CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 28 mars 2023

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margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 39611/18 GEORGIA against Russia   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 28   March 2023 as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Jovan Ilievski,   Egidijus Kūris,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Lado Chanturia,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Davor Derenčinović , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 August 2018, Having regard to the observations submitted by the parties, Having deliberated, decides as follows: PROCEDURE 1.     The application was communicated to the Russian Government (“the respondent Government”) on 18 June 2019. 2.     On 10 September 2019, at the request of the respondent Government, the Chamber decided to adjourn the case until the adoption of a judgment on the merits in the case Georgia v. Russia (II) (no. 38263/08). After the delivery of the judgment on the merits in that case on 21 January 2021, the proceedings in the present case were resumed on 25 May 2021. 3.     The parties submitted their observations on 15 December 2021 and on 25 February 2022. 4.     The Georgian Government (“the applicant Government”), were represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice. 5.     The respondent Government were represented by Mr M. Vinogradov, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights. 6.     On 16 March 2022 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in the context of a procedure launched under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, adopted Resolution CM/Res(2022)2, by which the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe as from 16 March 2022 . 7 .     On 22 March 2022 the Court, sitting in plenary session in accordance with Rule 20 § 1, adopted the “Resolution of the European Court of Human Rights on the consequences of the cessation of membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe in light of Article 58 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. It stated that the Russian Federation would cease to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022. 8.     On 5 September 2022 the Plenary Court took formal notice of the fact that the office of judge with respect of the Russian Federation would cease to exist after 16 September 2022. This, as a consequence, entailed that there was no longer a valid list of ad hoc judges who would be eligible to take part in the consideration of cases where the Russian Federation was the respondent State. 9.     By a letter of 8 November 2022, the Russian Government were informed, inter alia , that the Court intended to appoint one of the sitting judges of the Court to act as an ad hoc judge for the examination of applications against that State that the Court remained competent to deal with (applying by analogy Rule 29 § 2 of the Rules of Court). The Russian Government were invited to comment on that arrangement by 22   November 2022, but they did not submit any comments. 10.     Accordingly, in the present case the President of the Chamber decided to appoint an ad   hoc judge from among the members of the composition, applying by analogy Rule   29 §   2 (b). THE FACTS 11.     In the context of an armed conflict that occurred between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the Russian armed forces invaded all of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [1] (for more details about that conflict, see Georgia v. Russia   (II) [GC], no. 38263/08, §§ 32-44, 21 January 2021). Russia recognised those two Georgian regions as independent States on 26 August 2008. That recognition was not followed by the international community [2] . On the basis of “friendship and cooperation” agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia then established military bases and stationed up to 3,800 Russian soldiers in each of those two regions. Subsequent agreements set up a joint military command between Russia and Abkhazia and incorporated the South Ossetian “military” into the Russian armed forces [3] . 12 .     Furthermore, pursuant to agreements on “joint efforts in protecting the border” [4] , Russian border guards (under the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) secure the administrative boundary line (“ABL”) between those breakaway regions and the territory controlled by the Georgian government. It has been reported that there are around 900 Russian border guards in South Ossetia and around 1,500 in Abkhazia [5] . Since 2009, physical barriers and other measures have gradually been established to block people from crossing the ABL freely. As described by the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia [6] , this process – often called “borderisation” – includes three main elements: (1) the establishment of physical infrastructure, such as fencing, barbed wire, guard towers, signs informing people that they are approaching the “borders” and advanced surveillance equipment, to force commuters, vehicles and goods to use controlled crossing points established at the ABL; (2) surveillance and patrolling by either Russian border guards or security actors from the breakaway regions who monitor the situation and detain people if they are in violation of established rules; and (3) a crossing regime requiring commuters to have specific documents and only use “official” crossing points [7] . Reportedly, this process intensified in 2013 [8] . Uncontrolled crossings have been a frequent occurrence, with people taking backdoor paths across the conflict divide to bypass the controlled crossing points. Many of those who cross outside controlled crossing points have no crossing documents. Others cross via uncontrolled paths because travel to the crossing points is too inconvenient [9] . Another reason is that it is not always clear where the ABL lies (only parts of the ABL have been marked so far) [10] . 