CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 4 avril 2023

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margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sDF5332AA { width:15.87pt; display:inline-block } .s3DF5EF88 { width:128.75pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION CASE OF UAB KESKO SENUKAI LITHUANIA v. LITHUANIA (Application no. 19162/19)     JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Home • Correspondence • Absence of e x post facto judicial review of the manner in which Competition Council officials carried out inspection of applicant company’s office seizing large amounts of documents • Art 8 not to be interpreted as requiring an e x post facto judicial review in all such cases, but its availability among elements that might be taken into account when assessing compliance therewith • No adequate and effective procedural safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness • Interference disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society   STRASBOURG 4 April 2023 FINAL   04/07/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Jovan Ilievski,   Egidijus Kūris,   Saadet Yüksel,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Diana Sârcu,   Davor Derenčinović , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar , Having regard to: the application (no.   19162/19) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a company incorporated in Lithuania, UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania (“the applicant company”), on 3 April 2019; the decision to give notice of the application to the Lithuanian Government (“the Government”); the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 14 March 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant company complained that an inspection of its registered office by the Competition Council ( Konkurencijos taryba ) had been carried out in an unlawful and disproportionate manner and had not been subjected to any subsequent judicial review. It relied on Article   6   §   1, Article   8 and Article   13 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Lithuanian law, with its registered office in Kaunas. It was represented by Mr   M.   Juonys, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė-Širmenė. INVESTIGATION BY THE COMPETITION COUNCIL 4 .     On 17 April 2018 the Competition Council, a public body tasked with overseeing compliance with competition law, opened an investigation against five companies engaged in the production and retailing of construction material and household goods (see paragraphs 55 and 56 below). The Competition Council suspected that several major producers and retailers, including the applicant company, had agreed to fix the prices of certain goods sold in their stores, thereby breaching the Law on Competition (see paragraph   54 below) and the relevant EU law. 5 .     The Competition Council applied to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court for authorisation to enter and inspect the registered offices of the five companies that were the targets of the investigation (see paragraphs   59 and 60 below). On 30   May 2018 the court issued such authorisation in respect of four of those companies – including the applicant company. 6 .     On 5 June 2018 the Competition Council issued a decision stating that when carrying out inspections and other investigative measures in the course of the investigation in question, it would utilise the services of specialists from the Vilnius police department (see paragraphs 59 and 61 below). INSPECTION OF THE APPLICANT COMPANY’S REGISTERED OFFICE 7 .     On 6 June 2018 the Competition Council carried out an inspection of the applicant company’s registered office in Kaunas. According to the official written record of the inspection, the inspection began at 10.45 a.m. and was carried out by eight officials of the Competition Council. The applicant company’s in-house lawyer was present from the start of the inspection. Two high-level managers were present, respectively, from 11.24   a.m. and 11.47   a.m.; a lawyer specialising in criminal law was present from 12.48   p.m. until 1.36 p.m.; and three lawyers specialising in competition law were present from 1.35 p.m. 8 .     The official record of the inspection stated that the Competition Council had provided the applicant company’s representatives with copies of its decisions of 17   April and 5   June 2018 and a copy of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court’s decision of 30   May 2018 (see paragraphs 4-6 above). Moreover, according to the official record, the Competition Council explained to the applicant company’s representatives the way in which the inspection would be carried out, the rights and obligations of the Competition Council’s officials, and the rights and obligations of the applicant company and its representatives during the inspection. The above-mentioned in-house lawyer, the two managers and the criminal lawyer (see paragraph 7 above) signed the official record to confirm that they had received the aforementioned documents and that they had understood the explanation given. 9 .     The Competition Council examined the documents stored in the offices of five employees of the applicant company and questioned three of those employees. The official record included a list of documents that had been seized from the offices – over sixty items, amounting to nearly 400 pages. The Competition Council also examined the computers of those five employees and the mobile phone of one of them, and copied over 250   gigabytes of data. 10 .     