CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 1 septembre 2022

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display:inline-block } .s90B2F37D { width:135.76pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .sD00444C6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s3695F815 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sEECE831 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#474747 } .sE8934522 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF MAKARASHVILI AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA (Applications nos. 23158/20, 31365/20, 32525/20)     JUDGMENT   Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Unfair proceedings in respect of second applicant, through domestic court’s treatment of statements by police officers, acting as the prosecuting authority, as having a higher degree of credibility • No overall unfairness in respect of first and third applicants, where conviction also supported other evidence Art 11 • Peaceful assembly • Arrest and sanctioning of first and third applicants, for refusal to free road leading to Parliament entrances, within State margin of appreciation • Art 11 applicable to intentional action aimed at serious disruption of Parliamentary activity, but impacting on “necessity” assessment, in the light of the importance of Parliament’s effective functioning in a democratic society • Lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for second applicant’s conviction and sentence   STRASBOURG 1 September 2022   FINAL   30/01/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Síofra O’Leary, President,   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Lado Chanturia,   Ivana Jelić,   Arnfinn Bårdsen,   Mattias Guyomar, judges, and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   23158/20, 31365/20 and 32525/20) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Georgian nationals (“the applicants”) on the dates indicated in the Appendix; the decision to give notice to the Georgian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article   6 and Article   11 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 28 June 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the applicants’ complaint that their arrest at a demonstration and their ensuing conviction for the administrative offence of disobeying the lawful orders of the police had been in breach of Article   6 and Article 11 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants are civil society activists who were represented by Mr   E.   Marikashvili, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi. The applicants’ details are provided in the appended table. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr B.   Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND 5.     On 24   June 2019 the chairman of Georgian Dream, a political party that at the time in question held an absolute majority in Parliament, announced, in response to public demonstrations held over the preceding days, that the planned transition of the parliamentary electoral system from a “mixed ‑ member” system to one of proportional representation would be brought forward from 2024 to 2020. He stated that because of the accelerated reform, the parliamentary elections of 2020 would be carried out solely on the basis of a system of proportional representation. 6.     On 14 November 2019 the draft amendments to the Constitution of Georgia meant to facilitate the transition to a proportional representation electoral system did not garner sufficient votes in Parliament (apparently because some members of the ruling party did not support it), and were, therefore, not adopted.   As can be seen from the media coverage of the events, on the same day a demonstration was held in front of the Parliament building. 7 .     On 17   November 2019 another demonstration was held at the Parliament building to protest against Parliament’s failure to adopt the above-mentioned legislative amendments. The media coverage of the events indicated that approximately 5,500 individuals participated. This number included opposition politicians, civil society activists, and ordinary citizens. The demonstrators’ demands included the resignation of the government and the holding of snap Parliamentary elections; they stated that they would continue to block the functioning of Parliament until such time as their demands were met. Opposition politicians attached padlocks to one of the entrance gates to Parliament. They were removed by law-enforcement officers on the same day. In the evening, sandbags and tents were brought in and placed in the vicinity of one of the entrances to the Parliament building. Some of the demonstrators, including the three applicants, held a vigil at the building during the night. The demonstrators installed makeshift wood braziers as a heat source. Police officers were present on the site of the events throughout this period. No incidents were reported other than some officers’ apparently futile attempts to prevent the demonstrators from bringing wood for the braziers. 8 .     On the same day the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a statement warning the demonstrators of the unlawfulness of blocking entrances to the legislative body and of interfering with its activities. It called on the organisers and the participants in the demonstration to abide by the rules concerning the holding of demonstrations (including the prohibition on blocking access to administrative buildings) and to abide by the lawful orders of the police. EVENTS OF 18   NOVEMBER 2019 AND THE APPLICANTS’ ARREST 9 .     Sometime during the morning of 18   November 2019 the demonstration resumed.   Some organisers, including opposition politicians, called on the participants to continue obstructing the work of Parliament until their demands, including the holding of snap Parliamentary elections, were satisfied. 