CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 octobre 2022

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .s54AB6003 { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s39E5096F { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center } .s88D564B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border:0.75pt solid #000000; padding:1pt 4pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .sEB98FB19 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s28F0D84C { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:11.67pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:6.78pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s8B983D37 { text-transform:none } .sDA7B489D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:3.45pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s5C5C410E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.34pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:0.11pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s67CAFE05 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.45pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s7C22C014 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:16.34pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:2.11pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s716C64EA { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.45pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18.45pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase; list-style-position:inside } .s434D37A9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sDD998142 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sCBF2D345 { margin-left:11.67pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:8.18pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sCD7D0356 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:4.85pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s2044A09A { margin-left:6.51pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .sAE6FB95D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:32.01pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF54F3725 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sDBC81028 { width:4.83pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s65DDED6B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s7AE800C3 { width:4.28pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sC47DA4E2 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.34pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.51pt; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s448F0C15 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s74818F78 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; font-family:Arial; list-style-position:inside } .sE7B3A78A { width:1.99pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .sD11CFAB7 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15.01pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA04AE28A { width:35.22pt; display:inline-block } .s264C88EB { width:142.43pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s9D7227A3 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s66E9FC38 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#000000 } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s77B4793D { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s69BAC8AC { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; letter-spacing:-0.05pt; vertical-align:super; color:#000000 } .sF2D5869A { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; letter-spacing:-0.05pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s6DB91820 { text-align:center } .s85E2A1C4 { margin-right:auto; margin-left:auto; border:0.75pt solid #949494; border-collapse:collapse } .s1533E8B1 { height:41.4pt } .sD271F6F6 { border-right:0.75pt solid #949494; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s598389F9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt } .sEECE831 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#474747 } .s3E08F9CA { border-right:0.75pt solid #949494; border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .sC54D2024 { border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s97E2263B { height:20.3pt } .sDF42CB81 { border-top:0.75pt solid #949494; border-right:0.75pt solid #949494; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sEED95695 { margin-left:15.01pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:2.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold } .sE8934522 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s85D71A24 { border-top:0.75pt solid #949494; border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s3465B0A7 { height:17.85pt } .sE3C15D7A { height:21.85pt } .s3DE46EBF { border-top:0.75pt solid #949494; border-right:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sD3B88E32 { border-top:0.75pt solid #949494; border-right:0.75pt solid #949494; border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sA30831E3 { border-top:0.75pt solid #949494; border-left:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s164635C0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt; background-color:#ffffff } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s391E78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffffff } .s3DB046A9 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff }     THIRD SECTION CASE OF XENOFONTOS