CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 19 janvier 2023

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border-top:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; border-right:0.75pt solid #f8f8f8; border-left:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#5f5f5f } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sF920FE69 { font-family:Arial; color:#f8f8f8 } .sCC037FAC { width:22.94%; border-top:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; border-right:0.75pt solid #f8f8f8; border-left:0.75pt solid #f8f8f8; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#5f5f5f } .sF61BF5EC { width:22.94%; border-top:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; border-right:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; border-left:0.75pt solid #f8f8f8; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#5f5f5f } .s2F0B4A65 { width:8.26%; border:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s12C0A550 { width:22.94%; border:0.75pt solid #5f5f5f; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sB268EDDE { width:8.26%; border:0.75pt solid #0072bc; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#e8e8e8 } .s816B3540 { width:22.94%; border:0.75pt solid #0072bc; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#e8e8e8 } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   FIFTH SECTION CASE OF MACHALIKASHVILI AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA (Application no. 32245/19)     JUDGMENT   This version was   rectified on 1 February 2023 under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.   Art 2 (procedural) • Ineffective investigation into death of applicants’ relative during a security operation for his arrest conducted on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes Art 2 (substantive) • Life • Due to insufficient evidence, Court unable to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that death occurred in circumstances engaging State’s responsibility   STRASBOURG 19 January 2023 FINAL   22/05/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Machalikashvili and Others v. Georgia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Georges Ravarani , President ,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Lado Chanturia,   María Elósegui,   Mattias Guyomar,   Kateřina Šimáčková,   Mykola Gnatovskyy , judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   32245/19) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Georgian nationals, listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on 6 June 2019; the decision to give notice to the Georgian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 2, 3, and 13 of the Convention; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 8 November and 6 December 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the latter date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns the death of the applicants’ relative (T.M.) as a result of a fatal wound to the head that he received in the course of an arrest operation conducted within the context of a terrorism-related investigation. The applicants complained under Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2 .     The applicants, Mr M. Machalikashvili (“the first applicant”), Ms   E.   Machalikashvili (“the second applicant”), Ms N. Machalikashvili (“the third applicant”), and Ms A. Margoshvili (“the fourth applicant”) were born in 1968, 1949, 1989, and 1971 respectively and live in the village of Duisi, Georgia. The first and fourth applicants are the father and mother, respectively, of T.M., who died as a result of a fatal wound to his head that he received during a security operation for this arrest carried out on 26   December 2017. The second and the third applicants are, respectively, his grandmother and sister. They were represented by Ms T. Samkharadze [1] , Ms   T.   Mikeladze and Ms   K. Chutlashvili, lawyers practising in Tbilisi, and Ms J. Evans, Ms   J.   Sawyer, Ms J. Gavron, Mr P. Leach, and Ms K. Levine, from the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC), lawyers based in London. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 5 .     On an unidentified date, a criminal investigation was initiated by the Counter-Terrorism Department at the State Security Service of Georgia (“the SSS”) in respect of Akhmed Chatayev, a suspected terrorist, on account of his involvement with the so-called “Islamic State” (“ISIL”). According to Interpol, Chatayev was considered as one of the senior members of ISIL at the material time, who as of mid-2015 was in command of a Chechen faction of ISIL. 6 .     Following a special counterterrorist operation conducted by the SSS on 21-22 November 2017, after a twenty-hour siege of an apartment in Tbilisi, two suspected terrorists were killed, while Akhmed Chatayev carried out a suicide bombing. The fourth member of the group was arrested. On the basis of the evidence obtained prior to and after the above-mentioned special operation, the SSS identified five more individuals as being linked to Akhmed Chatayev’s terrorist group, including T.M., the applicants’ relative. THE OPERATION FOR THE ARREST OF T.M. AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 7 .     