CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 16 mai 2023

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16898/22; 17964/22; 17969/22; 20458/22; 21460/22; 21477/22; 21481/22; 21487/22; 24888/22; 24889/22; 24893/22; 24894/22; 24897/22; 26634/22; 27719/22; 27723/22; 27758/22; and 27827/22 against Italy lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Italian nationals, Mr   Alessandro   Ferrara (“the first applicant”), Mr Ferdinando Emilio Abbate (“the second applicant”), and Ms Sara Di Molfetta (“the third applicant”) (“the applicants”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table; Having deliberated, decides as follows: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applications concern the failure of the State authorities to pay debts because of the non-enforcement of assignment orders ( ordinanze di assegnazione ) aimed at implementing decisions or judgments issued under Law no. 89 of 2001 (“the Pinto Act”). 2.     The applicants, whose details are listed in the appended table, are lawyers who declared that they advanced legal fees in respect of their clients ( avvocati antistatari ) and who were directly awarded legal fees through assignment orders by national courts (see paragraph 19 below). THE FACTS 3.     The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND TO THE CASES 4.     Under Italian law, an assignment order is a type of enforcement order which a person who has been awarded a sum of money by judicial decision can request from the enforcement judge. Assignment orders allow individuals to obtain forced payment of a debt from a debtor who does not spontaneously fulfil his or her duty to pay. The assignment orders referred to in the applications were issued to enforce decisions or judgments given under the “Pinto Act”, under which parties to main proceedings can complain of the excessive length of those proceedings. 5.     Furthermore, under Italian law, judges determining main proceedings, judges deciding “Pinto” proceedings and enforcement judges issuing assignment orders also award legal fees in respect of each set of proceedings. Legal fees can be awarded to the party to the proceedings or, upon request, directly to the lawyers if they are avvocati antistatari . 6.     The present applications arose from several sets of main proceedings which led to subsequent sets of “Pinto” proceedings. Afterwards, proceedings were brought seeking the enforcement of the “Pinto” decisions or judgments, which in turn led to the granting of assignment orders. In those assignment orders, the domestic courts directly awarded legal fees to the applicants as they were avvocati antistatari in the enforcement proceedings. application n o . 2394/22 submitted by the first applicant 7 .     The first applicant represented several plaintiffs as an avvocato antistatario in numerous sets of “Pinto” proceedings (see the appended table) in which the competent court of appeal awarded each plaintiff compensation and awarded legal fees directly to the first applicant. 8 .     In particular, in order to enforce twelve of the “Pinto” decisions, each one issued in favour of multiple plaintiffs, separate sets of enforcement proceedings were initiated by each plaintiff, still represented by the first applicant as avvocato antistatario . In each set of enforcement proceedings, they sought to obtain one assignment order in the interest of each plaintiff. In ten cases, the first applicant also lodged a separate application for an assignment order in his own favour in respect of the legal fees awarded to him by the “Pinto” decisions as an avvocato antistatario (see appended table). 9 .     Similarly, in order to enforce thirty-nine “Pinto” decisions – each issued in favour of only one plaintiff – two sets of enforcement proceedings were initiated, which were aimed at obtaining assignment orders in the interest of the plaintiff and of the first applicant as avvocato antistatario . 10 .     In all those cases, the competent district court issued two separate assignment orders – one in favour of the first applicant and one in favour of his clients – each awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario in the enforcement proceedings. 11 .     In one case, the domestic court joined two separate sets of enforcement proceedings relating to the same “Pinto” decision, issued one assignment order and awarded the first applicant legal fees only once (see the appended table in respect of the assignment order issued by the Rome District Court in proceedings R.E. 20611/2015). 12 .     On two occasions, the first applicant lodged a single application with the domestic courts, aimed at enforcing “Pinto” decisions both in his own interest and in the interest of his client (see the appended table in respect of the assignment orders issued by the Rome District Court in proceedings R.E. 14746/2018 and R.E. 5189/2017). 13.     In thirteen cases, the first applicant instituted proceedings for the enforcement of “Pinto” decisions, regarding either the part of the decisions awarding his clients compensation or the part awarding him legal fees. applications n os . 16898/22, 17964/22, 17969/22, 26634/22, 27719/22, 27723/22, 27758/22 and 27827/22 submitted by the second applicant 14 .     