AND OTHERS v. CYPRUS (Applications nos. 68725/16, 74339/16 and 74359/16)       JUDGMENT Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Applicants’ murder conviction decisively based on confession by accomplice, who was not prompted by any deal, but was later placed in a witness protection programme and spared prosecution, not rendering trial unfair • Length of proceedings, five years and nine months, justified by complexity of case   STRASBOURG 25 October 2022   FINAL   06/03/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Xenofontos and Others v. Cyprus, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Georges Ravarani , President, Georgios A. Serghides , Darian Pavli , Anja Seibert-Fohr , Peeter Roosma , Andreas Zünd , Frédéric Krenc , judges, and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   68725/16, 74339/16 and 74359/16) against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Cypriot nationals, Mr   Grigoris Xenofontos (“the first applicant”), Mr   Anastasis Krasopoulis (“the second applicant”) and the latter’s sister, Ms   Elli Krasopouli Skordelli (“the third applicant”   – collectively “the applicants”), on 21   November and 1   December 2016; the decision to give notice to the Cypriot Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the use of accomplice evidence at the applicants’ trial and the length of that trial, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 27 September 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case mainly concerns the question whether a criminal trial can be considered to be “fair” within the meaning of Article   6 of the Convention if it led to a conviction based to a decisive extent on accomplice testimony. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants were born in 1981, 1973 and 1968 respectively and are currently serving life sentences in the Central Prison of Nicosia. They were represented before the Court by Mr   R.   Vrahimis and Mr   C.   Paraskeva, lawyers practising in Nicosia. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr   G.   Savvides, Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. THE MURDER OF A.H. 5.     In December 2009 the police received a tip-off about a murder-for-hire plot against an executive of a private television channel. The informant said that the murder would be carried out by two men, one of them being F.H., who was known to the police. The police alerted A.H., the channel’s CEO, but he saw no reason for concern. 6.     On 11   January 2010 A.H. was shot dead near his home as he was leaving his car after a day in the office. 7.     Later the same evening the police received another tip-off suggesting that the shots had been fired by F.H. ARREST AND QUESTIONING OF F.H., HIS PRESENTATION TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND THE FIRST APPLICANT’S DEPARTURE TO MOLDOVA 8.     On 12   January 2010 the police questioned F.H. on two occasions about the murder. He denied any involvement, claiming that he had been elsewhere at the time. 9.     More evidence against F.H. was gathered, and on 14   January 2010 the police arrested him and took him into custody at Pera Chorio Police Station. 10.     On 15   January 2010 the police received information about the possible involvement of the first applicant in the murder. On the same day, the first applicant took a flight to Moldova and an arrest warrant was issued in respect of him. 11.     On 17   January 2010 at 5   p.m., two investigators questioned F.H. as a suspect. They told him that they knew of his possible involvement in the murder but that they had no strong leads. They also told him that they could not see any personal motive for F.H. to kill the victim because, unlike F.H. himself, the victim had no connection with the criminal underworld or illegal activities and thus was unlikely to have had any differences with F.H. The investigators observed that F.H. became agitated each time they mentioned the victim’s good character. They also sensed that F.H. was regretting being caught up in a situation that could affect his family and himself. 12.     Convinced that F.H. knew details of the crime but was afraid to speak, the investigators offered to protect him as a witness. F.H. hesitated over the offer because he mistrusted the investigators and would have preferred to talk to someone whose word carried more weight. His lawyer warned him of the implications of entering the witness protection programme. 13 .     The investigators reported their impressions of the suspect to their superiors and suggested that a meeting between F.H and the Attorney ‑ General be arranged. The Chief of Police spoke with the Attorney ‑ General, who agreed to the meeting. At about 11   p.m. the investigators took F.H. to the office of the Chief of Police in Nicosia. While the men were waiting for the Attorney-General, one of the investigators encouraged F.H. to take the opportunity to ask the Attorney-General whatever questions he had. At some point, the Attorney-General walked in and said to F.H.: “Tell the truth, son, and you won’t lose anything. Whoever tells the truth never loses.” In less than a minute he walked out, followed by the Chief of Police. F.H. did not report his fears to the Attorney-General or make any request. The investigators drove F.H. back to his cell. 14.     