10 .     Members of Parliament who tried to enter the building were denied access by the demonstrators, who continued to block all entrances to the Parliament building. 11.     At approximately 2 p.m. the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a statement urging the organisers of the demonstration and its participants to obey the lawful orders of the police. The Ministry noted that the police had provided the necessary conditions for citizens to exercise their right to freedom of peaceful assembly during the demonstration of 17   November 2019, but that the demonstration had later become unlawful. In particular, it noted that the blocking of the entrances to Parliament had been contrary to section   9 of the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act. The Ministry called on the organisers of the demonstration and its participants to cease blockading Parliament, failing which the police would “react accordingly, within the mandate provided [to them] by law.” 12 .     Between 4.14 p.m. and 4.52 p.m. the police officers negotiated at the site of the demonstration with its organisers, as shown in video material broadcast by the media. One of the organisers of the demonstration – an opposition politician, A.E. – stated that the demonstrators had been “warned twice” by the police. The police officers’ statements to the organisers and participants in the demonstration included the following: “Our goal is to negotiate with you in order to defuse the situation. The barricades [at the entrances to Parliament] must be removed ... The road must be reopened. Appropriate measures will be taken if this does not happen. Blocking the road is one reason; the other is the blocking of the Parliament of Georgia, an administrative building. ... There [has been] a breach of the Assemblies and Demonstrations [Act] ...; please respect the law. ... Our request is [for you] to open the road and clear the entrance of the Parliament building ... This is my second warning, I urge you to obey the law.” 13 .     In the absence of a response to its earlier calls, at 5 p.m. the police proceeded to clear the entrances to Parliament and the road leading to them. It appears that water cannons were used for this purpose. The exact number of participants in the demonstration and of police officers involved remains unclear, but as appears from the visual material available in the case file, a couple of hundred demonstrators, several hundred police officers, and a number of police cars must have been present on the ground. 14 .     The first applicant was arrested at 5.20 p.m. The administrative-arrest report noted that he had been arrested on 9 April Street “in the area alongside the Parliament building, where a demonstration was being held.” The report stated that the first applicant had “blocked the entrance to Parliament and was swearing indiscriminately.” The officer who drafted the report stated that he had “called on [the first applicant] to calm down and to obey [his] lawful request, explaining the [nature] of a breach under the Code of Administrative Offences of Georgia”, which had made the first applicant “even more aggressive.” The report indicated that the first applicant’s arrest had been made in respect of offences listed under Articles   166 and   173 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”) (see paragraphs   39-40 below). An identical account was given in the administrative-offence report of 19   November 2019. 15 .     The second applicant was arrested at 7.15 p.m. The administrative ‑ arrest report noted that he had been arrested “on Rustaveli Avenue, alongside the Parliament building.” The report noted that the second applicant “had been swearing”. It was also stated that he had been “a participant in the demonstration and [had] maliciously disobeyed the police officers’ repeated lawful orders.” The second applicant’s arrest was made under Articles   166 and   173 of the CAO. An identical account was provided in the administrative-offence report of 19 November 2019. 16 .     The third applicant was arrested at 5.20 p.m. The administrative-arrest report noted that he had been arrested on 9   April Street, “in the area alongside the Parliament building, where a demonstration was being held.” The report stated that “the participants in the demonstration, including [the third applicant], did not comply with the lawful order of the police to free the entrance to Parliament (which they had blocked), and started swearing.” The third applicant’s arrest was made under Articles   166 and   173 of the CAO. The administrative-offence report of 19   November 2019 noted that the third applicant had been a participant in a demonstration on 9   April Street, had breached public order, and had not obeyed the repeated lawful orders of the police (but without the exact circumstances of the offence or of the police orders being specified, other than by reference to Articles   166 and   173 of the CAO). 17.     In total, thirty-seven protesters, including the three applicants, were arrested during the events of 18   November 2019. Four protesters and two law-enforcement officers were injured. All entrances to Parliament were cleared. The police then erected metal structures at the entrances to the Parliament building in order to prevent their being blocked. 18 .     Members of Parliament regained access to the building in the evening, and a meeting of the Parliament’s Bureau (responsible for matters including organisational and administrative issues relating to the daily work of the Parliament and its members) that had been scheduled for 3   p.m. that day was held at 8.30   p.m. 19.     