The second applicant represented several plaintiffs in one set of “Pinto” proceedings before the Perugia Court of Appeal (see the appended table), which awarded each plaintiff compensation for the excessive length of the main proceedings. 15 .     Each plaintiff, still represented by the second applicant, then instituted separate proceedings for the enforcement of the “Pinto” decision, requesting the issuance of separate assignment orders in favour of each of them. The Rome District Court issued separate assignment orders, each awarding the second applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario . 16 .     According to the documents attached to application no. 27719/22, the Rome District Court joined three separate requests for enforcement of the same “Pinto” decision, found that submitting separate requests for the enforcement of the same decision was an abuse of procedure and issued one assignment order rather than three, awarding the second applicant legal fees only once. Furthermore, the documents attached to applications nos.   26634/22, 27723/22, 27758/22 and 27827/22 show that the second applicant requested the issuance of assignment orders aimed at obtaining payment of the legal fees awarded to him as avvocato antistatario in the proceedings for the enforcement of a “Pinto” decision instituted in the interest of four plaintiffs. application n o . 20458/22 submitted by the second and third applicantS and applications n os .   214610/22, 21477/22, 21481/22, 21487/22, 24888/22, 24889/22, 24893/22, 24894/22 and 24897/22 submitted by the third applicant 17 .     The Court of Cassation rendered five judgments in “Pinto” proceedings (see the appended table), in each of which it awarded the second applicant as avvocato antistatario two separate sums in legal fees for having represented his clients in “Pinto” proceedings before both the competent court of appeal and the Court of Cassation. 18 .     The second applicant, represented by the third applicant as avvocato antistatario , brought separate enforcement proceedings in respect of those five judgments of the Court of Cassation, requesting the issuance of two separate assignment orders for each judgment, one for the sums awarded to the second applicant for having represented his clients before the competent court of appeal and one for having represented his clients before the Court of Cassation. The Rome District Court issued ten separate assignment orders in favour of the second applicant, each also awarding the third applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario . RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 19 .     Under Article 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a representative who advances legal fees for the benefit of his or her client ( avvocato antistatario ) can ask the court dealing with the case to directly award him or her legal fees ( distrazione ) in a decision ordering the losing party to pay costs. 20 .     Under Italian law, both debtors and creditors must act in good faith (Article 1175 of the Civil Code) and the parties and their representatives must display correctness and integrity in the course of proceedings (Article 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 21.     In so far as the representatives are concerned, certain forms of conduct may amount to a violation of professional ethics. Such conduct includes serving notice ( precetto ) on the opposing party aggravating his or her debt condition without previously informing him or her of the intention to bring enforcement proceedings and trying to settle the case (see judgment of the Court of Cassation no. 27214/09 of 23 December 2009), and aggravating the opposing party’s debt condition with multiple onerous legal actions, unless their purpose is effectively to protect the client’s interests (Article 66 of the Code of Lawyers’ Professional Ethics – Codice Deontologico Forense ). 22.     Compensation for damage that the creditor could have prevented using due diligence ( ordinaria diligenza ) should not be awarded (Article   1227 of the Civil Code). Furthermore, no compensation for excessive length of proceedings can be awarded in cases of an abuse of procedure causing an unjustified extension of the length of proceedings (section 2 (2   quinquies ) (d) of the “Pinto Act”). 23 .     In judgment no. 23726/07 of 15 November 2007, the plenary Court of Cassation ( Sezioni Unite ) established the leading principles governing the fragmentation of a claim ( frazionamento del credito ). First, the Court of Cassation emphasised the principle of good faith, grounded on the solidarity principle and the principle of a fair trial set forth respectively in Article 2 and Article 111 of the Constitution. Second, it noted that the fragmentation of a claim prevented the debtor from rapidly meeting his or her obligations and increased the number of sets of proceedings, consequently increasing costs and the number of legal actions that might need to be taken by the debtor against the requests for payment. Therefore, it concluded that the fragmentation of a single claim, when it was solely in the creditor’s interests and unilaterally altered the debtor’s condition to his or her detriment, amounted to an abuse of rights and infringed the principle of good faith. 24 .     