13.     Georgia and the overwhelming majority of the international community consider the process of “borderisation” illegal under international law. The Georgian authorities refer to the ABL as the occupation line. In contrast, the Russian and the de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities treat the ABL as an international border on the grounds that Russia has recognised the two breakaway entities as independent States. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 14 .     The applicant Government submitted the following materials stemming from international organisations and independent international human rights protection associations, in support of their claims: consolidated reports of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the conflict in Georgia dated 11 April 2017 (SG/Inf(2017)18) and 11 April 2018 (SG/Inf(2018)15); Amnesty International Report 2017/18 on the state of the world’s human rights during 2017; the decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the conflict in Georgia, adopted at the 1315th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies on 2   May 2018 (CM/Del/Dec(2018)1315/2.1); the Resolution of the European Parliament of 14   June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion (P8_TA(2018)0266); and the Resolution on Ten Years After the August 2008 War in Georgia, adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly at its twenty-seventh annual session in Berlin from 7 to 11 July 2018. 15 .     The relevant part of the 2017 consolidated report of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the conflict in Georgia (cited above) reads: “ III.1     Reports on Abkhazia III.1.i     Security 36.     According to the assessments by the [Geneva International Discussions (GID)] participants, the security situation has remained relatively stable and calm. However, in meetings with the delegation, the Georgian authorities identified detentions related to ABL crossings as a critical security concern for the local population. 37.     Since its resumption in May 2016, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in Gali facilitated by the UN Geneva co-chair has continued to function as the only format on the ground to alleviate security tensions and address incidents. All interlocutors positively assessed the process and the commitment of the participants. A regular and enhanced activation of the hotline is reported in connection to the IPRM resumption. 38.     It is understood that lack of progress regarding the investigation conducted by de facto authorities into the murder of an ethnic Georgian in the vicinity of the ABL, in May 2016 [11] , represents a challenge for joint efforts to sustain security and build trust between the sides. A large part of the Gali IPRM agenda is consecrated to this issue. The Georgian authorities stressed the need to bring the perpetrator to justice and informed the delegation that they had transmitted the necessary information to the Abkhaz side. However, no agreement on the matter was reached as of the time of the delegation’s visit. It was also reported to the delegation that a general insecurity feeling persists among the local population in Khurcha in the aftermath of the incident. 39.     Meanwhile, the identified suspect was tried in absentia on murder charges by a Georgian court, which sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment in December last year. On 10 March, the court of appeal reportedly increased the sentence to 14 years. On 17   March, Interpol issued a red notice warrant on the suspect. III.1.ii     Freedom of movement 40.     The main critical development over the reporting period concerns the closure of two additional crossing points on the ABL, namely Khurcha/Nabakevi and Meore-Otobaia/Orsantia, pursuant to a decision of the de facto authorities adopted on 28   December [2016], which became effective on 5 March 2017. 41.     Although anticipated, the decision prompted severe negative reactions both at the national level and internationally. The UN, the OSCE and the EU advised against such unilateral steps while warning about the detrimental effect on the freedom of movement, cross-ABL trade, access to healthcare and education as well as other aspects of daily lives of the local population, and more broadly on the security situation in the region. In this context, they called upon all actors to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions. On 10 March, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia reiterated that the decision was not subject to revision and that ‘it met the security needs of all its citizens’. In meetings with the delegation, all international interlocutors converged on the important humanitarian impact of the closures also in view of the fact that approximately 600 crossings per day reportedly take place in each location. The Georgian central government and international interlocutors expressed very strong concerns about the consequences of the decision. 42.     