On 22 December 2017 the prosecution authority applied to the Tbilisi City Court requesting, within the scope of a criminal investigation pending into the terrorism-related activities of Akhmed Chatayev and his group, the arrest of the above-mentioned five persons, including the applicants’ relative, and the search of their homes. According to the prosecution authority’s application, the five persons allegedly knew of Chatayev’s allegiance to ISIL and nonetheless provided his group with certain material support. In particular, they helped Chatayev’s group to find accommodation in Tbilisi, and provided the group with food supplies and household items, and other services. There was accordingly a reasonable suspicion that the five persons, including T.M., had committed an offence under Article 331 1 § 3 (b) of the Criminal Code of repeatedly providing material support to Akhmed Chatayev and his terrorist group (see the relevant provision cited in paragraph 58 below). In substantiating the request for the arrest of the five persons, the prosecution authority relied on the following grounds. Firstly, there was a risk of those persons absconding in view of the severity of a possible sentence. The prosecution authority referred in this regard to the fact that the five persons were aiding members of an international terrorist group and accordingly, there was a reasonable suspicion that they had links with other members of the terrorist group who could help them to flee Georgia. Secondly, the risk of their tampering with the evidence was referred to, particularly in view of the complexity and scale of the ongoing criminal investigation. Lastly, the prosecution authority argued that there was a risk of the five persons continuing their alleged criminal activities, particularly in view of the nature and specificity of terrorism-related crimes, which implied a high level of organisation and ideological allegiance. 8.     As to the request to conduct the search of their homes, the prosecution authority argued, with reference to the same information, that there was a reasonable suspicion that the five persons, including the applicants’ relative, were keeping arms and ammunition in their homes, and/or other important documents or objects for the investigation. 9 .     On 23 December 2017 the Tbilisi City Court authorised the arrest of five persons, including T.M., and the search of their houses. The judge concluded that there was a risk of their absconding and tampering with the evidence, and also the risk of their continuing their criminal activity. In this connection, the judge noted that terrorism-related crime was the most dangerous form of group crime and that there was a reasonable suspicion, having regard to the nature of the supporting material that had been provided, that the five persons would continue their criminal activity. On the same date the Tbilisi City Court also authorised the search of their homes. The judge concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the five persons had committed the impugned offence and that the evidential standard for conducting the searches had been met. The searches, were, hence, authorised for the purpose of seizing arms and ammunition and other important documents or objects for investigation. 10 .     On 26 December 2017, at around 3.45 to 4 a.m., the SSS Special Assignment Unit (“SAU”) entered the applicants’ house in order to arrest T.M. There were thirty-two SAU officers involved in the operation. SAU officer no. 1, followed by SAU officer no. 2, entered T.M.’s bedroom, which was located on the first floor (მეორე სართული) of the house. According to the investigation materials, T.M., having disregarded the request of the first officer to show his hands and surrender to the arrest, attempted to detonate a hand grenade and as a result was shot in the head. T.M. was immediately provided with first aid medical assistance by the SSS medical staff in the house and was then transferred sometime between 4.16 and 4.26 a.m. first to Akhmeta Regional Hospital and then to a hospital in Telavi , where he underwent surgery for his head injury. On 28 December 2017 the applicant was transferred to a hospital in Tbilisi, where, after almost two weeks of in-patient treatment, on 10 January 2018 T.M. died. 11 .     According to the case file, within about three hours of the special operation, at 7 a.m. on 26 December 2017, an investigator from the SSS Counter-Terrorism Department, I.K., conducted a search of the applicants’ house with the assistance of two crime experts and an explosive expert. The search, which lasted until 9.20 a.m., was also attended by the first applicant. As a result of the search, the investigator seized various items, including several mobile telephones from the ground and the first floors of the house, a computer processor from T.M.’s bedroom, and 23,600 Georgian laris (about 7,000 euros). He also seized a cylinder-shaped greenish object (later identified as a hand grenade) which was lying on the floor, to the left of T.M.’s bed. All of the participants in the search, including the first applicant, signed the search report. During the search, photographs were made. 12 .     According to the case file, after the search the investigator and the experts left the applicants’ house without securing T.M.’s bedroom. The applicants, several neighbours and a local journalist then went to the bedroom, with the journalist taking photographs of the room. In two of the photographs taken by the local journalist, the applicants claimed to have identified T.M.’s iPhone headphones, which, according to them, had subsequently disappeared (see in this connection paragraphs 38 and 42 below). 13 .     