CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 décembre 2022

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text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF SEVDARI v. ALBANIA (Application no. 40662/19)     JUDGMENT Art 8 • Private life • Disproportionate dismissal of prosecutor and lifetime ban from re-entering justice system due to an isolated professional error and her spouse’s failure to pay tax on a small part of his income • Absence of bad faith or deliberate violations by the applicant Art 46 • Individual measures • Reopening of vetting proceedings, upon applicant’s request, and re-examination of case in compliance with Art   8 requirements • No general measures indicated • Functioning of current vetting process in general not disclosing as such systemic problem of compliance with Convention requirements   STRASBOURG 13 December 2022   FINAL   13/03/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Sevdari v. Albania, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Jolien Schukking,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Andreas Zünd , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   40662/19) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Ms Antoneta Sevdari (“the applicant”), on 29 July 2019; the decision to give notice of the application to the Albanian Government (“the Government”); the third-party comments submitted by Res Publica, who had been granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule   44 § 3 of the Rules of Court); Having deliberated in private on 22 November 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns re-evaluation (vetting) proceedings resulting in the applicant’s dismissal from the post of prosecutor. She complained (i)   that there had been a breach of her right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention on account of her removal from office and the ensuing lifetime ban on her practising law as an advocate; (ii) under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention that the proceedings had been unfair; and (iii)   under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of an effective remedy in respect of her complaints under Articles 6 and 8. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Tirana. She was represented by Mr S. Powles, a lawyer practising in London. 3.     The Government were initially represented by their Agent, Mr   A.   Metani, and, subsequently, Ms J. Mansaku, Ms E. Muçaj, Ms B. Lilo and Mr   O. Moçka, General State Advocate. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Background to the case 5.     The background to and aims of the reform of the justice system in Albania, including the introduction of a vetting process in 2016 by the Annex to the Constitution and the Re-evaluation of Judges and Prosecutors Act (Law   no. 84/2016 – “the Vetting Act”), as well as the manner in which vetting proceedings, which all serving judges and prosecutors have to undergo, are conducted, are summarised in the Court’s judgment in Xhoxhaj v. Albania (no.   15227/19, §§ 4-7, 9 February 2021). 6.     The applicant served as a prosecutor attached to the Durres District Court from October 2003 until 2012. She was then appointed as a prosecutor attached to the Tirana District Court. From December 2018 onwards she also served as a member of the High Prosecutorial Council (“the HPC”). VETTING proceedings IN RELATION TO THE APPLICANT Proceedings before the Independent Qualification Commission 7.     On 18 July 2018 the Independent Qualification Commission (“the IQC”), following a public hearing, unanimously confirmed the applicant in her post as prosecutor attached to the Tirana District Court. In accordance with the applicable vetting provisions (see paragraphs 36-42 below), it had evaluated her on the basis of three criteria: (i) an evaluation of her personal assets; (ii) an integrity background check aimed at determining any possible links to organised crime; and (iii) an evaluation of her professional competence. 8.     As regards the evaluation of the applicant’s assets, the IQC concluded on the basis of a declaration of assets filed by her in the vetting proceedings and evidence that her disclosure of assets was accurate and complete and that her and her husband’s assets were lawful. The integrity background check, conducted on the basis of an integrity background declaration submitted by her, did not give cause for concern either. As to the evaluation of the applicant’s professional competence, the IQC, having regard to a professional self-appraisal form submitted by her and having examined reports as well as denunciations received from the public on her performance, concluded that she was professionally competent. Proceedings before the Special Appeal Chamber Conduct of the proceedings by the Special Appeal Chamber 9.     On 29 August 2018 the Public Commissioner lodged an appeal with the Special Appeal Chamber (“the SAC”) against the IQC’s decision. He argued that the IQC’s investigations had not shown that the applicant met the requirements of the Vetting Act both as regards the evaluation of her assets and the evaluation of her professional competence. 10.     The applicant was subsequently granted access to the case file. 11.     On 17 September 2018 the judges sitting in the applicant’s case were drawn by lot and the applicant was subsequently informed of the composition of the SAC (a separate chamber of the Constitutional Court). She neither requested the recusal nor alleged the ineligibility of any of the SAC judges. 12 .     