Despite having met with the Attorney-General, F.H. still had reservations about testifying. He asked whether he would be expected to give a deposition. The investigators replied that he could simply start talking and if his first statements proved true, the investigators would formally ask the Attorney-General to protect him as a witness. 15.     On 18   January 2010 the investigators secured evidence disproving F.H.’s alibi. They confronted him with that evidence, but he still refused to break his silence. The investigators sensed that he was struggling with himself. F.H.’S DECISION TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE APPLICANTS 16.     On 21   January 2010 F.H. told the investigators that he could no longer endure the pangs of conscience which he was experiencing and would testify. He did not ask for anything in return. He told the investigators how he had become involved in the murder and discussed with them how his forthcoming revelations and protection as a witness would change his life and that of his family. F.H. announced his decision to his lawyer and refused his further services. 17.     F.H. dictated his confession to two investigators. He said that the murder had been masterminded by the second and third applicants, brokered by A.G. and carried out by the first applicant and himself; the first applicant had shot A.H. and F.H. had driven the getaway motorcycle. 18.     F.H. asked what would happen to him and his family now that he had confessed. The investigators replied that they could only comment on the safety of his family, and that the decision concerning F.H. himself would be taken by the Attorney-General. They did, however, explain that, depending on the value of his testimony, the Attorney-General could request that F.H. be given a non-custodial sentence or a prison sentence with possible parole, or could even refrain from prosecuting him altogether. 19.     After checking the confession against other evidence at their disposal and consulting their superiors, the investigators suggested that instead of prosecuting F.H., the Attorney-General could use his testimony as evidence for the prosecution. They argued that F.H. had spoken freely, was ready to repeat his statements at the trial and had not tried to diminish his role or that of his accomplices, and that pursuing the organisers of the crime would better serve society. This suggestion was recorded in a police activity log ( ημερολόγιο ενεργείας ) and later discussed in person with the Attorney ‑ General in his office. The investigators confirmed to the Attorney ‑ General their impression that F.H. was telling the truth and that he feared for his safety, having received a threat while in detention. 20.     On 28   January 2010 F.H. was placed in a witness protection programme. 21 .     On 5   February 2010 the Attorney-General decided not to prosecute him. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANTS 22.     On 19   February 2010 the prosecuting authorities brought a case against the three suspects whom they had been able to arrest: the second and third applicants and A.G. The case against the first applicant was suspended pending his extradition from Moldova. 23.     On 14   June 2010 the first applicant was arrested in Moldova. 24.     On 18   August 2010 he was extradited to Cyprus and placed in detention. 25.     On 25   August 2010 a new case was brought, this time against all four suspects, and was referred to the Nicosia Assize Court. THE APPLICANTS’ TRIAL 26.     On 25   October 2010 the four co-defendants were committed for trial (case no.   19325/2010) before the three-member Nicosia Assize Court. 27.     The first applicant and A.G. each had personal counsel and the second and third applicants shared a group of four counsel. 28.     The prosecution relied on F.H.’s testimony. The defendants pleaded not guilty and alleged that F.H. and the police had fabricated his testimony to falsely implicate them in the crime. They asserted that F.H. had been the shooter, not the getaway driver, and that he was seeking to shift the blame onto them in exchange for witness protection and being spared prosecution. They also argued that F.H. was seeking to exonerate his two friends and his girlfriend, who were also implicated in the murder, and that the actions of the police, in their turn, had been based on “extraneous motives” ( αλλότριων στοχεύσεων ). 29.     On 9   November 2010 the hearing stage began. 30 .     Throughout the trial, the court held 280   hearings (some of them after working hours and during summer holidays), issued twenty-three interim decisions, inspected the scene of the crime, heard eighty-nine prosecution and sixty-one defence witnesses, and examined 905 exhibits, including audio ‑ and video-recordings and forensic evidence. The full record of the trial exceeded 11,300   pages. 31.     F.H. was cross-examined by all the defence counsel at twenty-one hearings amounting to a total duration of almost one month. 32 .     The proceedings were adjourned for forty-one   days because one of the judges was on a diplomatic mission abroad. They were also adjourned on account of absences of defence counsel. 33.     On 13   May 2012 the court closed the hearing stage. JUDGMENT OF THE NICOSIA ASSIZE COURT 34.     On 13   June 2013 the Nicosia Assize Court delivered a judgment in which it found the defendants guilty of murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 35.     