One of the applicant company’s lawyers noted in the record that the Competition Council had seized documents and copied information in an indiscriminate manner; it had thus seized certain documents that had not been related to the subject of the investigation. The lawyer gave several examples of such documents contained in the list of the documents that had been seized (see paragraph   9 above). She further stated that the seized and copied documents included information of a personal nature, correspondence with lawyers, and commercial secrets; however, in view of the large amount of the information that had been seized, it was impossible to list each such document. The lawyer also stated that the Competition Council’s decision on the launching of the investigation (see paragraph 4 above) had not indicated the period of time in respect of which the Competition Council would target its investigation, nor had that period been specified by the officials carrying out the inspection. As a result, they had examined information dating from an unspecified range of time – including some documents dating from 2012 and 2013. In addition, the offices of the above-mentioned five employees of the applicant company that the Competition Council had examined had housed documents and data pertaining to former employees of the applicant company; these had been seized and examined as well. Lastly, the lawyer stated that the persons who had been present during the inspection had not been informed of their rights and obligations, and that for approximately one hour after the start of the inspection they had not been allowed to telephone a lawyer. COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS LODGED BY THE APPLICANT COMPANY WITH THE COMPETITION COUNCIL Complaint about the conduct of the inspection The applicant company’s complaint 11 .     On 18 June 2018 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Competition Council under Article 32 § 1 of the Law on Competition regarding the actions of its officials during the inspection (see paragraph   67 below). The applicant company submitted that the officials of the Competition Council had arrived at its office accompanied by police officers and had not immediately explained to its employees the nature and purpose of the inspection. As a result, the applicant company’s employees had been under the impression that the inspection would be carried out by law-enforcement authorities and had accordingly summoned a lawyer specialising in criminal law (see paragraph   7 above). The nature of the inspection had been explained to them only later, which had resulted in a delay in calling lawyers specialising in competition law (see paragraph 7 above). Moreover, the actions of the Competition Council had caused unnecessary stress to the applicant company’s employees. The applicant company also submitted that the presence of police officers had not been recorded in the official written record of the inspection; therefore, it was not clear what actions they had carried out and at what time they had left. 12 .     The applicant company further submitted that the Competition Council’s officials had not properly familiarised it with its rights and obligations. At the start of the inspection, those officials had merely told the applicant company’s in-house lawyer, in a very general manner, that an inspection would be carried out and that it was the applicant company’s duty to give its full cooperation – without explaining what precise steps would be taken or the specific rights and obligations incumbent on the applicant company. Moreover, the above-mentioned decisions of the Competition Council and the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, which had been provided to the applicant company’s employees, were very concise and did not contain sufficient information to enable the applicant company to understand the investigative measures that were being taken or its rights and obligations (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). The applicant company contended that the list of rights and obligations should have been provided to its employees in writing. 13 .     Furthermore, the applicant company submitted that the Competition Council had restricted the rights of its employees in ways that had not been provided by law. In particular, for approximately one hour after the start of the inspection, the employees had not been allowed to make any phone calls – not even to lawyers, which had precluded them from promptly calling lawyers specialising in competition law; this had restricted the applicant company’s defence rights. Moreover, after phone calls had been authorised, the Competition Council’s officials had insisted on the applicant company’s employees conducting calls via speakerphone – thereby infringing on their right to communicate with lawyers in a confidential manner. The applicant company also submitted that the inspection had finished at 10.18 p.m.; its employees had therefore been forced to remain at their workplace for several hours after the end of the working day, when they had been tired. The applicant company contended that, by engaging in such actions, the Competition Council had sought to place its employees under psychological pressure. 14 .     Lastly, the applicant company submitted that the officials had seized and copied large amounts of information in an indiscriminate manner, without even attempting to assess whether certain documents were related to the investigation in question. In particular, they had copied the entire mailbox contents from the computers of five employees (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant company contended that the Competition Council had the right to seize and copy only such information that was related to the applicant company’s dealings with those other companies that were subjected to the same investigation (see paragraph 4 above) and that the officials should have identified that information by defining precisely the targeted time period and by using relevant keywords. However, the amount of the information that had been seized had in and of itself been indicative of the fact that no such selection had been performed. The applicant company stated that the Competition Council had copied more than 725,400 emails; of those, approximately 31,300 appeared to relate to the companies subjected to the investigation, and the remaining 694,100 did not. Similarly, of the approximately 117,500 documents copied from the above-mentioned five computers and one mobile phone, approximately 4,700 appeared to relate to the aforementioned companies, and the remaining 112,800 did not. 15 .     