The SAC held public hearings on three separate days (13, 19 and 25   February 2019) before delivering its decision on 28 February 2019. The applicant was given the opportunity to make submissions, request that the SAC admit new evidence or name witnesses. Decision of the Special Appeal Chamber 13 .     On 28 February 2019 the SAC reversed the IQC’s decision and dismissed the applicant from her post as prosecutor. It found that she had made an insufficient disclosure of assets within the meaning of section 61(3) read in conjunction with section   33(5)(b) of the Vetting Act and Article D §§   1 and 3 of the Annex to the Constitution (see paragraphs 42, 40 and 38 below) in that she had not proven the lawfulness of the financial resources used to acquire part of her real estate and the lawfulness of some of her husband’s income. Moreover, making an overall assessment of the three criteria (section 4(2) of the Vetting Act, see paragraph 36 below), the SAC concluded that the applicant had undermined public trust in the justice system (section 61(5) of the Vetting Act, see paragraph 42 below). (a)    Evaluation of the applicant’s assets (i)       Plot of land and house in Yzberisht, Tirana 14.     A plot of land and house in Yzberisht, Tirana, were acquired by the applicant’s then future husband and his relatives between 2000 and 2003, when the applicant was not yet a prosecutor. The IQC did not therefore evaluate this asset. The SAC, however, in line with the Public Commissioner, considered that the assessment of assets within the framework of the vetting process should extend to assets acquired prior to the applicant’s appointment as prosecutor and to the legality of the sources of income used for their creation. The applicant had argued that assets created prior to her appointment as prosecutor could not be considered to have been created by corrupt acts or illegal activities that could affect her integrity as a prosecutor. 15.     The applicant had declared in her vetting declaration that the plot of land and house had been acquired with her husband’s income of 3,000,000 lek (ALL – approximately 22,000 euros (EUR) at the time), which he had earned as an emigrant in Greece from 1997 to 2000 (before she was married to him) and with EUR   12,000 euros which he had earned through his work as engineer in Saudi Arabia in 2003. 16.     The SAC concluded in this regard that the applicant had made an insufficient disclosure of assets because she had insufficient lawful sources to justify the plot of land and house for the purposes of section   61(3) of the Vetting Act read in conjunction with Article D § 3 of the Annex to the Constitution. For vetting purposes, only income that had been previously declared and on which tax had been paid could be considered lawful. As a result, the applicant could only rely on income that met both these conditions in order to justify the acquisition of any real estate. 17.     As to the income which the applicant’s husband had earned as an emigrant in Greece, the SAC found that the applicant had not submitted sufficient supporting documents or other evidence to show that the income transferred from Greece to Albania in the form of remittances had been lawful. She had failed to prove that her husband had been employed in Greece during the period concerned, and had not specified the exact amount of income earned and the exact amount thereof transferred to Albania. 18 .     As to the income earned by the applicant’s husband in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the SAC observed that the applicant and her husband had disclosed this for the first time in 2016 in the framework of the vetting process and that they had been unable to convincingly explain the reasons for its non-disclosure in time. The SAC further concluded that the applicant had not submitted complete and sufficient proof to show that the source of her husband’s income in this regard had been lawful. The documents submitted by her and declarations by the employer company contained “indications” about the related person’s (her husband’s) professional engagement and the acquisition of income in exchange. However, she had not provided the necessary documents fully clarifying the manner in which this income had been paid and proving that tax had been paid on it by the company. The couple had further failed to demonstrate that it was objectively impossible for them to provide these documents. (ii)     Husband’s income from work in Saudi Arabia in 2006 19 .     In her vetting declaration, the applicant had further declared financial assets in the amount of some 20,000 US dollars (USD), which had been earned by her husband in Saudi Arabia in 2006. The SAC also found in this regard that she had made an insufficient disclosure of assets, within the meaning of section 61(3) of the Vetting Act read in conjunction with Article   D § 3 of the Annex to the Constitution, as she had failed to prove that her husband had complied with the relevant income tax obligations. 20.     The SAC considered that the documents provided by the applicant proving that her husband had been living and providing services in Saudi Arabia during the relevant period were credible, but that they did not constitute “complete proof” in the absence of an employment contract and proof that the relevant bank transfers had been made from Saudi Arabia and on behalf of the company to which he had provided services. 21 .     The SAC further found that the applicant had not provided any supporting documents to prove that her husband had paid tax in Albania on this income or proof that he had paid tax in Saudi Arabia, or that it was objectively impossible for her to provide the necessary documents. (iii)    Other assets 22 .     