The court found that F.H. was trustworthy, devoted to him fifty of the almost 400 pages of the judgment, and relied on his testimony to a “most decisive” ( καθοριστικότερο ) extent. The court stated: “F.H. answered with exemplary stability and detail on every aspect he was asked about, in a manner that clearly showed a person who was telling the truth. He remained literally unshaken in his very long, very demanding and exhaustive cross-examination. He was disarmingly genuine, vivid and figurative in his descriptions, which he gave in a simple and unpretentious manner ... He referred to facts and details that only someone who had actually experienced them could relate, thereby excluding any possibility that they might have been a figment of the imagination or, as was alleged many times and at every opportunity, the product of collaboration or direction, either by the investigators or those identified as the real moral perpetrators, whoever they were. His testimony was also characterised by spontaneity and readiness ... [This court has] dealt with all the examples that the defence submitted without identifying anything that points to false or extraneous motives on the part of the witness or, incidentally, to any divergence from accepted police practice and the realities for the effective and speedy resolution of a crime   – [the police] always showed respect for the rights of the suspects and the defendants ...” 36.     The court disagreed with the defence that F.H.’s trustworthiness was undermined by his history of unlawful behaviour (misconduct during military service and convictions for illegal possession and use of firearms and assault). 37.     Regarding the circumstances of his confession, the court found: “Nothing that was said to [F.H.] by the Attorney-General, the Chief of Police or the investigators could ... be interpreted as encouragement – through promises, exchanges or otherwise, in any unlawful sense – to tell anything but the truth or to falsely testify for any other purpose ... [The statement that] the Attorney-General ... made to [F.H.] was a simple yet meaningful piece of empirical wisdom ... [T]here is nothing special, from a legal point of view, in the Attorney-General’s choice not to prosecute [F.H.] for the offences for which he prosecuted [the applicants]   ...” 38.     The court explained that F.H.’s denial of his involvement in the murder at the initial police interviews had been a “perfectly normal, human reaction” to being accused of a crime. 39.     The court explained F.H.’s decision to testify by “... his determination to tell the truth to the investigators, having realised the great evil he had committed and after having weighed and calculated all the possibilities and options that were available to him ...” 40.     The court found that, among other things, its use of the accomplice testimony was justified by the Court’s case-law (referring to X v.   the United Kingdom , no.   7306/75, Commission decision of 6   October 1976, Decisions and Reports   (DR)   7, p.   115). 41.     Because F.H.’s testimony was not corroborated by any other evidence, the court issued a “self-warning” ( αυτοπροειδοποίηση ), stating that it was approaching that evidence with “caution, suspicion, consideration and attention of the highest degree”. The court found it possible to rely on that testimony “with absolute safety”, stating: “[The testimony is] one solid whole without cracks or contradictions, and juxtaposes details such that only someone who had actually experienced all [the events] could describe them in the way and to the extent that [F.H.] did ...” 42 .     In addition to F.H.’s testimony, the court relied on the testimony of three “very important” ( πολύ σημαντικούς ) witnesses: the defendants’ friends who testified, in sum, about having been approached with the proposal to carry out the murder, about having lent a motorcycle helmet to F.H., about the defendants’ movements and emotional state. The court also relied on material evidence and evidence of the applicants’ motives for killing A.H. (personal gain, revenge and a desire to take control of the television channel concerned). THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS 43.     On 14   June 2013 the defendants lodged appeals with the Supreme Court. 44.     On 23   July 2013 the court received the trial record. 45 .     Between October 2014 and February 2016, the court held six directions hearings at which it allowed counsel for the second and third applicants to amend the grounds of their appeals, granted counsel for the first applicant extra time to submit his grounds of appeal, set and postponed deadlines for the filing of skeleton arguments ( διάγραμμα αγόρευσης ) by the parties and granted the applicants’ counsel extra time to correct page-number references in their submissions. 46.     There were seventy-two final grounds of appeal, the main one being the perceived unfairness of the use of the accomplice testimony. 47.     On 16 and 17   March 2016 the Supreme Court heard the appeals and reserved its judgment. JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT 48.     On 6   June 2016 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, dismissing the appeals (nos.   103/2013, 102/2013 and 101/2013) and upholding the sentence. 