The general principles governing the fragmentation of a claim set forth by judgment no. 23726/07 were found to be also applicable to cases involving multiple creditors, including in “Pinto” and enforcement proceedings. 25 .     With regard to “Pinto” proceedings, the Court of Cassation found that, under certain conditions, parties to the same proceedings instituting separate “Pinto” proceedings should not be awarded legal fees separately. In the view of the Court of Cassation, if the plaintiffs were part of the same main proceedings, they all requested compensation for the excessive length of the main proceedings, they were all represented by the same lawyer and their requests had the same object and were based on the same domestic order, the institution of separate sets of “Pinto” proceedings amounted to an abuse of rights as it did not pursue any legitimate objective. The Court of Cassation found that such an abuse of procedure was inconsistent with the unitary management of proceedings, the solidarity principle – which prevented an unnecessary burden on the debtor – and the principle of a fair trial. With respect specifically to the principle of a fair trial, the Court of Cassation clarified that unnecessarily increasing the number of sets of proceedings negatively affected the organisation of the judiciary and inevitably extended the length of proceedings (judgment no.   12246/2011 of 6 June 2011). 26.     In respect of enforcement proceedings, the Court of Cassation found that the principle of good faith, the solidarity principle and the principle of a fair trial – including reasonable length of proceedings – precluded the fragmentation of requests for payment through the serving of notice on multiple occasions. The serving of notice concerning demands for partial payment followed by the serving of another notice grounded on the same domestic order amounted to an abuse of procedure. In particular, the principle of a fair trial affected the interpretation of Article 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 20 above) and implied that proceedings were unfair if their conclusion resulted from of an abuse of procedure, such as their use for purposes other than the legitimate protection of the right in question (see judgment no. 6664/13 of 15 March 2013). 27.     With specific regard to enforcement proceedings involving assignment orders, the Court of Cassation found that their issuance did not, per se , prevent the issuance of other assignment orders to enforce the same domestic decision until the fulfilment of the obligation by the debtor. Nevertheless, the right to issue several assignment orders was to be read in conjunction with the principles preventing the misuse of procedural means. Therefore, in the light of the principles established by judgment no.   23726/07, the Court of Cassation found that the creditor could not unnecessarily burden the debtor with the sole purpose of increasing legal fees at the enforcement stage to the detriment of the debtor. Such conduct amounted to an abuse because it unnecessarily affected the debtor’s position and the length of the proceedings. Therefore, subsequent unnecessary assignment orders were to be declared null ( nulli ) (judgment no. 7078/15 of 19 April 2015). 28 .     As in the case of “Pinto” proceedings (see paragraphs 24-25 above), the Court of Cassation applied those principles to enforcement proceedings involving assignment orders irrespective of the number of creditors. According to its jurisprudence, the fragmentation of enforcement proceedings concerning the same domestic order initiated at the same time by many creditors represented by a common lawyer against one debtor was only aimed at multiplying legal fees, and artificially and unlawfully creating new rights to the detriment of the debtor. In the light of the abusive nature of this conduct and its inconsistency with professional ethics, the Court of Cassation concluded that unnecessary legal fees and fees artificially multiplied by creditors should not be awarded (judgment no. 15077/21 of 31 May 2021). COMPLAINTs 29.     The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of the failure of the State authorities to pay a debt because of the non-enforcement of assignment orders awarding legal fees directly to them in enforcement proceedings and, in so far as the second applicant was concerned, the non-enforcement of assignment orders assigning him legal fees awarded in “Pinto” decisions or in enforcement proceedings of “Pinto” decisions. 30.     In particular, in application no. 2394/22 the first applicant complained of the non-payment of legal fees awarded to him by the Rome District Court in several assignment orders, most of which aimed to enforce the same “Pinto” decisions given by the competent court of appeal in different sets of “Pinto” proceedings (see the appended table). 31.     Similarly, in applications nos. 16898/22, 17964/22, 17969/22 and 27719/22 the second applicant complained of the non-payment of legal fees awarded to him by the Rome District Court in eight assignment orders aimed at enforcing one decision issued by the Perugia Court of Appeal in “Pinto” proceedings. In applications nos. 26634/22, 27723/22, 27758/22 and 27827/22 he complained of the non-payment of legal fees assigned to him by the Rome District Court in four assignment orders and previously awarded to him by as many assignment orders aimed at enforcing the same “Pinto” decision issued by the Perugia Court of Appeal (see the appended table). 