CEDHCASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG6Satisfaction
CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 6 juin 2023
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:0606JUD003641820
- Date
- 6 juin 2023
- Publication
- 6 juin 2023
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
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version préliminaireFaits
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Solution
source officielleViolation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
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margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sE5BF05B1 { width:2.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC2E086EB { width:36.89pt; display:inline-block } .s88AD0518 { width:147.76pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF NAVALNYY v. RUSSIA (No. 3) (Application no.   36418/20)     JUDGMENT   Art 2 (procedural) • Domestic authorities’ refusal to investigate in criminal proceedings plausible claims of applicant’s poisoning with a chemical nerve agent prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention • Inadequate pre-investigation inquiry fell short of being public and made no allowance for the victim’s right to participate in the proceedings • Failure to investigate possible political motive for attempted murder, involvement or collusion of State agents and the reported use of a prohibited substance Art 46 • Individual measures • Prompt Art 2-compliant investigation in criminal proceedings required   STRASBOURG 6 June 2023   FINAL   06/09/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3), The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Jolien Schukking , President ,   Pere Pastor Vilanova,   Yonko Grozev,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Ioannis Ktistakis , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   36418/20) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Aleksey Anatolyevich Navalnyy (“the applicant”), on 21   August 2020; the decision to indicate an interim measure to the Russian Government (“the Government”) under Rule   39 of the Rules of Court, and the decision to lift it; the decision to give notice of the application to the respondent Government; the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court) and treat as confidential documents pertaining to the applicant’s medical condition deposited with the Registry (Rule 33 § 1); the parties’ observations; the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the sitting judges of the Court to act as ad hoc judge, applying by analogy Rule 29 §   2 of the Rules of the Court (see, for background information, Kutayev v.   Russia , no.   17912/15, §§ 4-8, 24 January 2023); Having deliberated in private on 16 May 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     This application concerns the refusal of the Russian authorities to investigate in criminal proceedings the applicant’s alleged poisoning with a substance identified as a chemical nerve agent from the Novichok group. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently detained in high ‑ security correctional facility IK-6 in Melekhovo, Vladimir Region. He was represented by Ms O.   Mikhaylova, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 3.     The Government were initially represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by Mr   A. Fedorov, Head of the Office of the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.     In August 2020 the applicant and several staff members of the Anti ‑ Corruption Foundation (an NGO founded by the applicant) went on a work trip to Tomsk, Russia. On 20 August 2020 he took a flight from Tomsk to Moscow with one of his associates, while several others stayed in Tomsk. During the flight, he suddenly fell ill and lost consciousness. The flight crew had to make an emergency landing in Omsk, where ambulance doctors, after an initial assessment, provided him with urgent treatment. He was transported, in a coma, to a local municipal hospital, where he was put on life support. 6.     On the same day the applicant’s associate, Mr G., reported the incident to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (“the Investigative Committee”), requesting a criminal investigation into the applicant’s attempted murder by poisoning with an unknown substance. He stated that the intended assassination related to the applicant’s political activity and thus fell under Articles 105 § 1 (murder) and 277 (attempt on the life of a State official or public figure) of the Criminal Code. On the same day Mr L., the applicant’s representative, who had accompanied him on the trip to Tomsk, filed a similar criminal complaint with the Sovetskiy District Department of the Interior of Tomsk. He pointed to the fact that the applicant had suddenly fallen ill despite initially being well during the trip, and requested a criminal investigation into his poisoning. 7.     On 21 August 2020 the Court granted a request for an interim measure lodged under Rule 39 by the applicant’s wife and indicated to the Government to ensure that his family and doctors had access to him and that his condition be assessed with a view to transferring him to Germany for treatment. 8 .     On 21 August 2020, according to the Government, the Forensic Centre of the Omsk Regional Department of the Interior concluded that no potent or poisonous substances, narcotic substances, psychotropic substances or their precursors had been found on the cotton swab used to take samples from the applicant’s palms or nail clippings obtained after hospitalisation. They did not provide any further details or a copy of the forensic report. 9.     On 22 August 2020 the applicant was flown to Germany in a private medical plane for treatment at the Charité Hospital in Berlin. He remained in intensive care for several weeks, initially in a medically induced coma, followed by several months of rehabilitation. 10.     