49 .     The court found that the trial court’s assessment of F.H.’s testimony had not been arbitrary or unreasonable and that it had been lawful and justified not to prosecute F.H. 50.     The court also found that the use of his testimony had not rendered the trial unfair. Domestic law permitted the trial court to rely on F.H.’s confession alone. But the trial court had gone further and tested that confession in multiple rounds of “tug of war” ( διελκυστίνδες ) with other evidence, such as that concerning the pre-operational surveillance of the victim, the perpetrators’ escape route, modification of the motorcycle used by them and dozens of other details. 51 .     The court found that F.H. had confessed of his own volition and that the Attorney-General’s words to him did not suggest any improper dealings. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 52.     Article 113 § 2 of the Constitution provides: “The Attorney-General of the Republic shall have power, exercisable at his discretion in the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over and continue or discontinue any proceedings for an offence against any person in the Republic.” THE LAW JOINDER OF the APPLICATIONS 53.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE   6 §   1 OF THE CONVENTION concerning the use of accomplice testimony 54.     The applicants complained that their trial had been unfair, as the only evidence against them had come from an accomplice who had been spared prosecution. They relied on Article   6 §   1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” Admissibility The Government 55.     The Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill ‑ founded. 56.     They disagreed that F.H.’s confession had been the only evidence against the applicants. Just because the trial court had found no corroborating evidence did not mean that it had used no other evidence. Indeed, the domestic law distinguished between corroborating ( ενισχυτική ) and supporting ( υποστηρικτική ) evidence. Corroborating evidence proved that a crime had been committed and implicated the defendant, whereas supporting evidence reinforced witness testimony concerning the issues at stake. In addition to evidence given by F.H., there had been supporting evidence against the applicants. 57.     However, even if F.H.’s testimony had been the only evidence, under domestic law its use would still have been lawful if the court had made clear, as the Assize Court had, its awareness of the inherent unreliability of such evidence. A trial where such testimony was used would also be “fair” from the standpoint of the Convention (the Government cited Cornelis v.   the   Netherlands (dec.), no.   994/03, ECHR 2004-V; Habran and Dalem v.   Belgium , nos.   43000/11 and 49380/11, 17   January 2017; and, by contrast, Adamčo v.   Slovakia , no.   45084/14, 12   November 2019). 58.     The Government submitted that F.H. and the prosecution had not struck a deal. They contended that F.H. had confessed out of remorse, without any inducement by means of promises of favours and after having been cautioned. The Attorney-General had done no more than make a hard choice in the public interest and refrain from exercising his constitutional prerogative to prosecute. 59.     According to the Government, questions of the admissibility and evaluation of evidence were generally beyond the Court’s competence. The findings of the domestic courts had not been arbitrary and should not be altered. 60.     They further submitted that the rights of the defence had been respected. The defence had known that F.H. had confessed, what he had confessed to, and that he would not be prosecuted (his name had not been listed on the charge sheet). F.H. had testified under his own name and had been cross-examined extensively. His written confession had been tested at the trial as well. The investigators who had worked with him had also been cross ‑ examined. If the applicants had also wished to cross-examine the Attorney-General, they could have asked the court to summon him. 61.     Even after his confession, F.H. had been kept in custody for the time needed to verify his statements. Those statements had been verified at the trial as well. 62.     Lastly, although domestic law did not provide for a separate judicial review of the Attorney-General’s decision not to prosecute, the Convention did not oblige the State to make such provision, and any possible improper dealings between the witness and the prosecution could be revealed at the trial. The applicants (a)    The first applicant 63.     The first applicant maintained his complaint. 64.     He submitted that he had not had any motive to shoot the victim and that the shooter had probably been F.H. 65.     F.H.’s confession – the only evidence against the first applicant – had been unreliable. F.H. was a person of bad character, his testimony had been inconsistent and the courts had failed to resolve those inconsistencies. 66.     F.H.’s confession had been prompted not by remorse, but by the impunity promised by the Attorney-General. The two of them must have agreed a deal that was suspicious and unprecedented in the country’s legal history. That deal had not been put in writing and its details had remained unknown to the courts. 67.     