While the road linking villages adjacent to the ABL with the main crossing point over the Inguri bridge has been repaired and a shuttle service is in place, these measures are deemed to be insufficient to cope with the needs of the local population. It would appear that the new rules will have a particularly worrying effect on schoolchildren and humanitarian crossings. Crossing itinerary in some cases is extended to over 50 km. Moreover, the purported closure of yet another crossing point has been announced in the future, leaving only the Inguri road bridge where over 1,500 crossings are reported on a daily basis. The local residents in the Gali district peacefully protested against these measures, on 25 January. 43.     Freedom of movement continues also to be very negatively affected by the ongoing so-called ‘borderisation’ process, which according to information provided by the Georgian central government, has resulted in a 48 km stretch of fencing along the ABL. It was reported to the delegation that the so-called ‘border zone’ with a specific regime adjacent to the ABL inside the territory of Abkhazia had been expanded since November 2016. 44.     It is anticipated that the reduction in the number of crossing points will inevitably lead to an increased number of detentions, which continue to occur regularly in case of crossings in ‘unauthorised’ points and/or due to lack of valid documents. According to the Georgian Security Service, 190 detention cases were reported in the course of 2016 across the ABL with Abkhazia. While as a rule those apprehended are released after being shortly detained and paying a ‘fine’, the delegation continued to receive reports about instances of ill-treatment. A drastic increase in ‘fines’ – up to ten times higher – for recurrent ‘violations’ is reported to be recently enforced. III.1.iii     Identity documents 45.     It was reported to the delegation that in December 2016, the de facto Parliament of Abkhazia adopted changes to the de facto law on the status of foreign citizens that regulates, among other things, the status and rights of the ethnic Georgian population in the Gali district. At the time of the delegation’s visit to Tbilisi and as reported to the delegation by international interlocutors, the distribution of the new residence permits had not yet started. 46.     The new changes reportedly foresee that the majority of Gali district residents who have Georgian citizenship will be granted ‘permanent residency’ rights, however, it is understood that these changes do not address all outstanding issues. While it is anticipated that one improvement might purportedly concern crossings along the ABL, lack of clarity persists with respect to other rights attached to the permanent resident status, such as property rights. In discussions with the delegation, representatives of the Georgian central government expressed concern that restrictions for receiving the temporary and permanent ‘residence permits’ remain unchanged. ... III.2     Reports on South Ossetia 51.     Following the so-called ‘borderisation’ phase that resulted in installation of fences and barbed wire stretching over 52 km along the ABL, ploughing of furrows and deep ditches along the ABL were pursued during the period under review. As a result, local residents continued to be unable to access their agricultural and grazing lands in particular during the harvesting period. 52.     At the same time, the delegation was informed that the de facto authorities had eased some of the restrictions in terms of access to the so-called ‘border zone’ adjacent to the ABL, following several protests and criticism by South Ossetia residents who were unable to visit villages situated within the designated area. In particular, on 27   January 2017, the de facto government removed special permissions required to enter the so-called ‘border zone’. Other restrictions including the requirement of a permission to carry out livelihood activities within 100 m distance from the ABL reportedly remains in force. 53.     The Georgian central government and the international community remain firm in their opposition to the so-called ‘borderisation’ activities and their impact on the local population, particularly as regards adverse effects on their freedom of movement, livelihood and security perceptions. The issue is regularly raised in the Geneva and IPRM formats. 54.     International observers estimate that over 500 crossings per day take place along the ABL, out of which 400 at the Odzisi/Mosabruni main crossing point to Akhalgori; a region populated mainly by the ethnic Georgian population, a part of which continues to commute to and from government-controlled territories after being displaced as a result of the 2008 conflict. Notwithstanding the stable crossing rates, some interlocutors maintained that the crossing point is regarded as ‘temporary’ by the de facto authorities and continues to operate in view of the still complicated transport connection between Akhalgori and Tskhinvali. Reportedly, the previous weight restriction on merchandise (50 kg) allowed through the ABL was lifted during the period under review. 55.     Alleged violations of the ‘border’ regime by the local population keep resulting in short-term detentions by the de facto authorities who keep imposing ‘fines’ on the persons concerned. It was reported to the delegation that at least 10 cases of detentions per month could be ascertained by observers on the ground, although similar to Abkhazia, admittedly the number could be higher. 56.     