On 24 August 2020 the Court lifted the interim measure indicated on 21 August 2020. 11 .     On the same day, according to the Government, a forensic medical examination (no. 2175) established that no poisonous (narcotic or potent) substances had been found in or on the objects submitted for analysis. They did not provide any further details or a copy of the forensic report. 12 .     On 27 August 2020 Mr G.’s request for an investigation was forwarded to the West Siberian Transport Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee. 13 .     According to the Government, on the same day the Prosecutor General’s Office sent a request for legal assistance to Germany in relation to the case. They did not disclose its content or provide a copy to the Court. 14.     On 1 September 2020 Mr G. challenged the Investigative Committee’s inaction before the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He specified that Article   144 § 1 of that Code required the investigating authorities to take one of three decisions in response to his criminal complaint of 20   August 2020, namely to: (i) open a criminal investigation, (ii) refuse to open a criminal investigation or (iii) transfer the request to another investigating or judicial body with jurisdiction within three days of receipt. 15 .     On 2 September 2020 the German government announced that the results of the tests carried out on the applicant’s samples had revealed unequivocal proof of the presence of a chemical nerve agent from the Novichok group of substances prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC – see the press release cited in paragraph 20 below). 16.     On 3 September 2020 the head of the Investigative Committee’s department for processing petitions submitted a written explanation to the Basmannyy District Court stating that Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not applicable as there was no legal act to challenge under that provision. 17 .     On 4 September 2020, according to the Government, the clothes the applicant was wearing when he was admitted to the medical facility in Omsk were subject to a physical and chemical analysis. The relevant report (no.   2/281 of 4 September 2020) stated that no traces of narcotics, their derivatives, or psychotropic or poisonous substances had been found. The Government did not provide any further details or a copy of the report. 18 .     On the same day, the Basmannyy District Court dismissed Mr G.’s complaint on the grounds that his request had been forwarded to the relevant department (see paragraph 12 above) and that he, as the applicant’s representative acting on his behalf, could access the information relating to its processing. Therefore, his rights had not been infringed. 19.     On 7 September 2020 Mr G. appealed against the above-mentioned decision. He stated that the Investigative Committee had neither instituted the criminal proceedings he had requested nor taken a formal decision refusing to open an investigation within the three-day statutory time-limit. Moreover, he pointed out that the obligation to investigate the alleged attempted murder also arose from the public statement of the German authorities to the effect that the attempt on the applicant’s life had been carried out with a chemical nerve agent from the Novichok group. 20 .     On 14 September 2020 the German government’s Press and Information Office published a press release concerning the results of laboratory tests on samples taken from the applicant (see paragraph 76 below), which read as follows: “On 2   September 2020 the Federal Government announced that, at the request of the Charité [Hospital in] Berlin, a specialist Bundeswehr laboratory had carried out toxicology tests on samples from Alexei Navalnyy. The results of these tests have revealed unequivocal proof of the presence of a chemical nerve agent from the Novichok group. This constitutes a severe violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Federal Government has therefore requested that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) help analyse evidence related to the Navalnyy case. This request for OPCW assistance was made in accordance with Article   VIII 38 (e) of the CWC, which enables all States Parties to obtain technical assistance from the OPCW. On this basis, the OPCW has taken test samples from Mr   Navalnyy and made the necessary arrangements to have these examined in OPCW designated laboratories. Moreover, the Federal Government requested that France and Sweden as European partners conduct an independent examination of the German evidence based on new samples taken from Mr   Navalnyy. The results of this examination by specialist laboratories in France and Sweden have meanwhile been released and confirm the German findings. In efforts separate from the OPCW examinations, which are still ongoing, three laboratories have meanwhile independently of one another presented proof that Mr   Navalnyy’s poisoning was caused by a nerve agent from the Novichok group. We once again call on Russia to make a statement on the incident. We are closely consulting with our European partners regarding possible next steps.” 21 .     According to the applicant, on the same day the laboratory under Sweden’s Defence Research Agency, which deals with chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear substances and is on the list of the OPCW designated laboratories, also confirmed the presence of Novichok in the samples taken from the applicant. It stressed that its findings were irrefutable. Furthermore, according to the applicant, an OPCW designated laboratory in France made the same finding. The applicant did not provide copies of these reports to the Court. 22 .     According to the Government, on the same day, 14 September 2020, the Prosecutor General’s Office sent a request for legal assistance to Germany in relation to the case. They did not disclose its content or provide a copy to the Court. 23 .     