According to the case-file material, the second and the third applicant displayed signs of injury upon their placement in a detention facility, and a criminal investigation into the matter was initiated by the authorities of their own motion. The outcome of that investigation is unclear, and the applicants did not refer to it in their submissions. ADMINISTRATIVE-OFFENCE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANTS 20 .     On 19 and 20 November 2019 the Tbilisi City Court held hearings. The first and second applicants’ cases were joined. The third applicant’s case was decided as part of separate administrative-offence proceedings. The applicants were represented by lawyers of their choosing. The police officers who had arrested the applicants requested that the court find the applicants guilty of minor hooliganism and of disobeying the lawful orders of the police. The court allowed requests lodged by the applicants for the hearing to be postponed in order to allow them to acquaint themselves with the relevant material. 21 .     During the respective hearings the video material involving the first and third applicants was examined, with the parties’ participation. All three applicants were able to put questions to the police officers summoned as witnesses. A request lodged by the first and second applicants for a further witness (who was not a police officer) to be questioned was granted. The third applicant did not lodge any such request. The witness stated that the first and second applicants had not blocked the entrance to Parliament and had not been disobedient towards the police. During the trial, the police officers (including those who had arrested the applicants) gave witness statements and noted that the applicants had been among those protesters who had decided to block the entrances to the Parliament building and had later hindered the police officers’ access to those entrances by blocking the roads leading to them. The police officers further stated that the first applicant had stood in the way of police trying to reach the Parliament building’s entrances; the third applicant had sat down on the road to prevent the officers from proceeding to one of the entrances to the Parliament building, and the second applicant had attempted to block the avenue in front of Parliament. As regards the applicants’ submissions, the first applicant sang the national anthem in lieu of recounting his version of events; the second applicant refused to give a statement, stating that he regarded the court as the ruling party’s “tavern”; and the third applicant did not dispute the authenticity of the video material showing him sitting in the road, in the way of those police officers who had started to clear access to the Parliament building but claimed that it had been an expression of his right to freedom of demonstration. The applicants’ representatives maintained that their clients had been merely protesting against the failure of Parliament to carry out the promised electoral reform. 22.     On 21   November 2019 the Tbilisi City Court delivered two judgments: the first one concerned the first and second applicants, and the second related to the third applicant.   The description of the factual circumstances of the case contained in the respective judgments referred, as the basis of those judgments, to the case-file material, the parties’ submissions, and the content of the administrative-arrest and administrative ‑ offence reports in respect of the applicants (see paragraphs   14-16 above). 23 .     In stating the reasons for its approach to the assessment of the evidence placed before it in respect of the first and second applicants, the court stated that: “... particular attention should be paid to the information given by those individuals who put an end [ სამართალდარღვევის აღმკვეთი პირები ] to the administrative offence [in question], given that [such information] is particularly instructive and constitutes a greatly important source of evidence. The attention of this group of eyewitnesses is [particularly] focused because of the nature of their professional activities and their understanding of their public and civic duties. The receipt of information [regarding an offence] by this group of eyewitnesses is connected to the implementation of their professional duties, which they carry out by means of paying purposeful attention to certain circumstances, actions, objects, and individuals. [The] high [powers] of perception of such eyewitnesses [and] the completeness of [their] witness statements is connected to the fact that an official knows, in advance (even if only in general terms), the signs of a situation or an event [that could potentially constitute an offence]. ... Information provided by persons who put an end to administrative offences always has a direct link to the case, contains information regarding the facts to be assessed by a court, and corresponds to the requirement of admissibility of evidence. In view of the foregoing, explanations given by a public official contain signs of a high [degree of] trustworthiness, which is important for the formation of a judge’s inner conviction. Under Article   5 [§   1] of the General Administrative Code, an administrative body has no right to carry out any action that is in contravention of the requirements of the law, which leads to the presumption of good governance [ კეთილსინდისიერი მმართველობის პრეზიუმირება ], [and] the burden of proving the contrary rests, on the basis of the adversarial principle, on the opposing party. As regards an explanation given by persons in breach of administrative [rules and regulations] (ადმინისტრაციული სამართალდამრღვევი პირები ), this cannot, unless supported by other evidence, be regarded as constituting incontrovertible evidence in respect of determining the circumstances of a case. ... An explanation