On the same date, the SSS conducted four other special operations, arresting the four suspected accomplices of T.M. without any resistance on their part. According to the case file, they were eventually charged and convicted of providing material support and resources to a terrorist group, an offence under Article 333 1 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Criminal proceedings against T.M. were discontinued because of his death. THE INVESTIGATION AND DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE 14 .     On 26 December 2017 a criminal investigation was initiated into the circumstances in which T.M. was wounded, under Article 333 § 1 of the Criminal Code (misuse of authority) (cited in paragraph 58 below), by the Kakheti Regional Prosecutor’s Office.   On the same date, after the applicants had been questioned, the investigation was reclassified under Article 333 §   3   (b) of the Criminal Code (misuse of authority using violence or a weapon) (ibid.), and the case was transferred to the Tbilisi Prosecutor’s Office. Inspection of the scene and interviewing of the applicants 15.     On 26 December 2017, between 4 and 5.50 p.m., an investigator from the Kakheti Regional Prosecutor’s Office conducted an on-site inspection of T.M.’s bedroom, with the participation of two crime experts. During the inspection, which was also attended by the third applicant, T.M.’s sister, the investigator seized several pieces of evidence, including two pillowcases and a blanket, both containing blood stains. The report noted that there were two holes, one in the bedhead of T.M.’s bed and another one in the wall behind the bed, at a height of 85.5 cm and 84 cm from the floor respectively. Metal fragments were extracted from the hole in the wall, which measured some 3   cm. As was noted in the inspection report, a search of T.M.’s bedroom had been conducted by the representatives of the SSS before the arrival of the investigator (see paragraph 13 above). 16 .     On the same date, the investigator in charge of the investigation interviewed the applicants. According to the interview report of the fourth applicant, T.M.’s mother, she and her husband had been woken up at around 3 a.m. by the sound of smashing doors, coming from the first floor of their house. She had then seen some light and heard the noise of what might have been a gunshot. Both she and her husband had quickly run outside their bedroom situated on the ground floor and seen several masked armed officers in the courtyard of the house. At that point the fourth applicant had lost consciousness for some ten minutes. When she had regained consciousness, she, her mother-in-law and her daughter had been taken at gunpoint to her bedroom and locked in there. The fourth applicant stated that none of the armed officers had physically abused or otherwise insulted them. In the morning she and her husband went to the hospital, where she had learnt that her son had been injured on his forehead. 17 .     According to the third applicant’s, T.M.s’ sister’s statement, on the night of the special operation she was sleeping on the first floor of the house, in the bedroom next to that of her brother. At around 3.30 a.m. she had heard footsteps approaching, followed by the sound of smashing doors. She had immediately stood up, opened her bedroom door, and seen on the balcony, at the very entrance to her brother’s bedroom, two armed and masked men, who had ordered her to lie down. She had obeyed their order, and within seconds she had seen one of the officers shooting in the direction of T.M.’s bedroom. She had then heard one of the armed officers saying that there was an injured person who required medical assistance. After the shooting, four more masked and armed officers had arrived at the balcony on the first floor. They had calmed the third applicant down and accompanied her downstairs, to join her mother and grandmother in one of the bedrooms. According to the interview report, the third applicant was allowed to enter her brother’s bedroom only after several hours, when the SSS had left. She had seen his bed, a pillow, and the floor with blood stains on, as well as the damaged wall. 18 .     The second applicant, T.M.’s grandmother, stated in her interview that at around 3.30 a.m. she had heard the sound of smashing doors followed within seconds by a gunshot. She said that she had been locked by the armed officers in her bedroom with her granddaughter and daughter-in-law, and then moved to her neighbour’s house. 19 .     According to the interview report of the first applicant, T.M.s’ father, he had heard the sound of smashing doors at around 3.30 a.m., followed within a few seconds by two or three gunshots. He and his wife had run out of their bedroom but were prevented by some ten to fifteen armed and masked officers from going up to the first floor. The first applicant had been forced to the ground at gunpoint in the courtyard of the house and was kept there for some ten minutes. He was subsequently escorted to his mother’s bedroom on the ground floor and locked in there. The first applicant noted in his statement that after about three hours he had been told to attend the search of the house, first of the ground floor, as a result of which his mobile phone had been seized, and then of the first floor. When he was allowed to go to T.M.’s bedroom, he saw that his son’s bedroom was turned upside down, which made him think that that the search of the room had already been conducted. Upon entering the bedroom, he had noticed blood stains on the floor, the bed and the wall behind the bed. When he had asked about the stains, he was told that T.M. had tried to detonate a hand grenade and had been shot in self-defence. The officers had stated that T.M.’s life was not in danger and that he had been taken to a hospital. The first applicant was shown a hand grenade lying on the floor, which, according to the officers, T.M. had tried to detonate. In reply to a question, the first applicant had stated that he had not been verbally or physically insulted and that he did not require any medical examination. He had also said that he did not believe that the hand grenade had belonged to his son. 20 .     