On 18 September 2020 an investigator of the Transport Division of the Tomsk Department of the Interior ( Томский линейный отдел МВД – “the Tomsk transport police”) issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s alleged attempted murder as no objective information had been received suggesting that any intentional criminal acts had been committed. The decision stated that the pre-investigation inquiry had been extended to 19 September 2020, that a request for legal assistance had been sent to the German authorities and that it had not been possible in the preceding period to obtain explanations from Ms P., one of the applicant’s team members who had been on the trip to Tomsk. 24 .     On the same day, the deputy chief investigator reversed that decision and extended the pre-investigation inquiry by thirty days. The decision indicated that forensic examinations were still underway, that the request for legal assistance sent to the German authorities to have the applicant’s wife and his doctor questioned had not been answered, that Ms P. had not yet been questioned and that other steps had to be taken. 25 .     According to the Government, on 24 September 2020 the Prosecutor General’s Office sent a request for legal assistance to Germany in relation to the case. They did not disclose its content or provide a copy to the Court. 26.     On 28 September 2020 the Moscow City Court upheld the Basmannyy District Court’s decision of 4 September 2020, finding no breach of procedural or substantive law. 27 .     According to the Government, on the same day the Prosecutor General’s Office sent a request for legal assistance to Germany in relation to the case. They did not disclose its content or provide a copy to the Court. 28.     On 2 October 2020 the Kirovskiy District Court of Tomsk dismissed the complaint filed by Mr G., finding no evidence that the investigating bodies had been inactive or had breached the statutory time-limits. It took note of the inquiry file and found that the investigators had questioned over one hundred people and that forensic experts had examined over 500   physical exhibits. It also found that Mr L., the applicant’s representative, had been duly notified of the decisions of the inquiry bodies. It stated, however, that the Tomsk transport police had not received any complaints concerning the applicant’s alleged attempted murder, and that there was no proof that Mr   L.’s request of 20 August 2020 had been transferred to them. On 7 October 2020 Mr G. challenged that decision. 29 .     Meanwhile, on 6 October 2020 the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) issued a press release concerning its findings in the applicant’s case. The relevant parts read as follows: “The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) yesterday sent to the Federal Republic of Germany the report of the OPCW’s mission to provide the technical assistance requested with regard to the poisoning of Mr Alexei Navalnyy on 20 August 2020. The results of the analysis by the OPCW designated laboratories of biomedical samples collected by the OPCW team and shared with the Federal Republic of Germany confirm that   the biomarkers of the cholinesterase inhibitor found in Mr   Navalnyy’s blood and urine samples have similar structural characteristics to the toxic chemicals belonging to Schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15 that were added to the Annex on Chemicals to the [CWC] during the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019. This cholinesterase inhibitor is not listed in the Annex on Chemicals to the [CWC].” 30.     On 12 October 2020 (according to the applicant) or 16 October 2020 (according to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation – “the FSS”) Mr L., referring to the OPCW’s findings, requested the FSS to institute criminal proceedings under Article 355 of the Criminal Code (development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or sale of weapons of mass destruction). 31 .     On 14 October 2020, according to the Government, a panel of forensic medical experts issued report no. 156-k, which did not confirm the diagnosis of poisoning. They did not provide any further details or a copy of the forensic report. 32 .     On 16 October 2020 the investigator of the Tomsk transport police issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s attempted murder on the grounds that no objective information had been obtained to suggest that any intentional criminal acts had been committed. The decision stated that over 200 people had been questioned (including medical staff, the airline staff and passengers of the flight, staff of the hotels, restaurants and airport café), over sixty sites had been inspected and 542   physical exhibits had been examined by forensic experts. It also stated that there had been no opportunity to question the applicant, his wife, Ms P. or other people whose evidence was necessary in order to take a lawful and well ‑ reasoned decision in the case. Moreover, no reply had been received from the German, Swedish or French authorities pursuant to the earlier requests for legal assistance. 33 .     On the same day the deputy chief investigator reversed that decision and extended the pre-investigation inquiry by a further thirty days on the grounds that it was incomplete without questioning the applicant, his wife, Ms P. and others and without a response from the German, Swedish and French authorities. 34.     On 21 October 2020 Mr G. challenged the inaction of the Tomsk transport police before the Kirovskiy District Court, relying on Articles   125, 144 and 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court recorded the complaint as lodged on 27 October 2020. 35 .     On 30 October 2020 the Kirovskiy District Court examined and dismissed that complaint. It found that the investigating authorities had acted lawfully, and that the inquiry was still ongoing. The court rejected a request made by Mr   G. at the hearing to return the applicant’s personal belongings seized for the inquiry as not within its competence. 