given by persons against whom administrative-offence proceedings are ongoing is not, generally, characterised by a high degree of trustworthiness, given that [these individuals are] interested parties and that the information provided by them may be aimed at covering up an offence [and] avoiding sanctions, [among] other aims. Accordingly, statements given by such individuals must always be considered together with other evidence gathered in relation to a case. In the instant case the evidence presented includes documents drafted by the individuals who put an end to the administrative offence [in question] – the administrative-arrest and [administrative-offence] reports, which contain information regarding the contested actions attributed to the individuals accused of the administrative offences. The court has also received the parties’ explanations, witness statements and video material. ... The court indicates that the case-file material and the parties’ explanations confirm that the persons accused of the administrative offence resisted lawful orders [given by] law-enforcement officers. This falls under Article   173 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and other evidence that would enable the court to find otherwise has not been presented. On the basis of the parties’ explanations and the case-file material, it is established that ... Giorgi Makarashvili [the first applicant] committed an administrative offence. Namely, on 18   November 2019 [he was on 9   April Street], alongside the grounds of the Parliament of Georgia [and] did not obey a lawful order [given by] the police. ... Irakli Katcharava [the second applicant] committed an administrative offence. Namely, on 18   November 2019 ... [he was] on Rustaveli Avenue, in the area alongside the Parliament of Georgia ... and maliciously disobeyed a lawful order [given by] the police. ... After assessing the case-file material and the parties’ explanations, the court finds that [the accused] did not commit an act proscribed under Article   166 of the Code of Administrative Offences [for lack of evidence incontrovertibly proving the commission of such an act]. In particular, [it has not been established that the accused] swore at the site of a public gathering [and] disturbed the public order. ...” 24 .     The court went on citing the Police Act regulating the police officers’ conduct and reiterated that in the implementation of their duties police officers are presumed to be acting in good faith, having all the relevant qualities and skills to adequately assess the particular circumstances of a situation. As for disobedience to their orders, the legislature required, according to the court, the occurrence of disobedience in the face of multiple orders. It was irrelevant, the court stated, whether the order in question had been of a general nature or addressed to a particular individual. 25 .     Against this background, and in so far as the first and second applicants’ individual circumstances were concerned, the court noted as follows: “In the case under consideration it has been established that on 18   November 2019 there was a protest demonstration ongoing in Tbilisi, on Rustaveli Avenue. The police officers ensured the peaceful conduct of this demonstration and the protection of citizens’ constitutional rights. [The officers] ensured the protection of the [demonstrators’] security and of citizens’ constitutionally protected right to move freely on Rustaveli Avenue and the adjacent streets. ... [This] creates sufficient grounds [to consider that] the officers, who were obliged to pre-empt and put an end to breaches of the law, carried out necessary measures provided for by the law. The evidence presented in respect of the case, the parties’ explanations, witness statements, and video recordings confirm [the occurrence of] an appeal ( მოწოდება ) made by the police officers and the [ensuing] non-compliance of the individuals accused of the administrative offence [in question]. Specifically, the representatives of the law-enforcement body appealed to persons in breach of the law ( სამართალდამრღვევებს ) to leave the road so that cars would be able to move freely; [this call] was not complied with. The court considers it established that the law-enforcement [officers] requested that the order be complied with, [and] that this order was based on the law and was aimed at achieving the legitimate aim [of] protecting individuals’ security and public order. Accordingly, those persons who were in breach of the law failed to obey the lawful orders of the law-enforcement officers. Therefore, the court considers that they should have anticipated the possible risks entailed in disobeying the orders of the police. The court also notes paragraph   1 of section   11 1 of the Assemblies and Demonstrations [Act], under which, in the event of a partial or a full blockade by participants [in a demonstration or gathering] of an assembly or of a road used by transport vehicles, the executive branch of a local self-government authority has the right to decide to clear the road and/or restore the movement of transport if, taking into account the number of participants [involved], it is possible [for them] to hold a gathering or a demonstration [by other means]. When the executive branch of a local self-government body does not or cannot act on the authority granted by the [provision in question], the government of Georgia has the right to [make such a decision]. Under the second paragraph of this section, it is not permitted to [do so] if, on the basis of the number of the participants, it is impossible to hold a gathering or a demonstration [by other means], and provided that all the rules [provided by] this [Act] have been respected. Paragraph   3 of the indicated provision provides that