The applicants were additionally interviewed in March, April and June 2018, and February 2019. In their additional statements they complained that they had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment during the special operation. For example, the first applicant alleged that he had been forced to the ground half-naked in the courtyard of their house and had been subjected to verbal and physical abuse. The second applicant alleged that she had not been provided with the necessary medical treatment for her epileptic seizure on time and was in addition not allowed to go to the toilets and had had to urinate in front of the armed security officers. The evidence of the SAU officers and other evidence from the SSS 21 .     On 28 December 2017 the prosecutor in charge of the investigation wrote to the SSS asking for information about the identities of those who had participated in the special operation of 26 December 2017, the firearms used during the special operation, and the report of a responsible official concerning the conduct of the special operation. The prosecutor repeated his request on 4 January 2018. In a reply of 1 February 2018, a representative of the SSS provided a list of thirty-two officers who had participated in the operation, also indicating the firearms each of them had had with them that night. In the same letter, the prosecutor was informed that there were no audio, video or photographic files depicting the special operation. The prosecutor’s request for the report concerning the special operation was left unanswered. 22 .     On 1 February 2018, SAU officer no. 1, the officer who had shot T.M., was interviewed. According to his interview report, the assignment in the operation in question was to arrest those affiliated with Chatayev’s terrorist group. The instruction was to arrest the suspects alive and to avoid their “liquidation”. Some other SAU officers had secured the courtyard of the house while others had been responsible for the ground floor. He had been told to position himself on the first floor of the applicants’ house and to check the two rooms there. Before entering the first room on his right, SAU officer no. 1 had checked that the doors were not locked; he had also noticed light coming from the window. Then he had entered the room, followed by another SAU officer (officer no. 2). After taking two steps, he had seen T.M., who was awake in a half lying position in the bed, with his head slightly elevated over the pillow. T.M. was covered with a blanket which had prevented SAU officer no. 1 from seeing his hands. The officer had ordered T.M. to show his hands and not to move. T.M. had, however, taken off the blanket and reached out for a hand grenade on the right side of his bed. After grabbing the hand grenade, he had returned to his initial position and tried to detonate it. According to officer no. 1, at this moment, since he and the other officer were facing an imminent threat to their lives, he had acted in self-defence and fired at T.M. from his Sig Sauer model 516 gun, hitting him in the head. As a result, T.M. had dropped the hand grenade, which fell onto the bed. The officer had taken the hand grenade and put it, for security purposes, on the floor. In reply to a specific question, SAU officer no. 1 had maintained that they had been instructed to arrest T.M. and not to kill and/or injure him. 23.     SAU officer no. 1 was subsequently interviewed several times. In his additional statement of 6 August 2019, he confirmed that T.M. had been lying in his bed with his body and hands fully covered, and that after reaching out for the grenade, he had returned to his previous position. In reply to a specific question, he noted that the lights had been turned on in T.M.’s bedroom and that T.M. had been awake at the moment of the officers’ entrance into the room. He also dismissed as untrue the applicants’ allegations concerning their degrading treatment and stated that the pre-operation instructions had been given orally. In his additional statement of 22 January 2020, he also stated that he had seen T.M. taking a hand grenade from the upper right side of his bed, and that he could not remember whether after the shot he had seen a mobile telephone in T.M.’s bed. As to the shot itself, he claimed that he had directly targeted T.M.’s head, as with a gunshot to his body there would still have been a risk of his detonating the hand grenade. 24 .     SAU officer no. 2 gave a statement identical to that of the first officer. He confirmed hearing the first officer demanding that T.M. show his hands. He had also seen T.M. reaching out for a hand grenade and trying to detonate it, at which moment the first officer had fired. The second officer noted that the SAU’s assignment during the special operation was to arrest the suspected terrorists. In his additional statement of 22 January 2020, he stated that he had not seen T.M. taking the hand grenade as he had been behind SAU officer no.   1. When he had seen T.M. with a hand grenade, T.M. had already been in a position which could have allowed him to detonate the explosive device. He also did not remember seeing a mobile telephone in the bed. 25 .     