Other real estate and income of the applicant and her husband from domestic sources evaluated by the SAC were considered lawful. (b)    Evaluation of the applicant’s professional competence 23 .     The SAC found that none of the denunciations received from the public regarding the applicant’s professional competence had disclosed a lack of professional competence on her part. 24.     As regards the assessment of several cases dealt with by the applicant and selected for vetting review, the SAC found that in one of these cases, which had concerned charges against a public official for failure to duly declare his assets, the applicant had missed the deadline for filing an appeal against the first-instance court’s decision to dismiss the charges. Her subsequent application for leave to appeal out of time owing to family hardship had been rejected. The SAC concluded in this regard that even if the results of the investigation confirmed that the applicant had shown a lack of knowledge of the case-law related to a specific legal concept and inefficiency in managing complex situations in the exercise of her duties, the case in question was isolated and therefore insufficient in itself to find that she was professionally unfit. The SAC considered, however, that the fact that the case was related to the declaration of assets of a public official, even if isolated, affected public confidence in the justice system. As a prosecutor specialising in tax-related offences, it undermined public confidence in the justice system if her own family members failed to comply with tax laws. (c)    Overall assessment 25 .     The SAC therefore concluded that, on the basis of an overall assessment of the three re-evaluation criteria, the applicant had also undermined public trust in the justice system, for the purposes of section61(5) of the Vetting Act. (d)    Dissenting opinion 26 .     One of the members of the panel, I.R., filed a dissenting opinion, supporting the position that the applicant should not be dismissed from her post as prosecutor. I.R. took the view that the applicant had not made an insufficient disclosure of assets under sections 61(3) and 33 of the Vetting   Act. She had proven the lawful sources of her assets in so far as she had sufficiently proven the existence of her husband’s income and the fact that it had originated from lawful gainful (rather than criminal) activity. In the dissenting judge’s view, failure to prove the payment of tax on such income should not always lead to the conclusion that there were insufficient lawful sources to justify the person’s assets and thus an insufficient disclosure of assets resulting in dismissal from office under section 61(3) of the Vetting   Act. In such circumstances, section 61(1) of the Vetting Act should apply, that is, only when the declared assets of the person being vetted were greater than twice the value of the assets obtained with taxed income was there cause for dismissal. This was not, however, the case for the applicant; the impugned income amounted to 9.5% of the total income. I.R. further took the view that it was disproportionate to dismiss the applicant for undermining public trust in the justice system, given that she had successfully prosecuted many important public finance cases. (e)    International Observer’s opinion 27 .     The International Observer of the International Monitoring Operation (“the IMO”) – an international body led by the European Commission established by Article B of the Annex to the Constitution to support, monitor and oversee the re-evaluation process – also issued a dissenting opinion, dated 25 April 2019. He considered that it was disproportionate to sanction the applicant with dismissal. He took note of the SAC’s finding that she had complied with her obligation to declare her assets and the related sources of income. The SAC had, however, considered (in contrast to the IQC’s findings) that she had failed to provide sufficient justification for her assets, that is, she had not submitted sufficient documents proving the lawfulness of the alleged sources of income, in particular proof of the payment of tax on that income. 28 .     The International Observer considered that the SAC’s expansive interpretation of “insufficient disclosure of assets” in section 61(3) of the Vetting Act as a ground for dismissal contravened Article D §§ 4 and 5 of the Annex to the Constitution and produced disproportionate results. He argued, in particular, that a finding of “insufficient disclosure” under section   61(3) of the Vetting Act could only be reached if the person being vetted had committed a falsity, in particular when there was proof that he or she had not possessed the source of income claimed (which the SAC had not found in the applicant’s case). Failure to justify the disclosed assets could be sanctioned under section 61(1) of the Vetting Act if its requirements were met (that is, if the unjustified assets were more than half the total amount of assets), which was not the case with the applicant either. If failure to justify declared assets was sanctioned as insufficient disclosure, section 61(1) of the Vetting Act would become irrelevant and the safeguard of the “twice as much” threshold would no longer apply. 29 .     