In discussions with the delegation, representatives of the Georgian central government expressed fears that the practice of longer-term detentions could be reinstated. In this respect they once again drew the delegation’s attention to the case of a Georgian IDP from the Gori district that was detained in June 2016 for ‘illegal border crossing’, and sentenced to over 20 years of imprisonment on 3 February 2017 allegedly on crimes relating to ‘illegal possession of weapons’ during the August 2008 conflict. The delegation was also informed that another person had been recently released after a relatively long detention period in Tskhinvali. 57.     As far as identity documents are concerned, the delegation was informed that new ‘permissions’ valid for three years were being distributed to the ethnic Georgian population in Akhalgori as replacement for long expired documents. While this measure is thought to improve the situation with freedom of movement and the conduct of daily activities, the Georgian authorities have reported cases when ‘permissions’ were issued with a much shorter validity period of three months. Separation of family members appears to remain a pressing concern for the local population in Akhalgori, in particular as not everybody has been able to obtain the new ID documentation. 58.     Meanwhile, according to media reports, the de facto authorities have also started to re-issue ‘passports’ to the local Georgian population for the first time since 2014, in a move that appears to be related with de facto presidential elections scheduled for 9   April. On 1 March 2017, de facto President of South Ossetia Tibilov declared that ethnic Georgians could be hired to serve in local administration posts. 59.     During the period under review, the participants from the Georgian central government and South Ossetia continued to meet regularly in the presence of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the OSCE Geneva Co-Chair in the framework of the IPRM in Ergneti to address security concerns and incidents. The continued readiness of the participants to address jointly security concerns by effectively using the hotline to manage incidents on the ground has been valued by the international co-facilitators.” 16.     The relevant part of the 2018 consolidated report of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the conflict in Georgia (cited above) reads: “ III.1     Reports on Abkhazia III.1.i     Security 35.     Though the security situation on the ground remained relatively stable as reported by various relevant interlocutors involved in the monitoring of the situation, it was reported to the delegation that the general crime situation had worsened in Abkhazia during the period under review. 36.     During the period under review, the IPRM under the auspices of the UN co-chair of the GID continued to convene regularly in Gali, with the most recent, the 53rd round taking place on 27 February. All participants recognise the value of the mechanism, and the associated hotline managed by the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), in ensuring exchange of information, increasing confidence and predictability and addressing humanitarian concerns on the ground. 37.     Regrettably, no progress was made in delivering justice in the case of the murder of Georgian civilian, Mr Giga Otkhozoria, on 19 May 2016, in the vicinity of the village of Khurcha, on the ABL with Abkhazia (see previous consolidated reports). Representatives of the Georgian central government underlined to the delegation that they remained gravely concerned by the impunity for this criminal act and continued to raise the issue at the GID and IPRM. The media reported that in January 2018, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, a prominent Georgian NGO, lodged an ECtHR application on behalf of the victim’s relatives [12] . III.1.ii     Freedom of movement 38.     Freedom of movement continued to be severely affected by the so-called ‘borderisation’ process. The delegation’s interlocutors noted that the period under review was marked by gradual reinforcement of so-called ‘borderisation’ activities, displayed in new earth berms, ditches and new surveillance equipment including in and around ‘crossing points’ that were closed down last year. The Georgian authorities continue to resolutely protest against the so-called ‘borderisation’ process and condemn it in strong terms. 39.     An average of 3,000 ABL crossings per day are reported on the main bridge over the Inguri River, marking an increase in comparison to previous periods, presumably as a result of the closure of other points. Whilst some interlocutors noted that the situation with crossings had relatively stabilised due to certain steps taken by the de facto authorities and international humanitarian agencies, other argued that these measures were insufficient and that the most vulnerable groups of the population such as elderly and disabled people, schoolchildren and patients in emergency medical evacuations were affected the most. Though a second crossing point remains in place, preparations to close it are reported as ongoing. 40.     As regards crossing documentation, the delegation was informed that the de facto authorities in Abkhazia had temporarily extended the validity of use of the so-called ‘Form Nr. 9’ [13] , arguably in view of the low number of so-called ‘residence permits’ issued so far (cf. also part III.1.iii ). 41.     