SAU officers nos. 3 and 4 confirmed in their statements the version of events as presented by the first and second officers. They stated that they had been on the balcony of the first floor when they had heard the gunshot. They had immediately rushed to T.M.’s bedroom; but it had taken them about fifteen to twenty seconds to get inside the room, as SAU officer no. 3 had become stuck in the entrance with his backpack, and SAU officer no. 4 had had to smash one wing of the door with his foot in order to allow them to enter. They noted that when they had entered the room, they had seen the hand grenade lying on a small carpet on the left side of the bed. The remaining officers were also interviewed on several occasions. They all gave identical statements, providing a short account of the operation and dismissing the applicants’ allegations of degrading treatment as untrue. They also stated that the instructions before the special operation took place had been given to them orally; that they had been told that those to be arrested were affiliated with Chatayev’s group and hence military resistance on their part was to be expected; and that the purpose of the special operation had been to arrest the suspects. 26 .     On 20 February 2018 two officers in charge of removing mines (explosive experts) were interviewed. According to their statements, they had both been waiting in a car in the vicinity of the applicants’ house when the operation had started. Within several minutes after it had started, they had heard information on their radio communication devices about “the object” being injured, and the request for medical help. After some time, they had been called to T.M.’s bedroom, where they had seen a hand grenade lying on the floor on the left side from the entrance doors. Having neutralised the hand grenade, they had returned it to the same place. They had then inspected the room but had not found any other explosive materials. In reply to a specific question, they had stated that when they had entered the bedroom, T.M. had no longer been there. They confirmed seeing blood stains on the bed and the floor and said that they had been told by SAU officers about the way in which the operation had unfolded, including T.M. attempting to detonate a hand grenade and one of the officers shooting in self-defence. 27.     On 18-19 April 2018 two SAU doctors were interviewed. According to their interview statements, they were in the village of Duisi when the special operation started. They had been waiting outside in a car specially equipped for providing urgent medical care. Some ten minutes after the operation had started, they had heard via radio communication devices that the “object” was injured. Within two to three minutes, they had been asked to go inside the applicants’ house. When they entered what later appeared to be T.M.’s bedroom, T.M. was lying on the bed, unconscious, with a single perforating gun wound to his head. They had provided him with urgent medical care, treated his wound, and transferred him with the help of a stretcher to their car. They had been informed by that time that the ambulance was on its way, however they had decided, in view of the urgency, to drive T.M. in the direction of the ambulance. After some ten minutes’ drive, they had met the ambulance and transferred T.M. into it. 28.     The SAU officers were interviewed again in August and November 2019, and then in January 2020. In their additional statements they confirmed that they had not been provided in advance with any written documents concerning the planning of the operation, that they had been instructed orally, and that some main points concerning the operation had been written on a whiteboard and then deleted. When asked about headphones, they all noted that they had not seen any headphones in T.M.’s bedroom. 29 .     On 14 August 2019, I.Ch., the head of the Counter-Terrorism Department at the SSS, was interviewed. According to the relevant interview statement, T.M.’s identity and that of four other individuals, was established within the scope of the investigation conducted into the activities of Akhmed Chatayev and his terrorist group. Those five people were suspected of providing the terrorists with material support, including household items and food. They were also suspected of helping to arm Chatayev. According to I.Ch., in view of their experience with the special operation of 21-22 November 2017, it was decided to involve the SAU in the special operation for the arrest of the five individuals on 26 December 2017. I.Ch. had briefed the head of the SAU, Z.Z., about the circumstances of the case, including the information they possessed about the five persons. He had told him that those persons were affiliated with the terrorists who had been “liquidated” during the November special operation and hence, they could have been equipped with firearms and explosives and could have provided armed resistance to the arrest. I.Ch. further noted during his interview that, after the location of the places of residence of the five individuals had been examined, on 25 December 2017 the operation had been planned for early in the morning on 26 December 2017. He had coordinated its conduct from Tbilisi, while his deputy P.J. was on the ground in the village of Duisi. 