As to the proficiency assessment, the International Observer took the view that failure to file an appeal in one case by the deadline could not be given any significant weight. He noted that an appeal was to be filed owing to the general instructions for the prosecution to do so whenever the court had decided against the prosecution’s requests; the appeal in question had not had any reasonable prospects of success so the shortcoming had been of a merely formal nature. The shortcomings disclosed altogether were not significant enough to justify the conclusion that the applicant had undermined public trust in the justice system for the purposes of section 61(5) of the Vetting Act. Subsequent developments The applicant’s professional life following the SAC’s decision 30 .     On 19 March 2019 the HPC, having regard to the applicant’s dismissal as a prosecutor, dismissed her as a member of the HPC. 31 .     The applicant, who obtained a licence to practise as a lawyer from the National Chamber of Advocates on 6 May 2016, was registered in its register of lawyers actively practising the profession as of 7   March 2019 and subsequently started practising as a lawyer. Proceedings regarding Judges L.D. and A.H. 32 .     On 4 December 2019 the SAC dismissed a request lodged by the applicant after the termination of the vetting proceedings against her (on 23   May 2019) for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against two members of the SAC, L.D. and A.H. and for termination of their mandate under the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the removal from office of Constitutional Court judges on which the applicant had relied. 33 .     On 20 November 2019 the IMO, which was competent under section   17 of the Vetting Act to examine requests for disciplinary proceedings from the public, informed the applicant that despite the allegations raised by her against Judges L.D. and A.H., none of the grounds under section 16 of the Vetting Act on which IMO members could initiate disciplinary proceedings could be invoked. 34 .     On 24 July 2020, following the institution of criminal proceedings against Judge L.D., which had been initiated on the basis of a criminal complaint lodged by Mr B. Cani (the applicant in application no. 37474/20 before this Court), the SAC decided to suspend L.D. from office. L.D. was subsequently convicted of forgery of documents. He was found to have submitted false information in his application for the position of judge of the SAC as he had failed to disclose that he had been dismissed from office as a judge in 1997 (see, for further information in this regard, Besnik Cani v.   Albania , no. 37474/20, §§ 8-31, 4 October 2022 (not final)). 35.     On 28 October 2022, the Constitutional Court quashed, on fair trial grounds, the decision of the Supreme Court confirming the criminal conviction of L.D. and ordered the rehearing of the case by the Supreme Court. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE RELEVANT DOMESTIC MATERIAL General background to and functioning of the vetting proceedings in Albania 36 .     The transitional re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors in Albania is governed by Article 179/b of the Constitution, the Annex to the Constitution and the Re-evaluation of Judges and Prosecutors Act (Law no. 84/2016 – “the Vetting Act”), which entered into force on 8 October 2016. Article 179/b of the Constitution provides for a one-time re-evaluation of all serving judges and prosecutors with a view to guaranteeing the functioning of the rule of law, the independence of the justice system and the restoration of public trust in the institutions of that system. Re-evaluation is carried out by the Independent Qualification Commission (“the IQC”) at first instance and the Special Appeal Chamber (“the SAC”), attached as a separate chamber to the Constitutional Court, on appeal. Re-evaluation consists of an evaluation of assets, an integrity background check and an evaluation of professional competence (see Article Ç § 1 of the Annex to the Constitution and section   4(1) of the Vetting Act). The evaluation decision is based on only one or several of these components, or on an overall assessment of all three components and an overall assessment of the proceedings (section 4(2) of the Vetting Act). 37.     The relevant legal framework and practice regarding the vetting proceedings introduced in Albania in 2016 are summarised in the judgment in Xhoxhaj (cited above, §§ 93-226). The provisions and practice referred to in the present case are as follows. Provisions governing the evaluation of assets 38 .     Article D of the Annex to the Constitution, which governs the evaluation of assets, reads as follows: Article D – Evaluation of assets “1. Persons to be vetted shall disclose their assets, and have them evaluated, in order to identify persons who possess or use more assets than can be lawfully justified, or those who have failed to make an accurate and full disclosure of their assets and those of related persons. 2. The person to be vetted shall file a new and detailed declaration of assets in accordance with the law. The High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest [HIDAACI] shall verify the declaration of assets and provide the [IQC] with a report concerning the lawfulness of the assets, as well as the accuracy and completeness of the asset disclosure. 3. The person being vetted shall provide convincing explanations concerning the lawful source of his or her assets and income. For the purposes of this law, assets will be considered lawful if the income has been declared and subject to the payment of tax. Additional elements of lawful assets shall be determined by law. 4. If the person being vetted has [total] assets greater than twice the value of lawful assets, the person shall be presumed guilty of a disciplinary breach, unless [he   or she] submits evidence to the contrary. 