The so-called ‘borderisation’ and other freedom of movement restrictions along with the reported lack of crossing documents continue to complicate access to livelihoods, healthcare and education as well as family links. Several interlocutors met in Tbilisi, including from civil society, raising concerns that the humanitarian and economic situation in the Gali district is primarily and particularly affected even though restrictions appear to affect not only the ethnic Georgian population but also members of other communities. 42.     Concerns persist also in relation to the detention of persons who are accused of ‘violating’ crossing rules. On a more positive note, the delegation was informed that two Georgian citizens who were earlier detained for ‘illegal crossing’ and subsequently sentenced on other charges (cf. 16th consolidated report) had been recently released. III.1.iii     Identity documents 43.     As of the time of the visit, it was reported that the de facto authorities had issued 1,500 new so-called ‘residence permits’ to ethnic Georgians in the Gali district under the so-called ‘Law on the legal status of foreigners’. The delegation was informed that some 5,000 applications were filed compared to over 20,000 persons who had their de facto ‘passports’ removed or invalidated in 2013. According to some interlocutors, the applications take excessive time to process in part due to security checks. 44.     In addition, the local de facto authorities in Gali have indicated that some 4,000 individuals would not be entitled to a so-called ‘foreign residence permit’. The decision purportedly affects people who have moved to reside in adjacent areas under the control of the Georgian central government but periodically cross to Abkhazia to access their land and agricultural livelihoods. 45.     As previously reported, the scope of the rights and entitlements attached to this new ‘legal status’ is marked by ambiguity, giving rise to concerns about the rights of the local population. Effective implementation of property rights during property transfer transactions seems to be particularly problematic. The delegation was informed that the de facto authorities have undertaken to amend the de facto legislation in the near future. However, little information seems to be available in this respect creating further uncertainty. 46.     It is recalled that the UN has sought assurances with regard to returnees’ rights relating to permanent residence, freedom of movement, birth registration and property ownership and more generally has called for access to political rights, equal protection before the law, social security, health care, work and employment, education, freedom of thought, conscience and expression, and cultural life. III.1.iv     Access to education, including teaching of/in the native language ... 50.     It was reiterated to the delegation that the freedom of movement of schoolchildren who attend schools in central government-controlled territory remained problematic in the aftermath of the closure of two ‘crossing points’ in 2017, even though no detentions seem to have recently occurred. Currently, only 16 children are reported to be crossing, which appears to be a considerably lower number in comparison to previous years. III.2     Reports on South Ossetia 51.     The general security situation along the ABL during the reporting period was assessed by observers on the ground as relatively calm. Security incidents continue to be discussed in the IPRM in Ergneti and are effectively dealt with through the activation of the associated Hotline. It was reported that in this framework the EUMM has proposed to enlarge the list of activities conducted by military/security services near the ABL that could be pre-announced via the Hotline. At the same time, representatives of the Georgian central government underlined the necessity of creating international security arrangements to address security challenges on the ground. 52.     The period under review was regrettably marked by a continuation of so-called ‘borderisation’ activities. In addition to the 60 km which have been fenced off, ploughed lines continue to be used, apparently in an effort to ‘demarcate’ the ABL, according to the interlocutors met by the delegation. The human rights and humanitarian dimensions of the so-called ‘borderisation’ were unfortunately reflected in the inability of the local population to move freely, access livelihoods or collect firewood during the winter season remain of serious concern. 53.     As previously reported, approximately 500 people are estimated to cross daily through the Mosabruni/Odzisi ‘crossing point’ to the Akhalgori district inhabited by ethnic Georgians. It was reported that since January 2018 a de facto customs office has been functioning at this crossing point. According to the de facto authorities, who have justified this measure with the need to control the flow of agricultural goods to South Ossetia, Akhalgori residents would be allowed to transport goods (except meat and dairy products) of up to 50 kilograms monthly for personal use. Goods beyond that limit are declared and a fee is levied. Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the opening of the post as another ‘illegal step’ by the Russian Federation and warned about the aggravation of the humanitarian situation of the local people. 54.     