32 .     In applications nos. 20458/22 and 21481/22, the third applicant complained of the non-payment of legal fees awarded to her by the Rome District Court in two assignment orders aimed at enforcing the same judgment of the Court of Cassation. Those judgments had awarded the second applicant, as “ avvocato antistatario ”, two sums in legal fees for having represented his clients both in the proceedings on the merits and in the proceedings before the Court of Cassation (see the appended table). 33.     The same complaint was raised in respect of the pairs of applications nos. 21477/22 and 24888/22, 21487/22 and 214610/22, 24893/22 and 24894/22, and 24889/22 and 24897/22. 34 .     Furthermore, with regard to application no. 20458/22, the second applicant complained of the non-payment of the sum assigned to him by the Rome District Court in the assignment order aimed at enforcing the judgment of the Court of Cassation awarding him legal fees. THE LAW Joinder of the applications 35.     In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background. abuse of the right of application 36.     Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention reads as follows: “3.     The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that: (a)     the application is ... an abuse of the right of individual application; General principles 37.     According to the Court’s case-law, the question of admissibility where there is possible abuse of the right of individual application under Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention can be raised proprio motu (see Dimo Dimov and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 30044/10, § 41, 7   July 2020, and Shalyavski and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 67608/11, § 43, 15 June 2017). 38.     The concept of “abuse” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention must be understood in its ordinary sense according to general legal theory – namely, the harmful exercise of a right for purposes other than those for which it is designed (see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia , no.   798/05, § 62, 15 September 2009; De Luca v.   Italy , no. 43870/04, §   35, 24 September 2013; Migliore and Others v. Italy (dec.), nos. 58511/13 and 2   others, § 30, 12 November 2013; and Petrović v.   Serbia (dec.), nos.   56551/11 and 10 others, 18 October 2011). 39.     The Court has applied that provision, in particular, in two types of situation. Firstly, an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) if it was knowingly based on untrue facts (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no.   67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014, with further references). Secondly, it may also be rejected in cases where an applicant used particularly vexatious, contemptuous, threatening or provocative language in his communication with the Court – whether this was directed against the respondent Government, their Agent, the authorities of the respondent State, the Court itself, its judges, its Registry or members thereof (see Miroļubovs and Others , cited above, § 64, with further references). 40.     However, the notion of abuse of the right of application under Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention is not limited to those two instances and other situations can also be considered an abuse of that right. In principle any conduct on the part of an applicant which is manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and which impedes the proper functioning of the Court or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it can be considered an abuse of the right of application (see Miroļubovs and Others , cited above, §   65; Ghe rardi Martiri v.   San Marino , no. 35511/20, § 74, 15 December 2022; Podeschi v.   San   Marino , no. 66357/14, § 86, 13 April 2017; and Migliore and Others , cited above, § 30). In this regard, the Court reiterates that such abuse may consist in the object sought to be attained by the application (see Petrović , cited above). 41.     The Court has frequently held that procedural rules are designed to ensure the proper administration of justice and compliance with the principle of legal certainty and that litigants must be entitled to expect those rules to be applied (see, among other authorities, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no.   55707/00, § 99, ECHR 2009; Miholapa v. Latvia , no. 61655/00, §   24, 31   May 2007; Gorou v. Greece (no. 3) , no. 21845/03, § 27, 22   June 2006; and Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , no. 55782/00, § 36, ECHR 2002-VIII). This principle applies both ways, not only in respect of litigants but also in respect of the national courts (see Andrejeva , cited above, § 99; compare also Miroļubovs and Others , cited above, § 66; and Migliore and Others , cited above, §   31). 42.     The Court has referred to this principle on various occasions when examining possible grounds for inadmissibility in respect of an abuse of the right of individual application, especially in assessing whether an intentional breach of the rule of confidentiality may constitute an abuse of that right, resulting in the application being declared inadmissible pursuant to Article   35 § 3 of the Convention (compare Miroļubovs and Others , cited above, §   66; Žáková v.   the Czech Republic (just satisfaction), no. 2000/09, §§ 16-17, 6   April 2017; and Mandil v. France (dec.), no. 67037/09, 13   December 2011). 