Accordingly, citing Article 32 of the Law on Competition (see paragraph 67 below), the applicant company asked the Competition Council to find: (1)   that its officials had acted unlawfully in copying information from the computers of the applicant company’s employees in an indiscriminate manner and that any evidence collected this way was to be considered as having been unlawfully obtained; (2)   that its officials had acted unlawfully by failing to properly inform the applicant company’s employees about the course of the inspection and their rights and obligations and by restricting their right to contact lawyers, and that all investigative measures carried out before the arrival of the lawyers were to be considered unlawful; and (3)   that its officials had acted unlawfully by prohibiting the applicant company’s employees from making phone calls, including to lawyers, and by continuing the inspection outside of the applicant company’s working hours. The Competition Council’s decision 16 .     On 27 June 2018 the Competition Council dismissed the applicant company’s complaint. 17.     It stated that the decision on the opening of the investigation had clearly indicated its subject (see paragraph 4 above) and that the applicant company ought to have been able to understand the alleged infringements that were being investigated. According to the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “the CJEU”), the Competition Council had not been required to indicate the precise period of time during which the alleged infringements had been committed. 18.     It further stated that the Law on Competition had entitled it to examine, copy and seize any documents which were relevant to the investigation and which might have evidentiary value (see paragraph 59 below). The purpose of an inspection was to obtain information which was not publicly available and which might often constitute the only evidence of infringements of competition law. Anti-competitive actions or agreements could sometimes be identified on the basis of certain coincidences or indications that, when taken together, and in the absence of any other logical explanation, could constitute evidence of an infringement of competition law; the right to obtain documents included the right to look for information that was not yet known or not precisely identified. Therefore, although the Competition Council’s right to obtain information during an inspection was not unlimited, its investigations had to be effective and the limits of such investigations could be broad. 19.     The Competition Council disputed the applicant company’s allegation that documents had been seized and copied without any selection criteria being applied. It stated that it had only inspected the offices of those employees who worked in the areas concerned by the investigation and that it had not copied any documents that were obviously unrelated to the subject of the investigation. It also rejected the applicant company’s argument that its officials should have searched for information by using certain keywords – it submitted that that was only one of the possible ways of finding relevant information, but that it was not sufficient, because the existence of an unlawful agreement could be ascertained by perusing a variety of documents and not only those in which the names of the relevant companies were explicitly mentioned. Moreover, unlawful agreements were typically kept secret, and any reference to such agreements might be made by means of using codewords – the Competition Council referred to examples from past cases where it had identified such actions. It also emphasised that the investigation was still at its initial stage; therefore, it was not yet possible to indicate exactly whether and how each of the seized documents might be instrumental in verifying the existence of any infringements. 20.     The Competition Council rejected the applicant company’s allegation that its employees had been misled about the nature and purpose of the inspection. It pointed out that having recourse to police officers during such inspections was authorised by law (see paragraph 61 below). In the case at hand, the police officers had not carried out any investigative measures and had left the premises as soon as the inspection had begun. Therefore, it had not been necessary to indicate their presence in the record of the inspection. 21 .     The Competition Council also stated that, as indicated in the official record, the applicant company’s representatives had been informed of their rights and obligations and of the relevant decisions authorising the inspection (see paragraph 8 above). Such information had been provided to them orally. Moreover, the applicant company’s in-house lawyer had been present from the start of the inspection, and the applicant company had contacted external lawyers specialising in criminal law and in competition law; the latter had arrived at the applicant company’s office shortly after the former (see paragraph 7 above). According to its Rules of Procedure, the Competition Council had not been required to wait for the arrival of the external lawyers in order to begin the inspection (see paragraph 70 below). 22 .     Lastly, the Competition Council stated that it had restricted the right of the applicant company’s employees to make phone calls only at the beginning of the inspection, with a view to ensuring its secrecy. Subsequently, when the employees had been allowed to contact lawyers by telephone, the Competition Council officials had only listened to the beginning of conversations, in order to make sure that the employees were indeed talking to lawyers. It contended that their doing so had been consistent with the relevant case-law of the CJEU. 23 .     