It was reported to the delegation that the number of detentions related to ‘unauthorised’ crossings seemed to be lower than in previous periods, although no comprehensive statistical data exists in this regard. The Georgian authorities and the EUMM possess information only about detentions of ethnic Georgians who are subsequently handed back to the Georgian side, whilst it is understood that the community in Tskhinvali is also affected. It was also reported that a case involving a Georgian long-term detainee in Tskhinvali, referred to in the previous consolidated report, had been positively resolved in November, leading to his ‘pardon’ and release. At the same time, in the meeting with the delegation, the Georgian Public Defender expressed concerns about the allegations of ill-treatment in Tskhinvali detention facilities. 55.     In a grave development, on 23 February, Mr Archil Tatunashvili, a Georgian citizen residing in the Akhalgori district was detained and later died in custody in South Ossetia. This tragic incident led to a wide outcry in Georgia and to broad international condemnation. Moreover, the de facto authorities’ decision to delay the transfer of the victim’s body to the Georgian central government and the family, for almost one month, until 20 March, on the grounds of conducting forensic procedures gave rise to additional concerns. Meanwhile, two other persons who were detained with the victim were released only 11 March. The Co-chairs of the GID have called for a thorough investigation into the case, as well as for co-operation among relevant actors, including in the IPRM framework. Other international actors have made similar calls.” 17.     The relevant part of the Amnesty International Report 2017/08 on the state of the world’s human rights during 2017 (pp. 172-73) reads as follows: “Russian forces and de facto authorities in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to restrict movement across the de facto border, briefly detaining and fining dozens of people for ‘illegal’ border crossing. The increased fencing along the administrative boundary lines continued to adversely affect the rights of local residents, including the rights to work, food and an adequate standard of living, owing to the loss of access to their orchards, pasture and farm land.” 18 .     The decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 2 May 2018 on the conflict in Georgia (cited above) reads as follows: “The Deputies 1.       recalled their decisions on ‘The Council of Europe and the conflict in Georgia’ of 29 and 30 April and 2   May 2014 (1198 th meeting), 12 May 2015 (1227 th meeting), 4   May 2016 (1255 th meeting) and 3 May 2017 (1285 th meeting); reiterated the unequivocal support of the Council of Europe member States for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders; 2.       stated that the conclusion and implementation of so-called treaties on alliance and strategic partnership/integration between the Russian Federation and Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and the recent ratification by the Russian State Duma of a so-called agreement on the incorporation of military units of the Tskhinvali region of Georgia into the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the recent opening of so-called customs points in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia aimed at the integration of these regions respectively into the customs sphere of the Russian Federation, impede the peaceful conflict resolution, undermine the ongoing efforts to strengthen security and stability in the region, constitute repeated violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and have no legal validity; reiterated that any illegal act aimed at changing the status of the Georgian regions will have no legal effect; reiterated that any illegal act by the Russian Federation aimed at changing the status of the Georgian regions, including through issuing passports and establishing a so-called status of foreign residents, have no legal effect and further complicate the situation on the ground; called upon the Russian Federation to stop and reverse this process and to comply with its international law obligations and commitments, including under the EU mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, in particular with regard to the withdrawal of military forces and allow the establishment of international security mechanisms on the ground; 3.       stated that Georgia, as the only sovereign State under international law over its regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, is still prevented from exercising legitimate jurisdiction over these regions due to the continuous impediments put by the Russian Federation, including its continuing military presence therein; 4.       deeply regretted that despite the constant calls upon the Russian Federation to reverse this process, it continues installing razor and barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the administrative boundary lines (ABLs) dividing families and communities, violating human rights and fundamental freedoms, complicating the settlement of the conflict involving two member States; expressed their concern that the closure of ‘crossing points’ across the ABL of the Georgian region of Abkhazia is detrimental for freedom of movement and livelihood of the local residents and further deteriorates the humanitarian situation on the ground; 5.       underlined the efforts of Georgia to reach out to the residents of its regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia by enhancing humanitarian activities; expressed appreciation for the various initiatives taken by Georgia in this respect,   inter alia , through providing education opportunities and free medical service to the residents of these regions; welcomed the new peace initiative of the Government of Georgia entitled ‘A step to a better future’, as a vivid sign of Georgia’s firm commitment to promote confidence and interaction between the societies split by the dividing lines; 6.       