5. If the person to be vetted does not file the declaration of assets within the time-limit prescribed by law, [he or she] shall be dismissed from office. If the person being vetted endeavours to conceal or make an inaccurate disclosure of assets in his or her ownership, possession or use, a presumption in favour of the disciplinary sanction of dismissal from office shall apply and the person will be required to prove the contrary.” 39.     Section 3 of the Vetting Act contains the following definition of “related persons”: “(13)   ’Related persons’ shall mean the circle of individuals related to the person to be vetted, public commissioner or judge, consisting of the spouse, live-in partner, adult children, as well as any other individual whose name appears on the family certificate as provided by the civil registry office to the person to be vetted, commissioners, public commissioners or judges for the period of re-evaluation ...” 40 .     The relevant part of section 33 of the Vetting Act, on the re-evaluation procedure, provides: “5.     Upon completion of the audit, the Inspector General of HIDAACI [High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest] shall draw up a reasoned and detailed report [on the declaration of each person being vetted] stating whether: (a) the declaration is accurate [and] in compliance with the law, [supported] by legitimate financial sources and there is no conflict of interest; (b) there is a lack of legitimate financial sources to justify the assets; (c) there has been a concealment of wealth/assets; (ç) a false declaration was made; (d) the [person being vetted] has been involved in a conflict of interest.” Disciplinary sanctions 41 .     Article Ë § 1 of the Annex to the Constitution and sections 58 and 66 of the Vetting Act provide that on the conclusion of the proceedings, the vetting bodies may either confirm the person being vetted in his or her post or impose one of the following disciplinary sanctions: suspension from office for one year accompanied by an obligation to attend a training programme run by the School of Magistrates, or dismissal from office. 42 .     Under section 61 of the Vetting Act, dismissal from office may be ordered if it appears that: “1. the person being vetted has declared [total] assets greater than twice the value of lawful assets belonging to him or her and related persons; 2. there are serious concerns about the integrity background check because the person being vetted has had inappropriate contact with individuals involved in organised crime, which renders it impossible for him or her to continue in his or her position; 3. the person being vetted has made an insufficient disclosure of assets and integrity background [declaration] under sections 39 and 33 of this Act; 4. as regards the evaluation of professional competence, the person being vetted is professionally unfit; 5. on the basis of the overall conduct [of the proceedings], within the meaning of section 4(2) ... the person being vetted has undermined public trust in the justice system and it is impossible to remedy the deficiencies by means of a training programme.” Provisions and practice regarding challenges to the composition of the SAC 43.     The relevant parts of section 27 of the Vetting Act, on guarantees of impartiality, provide: “1. The members of the vetting bodies shall declare and avoid any situation of conflicts of interest, based on the [Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Exercise of Public Office Act]. Any decision taken in a situation of conflicts of interest, apart from any legal consequences in the decision-making process, shall constitute serious disciplinary misconduct. 2. In the event that a member of the vetting bodies is unable to decide an assigned case for the reasons mentioned in Article 30 of the Code of Administrative Procedure or the [Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Exercise of Public Office Act], he or she shall immediately notify the panel in writing. The decision on exclusion of a commissioner [of the IQC], judge or Public Commissioner shall be taken by another panel drawn by lot. ...” 44 .     As to the Constitutional Court’s practice regarding complaints of non-compliance by members of the vetting bodies with the statutory eligibility criteria, on 29 April 2020 it rejected as inadmissible a complaint lodged by Mr B. Cani (see paragraph 34 above) requesting to have Parliament’s decision to appoint L.D. to the SAC declared unconstitutional. 45 .     In so far as Mr Cani had complained under Article   131 § 1 (f) of the Constitution that L.D.’s appointment to the SAC in breach of domestic law had violated his individual right to a “tribunal established by law” in the course of the vetting proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning as follows: “20. Returning to the present case, the [Constitutional Court’s] Bench notes that the applicant alleges a violation of his right to a fair hearing by virtue of an act undertaken by a public authority before the end of the proceedings before the SAC, and, consequently, does not raise any claim against the final outcome of the [vetting] process. He challenged ... the appointment [of L.D. to the SAC] and [requested] the partial invalidation of the decision of Parliament appointing L.D. as a member of the SAC. 21. The Constitutional Court has emphasised that the right to fair hearing, including complaints related to a tribunal established by law, is guaranteed during a legal or judicial process, in connection with the final result [ ne funksion të rezultatit përfundimtar ] which generates concrete and direct consequences for applicants as holders of procedural and substantive constitutional rights. The Bench considers that in the process of transitional re-evaluation too, the procedural rights of the individuals being re-evaluated should be guaranteed within the judicial process conducted by the [SAC], in accordance with the competencies assigned to them by the Constitution and the law. ... 