The decision of the Competition Council indicated that an appeal against it could be lodged with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court within twenty   days. Request to remove information from the investigation file 24 .     On 20 June 2018 the applicant company lodged a request with the Competition Council, asking that any information that was not related to the subject of the investigation be returned to it or removed from the Competition Council’s storage devices, or otherwise destroyed. 25 .     On 3 July 2018 the Competition Council informed the applicant company that the information that had been obtained during the inspection had been assessed by its officials as necessary for the investigation. Information could be removed from the investigation file only following a well-founded request, which should indicate the exact information to be removed and the grounds for its removal. The Competition Council asked the applicant company to clarify its request within seven days: namely, to specify which information was obviously unnecessary for the investigation and to provide precise keywords or other criteria for identifying any such unnecessary information. 26 .     On 10 July 2018 the applicant company replied to the Competition Council that it was impossible for it to clarify the request within a reasonable time, in view of the very large amount of information that had been seized (see paragraph 9 above). Reviewing each document and each email and indicating a precise reason for deleting any of them from the investigation file would require an excessive amount of time and would not make sense, particularly in view of the fact that the applicant company had not been informed of the period of time in respect of which the Competition Council would target its investigation, or of any other criteria by which could be determined the relevance for the investigation of any piece of information. Therefore, the Competition Council was better placed than the applicant company to identify the information that it needed for the purposes of the investigation. The applicant company asked for an opportunity to meet with the Competition Council and to discuss any possible solutions to the situation. 27.     On 20 July 2018 a meeting was held between the representatives of the applicant company and those of the Competition Council, but they did not manage to reach any agreement on the question of the removal of allegedly irrelevant information from the investigation file. COURT PROCEEDINGS Proceedings before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court The applicant company’s complaint 28 .     On 18 July 2018 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court against the Competition Council’s decision of 27 June 2018 (see paragraph 16 above). It presented essentially the same arguments as those that it had raised with the Competition Council (see paragraphs   11-15 above). 29.     In addition, the applicant company submitted that the carrying out of investigative measures in a company’s registered office interfered with that company’s right to respect for its private life, home and correspondence. Therefore, when carrying out any such measures, the subject of the investigation had to be defined in a clear and precise manner, and only information related to that subject could be seized. Determining which information was relevant for such an investigation was the duty of the Competition Council. However, the applicant company contended that the Competition Council had failed to properly prepare for the inspection of the applicant company’s office and to determine the criteria for identifying the relevant information; it had instead copied the entire contents of the mailboxes on the computers of the applicant company’s employees, which was contrary to the principles established in the case-law of the CJEU. 30 .     The applicant company further submitted that, even though the Competition Council had inspected the offices and computers of only five of its employees, the fact that it had copied their entire mailboxes demonstrated that it had not carried out any assessment of which emails were related to the subject of the investigation. Each of those five employees had worked with multiple other companies that were not involved in the investigation; thus, it was obvious that part of the information copied by the Competition Council had not been relevant. 31.     The applicant company also submitted that, when copying other information from its employees’ computers, the Competition Council had used certain keywords, but that those keywords had been too general and imprecise and overly inclusive. Although the Competition Council had not informed the applicant company of the keywords that it had been using, its employees had noticed that the keywords had included words such as “competitor” or “price”, which could have led to the officials obtaining information about all of the applicant company’s competitors and all decisions related to prices – including those that had nothing to do with the investigation. 32 .     Lastly, the applicant company submitted that the Competition Council had not informed its employees of their rights and obligations in writing. As a result, the applicant company’s employees, who had been under stress because of the presence of the police and the officials, and who themselves were not experts in competition law, had been unable to clearly understand what the officials of the Competition Council were and were not authorised to do. In particular, without having adequate knowledge of their rights and without being able to promptly consult a lawyer specialising in competition law, the applicant company’s employees had not been able to question the officials’ actions in restricting their telephone communication and in making them stay in their workplace after working hours. The applicant company argued that the law did not authorise the Competition Council to restrict the rights of its employees in such a way. 33 .     