expressed profound concern that the human rights situation in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia has been further deteriorating, including with regard to the right to education in native language, the right to freedom of movement, the right to property, and the right to liberty and security; expressed serious concern at the discrimination based on ethnic grounds; expressed concern that IDPs and refugees continue to be deprived of the right to return to their places of origin in a safe and dignified manner; 7.       expressed grave concern over the detention of three Georgian citizens Mr Archil Tatunashvili, Mr Levan Kutashvili and Mr Ioseb Pavliashvili in Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and the subsequent death of Mr Archil Tatunashvili in custody; condemned the fact that handing over his body became a topic for negotiations, which lasted almost one month; expressed concern over obstacles to the freedom of movement of Mr Levan Kutashvili and Mr Ioseb Pavliashvili, who were allowed to cross into Tbilisi Administered Territory after considerable delay; 8.       expressed grave concern over impunity around the killing of an unarmed Georgian civilian on 19 May 2016 in the village of Khurcha [14] ; 9.       expressed concern at the razing of intentionally damaged houses belonging to IDPs in Eredvi village, Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, in violation of property rights; 10.     bearing in mind that human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be protected by all relevant States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, called on the authorities exercising effective control: -     to create conditions allowing for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees, and to protect their property rights; -     to guarantee and implement the right to education in schools and preschools, including education in the native language in Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; -     to remove any impediment, restriction or limitation to the right to freedom of movement across the ABLs, including for medical and education purposes; to cease arbitrary detention of persons, including in the context of so-called ‘illegal border crossing’ and to re-open ‘crossing points’; -     to   ensure that residents of the Georgian regions concerned are not subject to discrimination on any including ethnic ground and are prevented from holding Georgian passports; -     to investigate allegations of human rights violation and ensure appropriate follow-up in accordance with the European standards on human rights; -     to prevent further deterioration of monuments belonging to the cultural heritage throughout Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; 11.     deeply regretted that neither the Commissioner for Human Rights, the monitoring bodies, nor the Secretariat delegation preparing the Secretary General’s consolidated reports have been granted access to the Georgian regions concerned; invited the Secretary General to engage in a dialogue with the Russian Federation and Georgia to this end; called on the Russian Federation to secure immediate and unrestricted access to the territories beyond the control of the Government of Georgia to the Council of Europe bodies; 12.     encouraged the Secretary General to continue the submission of his biannual consolidated reports on the conflict in Georgia to the Committee of Ministers.” 19 .     The Resolution of the European Parliament of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion and the OSCE Resolution on Ten Years After the August 2008 War in Georgia (cited in paragraph 14 above) are along the same lines as the decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 2 May 2018 on the conflict in Georgia, reproduced in paragraph 18 above. Since they are available on the Internet, they have not been reproduced here. COMPLAINTS 20 .     The applicant Government outlined their case as follows: “Georgia alleges before the Court two separate but related administrative practices, each of which involves a pattern of repeated and linked violations of multiple Convention rights. Both concern the recent sharp deterioration in the human rights situation in the occupied territories that has been recognised in various international fora: a. The first administrative practice is the ongoing practice of the Russian authorities, and the ‘authorities’ of Russia’s subordinate local administrations ( de facto organs of Russian Federation in the occupied Georgian territories), of harassing, unlawfully arresting and detaining ethnic Georgian civilians attempting to cross the ABLs, or living adjacent to them, of restricting their freedom of movement, detaining them against their will, and of subjecting them to physical ill-treatment (sometimes amounting to torture or leading to death). The purpose or effect of the administrative practice is to intimidate the ethnic Georgian population living close to the ABL, to cut those who are resident in the occupied territories off from the facilities, opportunities and people located in Georgian-controlled territory, to further isolate ethnic Georgians resident in the occupied territories, and to consolidate and complete the process of ‘cleansing’ the occupied territories of their ethnic Georgian civilian population. i. This administrative practice involves a systematic pattern of action which violates the Convention rights of the ethnic Georgian civilian population