43.     Furthermore, despite making no explicit reference to the above ‑ mentioned principle, the Court has rejected applications under Article   35   §   3   (a) upon ascertaining, on the basis of a cumulative analysis of the applicants’ behaviour both at the domestic level and before the Court, the misuse of the safeguard mechanisms established by the Convention, in which domestic remedies are the primary means to protect human rights (see Cavaliere v. Italy , nos. 50930/11 and 50893/13, 12 November 2013). It has also found that the misuse of domestic remedies and the applicant’s conduct before the national authorities are relevant factors in assessing whether an application should be considered an abuse of the right of application (see Bock v. Germany (dec.), no. 22051/07, 19 January 2010, and Dudek (VIII) v.   Germany (dec.), no.   12977/09 and 4 others, 23 November 2010). 44.     With regard to the subjective element, the Court has emphasised that for behaviour to qualify as abuse of the right of application, it must be intentional and this intention must be established with sufficient certainty (see Gross , cited above, § 28, in respect of the intention to mislead the Court, and Miroļubovs and Others , cited above, § 66, in respect of the intentional breach of the principle of confidentiality of friendly-settlement proceedings). Application of the above principles to the present case The applicants’ conduct in domestic proceedings and before the Court 45.     The Court observes that the applicants complained of the non ‑ enforcement of assignment orders issued in enforcement proceedings and awarding them legal fees. Only the second applicant in application no.   20458/22 also complained of the non-enforcement of one assignment order assigning him legal fees previously awarded to him by a “Pinto” judgment; thus, in substance, he complained of the non-enforcement of a judgment adopted in the main proceedings. 46 .     The Court notes the applicants’ conduct in the domestic proceedings as described above and takes the view that it can be summarised according to the following two schemes. 47 .     The first scheme was based on the fragmentation of enforcement proceedings by seeking the issuance of separate assignment orders depending on the number of individuals in whose favour the “Pinto” decision had been issued. In this regard, the Court would emphasise that the first and second applicants fragmented the enforcement proceedings in respect of “Pinto” decisions in favour of multiple individuals by filing separate requests for assignment orders to enforce the same decision. Both the first and the second applicants represented their clients in “Pinto” and in enforcement proceedings and the requests for the issuance of assignment orders aimed at enforcing the same decision against the same debtor were filed at the same time (see paragraphs 8 and 15 above). Furthermore, in at least thirty-nine cases (forty taking into account the fact that the domestic court joined two sets of enforcement proceedings; see paragraph 11 above), the first applicant introduced two separate parallel sets of proceedings to enforce each “Pinto” decision, one as the representative of his client and one in his own favour as avvocato antistatario in the same “Pinto” proceedings (see paragraph   9 above). 48 .     The second scheme was based on the fragmentation of enforcement proceedings by seeking the issuance of separate assignment orders depending on the number of sums awarded to the same creditor in a “Pinto” judgment. In this regard, the Court points out that the second and third applicants, respectively as avvocato antistatario of plaintiffs in “Pinto” proceedings and as avvocato antistatario for the second applicant in the enforcement proceedings, fragmented the enforcement proceedings in respect of five judgments of the Court of Cassation even though those judgments had awarded only one creditor (namely the second applicant) two sums in legal fees to be paid by the same debtor. In this case too, the requests for the issuance of assignment orders aimed at enforcing the same judgment were filed at the same time (see paragraphs 17-18 above). 49 .     The Court observes that the unnecessary fragmentation of enforcement proceedings increases the number of sets of proceedings, negatively affecting the organisation and the workload of domestic courts and inevitably extending the length of proceedings. Furthermore, it increases the costs of proceedings by multiplying awards of legal fees (see paragraphs   10, 15-16 and 18 above). 50 .     