the executive branch of a local self-government body [and] the government of Georgia must take the decision provided for in paragraph   1 in each specific situation, depending on the existing circumstances and the public interest, in accordance with the rule laid down in paragraph   3 of Section   2 of this [Act]. It is impermissible to intentionally block a road if this is not rendered necessary by the number of the participants of an assembly or a demonstration. It is equally impermissible to block a road by using cars, different objects and/or items. On the basis of a joint analysis of the parties’ explanations, video recordings ... and other evidence, the court considers that a need to block the road has not been demonstrated in the present case. Accordingly, the persons charged with administrative offences did not have the right to use the road used by transport and, given the objectives of the Police Act, multiple requests by the police officers for [that area] to be cleared in order to allow cars to move freely were ... lawful [but not heeded by] the persons [concerned], and only the intervention of the police made their withdrawal from the road possible.” 26.     The Tbilisi City Court’s decision relating to the third applicant contained identical reasoning in respect of the assessment of the evidence (see paragraph   23 above). As in the case of the proceedings against the first and second applicants, the third applicant was acquitted of minor hooliganism for lack of evidence. As regards any disobedience in respect of the lawful orders of the police, a reasoning similar to that in the judgment concerning the first and second applicants was offered (see paragraphs   24-25 above). The court found that the evidence available in the case-file material indicated that the police had issued a lawful order for the road to be cleared for traffic and that the third applicant had disobeyed that order. 27 .     The first-instance court thus found the three applicants guilty of the administrative offence of disobeying the lawful orders of the police under Article   173 of the CAO (see paragraph   40 below) and, referring to Articles   33 and 35 of the CAO (see paragraph   38 below), reasoned that the imposition of a custodial sentence of twelve days on the first applicant, four days on the second applicant and seven days on the third applicant (as opposed to the imposition of a fine) would constitute the most appropriate sanction for the purposes of attaining the objectives of a punishment. 28 .     On 22   November 2019 the applicants lodged an appeal. They argued that the administrative-arrest and administrative-offence reports had been couched in vague terms, rendering it impossible to mount a defence, and that the decision of the first-instance court had not contained sufficient reasoning to justify their conviction. Furthermore, in so far as the applicants’ individual circumstances were concerned, it was noted that the video material available in the case-file material in respect of the first applicant had only showed him being escorted to the police car, rather than the circumstances of his arrest. As regards the second applicant, it was noted that there had been no video or other evidence confirming the police officers’ account and the content of the administrative-arrest and administrative-detention reports. The third applicant noted that one video recording assessed during the proceedings had shown him sitting down on the road, while the other had shown him standing in front of police officers with the Georgian flag on his back and blowing a whistle – a form of intentional non-violent protest against developments in the country. The applicants submitted that the administrative-offence proceedings had been “criminal” in nature, within the meaning of Article   6 of the Convention, necessitating the application of the standards of a criminal trial, including the principle that nobody should be obliged to prove their innocence and that any doubt should benefit the accused. The applicants stated that their conviction had amounted to the collective punishment of all demonstrators for the blocking – by only some participants in the demonstration – of the entrances to Parliament; they further submitted that they had been legitimately exercising their right to protest in relation to important issues in a democratic society. The three applicants also submitted, in general terms, that the police had used excessive force in dispersing the demonstration and that their arrest and punishment would create a chilling effect on the right to peaceful assembly. 29 .     On 25   and 26   November 2019 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of final instance, dismissed, by means of written proceedings, the applicants’ appeals as manifestly ill-founded. It briefly stated that the applicants had failed to demonstrate what important issues and evidence had been insufficiently assessed by the lower court, which requirements of the law had been breached, and/or what errors had been committed by the first-instance court in the examination of their cases. The appellate court added that in its assessment of the relevant circumstances, the first-instance court had taken into account all the facts of the cases relating to the applicants, thereby justifying the appellate court’s decision to declare the appeals inadmissible. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE ASSEMBLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ACT (1997) 30.     Section   2(1) of the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act (“the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act” or “the Act”), as worded at the material time, provided the “right of individuals, as recognised by the Constitution of Georgia, to gather publicly, unarmed, both indoors and outdoors, without [the need for] prior authorisation.” 