living close to the ABLs (on both sides of each line), in particular by action that violates the right to freedom of movement (Article 2 of Protocol 4); the right to be protected against arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Article 5(1)); the protection from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3); the right to life (Article 2); the right to respect for one’s home, and one’s private and family life - lack of access to home and the graves of relatives (Article 8); the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol 1); the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1). This pattern of violations of the Convention is well-established, entrenched, officially tolerated (indeed encouraged) and ongoing. ii. The applicant Government also invokes, in this connection, Article 14 (the prohibition on discrimination) and Article 18 (limitation on the use of restrictions on Convention rights) in conjunction with the pattern of violations of Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 1 and Article 2 of Protocol 4 and Article 5 of the Convention. b. The second administrative practice is the policy of the Russian authorities, and the ‘authorities’ of the subordinate local administrations, to shield perpetrators from justice for serious crimes of violence (including fatal violence) committed by ‘border guards’ or ‘officials’ for whose actions the Russian Federation is accountable under the Convention. This amounts to a practice of impunity or de facto immunity for public officials and others committing those crimes. This administrative practice violates the investigative obligation inherent in Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, (the duty to conduct a prompt, independent and impartial investigation capable of leading to the identification, accountability and punishment of the perpetrator); and Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy). Lastly, the applicant Government asks the Court to consider the three individual cases arising out of the abduction and murder of Davit Basharuli, Giga Otkhozoria and Archil Tatunashvili: a. The Court is first asked to consider these three cases as compelling and detailed illustrations of the two administrative practices alleged (i.e. as ‘case studies’ of the practices). b. However, the Court is also asked to consider these three cases as individual violations that call for a specific finding and an award of just satisfaction. i. In all three cases, the violation of the relevant investigative obligations amount to continuing breaches of Articles 2 and 3 and Article 13 of the Convention, and the Court is asked so to find. ii. In the case of Archil Tatunashvili the Court is additionally asked to reach a finding on the substantive violations of Articles 2, 3, 5, and 8 of the Convention and Article   2 of Protocol 4.” THE LAW PRELIMINARY ISSUES 21 .     The applicant Government asked the Court to consider the cases of Davit Basharuli, Giga Otkhozoria and Archil Tatunashvili not only as illustrations of the administrative practices alleged, but also as individual violations of the Convention. The Court notes that those cases are also the subject of three pending individual applications ( N.G. and N.B. v. Russia , no.   44677/21; Matkava and Others v. Russia , no. 3963/18; and Tatunashvili v.   Russia , no. 41776/18). Notice of one of them has already been given to the respondent Government and the applicant Government have intervened as a third party under Article 36 § 1 of the Convention ( Matkava and Others , cited above). Accordingly, in this inter-State case, the Court will only examine the allegations of administrative practices and will consider the three individual cases as alleged illustrations of such practices (see Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no.   13255/07, § 128, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). 22 .     As to the temporal scope of the case, the Court notes that the applicant Government complained, in essence, about various human rights consequences of the process of “borderisation” outlined in paragraph   12 above. That process started in 2009. The Court therefore agrees with the respondent Government that no events which occurred before 2009 should be taken into consideration as illustrations of the administrative practices alleged. 23 .     Lastly, in view of the fact that the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022 (see paragraph 7 above), the Court decides that it has jurisdiction to deal with the applicant Government’s complaints in so far as they relate to facts that took place before that date (see Fedotova and Others v Russia [GC], nos. 40792/10 and 2 others, §§ 68-73, 17   January 2023, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], nos.   8019/16 and 2 others, 25 January 2023). ALLEGED LACK OF A GENUINE APPLICATION The parties’ submissions 24.     The respondent Government objected that the purpose of the applicant Government was not genuinely to raise issues related to the protection of human rights under the Convention. Rather, the application had been brought to seek a decision on issues of general international law. They submitted that putting such questions before the Court demonstrated a lack of good faith on the part of the applicant Government and amounted to an abuse of process. 25.     The applicant Government disagreed, without going into any details. The Court’s assessment 26.     In relation to individual applications, Article 35 § 3 (a) allows the Court to declare inadmissible an application lodged u