Having examined the circumstances of the cases at hand, the Court finds that the fragmentation of enforcement proceedings by requesting the delivery of separate assignment orders cannot be seen as an efficient enforcement of the “Pinto” decisions and judgments and was not justified by the need to protect the interests of the applicants’ clients or any of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto (see Andrejeva , cited above, § 99, and Miholapa , cited above, § 24; compare, mutatis mutandis , Petrović , cited above; Bekauri v. Georgia , (dec.) no.   14102/02, §   21, 10   April 2012; and De Cristofaro v. Italy (dec.), nos. 30464/07 and 7   others, §   45, 10   July 2012). Bearing in mind that none of the applicants explained either before the domestic courts or in their applications to the Court why the fragmentation of enforcement proceedings might have been necessary in the interests of the proper course of the proceedings or otherwise, the Court finds that the applicants’ extensive recourse to separate parallel enforcement proceedings was not grounded on any objective reason, other than to spuriously multiply awards of legal fees (compare, mutatis mutandis , Basileo and Others v. Italy (dec.)¸ no. 11303/02, 23 August 2011). 51.     The Court further notes that national case-law clearly stated that the fragmentation of a claim also amounted to an abuse in cases involving a multitude of creditors, and irrespective of the kind of proceedings (see paragraphs 23 ‑ 28 above). 52 .     The Court also observes in passing – although this is not a decisive element in the present case – that the domestic courts did not systematically identify all the connected enforcement proceedings referred to in the applications. 53 .     Nevertheless, at least in respect of the second applicant, the documents attached to application no. 27719/22 concerning the same enforcement proceedings referred to in applications nos. 16898/22, 17964/22, 17969/22, 26634/22, 27723/22, 27758/22 and 27827/22, show that the Rome District Court had already joined three separate requests for enforcement of the same “Pinto” decision and had issued only one assignment order rather than three. In the order, the District Court found that submitting separate requests for enforcement of the same decision was an abuse of procedure and awarded the second applicant legal fees only once (see paragraph 16   above). 54 .     Similarly, in respect of the first applicant, in at least one case a domestic court joined two connected sets of enforcement proceedings (see paragraph   11 above). 55 .     Moreover, the Court notes that the applicants’ conduct before the Court was not beyond reproach, for the following reasons. 56.     The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Rule 44A of the Rules of Court, the parties have a duty to cooperate fully in the conduct of the proceedings and, in particular, to take such action within their power as the Court considers necessary for the proper administration of justice. 57.     As regards the submission of an application before the Court, paragraph 14 of the Practice Direction on institution of proceedings issued by the President of the Court in accordance with Rule   32 of the Rules of Court states that “where an applicant or representative lodges complaints on behalf of two or more applicants whose applications are based on different facts, a separate application form should be filled in for each individual giving all the information required”. 58.     However, in the case at hand, the second and third applicants, at the same time and in their own interests, submitted separate identical applications based on the same facts complaining before the Court of the non ‑ enforcement of assignment orders aimed at enforcing the same “Pinto” decision or judgment. Not only did they fail to join the complaints regarding those orders in one application, but they did not even inform the Court of the existence of a link between the applications. Moreover, in each application they requested the Court to award them just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs, including legal fees (compare, mutatis mutandis , Simonetti (II) and (III) v. Italy (dec.), nos.   50914/11 and 58323/11, §§ 22-23, 10 July 2012, and De Cristofaro , cited above, §§   47 ‑ 49). 59 .     The Court also observes that the second applicant appointed the third applicant as avvocato antistatario in the enforcement proceedings with the purpose of requesting the issuance of assignment orders (see paragraphs   18, 32 and 34 above). Although applicants are free to appoint representatives in domestic proceedings (compare Fe ilazoo v. Malt a , no. 6865/19, § 126, 11   March 2021, which states that “given the independence of the legal profession from the State, the conduct of the case is essentially a matter between the defendant and his or her counsel”), the Court notes that the decision of the second applicant to appoint the third applicant as his representative doubled the number of individuals entitled to lodge applications before the Court and that, at least with regard to application no.   20458/22, both applicants requested an award of just satisfaction and costs (see paragraphs 32 and 34 above). 60 .     Accordingly, the Court finds that the second and third applicants, employing the same technique as before the national courts and perpetuating before the Court their conduct at the national level, unnecessarily lodged separate applications, spuriously and deliberately multiplying their requests for awards of just satisfaction, including costs, legal fees and expenses (see Miroļubovs and Others , §   65; Podeschi , § 86; and Petrović , all cited above). Such conduct on their part demonstrates disregard for the Court’s relevant rules of procedure and a failure to display the required level of prudence and meaningful cooperation with the Court (see Zhdanov and Others v.   