30 .     On 15 August 2019, P.J., the deputy head of the Counter-Terrorism Department at the SSS, was interviewed. According to his statement, the arrest operation was planned on 25 December 2017. In view of the affiliation of the five persons with Chatayev’s terrorist group, the operation was planned on the assumption that the five could provide armed resistance. The head of the Counter-Terrorism Department, I.Ch. had ordered that the arrest operation be conducted with no casualties and that the special forces take all possible measures to avoid wounding or “liquidating” the suspects. P.J. personally went to the village of Duisi to oversee the arrest of two suspects, including T.M. According to the plan, the SAU officers were to enter the houses first to effect the arrest of the suspects and to secure the ground. They were then to be followed by SSS investigators. The operation had started at around 3.30   a.m. After some ten to twenty minutes, P.J. had been informed by one of the officers (he did not know who exactly) via radio communication that one of the suspects was injured and required medical assistance. In reply to a specific question, he had stated that he had not participated in the search of T.M.’s bedroom. However, in order to prevent any complications that might be caused by the first applicant during the search, he had accompanied the investigators to T.M.’s bedroom and had seen the blood stains on the bed and the floor. He had also noticed a hole on the top of the bedhead and a hand grenade on the floor next to the bed. 31 .     On 19 August 2019 the deputy head of the SSS was interviewed. He stated that he had coordinated the conduct of the special operation of 26   December 2017 from Tbilisi together with I.Ch., the head of the Counter ‑ Terrorism Department. 32 .     I.K., the SSS investigator who had conducted the search of the applicants’ house in the immediate aftermath of the special operation, was interviewed on 29 May 2018, 7 August and 25 November 2019, and 23   January 2020. As to the circumstances of the search of T.M.’s bedroom, according to I.K.’s statement, the first two SAU explosives experts had been summoned. They had neutralised the hand grenade and searched T.M.’s bedroom for other potential explosives. Two crime experts were then called to conduct the search. In his additional interview of 23 January 2020, in reply to a specific question, I.K. noted that there had been no headphones in T.M.’s bedroom, particularly not on his bed. He also confirmed that he had not secured the scene because he had seized all the evidence he required for the purposes of the terrorism-related investigation. He also had not known that the investigation into the wounding of T.M. had started. Z.N., another SSS officer, who had participated in the search, confirmed the circumstances of the search in his interview report. He listed among the items seized from T.M.’s bedroom several mobile telephones and a hand grenade. He noted that the two parts of the neutralised hand grenade had been lying on the floor, on the left from the entrance door, and that one of the mobile telephones had also been found on the floor. 33 .     According to the case file, the SSS claimed that no audio, video, or photographic recording of the special operation had been conducted. In their letter of 26 June 2019, in reply to that of the prosecution authority, a representative of the SSS additionally noted that no written document providing for the planning of the operation or instructions for the SAU officers had been drawn up. The arrest operation was planned on 25   December 2017 and certain instructions for the officers had been drawn up on a whiteboard and subsequently erased. The forensic examinations 34 .     On 3 January 2018 the SSS investigator I.K. sent the hand grenade and other evidence to the National Forensic Bureau and requested the organisation of a biological, ballistics, and dactyloscopic examination. The report on the dactyloscopic examination of the hand grenade, dated 10   January 2018, noted that the traces on the hand grenade were not sufficient or suitable for identification purposes and thus no useable fingerprints could be obtained. According to the ballistics report dated 19 January 2018, the hand grenade in question was a fully functional explosive weapon, until its destruction as a result of a firearms forensic examination. As to the biological report dated 30 January 2018, the experts noted that the red-brown stains on the hand grenade seized from T.M.’s bedroom were blood stains which corresponded to the genetic profile of T.M. According to the case file, the hand grenade was destroyed during the firearm’s forensic examination. 35.     On 23 January 2018 another ballistic report was issued concerning the metal fragments extracted from the wall behind T.M.’s bed. 36.     On 12 March 2018 a forensic medical report was issued, according to which T.M. had had a penetrating gunshot wound on the left side of the forehead and an exit wound on the back of his head. The report stated that the head injury had resulted in T.M.’s death, and that a surgical intervention that T.M. had undergone following his wounding had prevented the expert from establishing the firing distance. The report also noted that the trajectory of the gunshot wound had been from the front to the back and almost horizontal. 