By deciding not to prosecute F.H., the Attorney-General had abused his discretion. His decision had served no public interest and had been neither regulated nor overseen by the courts. By letting a murder suspect walk free, the State had breached its obligations under Articles   2 and 3 of the Convention. (b)    The second and third applicants 68.     The second and third applicants also maintained their complaint. 69.     They submitted that the Government had misinterpreted the domestic judgments and had not understood the true evidentiary value of F.H.’s testimony and the other evidence. According to the applicants, there had been nothing but F.H.’s testimony against them. No amount of “self-warnings” issued by the trial court could alter the fact that the court had relied on that testimony. 70.     Before confessing, F.H. had denied his guilt four times. The domestic courts had failed to account for that inconsistency, as required by Article   6 (the applicants cited Zhang v.   Ukraine , no.   6970/15, 13   November 2018). 71.     Cypriot law did not provide for a separate judicial review of the Attorney-General’s decision not to prosecute. Nor had the courts properly reviewed the Attorney-General’s decision during the applicants’ trial. 72.     There had been no written record of the deal between F.H. and the prosecution. 73.     The applicants argued that the Court’s case-law on accomplice testimony supported their position. There were important factual differences between their case and the cases in which no violation had been found (they referred to Cornelis and Habran and Dalem , both cited above) and similarities with a case in which a violation had been found (referring to Adamčo , cited above). The Court 74.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits 75.     The parties’ submissions are summarised above. 76.     The Court reiterates that, as the Government correctly pointed out, Article   6 §   1 of the Convention does not set out any rules on how evidence should be assessed. The Court may interfere in this field only if a domestic court assesses evidence arbitrarily or manifestly unreasonably (see Bochan v.   Ukraine (no.   2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). 77.     The Court also reiterates that the Convention does not prohibit a domestic court from relying on incriminating testimony given by an accomplice (see Wilhelm Tatzel v.   Austria , no.   1599/62, Commission decision of 16   January 1963, Yearbook 6, p.   348), even if that witness has been known to move in criminal circles (see Habran and Dalem , cited above, §   111). 78.     However, the testimony of an accomplice, given in exchange for immunity from prosecution, may render a trial unfair (see Erdem v.   Germany (dec.), no.   38321/97, 9   December 1999). This is because such testimony by its very nature is open to manipulation and may be given purely to obtain those advantages or for personal revenge (see Adamčo , cited above, §   59). 79.     In the past the Court made the conclusion about the effect of such testimony on the fairness of a trial taking into account, inter alia : –     the defence knew the witness’s identity (see Habran and Dalem , cited above, §   104); –     the defence knew about the existence of an arrangement with the prosecution (see X v.   the United Kingdom , cited above); –     a domestic court reviewed the arrangement (see Adamčo , cited above, §   70); –     the domestic court paid attention to all possible advantages received by the witness (ibid., §§   65-66); –     the arrangement was discussed at the trial (see X v.   the United Kingdom , cited above); –     the defence had the opportunity to test the witness (see Cornelis , cited above); –     the defence had the opportunity to test the members of the prosecution team involved (see Verhoek v.   the Netherlands (dec.), no. 54445/00, 27   January 2004); –     the domestic court was aware of the pitfalls of relying on accomplice testimony (see Cornelis , cited above); –     the domestic court approached the testimony cautiously (see Verhoek , cited above); –     the domestic court explained in detail why it believed the witness (ibid.); –     untainted corroborating evidence existed (see Habran and Dalem , cited above, §   105, and Salmon Meneses , cited above); –     an appeal court reviewed the trial court’s findings in respect of the witness (see X v.   the United Kingdom , cited above); and –     the question was addressed by all the courts dealing with the various appeals (see Adamčo , cited above, §   63). 80.     First and foremost, as was established by the domestic courts in the present case, there was no deal between F.H. and the prosecution. The witness confessed and turned in the applicants out of remorse, without having been promised anything in return. The Attorney ‑ General’s decisions to grant him protection and not to charge him involved the exercise of the official’s discretion, rather than a follow-up on a promise he had given. 81.     All the applicants, and especially the first applicant, alleged that there was more than met the eye in the interaction between the prosecution and the witness. At the trial, the applicants also asserted that the police had acted on the basis of “extraneous motives”. The applicants failed, however, to specify what those motives were. They also failed to provide any evidence of a deal between F.H. and the prosecution. This being so, the Court must accept the circumstances of F.H.’s confession as established by the domestic courts and as described above. 