Accordingly, it asked the court to find: (1)   that the Competition Council had acted unlawfully in copying the information found in the offices, computers and mailboxes of the applicant company’s employees without first assessing its relevance for the investigation and that any evidence collected this way was to be considered as having been unlawfully obtained; (2)   that the officials of the Competition Council had acted unlawfully in failing to properly inform the applicant company of the nature and purpose of the inspection, by exerting psychological pressure on the applicant company, by not properly explaining to the applicant company its rights and obligations, by restricting its employees’ right to make phone calls and to consult lawyers, and by keeping its employees in their workplace outside of the working hours. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court’s decision 34.     On 30 July 2018 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court refused to accept the applicant company’s complaint for examination. 35.     It stated that the right of access to a court was guaranteed by the Constitution and by the well-established case-law of the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 49 and 72 below). At the same time, the Law on Administrative Proceedings provided that the right of access to a court had to be exercised in accordance with the conditions established by law, and that one of the grounds on which a court could refuse to examine a complaint was when such complaints could not be examined by courts (see paragraphs 51 and 52 below). According to the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, the administrative courts examined cases concerning the lawfulness of decisions, actions or omissions on the part of public-administration bodies that affected persons’ rights or lawful interests. However, a decision that clearly did not give rise to any legal consequences could not be the subject of an administrative case. Were a court to examine a complaint concerning a decision that had not given rise to any legal consequences, it would not be able to defend a person’s rights, because even if such a complaint were upheld, the extent of that person’s rights and obligations would not change and the proceedings would be essentially meaningless (see paragraph 73 below). Accordingly, a refusal by a court to examine a complaint concerning a decision that had no legal consequences did not breach the principles of effective legal defence and ubi ius, ibi remedium . 36 .     Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court stated that the Competition Council’s decision of 27   June 2018 had concerned certain procedural aspects of the inspection carried out in the applicant company’s registered office – namely, the lawfulness of the actions of the Competition Council’s officials. Therefore, that decision had constituted a procedural document of an interim nature ( tarpinio pobūdžio procedūrinis dokumentas ) that had not given rise to any material legal consequences for the applicant company, and complaints against it could not be lodged with the courts (the court referred to the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision of 9 September 2015, which is summarised in paragraph 79 below). Legal consequences for the applicant company would arise only when the Competition Council completed the investigation and issued a final decision. The court considered that the proceedings that the applicant company was seeking to institute concerned the lawfulness of the entire procedure conducted by the Competition Council – a procedure that would be concluded upon the issuance of the final decision. The applicant company would have the right to lodge a complaint with the courts against the final decision; in that complaint it would also be able to challenge the actions of the Competition Council’s officials during the inspection. Thus, the refusal to examine the applicant company’s present complaint did not preclude it from eventually defending its rights and interests before a court. Proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court The applicant company’s appeal 37 .     On 6 August 2018 the applicant company lodged an appeal against the above-noted decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. It submitted that Article 32 § 2 of the Law on Competition granted it the right to lodge complaints with the Competition Council concerning the actions of its officials (see paragraph   67 below), and that under Article 32 § 3, appeals against decisions taken by the Competition Council pursuant to such complaints could be lodged with the courts (see paragraph 68 below). According to those legal provisions, the lodging of complaints was subject to only two conditions: (1) the entity in question believed that its rights had been violated; and (2) the complaint had to be lodged within ten days of that entity finding out about the impugned decision. Thus, the applicant company contended that the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had unjustifiably restricted the rights guaranteed to the applicant company under Article 32 of the Law on Competition. It also submitted that, were it to complain about the actions of the Competition Council’s officials only after the investigation was completed, it would miss the ten-day time-limit established in that Law (see paragraph 67 below). 38 .     