36.     On the same day Mr G. requested the Tomsk transport police to give him access to the inquiry file. 37.     On 6 November 2020 Mr G. appealed against the Kirovskiy District Court’s decision of 30 October 2020. He complained, in particular, that no criminal proceedings had been instituted into the alleged poisoning, and that the practice of terminating the inquiry simultaneously with its reopening (see paragraphs 32-33 above) amounted to its indefinite extension. He pointed out that the inquiry was not an appropriate procedure as it did not afford the applicant the same procedural guarantees as a criminal investigation, in which he would have victim status. In a criminal case, he would be able to participate in the criminal prosecution, give statements, gather and submit evidence to be joined to the case file, request procedural steps or decisions to be taken to establish the circumstances of the case, make use of procedural rights related to the carrying out of forensic examinations and receive copies of procedural documents affecting his interests. The inquiry did not provide the applicant with such opportunities. He further specified that the questioning of over 200   people during the inquiry was not considered a “witness examination” and had not therefore been subject to any formalities. The people concerned could not, for example, be held liable for giving false statements. As regards the forensic examination of the 542 physical exhibits, the applicant and his representatives could not make use of the procedural rights which would be granted in criminal proceedings, such as the right to receive decisions on appointing experts and their reports, challenge experts, request the appointment of experts from a different institution or specific experts, be present during the expert examination, give explanations to the expert and request that additional questions be put to the expert. Lastly, he stated that there were no legal grounds for withholding the applicant’s belongings after the termination of the inquiry. 38.     On the same day Mr L. complained to the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow of inaction on the part of the FSS following his request to open a criminal investigation lodged on 12 (or 16) October 2020. 39.     On 10 November 2020 the FSS replied to Mr L. that there were no grounds for taking any procedural steps in response to his request in view of the ongoing verification by another law-enforcement agency of the facts alleged therein. 40 .     On 14 November 2020 the investigator of the Tomsk transport police issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation and on the same day the deputy chief investigator reversed it. 41.     On 16 November 2020 Mr L. complained to the Lefortovskiy District Court of inaction on the part of the FSS in relation to his request. He stated, in particular, that the FSS’s reply of 10 November 2020 did not fall into one of the three categories provided for by Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 42 .     On 20 November 2020 Mr G. lodged two complaints with the Kirovskiy District Court of inaction on the part of the Tomsk transport police (i) on account of their failure to open a criminal investigation on the basis of the inquiry file, and (ii) concerning their refusal to give the applicant’s representatives access to the inquiry file. On the same day he lodged a complaint with the Leninskiy District Court of Novosibirsk of inaction on the part of the West Siberian Transport Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee for failure to open a criminal investigation following his request of 20 August 2020. 43 .     On 25 November 2020 the Lefortovo District Court dismissed the complaint of inaction on the part of the FSS on the grounds that Mr L.’s request had not provided a sufficient factual basis to trigger an obligation to take any procedural steps in accordance with Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the court noted: “The scope of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only allows the court dealing with the complaint to review the lawfulness and well-foundedness of actions of public officials which may interfere with the constitutional rights and freedoms of parties to criminal proceedings or restrict their access to justice; at the same time, the court may not predetermine the decision of public officials in charge of an inquiry, reverse their decisions or require them to reverse their decisions, or require such officials to conduct a pre-trial investigation, issue a decision to institute criminal proceedings or refuse to institute them.” 44.     On 30 November 2020 Mr L. appealed against that decision. 45.     On 26 November 2020 the Tomsk Regional Court dismissed the appeal against the Kirovskiy District Court’s decision of 2 October 2020. The court found that the inquiry was ongoing at the time the complaint was lodged and that therefore its dismissal by the lower court had been justified. It was noted that the investigator had not given access to the inquiry material to the applicant’s representative because the file had been in use, but that he had still had a right to access it. 46 .     On 4 December 2020 the Kirovskiy District Court dismissed the complaint of 20 November 2020. Referring to the decisions of 14   November 2020 (see paragraph 40 above), it found no failure on the part of the Tomsk transport police to open a criminal investigation on the basis that the inquiry was underway. It further held that it was lawful at that stage not to return the applicant his belongings. The decision contained the following reasoning: “The court is not allowed to consider any complaint requiring the investigator to take specific steps as it does not fall within the scope of judicial review under Article   125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which would be contrary to Article 38 of the Code that protects the procedural discretion of the investigator. For this reason, the applicant’s request to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of the inquiry file and to return the items that were seized during the pre-investigative inquiry does not fall within the scope of judicial review under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 47 .     