82.     The Court further notes that the applicants knew of F.H.’s identity, the contents of his confession and the fact that he would not be prosecuted. 83.     At the trial, the applicants were able to examine at will both F.H. and the police officers who had questioned him. As to the Attorney-General, the applicants did not ask that he be examined. 84.     The trial court was fully aware of the dangers inherent in using accomplice evidence and took pains to explain in detail why it believed F.H. 85.     As to the parties’ disagreement about the existence of other incriminating evidence against the applicants, the Court considers that its role in that field is limited. It therefore accepts the Supreme Court’s relevant findings and concludes, as argued by the Government, that the conviction did not rely solely on F.H.’s evidence. 86.     The trial court’s assessment of F.H. was reviewed by the Supreme Court (see paragraphs   49-51 above), the only appellate court available. 87.     Lastly, unlike in Zhang , which was cited by the second and third applicants, in the present case the trial court did explain why F.H. had changed his mind. 88.     In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Nicosia Assize Court’s reliance on the accomplice testimony rendered the trial unfair. 89.     There has accordingly been no violation of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §   1 OF THE CONVENTION concerning the length of proceedings 90.     The first applicant also complained that his trial had lasted an unreasonably long time. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...” Admissibility The Government 91.     The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill ‑ founded. 92.     The applicant’s trial had lasted thirty-four months: from 25   August 2010 (when the case against the first applicant had been brought) to 13   June 2013 (when the Nicosia Assize Court had delivered its judgment). 93.     That period had been reasonable in the circumstances. 94.     The case had been complex (see paragraph   30 above) and the trial had been, as the Assize Court stated, “arduous” ( επίπονος ). It had concerned a murder for hire with many competing versions of the events. There had been four defendants, represented by different counsel pursuing different defence strategies. 95.     Numerous procedural objections had led to several interim decisions. The defence counsel had pleaded their cases and cross-examined prosecution witnesses slowly and repetitively. They had examined the same witness in turn. 96.     To compensate for the delays caused by the adjournments, the trial court had held some hearings after working hours and during summer holidays. 97.     The duration of the appeal phase   – three years   – had also been reasonable because the appeals were complex. The Supreme Court had had to study thousands of pages of the trial record and to examine multiple grounds of appeal. The first applicant 98.     The first applicant maintained his complaint. 99.     He submitted that the proceedings had lasted from 14   June 2010 (when he had been arrested in Moldova) to 6   June 2016 (when the Supreme Court had delivered its judgment). 100.     According to the first applicant, the case was simple: he had faced only two charges, the only evidence had come from the accomplice, only the Cypriot police had been involved in the investigation and all the witnesses had lived in Cyprus. 101.     The first applicant asserted that he had not resorted to delaying tactics. The extensive cross-examination of witnesses by each counsel had been explained by the need to fill in gaps left by the police investigation. By contrast, the trial court had postponed hearings on account of its other engagements, the judges’ absences or other reasons. Some postponements had remained unexplained. The domestic courts were known to be experiencing a backlog. 102.     The first applicant argued that the Supreme Court should have given its judgment sooner than it had since it had not been required to hear witnesses and had only had to decide on questions of law. The Court 103.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits 104.     The parties’ submissions are summarised above. The period to be examined 105.     The Court considers that the period to be examined lasted five years, nine months and nineteen days: from 18   August 2010 (when the first applicant was arrested in Cyprus upon his extradition from Moldova) to 6   June 2016 (when the Supreme Court delivered its judgment). 106.     The Court cannot agree with the Government that the period started as late as 25   August 2010 (when the case was brought against the first applicant), because by then he had already been “substantially affected” by his arrest (see Eckle v.   Germany , no.   8130/75, §   73, 15   July 1982, and Panayiotou v.   Cyprus , no.   20009/06, §   35, 20   January 2011). 107.     Furthermore, the Court cannot agree with the first applicant that the period started as early as 14   June 2010 (when he was arrested in Moldova), because the duration of the extradition proceedings cannot be attributed to the Cypriot authorities. Assessment of the reasonableness of that period 108.     