact schedule between the applicant and M. had been considered necessary by the domestic courts in view of M.’s young age, her dependence on her mother and the specific features of the case. In decision no. 2884/2016, the Athens One-Member Court of First Instance had taken into account the following factors in defining the contact schedule: the complete lack of closeness between the applicant and his daughter, as they had only met once; M.’s young age, and the fact that she had been used to the exclusive care of her mother; the lack of a specially adapted place for the child in the residence where the applicant lived, and the help that he was going to need with the child’s care when spending time with her, at least in the beginning (see paragraph   10 above). 39.     Similarly, the Athens Court of Appeal had given specific reasons for which the limitations in the contact between the applicant and M. were necessary, namely the lack of closeness between the applicant and his daughter, M.’s young age, and her being used to the exclusive care of her mother, and had defined the contact schedule accordingly (see paragraph   11 above). 40.     All of the domestic decisions had based their findings on the evidence adduced before them, with the child’s best interests and the relevant circumstances of the case in mind. The Athens Court of Appeal had defined the contact schedule as a way for the applicant and M. to get to know each other and develop a bond; it was up to the applicant to submit a fresh application and to obtain a new ruling on the matter once the situation was amended. 41.     In the Government’s view, all of the domestic decisions had been reasoned; therefore, in view of the subsidiarity principle, the Court should abstain from questioning their outcome. The applicant had been heard at all levels of jurisdiction and had been able to exercise all his procedural rights and have a fair trial as provided for by Article 6 of the Convention. The Court’s assessment (a)    Applicability of Article 8 42.     The Court reiterates that the notion of “family life” under Article 8 of the Convention is not confined to marriage-based relationships and may encompass other de facto “family” ties where the parties are living together out of wedlock. A child born out of such a relationship is ipso jure part of that “family” unit from the moment, and by the very fact, of the birth (see Keegan v.   Ireland , 26 May 1994, § 44, Series A no. 290; L.   v.   the   Netherlands , no.   45582/99, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ IV; and Znamenskaya v.   Russia , no.   77785/01, § 26, 2 June 2005). 43.     However, a biological kinship between a natural parent and a child alone, without any further legal or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal relationship, is insufficient to attract the protection of Article   8 (compare L. v.   the   Netherlands , cited above, § 37). As a rule, cohabitation is a requirement for a relationship amounting to family life. Exceptionally, other factors may also serve to demonstrate that a relationship has sufficient constancy to create de facto “family ties” (see Kroon and   Others v.   the   Netherlands , 27 October 1994, § 30, Series A no.   297 ‑ C, and L. v.   the   Netherlands , cited above, § 36). 44 .     Moreover, the Court has considered that intended family life may, exceptionally, fall within the ambit of Article 8, in particular in cases in which the fact that family life has not yet fully been established was not attributable to the applicant (compare Pini and Others v. Romania , nos.   78028/01 and   78030/01, §§ 143 and 146, ECHR 2004-V). In particular, where the circumstances warrant it, “family life” must extend to the potential relationship which may develop between a child born out of wedlock and the natural father. Relevant factors which may determine the real existence in practice of close personal ties in these cases include the nature of the relationship between the natural parents and a demonstrable interest in and commitment by the father to the child both before and after the birth (see Nylund v. Finland (dec.), no. 27110/95, ECHR 1999-VI; Nekvedavicius v.   Germany (dec.), no. 46165/99, 19 June 2003; L.   v.   the   Netherlands , cited above, § 36; and Hülsmann v. Germany (dec.), no. 33375/03, 18 March 2008; compare also Różański v. Poland , no.   55339/00, § 64, 18 May 2006). 45.     The Court further reiterates that Article 8 protects not only “family” but also “private” life. It has been the Convention institutions’ traditional approach to accept that close relationships short of “family life” would generally fall within the scope of “private life” (see Znamenskaya , cited above, § 27, with further references). The Court thus found in the context of proceedings concerning the establishment or contestation of paternity that the determination of a man’s legal relations with his legal or putative child might concern his “family” life but that the question could be left open because the matter undoubtedly concerned that man’s private life under Article 8, which encompasses important aspects of one’s personal identity (see Rasmussen v.   Denmark , 28 November 1984, § 33, Series A no. 87; Nylund , cited above; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), no. 34308/96, 19 October 1999; and Backlund v.   Finland , no. 36498/05, § 37, 6 July 2010). 46.     In the present case, the Court must first determine whether the decision of the Court of Appeal, upheld by the Court of Cassation, to put certain restrictions on the applicant’s contact with M. disregarded the applicant’s existing “family life” with his child within the meaning of Article   8. It notes at the outset that, despite K.P.’s initial refusal to acknowledge that the applicant was the biological father of M., it was then established that that was indeed the case; the applicant’s paternity is now uncontested between the parties. In examining whether there is, in addition, a close personal relationship between him and the child which must be regarded as an established “family life” for the purposes of Article 8, the Court observes on the one hand, that the applicant cohabited with M.’s mother for a short period of time and they intended to get married; on the other hand, the applicant has never cohabited with M. and, despite the contact rights granted by the domestic decisions, he had only met M. once on 7 March 2015 until the end of the domestic proceedings in question, when M. was around three and a half years old. There are no signs of any commitment on the part of the applicant towards M. before she was born. In these circumstances, their relationship does not have sufficient constancy to be characterised as an existing “family life”. 47.     However, the Court has found that intended family life may, exceptionally, fall within the ambit of Article 8 in cases in which the fact that family life has not been established is not attributable to the applicant (see the references in paragraph 44