23. Furthermore, the Bench notes that the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in reviewing the individual constitutional complaint of the applicant in respect of his re-evaluation process as a prosecutor, is limited by the powers that the Constitution itself, in its Annex, has conferred to the re-evaluation bodies. Thus, paragraph   2 of Article   179/b of the Constitution provides that the re-evaluation process, which is carried out by the IQC and the SAC, will be based on the principle of a fair hearing and respect for the fundamental rights of the individuals being re-evaluated. ... 24. The Bench reiterates that the constitutional procedural rights ... including the right to a “tribunal established by law”, have been guaranteed by the Constitution to the individuals being re-evaluated, by virtue of the judicial process carried out by the SAC and, subsequently, by virtue of the possibility of exercising the right to complain to the European Court of Human Rights. In view of the powers of the SAC to hear appeals against the decisions of the IQC, the court has held that this [appeal] process includes a review of the compatibility of the proceedings with the Constitution ...” Provisions on the review of final judgments 46 .     Under section 4(6) of the Vetting Act, read in conjunction with section   1(2) of the Administrative Courts Act (Law no. 49/2012 on the organisation and functioning of the administrative courts), the vetting bodies may in certain circumstances also apply provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 494 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a party may request the review of a decision which has become final in certain circumstances, namely when: “a) new circumstances or new written evidence are discovered that are pertinent to the case, which could not have been known by the party during its consideration; b) it is proven that the statements of witnesses or expert opinions contributing to the decision were false; c) the parties, their representatives or any members of the adjudicating body who participated in the trial of the case have committed criminally punishable acts influencing the decision; ç) it is proven that the decision was based on forged documents; d) the decision is based on a decision of the court or of another institution which was subsequently revoked; dh) the decision has been taken in clear contradiction with another irrevocable decision taken for the same parties, the same subject and for the same cause; e) where the European Court of Human Rights finds a violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols, ratified by the Republic of Albania.” Provisions regarding the status of prosecutors 47 .     Under section 32 of the former Prosecutor’s Office Act of 12   February 2001 (Law no. 8737/2001 on the organisation and functioning of the prosecutor’s office), as amended, disciplinary violations included, inter alia , actions that seriously discredited the prosecutor’s function or that, pursuant to the law, were incompatible with it. Under section 33 of that Act, such violations were punishable by a reprimand, a notice with warning of dismissal from office, transfer to a lower position or dismissal from office. 48.     The Constitutional Court stated that serious actions discrediting the official function included inappropriate and unworthy conduct either in the performance of official duties or outside the performance of those duties (decision no. 75/2002). 49 .     The Status of Judges and Prosecutors Act of 6 October 2016 (Law   no.   96/2016 on the status of judges and prosecutors) determines the status of “magistrates”, namely judges and prosecutors (section 2(gj)). The relevant part of section 3 of that Act, on fundamental values, provides: “5.     The conduct of a magistrate shall, in the course of assuming his or her function and beyond its scope, guarantee the preservation and strengthening of public confidence in the justice system, the legal profession and parties who are the subject of proceedings. A magistrate shall exercise his or her functions in a fair, accurate, timely, reasonable, conscious, cautious, dedicated and systematic manner, with objectivity, self-restraint and maturity.” Provisions regarding the exercise of the lawyers’ profession 50 .     Under section 13(1) of the Lawyers Act (Law no. 55/2018 of 23   July 2018 on the lawyers’ profession), a person is qualified to act as a lawyer if he or she has obtained the title of “advocate” and has been admitted as an advocate on the strength of a certificate (licence) issued by the National Chamber of Advocates (namely the Bar Association). Section 13(2) lists a number of general requirements that have to be satisfied in order for a person to be admitted as an advocate, the most relevant, for the purposes of this case, being that “a person shall not have been removed from duty or a public function, on account of [a breach of] ethical integrity, by a final decision of the competent authority, save for cases where the disciplinary sanction has been extinguished by virtue of a specific law”. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL 51 .     