31.     Section   2(3) provided for restrictions on this right. It referred to the legitimate aims of an interference provided in the Constitution of Georgia, such as: protecting national security or public safety, territorial integrity, or the rights of others; preventing the disclosure of confidential information; and maintaining the independence and impartiality of a court. Any interference in the pursuance of such aims had, under the provision in question, to be based on the law, necessary in a democratic society, non-discriminatory, proportionate, and such that the interest protected by the restriction would outweigh the damage inflicted by it. 32 .     Section   9(3) of the Act provided as follows: “the blocking of entrances to buildings ... during an assembly or a demonstration shall be prohibited.” 33.     Section 11(2)(e) provided that it was “prohibited ... to deliberately create obstruction for the traffic, including by breaching the requirements of Section   11 1 of this Act.” 34.     Under section   11 1 (1), “in the event of a partial or a full blocking by the participants of an assembly or a demonstration on a road used by transport vehicles, the executive branch of the local self-government [authority] may decide to clear the road ... and/or restore the traffic if the number of the participants in an assembly or a demonstration allows for the latter to be held [elsewhere]. If the executive branch of the local self-government authority does not or cannot implement the powers provided in this paragraph, the government of Georgia can decide to clear the road ... and/or restore the traffic.” Any such decision was, under section   11 1 (3) of the Act, to be taken “in a particular case, taking into account the existing circumstances and the public interest, in line with section   2(3) of this Act.” 35 .     Section   11 1 (4) of the Act provided that “the artificial blocking of a road, if this is not necessitated by the number of participants of an assembly or a demonstration, [and] the blocking of a road by means of cars, objects, and/or other items, shall be prohibited.” 36 .     Section 13(3) of the Act provided that in the event of a breach of section   11(2)(e) and/or the taking of a decision under section   11 1 (1) the organiser of an assembly or a demonstration was obliged, within fifteen minutes from receiving a warning from the authorities, to address the participants of an assembly or a demonstration and to take all reasonable measures to clear the road and/or restore the movement of the transport vehicles. A failure on the part of an organiser to ensure compliance with these rules would, under section   13(6), entail the law-enforcement authorities’ taking “actions provided for in international law and Georgian legislation” aimed at clearing the road and/or restoring the movement of traffic. 37 .     Under section   13(5) of the Act, a breach of section   11 of the Act by individual participants of an assembly or a demonstration would incur individual liability under the relevant legislation. CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES (1984) 38 .     Article 33 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) provided that the nature of the offence, the personalities of the offenders, the degree of blame to be ascribed to the latter, their financial status, and any extenuating and aggravating circumstances were to be taken into account at the sentencing stage. Article   35 provided, among other things, that a prior commission of an administrative-offence and continuation of unlawful conduct in the face of demands of authorised officials to stop doing so, constituted aggravating factors at the sentencing stage. 39 .     Article 166 of the CAO, as worded at the material time, defined minor hooliganism as “swearing and cursing in a public place, [causing] the insulting harassment of a person, or other similar actions that disturb public order and peace.” It was punishable by a fine and/or up to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 40 .     Article 173 of the Code provided that “disobeying a lawful instruction or order [issued by] a law-enforcement officer on duty ... or insulting [the latter]” was punishable by a fine in the minimum amount of 1,000 Georgian laris (GEL) and the maximum amount of GEL   4,000, or up to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 41 .     Article 174 1   §§   1 and 2 provided that a breach of rules concerning the organisation and conduct of an assembly or a demonstration would incur a fine in the amount of GEL   500 in respect of participants and GEL   5,000 in respect of the organisers. Article   174 1   §   4 provided that a breach of sections   9, 11 and 11 1 of the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act (see paragraphs   32-35 above) would incur a fine in the amount of GEL   500 (for participants) or GEL   5,000 (for organisers), or up to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 42 .     Under Articles   271 of the CAO, an appeal against a decision issued as part of administrative-offence proceedings could be lodged by the individual against whom that decision had been issued, by a victim of the offence in question, or by the author of the administrative-offence report. CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1999) 43 .     Article   14 of the Code of Administrative Procedure provides that the author of an administrative-law document is a party to the respective administrative-law proceedings. PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 44 .     