Russia , nos. 12200/08 and 2 others, §   81, 16   July 2019). 61 .     With regard to the conduct adopted before the Court by the first applicant, the Court notes that he lodged one application complaining of the non-enforcement of several assignment orders and therefore requested the Court to award him just satisfaction, legal fees and expenses only once. Nevertheless, the Court observes that the first applicant also failed to explain in his application to the Court why the fragmentation of enforcement proceedings had been necessary in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 50 above). Therefore, it takes the view that the first applicant’s application to the Court was merely instrumental to the enforcement of assignment orders stemming from the multiplication of sets of domestic proceedings while, at the same time, he sought an award of just satisfaction with respect to conduct that had been deemed an abuse of procedure in the domestic case-law. 62 .     Ultimately, the Court, taking into account the number of cases lodged both with the domestic courts and the Court in which the three applicants appear to have demonstrated the conduct described above, concludes that on several occasions they have applied one or the other of the schemes summarised above (see paragraphs 46-48). Conclusions 63.     In the light of the above considerations, the Court finds that all three applicants misused domestic proceedings, which are a primary means of protecting human rights (see Cavaliere , cited above) and that their conduct was clearly capable of contributing to the congestion of the courts at the domestic level and thus to one of the causes of excessive length of proceedings (see paragraphs 46-48 and 62 above; see also Andrejeva , cited above, § 99, and compare, mutatis mutandis , Bock and Dudek , both cited above). The artificial fragmentation of enforcement proceedings also increased the costs of the proceedings, unnecessarily and unjustifiably multiplying the legal fees awarded to the applicants (see paragraph 49   above). 64.     Moreover, the Court finds that the second and third applicants also made unnecessarily extensive use of their right of individual application before the Court, against the background of the Court’s caseload and the fact that a large number of applications raising serious human rights issues are currently pending (see Bock , cited above), by deliberately multiplying their requests for the award of just satisfaction, including costs (see paragraph   59 above, and Miroļubovs and Others , § 65; Podeschi , § 86; and Petrović , all cited above). In this connection, the Court reiterates that its task, as defined by Article 19 of the Convention, is “[t]o ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto”. Dealing with manifestly abusive conduct by applicants or their authorised representatives, which creates unnecessary work for the Court, is incompatible with its proper functions under the Convention (see Petrović ; Bekauri , § 21; and De Cristofaro , §   45, all cited above). With regard to the first applicant, the Court finds that he similarly aimed to take advantage of the system of protection of human rights under the Convention by asking the Court to find a violation of his rights that stemmed from his own abusive conduct at the domestic level (see paragraph 61 above). 65.     Having regard, in particular, to the following elements: (i)     the applicants’ repeated use at the domestic level of one of the schemes summarised above (see paragraphs 46-48, 62 above); (ii)     their failure to justify the fragmentation of the proceedings both before domestic authorities (see paragraphs 49-50 above) and before the Court (see paragraphs 55 ‑ 61 above); (iii)     the lack of any objectively justified reason for the second applicant to appoint the third applicant as his representative in the enforcement proceedings and the subsequent doubling of the number of individuals entitled to lodge applications before the Court (see paragraphs 59-60 above); (iv)     the fact that the domestic authorities have already found that fragmentation of proceedings was an abuse of procedure in respect of the first and second applicants (see paragraphs 53 ‑ 54 above); and (v)     the fact that for thirty-nine cases the first applicant requested the issuance of two separate assignment orders in each case – one in his own interest and one in the interest of his client – although it appears that he was aware that a request for one order was sufficient (see paragraphs 9-12 above), the Court concludes that the applicants intentionally abused their right of individual petition (see Gross , § 28, and Miroļubovs and Others , §   66, both cited above). 66.     Lastly, the Court points out that, having due regard to its functions as defined by Article 19 of the Convention, lawyers must show a high level of professional prudence and meaningful cooperation with the Court by refraining from bringing unmeritorious complaints and, once proceedings before the Court have been instituted, by abiding by all the relevant rules of procedure and professional ethics. Otherwise, an abusive or negligent application undermines the credibility of lawyers’ work in the eyes of the Court and, if done systematically, may even result in their being excluded from the proceedings under Rule 36 § 4 (c), as amended by the Court on 7   February 2022, and Rule 44D of the Rules of Court (see Eskerkhanov and Others v. Russia , nos. 18496/16 and 2 others, §§   23‑29, 25 July 2017; Petrović , cited above; Bekauri , cited above, § 24; and De Cristofaro , cited above, § 56). 