37.     On 21 December 2018 another forensic report was issued, according to which it was impossible to establish the exact position of T.M. at the moment he was shot owing to several possible variations of the exact location of his hands, legs and torso. At the same time, it was noted in the report that T.M. had been in a lying down position with his head slightly elevated, and that his sitting or standing could be ruled out. 38 .     On 29 November 2019 an expert report was issued following the examination of the photographs of T.M.’s bedroom taken by the local journalist in the immediate aftermath of the special operation (see paragraph 12 above). These photographs were compared with those taken by the SSS investigator during the search and subsequently by the prosecution authority during the inspection of the crime scene. After analysing the photographs, the expert concluded that, first, it was technically impossible to clearly establish what the white object (alleged by the applicants to be T.M.’s iPhone headphones) was which could be seen in the two photographs taken by the local journalist; and secondly, that object could not be seen on the photographs taken during the search and the inspection. 39 .     Several other forensic examinations were conducted within the scope of the ongoing criminal proceedings, including a forensic medical examination for the purpose of assessing the adequacy of the medical assistance provided to T.M. following his wounding. According to the relevant report issued on 4 October 2019, while there had been a delay in providing T.M. with artificial respiration, it had no causal link with his death, and moreover all other stages of his treatment had been prompt, accurate and adequate. Other evidence 40 .     During the investigation, a doctor and a nurse from Telavi Hospital were interviewed. They noted that T.M. had been taken to hospital at around 7.10 a.m. by an ambulance, that he had had a gunshot wound to the left area of his forehead, and that no other injuries could be seen on him. The ambulance doctors and a driver, for their part, noted that they had received a call at 4.21 a.m. and had immediately left for the village of Duisi, however, before they arrived, they had come across a car in the vicinity of the village of Matani, which had been driving T.M. in their direction. T.M. had been quickly transferred to the ambulance and they had driven him to Akhmeta Hospital. In reply to a specific question, one of the ambulance doctors noted that when they had first seen T.M. he had already been given first aid. 41.     T.M.’s cousin stated in his interview that the last message he had received from T.M. on the morning of the special operation was via WhatsApp at 3.39 a.m. 42 .     On 22 January 2019 the local journalist, who took photographs of T.M.’s bedroom, was interviewed. According to his statement, he went to see T.M.’s bedroom sometime between 9 and 10   a.m., immediately after the police and the SAU officers had left. He remembered seeing red stains on the floor and the bed. There was a hole in the wall next to the entrance door just behind the bed, and there were pillows, bed sheets, a mattress, and bedcovers all over the floor with blood stains. He had taken nine photographs with his mobile telephone, recorded a short interview with the third applicant and left in order to come back with proper equipment. He had come back within some thirty minutes and noticed that certain objects in the room had been moved around. He had then taken sixteen photographs with his professional camera. In reply to a specific question, he showed a photograph taken by him, showing a small white object on a carpet next to the bed. He had identified this object as an iPhone earbud. He also showed another photograph, where another small white object could be seen. He noted that this object could have been an earbud or something else. 43.     Several of the applicants’ neighbours were also interviewed in connection with the circumstances of the special operation. According to the interview report of E.Ts., shortly after the special operation, when the SAU officers had started to leave, she had gone to T.M.’s bedroom with T.M.’s sister and had seen the bed sheets with blood stains on them. She also recalled that early in the morning, journalists had come to see T.M.’s bedroom and she had shown them the blood stains in the room. 44.     The prosecution authorities also interviewed the experts who had conducted various forensic examinations. The applicants’ involvement in the investigation and their access to the investigation file 45 .     On 9 January 2018 the applicants wrote to the prosecutor’s office requesting that T.M. be granted victim status. The request was refused, with the prosecution authority noting that the investigation was in its active phase, many investigative actions were yet to come, and there was no sufficient basis to conclude that T.M. was a victim of a criminal offence within the meaning of Article 3 § 22 and Article 56 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP” – see the relevant provisions cited in paragraph 59 below). Following T.M.’s death, on 16 January 2018 the applicants sent a new request, this time requesting victim status for T.M.’s father, the first applicant. That request and the applicants’ subsequent appeal to the superior prosecutor were refused with the same reasoning as previously given on 18 and 25 January respectively. The superior prosecutor in addition noted that the