In a judgment of 2   April 2013 (case no. BS-544-535(K-12) relating to the annulment of a fine issued by police for a violation of traffic rules) the Chamber of Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court criticised the lower courts’ practice of affording heightened importance to the evidence given by police officers. The Supreme Court explained that such practice had apparently stemmed from an incorrect interpretation of its earlier judgment of 2007 in which it had underlined the special skills and know-how of the police in determining that an offence had taken place. In this regard, the Supreme Court noted that it had not, in that earlier judgment, excluded the possibility that an officer addressing an offence could make an “imprecise, partial or unobjective assessment.” The Supreme Court clarified that “under no logical reading could its earlier assessment [regarding the officers’ special skills and know-how] be transformed into imperative, slogan-type declaration such as ‘a representative of a law-enforcement authority has focused attention which stems from the nature of their professional activities [and] the understanding of their public and civic duties.’” The Supreme Court also criticised a blank statement that “an explanation given by persons against whom administrative-offence proceedings are ongoing may be aimed at covering up an offence, avoiding sanctions, or other aims [and such explanations] must always be balanced against other evidence gathered in respect of a case.” The Supreme Court concluded as follows: “...based on the information available to the Court of Cassation [such an interpretation by the lower courts] is not, unfortunately, a one-off occurrence and, accordingly, there is a risk of its repetition. [This] requires the taking of preventive measures ... so that the lower courts make an adequate and competent application of the legal conclusions of the Supreme Court, if shared by them, to the cases before them[.] [By making the above-noted interpretations] the lower courts breach the fundamental principles of administrative and civil procedure - [the principle of] impartiality and [that of] equality of arms.” THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 45.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. COMPLIANCE WITH THE SIX-MONTH TIME-LIMIT 46.     The Court reiterates that the six-month rule is an autonomous public ‑ policy rule (see Merabishvili v.   Georgia [GC], no.   72508/13, §   247, 28   November 2017). It will, therefore, in the absence of any objection from the Government, assess the question of whether the second and the third applicants complied with Article   35 §   1 of the Convention by introducing applications nos.   31365/20 and 32525/20 on 15   June 2020, despite the fact that the final domestic decision was delivered on 26   November 2019. 47.     Citing its interpretive jurisdiction under Article   32 of the Convention, the Court has found that in order to preserve the right of individual petition during the outbreak of the global pandemic, the method of calculation of the six-month rule had to be adjusted to the reality of that crisis (see Saakashvili v.   Georgia (dec.), applications nos.   6232/20 and 22394/20, §   57, 1   March 2022). Accordingly, if a calendar six-month period either started to run or was due to expire during the time frame specified in the decisions of the President of the Court (from 16 March until and including 15 June 2020), the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention should be exceptionally considered to have been suspended for three calendar months in total (ibid., §   58). 48.     Having regard to the fact that (i) in respect of applications nos.   31365/20 and 32525/20 the calendar six months expired on 25   May 2020, and (ii) the latter date fell within the above-noted time frame, the Court rules that the second and third applicants had an additional three months – until and including 25   August 2020 – in which to lodge an application with the Court. The Court therefore finds that these applications cannot be considered to have been lodged out of time, within the meaning of Article   35   §   1 of the Convention, given the exceptional circumstances outlined above. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION 49.     Relying on Article   6 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the administrative-offence proceedings against them had been unfair, claiming that the domestic courts had unduly given primacy to the police officers’ statements against the applicants, placing the burden of proof on the latter, and that the absence of a prosecutor in those proceedings had invested the trial judge with the functions of a prosecuting authority, in breach of the judicial impartiality requirement under paragraph   1 of the provision in question. The applicants also complained of a lack of adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence and of their inability to obtain the attendance of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as those in respect of witnesses against them. Article   6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1.     In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal ... 3.     Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... (b)     to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; ... (d)     to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...” Admissibility 50.     Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (d) of the Convention regarding the lack of adequate time and facilities afforded them to prepare their defence and their inability to obtain the attendance of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as those in respect of witnesses against them do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. This part of the applications must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 51.     As regards the remainder of the applicants’ complaints under Article   6   §   1 of