67.     In the present case the applicants’ conduct was manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and impeded the proper functioning of the safeguard mechanisms established by the Convention. 68.     It follows that the applications must be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application pursuant to Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 8 June 2023.     Renata Degener   Marko Bošnjak   Registrar   President   Appendix ​List of cases   No. Application no. Date of introduction Case name Applicant Year of birth Place of residence Decision or judgment in “Pinto” proceedings Assignment order awarding legal fees 1. 2394/22 04/01/2022 Ferrara v. Italy Alessandro FERRARA 1973 Rome Rome Court of Appeal R.G. 57009/2011 Decision no. 3911/2016 16/05/2016 awarding G.M. and F.I. compensation in “Pinto” proceedings and the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario . Rome District Court R.E. 2099/2018 26/03/2018 assigning G.M. the sum awarded by Decision no. 3911/2016 of the Rome Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for G.M. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 1976/2018 08/10/2018 assigning F.I. the sum awarded by Decision no. 3911/2016 of the Rome Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for F.I. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 27540/2017 22/01/2018 assigning the first applicant the legal fees awarded to him by Decision no. 3911/2016 of the Rome Court of Appeal and awarding him legal fees with regard to the enforcement proceedings. Naples Court of Appeal R.G. 1661/2016 Decision no. 2909/2016 06/12/2016 awarding M.C., M.C.D., L.R., G.F.C., F.C., A.C. and A.C., the last three acting as heirs of C.d.S., compensation in “Pinto” proceedings and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario . Rome District Court R.E. 1972/2018 08/10/2018 assigning M.C. the sum awarded by Decision no. 1661/2016 of the Naples Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for M.C. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 2427/2018 07/06/2018 assigning F.C., A.C. and A.C. the sum awarded by Decision no. 1661/2016 of the Naples Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for F.C., A.C. and A.C. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 1977/2018 08/10/2018 assigning G.F.C. the sum awarded by Decision no. 1661/2016 of the Naples Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for G.F.C. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 2424/2018 07/06/2018 assigning L.R. the sum awarded by Decision no. 1661/2016 of the Naples Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for L.R. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 2098/2018 26/03/2018 assigning M.C.D. the sum awarded by Decision no. 1661/2016 of the Naples Court of Appeal and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for M.C.D. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 915/2018 20/12/2018 assigning the first applicant the legal fees awarded to him by Decision no. 1661/2016 of the Naples Court of Appeal and awarding him legal fees with regard to the enforcement proceedings. Naples Court of Appeal R.G. 944/2016 Decision no. n/a 12/07/2020 awarding C.C.U. s.c.a.r.l., R.S., T.S., A.C., and F.C. compensation in “Pinto” proceedings and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario . Rome District Court R.E. 27133/2017 04/04/2016 assigning C.C.U. s.c.a.r.l. the sum awarded by the Naples Court of Appeal in proceedings R.G.V.G. 944/2016 and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for C.C.U. s.c.a.r.l. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 1780/2018 08/10/2018 assigning R.S. the sum awarded by the Naples Court of Appeal in proceedings R.G.V.G. 944/2016 and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for R.S. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 1975/2018 08/10/2018 assigning A.C. the sum awarded by the Naples Court of Appeal in proceedings R.G.V.G. 944/2016 and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for A.C. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 1346/2018 7/11/2018 assigning T.S. the sum awarded by the Naples Court of Appeal in proceedings R.G.V.G. 944/2016 and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for T.S. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 2100/2018 26/03/2018 assigning F.C. the sum awarded by the Naples Court of Appeal in proceedings R.G.V.G. 944/2016 and awarding the first applicant legal fees as avvocato antistatario for F.C. in the enforcement proceedings. Rome District Court R.E. 27134/2017 04/04/2018 assigning the first applicant the legal fees awarded to him by the Naples Court of Appeal in proceedings R.G.V.G. 944/2016 and awarding him legal fees with regard to the enforcement proceedings. Naples Court of Appeal R.G. 1991/2017 Decision no. 3107/2017 01/12/2017 awarding A.T., P.T., R.T. and O.T. compensation in “Pinto” proceedings and the first applicant legal fees