Furthermore, the applicant company disputed the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court’s finding that its complaint “concerned the lawfulness of the entire procedure” (see paragraph 36 above). It submitted that an inspection of an entity’s registered office constituted a special measure taken by the Competition Council’s officers and that it was therefore subject to a special complaint procedure. Unlike the opening of an investigation, which was within the discretion of the Competition Council, an inspection could only be carried out with the authorisation of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court (see paragraph   60 below); the applicant company contended that, for that reason, it should be for the courts to verify whether the inspection had complied with the law and with the court order. Moreover, during an inspection, a written record had to be drawn up, indicating the times of its start and end, and the exact measures that had been taken; this further demonstrated that it constituted a separate and precisely defined procedure. 39.     The applicant company also submitted that the investigation by the Competition Council would not necessarily end in a decision against which the applicant company could appeal – after completing the investigation, the Competition Council might decide to discontinue it or to not impose any penalties (see paragraphs   65 and 66 below). Were that to happen, the applicant company would not have any possibility to challenge the violations of its rights during the inspection. 40.     The applicant company pointed out that, in other branches of law, such as criminal law, complaints could be lodged against any investigative measures taken by an investigator or a prosecutor – even when the pre-trial investigation in question was ongoing. It argued that, if the lawfulness of officials’ actions could be assessed only at the very end of an investigation, that would not only be unacceptable from the human rights perspective but would also create a risk that the final decision might be based on evidence collected through possibly unlawful actions. That was why the possibility to appeal against the actions of the Competition Council’s officials was provided in the Law on Competition. Moreover, the wording of the decision of 27   June 2018 had itself indicated that that decision was subject to appeal (see paragraph 23 above). 41 .     In addition, the applicant company argued that the impugned decision had given rise to legal consequences. It submitted that the officials of the Competition Council had exceeded their remit and had violated the applicant company’s constitutional rights. Those violations were still ongoing and they risked negatively impacting the applicant company’s interests because the Competition Council had retained the unlawfully obtained information and was continuing to use it in the investigation. The applicant company reiterated its earlier arguments – namely, that the Competition Council’s officials had seized and copied large amounts of information in an indiscriminate manner and that they had restricted the rights of the applicant company’s employees (see paragraphs 11-14 and 30-32 above). In doing so, they had exceeded the powers granted to them under Article   25   §   1 of the Law on Competition (see paragraph 59 below) and had violated the applicant company’s right to respect for its private life, the confidentiality of its correspondence and its right of access to a court, as guaranteed by the Constitution (see paragraph 49 below). 42 .     Lastly, the applicant company contended that the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court supported its position that its complaint against the Competition Council could be examined by the courts. It submitted that the Supreme Administrative Court had held that Article   32 of the Law on Competition enshrined a special complaint procedure, whereby complaints had first to be lodged with the Competition Council and subsequently with the courts, and that that provision granted the right to lodge complaints against actions or decisions taken by the Competition Council’s officials which did not constitute the final decisions in an investigation but which gave rise to independent material legal consequences in respect of their addressees (see the cases to which the applicant company referred in paragraphs   76 and 78 below). The applicant company also contended that the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had interpreted the Supreme Administrative Court’s case-law incorrectly because the decision on which it had based its judgment had been delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court in the light of different factual circumstances – namely, in a situation where the Competition Council had already completed the investigation (see paragraphs   36 above and 79 below). The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision 43 .     On 3 October 2018 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. It stated that its case-law regarding the interpretation and application of Article 32 §§ 1 and 3 of the Law on Competition (see paragraphs   67 and 68 below) had not changed: both in its earlier and in more recent case-law, the Supreme Administrative Court had simply noted that those legislative provisions guaranteed the right to lodge complaints against the actions and decisions of the Competition Council’s officials; they also laid down the procedure for exercising that right (see paragraphs   76 and 80 below). However, Article   32   §§   1 and 3 could not be construed as granting the right to lodge complaints against absolutely any decisions taken by the Competition Council, including those that did not give rise to any legal consequences – instead, they had to be read in the light of the legal instruments concerning the right of access to a court. 44.     