The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, regard being had to the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and the conduct of the competent authorities (see Pélissier and Sassi v.   France [GC], no.   25444/94, §   67, ECHR 1999 ‑ II). 109.     The Court agrees with the Government that the case was complex. Contract murders are generally hard to investigate and as many as four co ‑ defendants were on trial. The Assize Court was faced with voluminous evidence (see paragraph   30 above). In its turn, the Supreme Court had to study thousands of pages of trial records and to respond to seventy-two grounds of appeal submitted by four lawyers. 110.     As to the behaviour of the first applicant and the authorities, the Court cannot conclude that either of them caused more delay than the other. Both parties caused adjournments of the trial (see paragraph   32 above) and the rather long preparatory phase of the appeal proceedings (see paragraph   45 above). 111.     The Court has previously found a violation in a comparable case against Cyprus (see Panayiotou , cited above). That case concerned a sex ‑ offence trial before an assize court and an appeal before the Supreme Court, which together lasted five years and three months. However, despite that outward similarity, the present case is markedly different. Unlike in Panayiotou (cited above, §§   40-41), in the present case the Nicosia Assize Court did not allow consecutive adjournments and its trial record reached the Supreme Court only one month after the judgment, as opposed to one year. 112.     In sum, the Court considers that the complexity of the case justified the somewhat lengthy duration of the proceedings. 113.     There has accordingly been no violation of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT Decides , unanimously, to join the applications; Declares , unanimously, the applications admissible; Holds , by six votes to one, that there has been no violation of Article   6   §   1 of the Convention on account of the use of accomplice testimony; Holds , unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention on account of the length of proceedings. Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 October 2022, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.   Milan Blaško   Georges Ravarani   Registrar   President   In accordance with Article   45 §   2 of the Convention and Rule   74 §   2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Serghides is annexed to this judgment. G.R. M.B.   Partly DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES I. Introduction 1.     My disagreement with the judgment concerns only point 3 of the operative provisions, namely, the finding that there has been no violation of Article 6 §   1 of the Convention on account of the use of immunised accomplice testimony. 2.     The present case concerns the applicants’ complaint that their trial had been unfair, as the only evidence against them, which led to their conviction for murder and a sentence of life imprisonment, had been given by F.H., an accomplice, who had been spared prosecution. 3.     I will explain my disagreement with the majority on point 3 of the operative provisions, by adopting the following methodology. I will first examine the relevant case-law of the Court on the admissibility and assessment of evidence. I will subsequently explain that, if that relevant case ‑ law were followed, the sole or decisive reliance on the testimony of F.H., the immunised accomplice, would entail a violation of Article 6 because there were no sufficient safeguards to counterbalance this fundamental flaw. For the sake of a more comprehensive discussion, however, I will also elaborate on the view that the trial would necessarily be unfair where the sole or decisive testimony was that of an immunised witness, irrespective of any alleged “safeguards”. I will conclude that, on the basis of the relevant case ‑ law, there would be a violation of Article 6 in any event. II. Relevant case-law of the Court on the admissibility and assessment of evidence in criminal proceedings 4.     Article 6 does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, as this is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see SA-Capital Oy v. Finland , no. 5556/10, § 73, 14 February 2019) [1] . The Court has consistently held that, as a general rule, it is a matter for the domestic courts to assess the evidence before them. Consequently, and as the judgment also states (see paragraph 76), the Court will not, in principle, intervene in issues concerning the assessment of evidence and the establishment of the facts, or in the interpretation of domestic law, unless the decisions reached by the domestic courts appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable and provided that the proceedings as a whole were fair as required by Article 6 § 1 (see, for instance, Ajdarić v. Croatia , no.   20883/09, § 32, 13 December 2011; SA ‑ Capital Oy , cited above, § 73; and Bochan v.   Ukraine (no.   2) [GC], no.   22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). Article   6 §   1 of the Convention does not set out any rules on how evidence should be assessed. There is a distinction between the admissibility of evidence, that is, the question of which items of evidence may be submitted to th