The relevant parts of the European Guidelines on Ethics and Conduct for Public Prosecutors (“the Budapest Guidelines”), adopted by the Council of Europe Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe on 31 May 2005, provide: IV.   Private conduct “a.     Public prosecutors must not compromise the actual or the reasonably perceived integrity, fairness and impartiality of the public prosecution service by activities in their private life. b.     Public prosecutors shall respect and obey the law at all times. c.     Public prosecutors should conduct themselves in such a way as to further and retain public confidence in their profession. ...” 52 .     The relevant parts of Opinion No.   13 (2018) on the independence, accountability and ethics of prosecutors, issued by the Council of Europe’s Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), provide: “22.     The conduct of prosecutors, like that of judges, cannot be left to their sole discretion, be it within and outside their work. This is particularly important when assessing the activities of prosecutors and in disciplinary proceedings against them. ... 51.     The respect for the rule of law requires the highest ethical and professional standards in behaviour of prosecutors, as for judges, both on duty and off, which allows confidence in justice by society. Prosecutors act on behalf of the people and in the public interest. They should therefore always maintain personal integrity and act in accordance with the law, fairly, impartially and objectively, respecting and upholding fundamental rights and freedoms, including the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the principles of equality of arms, separation of powers, and binding force of court decisions. They have a duty to be free from political or other influence.” THE LAW the government’s preliminary objection 53.     The Government submitted that the applicant had abused her right of application since her complaint that she had been unable to practise her profession after the conclusion of the vetting proceedings was based on untrue facts. In particular, they argued that contrary to her submissions in her application to the Court, she was currently practising as a lawyer. 54.     The applicant contested that view. She claimed that she had submitted in her application, and maintained, that as a result of her dismissal in the vetting proceedings there was a lifetime ban on her practising law as an advocate under section 13(2) of the Lawyers Act (see paragraph 50 above). She therefore risked being disbarred at any moment without any possibility of ever enrolling again. 55.     The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on untrue facts (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 16 September 1996, §§ 53-54, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, and Varbanov v. Bulgaria , no. 31365/96, § 36, ECHR 2000-X). The submission of incomplete and thus misleading information may also amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no.   67810/10, § 28, ECHR   2014). The same applies if important new developments have occurred during the proceedings before the Court and where, despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 §   7 (formerly Rule   47 § 6) of the Rules of Court, the applicant has failed to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts (see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia , no. 798/05, §   63, 15 September 2009, and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012). However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano , §   97, and Gross , §   28, both cited above). 56.     Having examined the case file and the parties’ submissions in the light of the foregoing principles, the Court considers that the applicant’s submissions could have been clearer as regards the fact that she had in practice started working as a lawyer following her dismissal as a prosecutor. However, in view of the explanations given by her, the Court does not find it established that she withheld that information, which does not concern the very core of her case on her dismissal in vetting proceedings, in a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court. The Government’s objection in this regard must therefore be dismissed. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 57.     The applicant complained that her removal from office as a prosecutor and the ensuing lifetime ban on her practising law as an advocate had breached her right to respect for her private life as provided in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility Complaint concerning the applicant’s dismissal from office 58 .     Referring to the criteria established in the Court’s judgment in the case of Denisov v. Ukraine ([GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 123 and 125, 25   September 2018), the Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in respect of the applicant’s complaint about her dismissal. She had not proven that her removal from public office as a prosecutor had affected her private life to a sufficiently serious extent as she was instead practising law as an advocate. 59 .     The applicant argued that her dismissal as a prosecutor had considerably affected her private life and that, having regard to the criteria established in the case of Denisov (cited above, §§ 107 and 114), Article 8 was thus applicable. The loss of her job and salary had resulted in a worsening of her and her family’s material well-being. She had further lost professional opportunities; her reputation had been damaged and she had been stigm