In this connection, the Supreme Administrative Court referred to its case-law and reiterated that the administrative courts could examine only such complaints that were lodged against decisions, actions or omissions that gave rise to legal consequences; were it otherwise, the court proceedings would have no effect on the extent of the complainant’s rights and obligations and would therefore be meaningless (see paragraph 73 below). Moreover, even when it could not be concluded that a decision had no legal consequences, that decision had to be assessed within the context in which it had been taken, and it had to be determined whether the complainant’s interests would be actually defended; it was also important to consider whether the complainant would be entirely precluded from defending his or her interests before a court (see paragraph   74 below). 45 .     Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Administrative Court observed that the applicant company had asked the courts to find that the Competition Council’s officials had acted unlawfully when carrying out the inspection and obtaining evidence (see paragraph 33 above). However, were the courts to allow that complaint, the extent of the applicant company’s rights and obligations would not change. The court further held that the impugned actions of the officials could be assessed after the Competition Council completed the investigation and issued a final decision; moreover, there was a possibility to lodge a civil claim for damages against the State, provided that the conditions allowing the State’s civil liability to arise had been met (see paragraph 50 below). Therefore, the Supreme Administrative Court was satisfied that the refusal to examine the applicant company’s complaint had not deprived it of access to a court. Application for the reopening of the proceedings 46 .     On 26 October 2018 the applicant company lodged an application for the reopening of the proceedings. It argued, in particular, that the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision of 3   October 2018 had contradicted that court’s case-law in similar cases, including in some very recent ones, where it had been acknowledged that complaints concerning the lawfulness of actions of Competition Council officials relating to the collection of evidence could be lodged under Article   32   §   3 of the Law on Competition, irrespective of whether the investigation in question had been concluded by the issuance of a final decision (see paragraphs 80 and 81 below). 47.     On 18 December 2018 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant company’s application. It stated that there was no possibility, under domestic law, to reopen proceedings in which the administrative courts had refused to accept a complaint for examination. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS 48 .     On 24 March 2020 the Competition Council discontinued its investigation (see paragraph 66 below). It stated that, after carrying out inspections in the registered offices of the companies concerned and obtaining and examining relevant information, it had found no grounds to believe that the said companies had committed any infringements of competition law. No appeals against that decision were lodged. It appears that the information obtained from the applicant company’s office was eventually destroyed (see paragraph 107 below). RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE Constitution 49 .     The relevant provisions of the Constitution read: Article 22 “Private life shall be inviolable. Personal correspondence, telephone conversations, telegraph messages, and other communications shall be inviolable. Information concerning the private life of a person may be collected only upon a justified court decision and only in accordance with the law. The law and courts shall protect everyone from arbitrary or unlawful interference with his private and family life, as well as from encroachment upon his honour and dignity.” Article 30 “A person whose constitutional rights or freedoms are violated shall have the right to apply to a court. Compensation for material and moral damage inflicted upon a person shall be established by law.” Article 46 “The economy of Lithuania shall be based on the right of private ownership, freedom of individual economic activity, and economic initiative. ... The law shall prohibit the monopolisation of production and the market and shall protect freedom of fair competition. ...” Civil Code 50 .     Article 6.271 § 1 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia , that compensation for damage caused by unlawful acts of public authorities must be afforded by the State, irrespective of whether an individual civil servant or employee was at fault. Article 6.271 § 3 provides, inter alia , that, for the purposes of that Article, “acts” mean any actions or omissions on the part of a public authority or its employees that directly affect the rights, freedoms and interests of other persons, such as legal instruments or decisions issued by State institutions, administrative decisions or physical actions, except for judgments, decisions or rulings adopted by courts. Article   6.271   §   4 provides, inter alia , that the State shall incur civil liability under that Article in the event that public authorities or their employees fail to act in the manner required by law. Law on Administrative Proceedings 51 .     Article 5 § 1 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings provides that everyone has the right to lodge a complaint with a court, in accordance with a procedure established by law, in order to defend rights or lawful interests which have been violated or which are disputed. 52 .     Article 33 § 2 (1) provides that the president or a judge of an administrative court shall refuse to accept a complaint, a request or a claim for examination where the said complaint, request or claim cannot be examined by the courts in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Administrative Proceedings; a reasoned decision shall be issued to that effect. Law on Competition 53.     Article 2 § 1 of the Law on Competition states that economic entities are prohibited from carrying out any actions that limit, or may limit, competition, irrespective of the economic fie