On the same date the court dismissed the complaint concerning the lack of access to the inquiry file (see paragraph 42 above) on the grounds that no such obligation existed before the final decision in the inquiry. On 8   December 2020 Mr G. appealed against both decisions. He pointed out, inter alia , that the decisions of 14   October 2020 had only been notified to him in the court’s decision of 14   December 2020 and reiterated his arguments for the opening of a criminal file. 48 .     On 13 December 2020 the investigator of the Tomsk transport police issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation and on the same day the deputy chief investigator reversed it. The latter decision was not provided to the Court. 49 .     On 14 December 2020 journalists of Bellingcat (an investigative journalism collective) and The Insider (an online newspaper) published a report on their investigation into the applicant’s alleged poisoning. They revealed that since 2017 he had been under FSS surveillance, and that the agents involved in it had specialised in toxic chemical substances. The findings of the report were based on the telephone and geolocation data of the phones used by the named persons identified as security agents. 50 .     On 15 December 2020 Mr L. filed a request with the Military Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee, requesting a criminal investigation into the applicant’s alleged poisoning by security agents, referring to the publication by Bellingcat and The Insider . He filed a similar request on 21 December 2020. 51.     On 17 December 2020 Mr L. lodged a complaint with the Kirovskiy District Court of failure on the part of the Tomsk transport police to open a criminal investigation. He relied, inter   alia , on the OPCW’s findings as regards the chemical substance identified in the samples taken from the applicant and challenged the effectiveness of the inquiry, in particular on account of the applicant’s inability to exercise victim’s rights. He also complained that the inquiry bodies had unlawfully retained the applicant’s belongings. 52 .     On 21 December 2020 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed the complaint against the West Siberian Transport Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee (see paragraph 42 above). It held that there had been no inaction on the part of that authority as Mr G.’s request for an investigation had been forwarded to the authority with jurisdiction, the Tomsk transport police, and the inquiry was underway. Mr G. challenged that decision on 28 December 2020. 53.     On the latter date the Tomsk Regional Court examined and dismissed the appeal against the decision of the Kirovskiy District Court of 30 October 2020 (see paragraph 35 above). It reiterated the lower court’s findings as regards the ongoing inquiry. As regards the retention of the applicant’s seized belongings, it found that it was lawful on the basis that the inquiry had resumed. 54 .     On 30 December 2020 the Military Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee replied to Mr L.’s requests of 15 and 21 December 2020 (see paragraph 50 above), stating that they did not contain any specific facts that would warrant an investigation. Those complaints were forwarded to the Russian Transport Police for the Siberian Federal District. Mr   L. challenged that decision before the 235 th Garrison Military Court of Moscow on 15 February 2021. 55 .     On 11 January 2021 the investigator of the Tomsk transport police issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation and on the same day the deputy chief investigator reversed it. The latter decision was not provided to the Court. 56.     On 15 January 2021 the Kirovskiy District Court dismissed the complaint concerning the failure of the Tomsk transport police to open a criminal investigation, noting that the decisions of 18   September 2020, 16   October 2020, 14   November 2020, 13   December 2020 and 11   January 2021 (see paragraphs 23, 32, 40, 48 and 55 above) had all been reversed and that the inquiry was ongoing. Therefore, there had been no inaction on the part of the investigating authorities, nor was the retention of the applicant’s belongings unlawful. Mr L. appealed against that decision on 5 February 2021. 57 .     On the same day the applicant requested the Tomsk transport police to transfer the inquiry file to the Main Military Investigation Department of the Interior, which had jurisdiction as the case reportedly involved FSS   agents. This request was refused on 20 January 2021 as unsubstantiated, and on 6 March 2021 Mr L. challenged the refusal before the Kirovskiy District Court, stating, in particular, that it had been impossible for the applicant to access the inquiry file, and that the inquiry had been ineffective. 58 .     According to the Government, on 15 January 2021 the German authorities replied to Russia’s request for legal assistance. They informed the Russian authorities that the Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology had conducted a toxicological test on three water bottles transferred to the laboratory of the Charité Hospital, and that traces of a nerve agent had been found on two of those bottles. The Government did not provide a copy of this document to the Court. 59 .     On 10 February 2021 the investigator of the Tomsk transport police issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation. Mr   G.   challenged the investigator’s decision on 12 April 2021. He reiterated the circumstances of the applicant’s poisoning, hospitalisation, the findings of the OPCW designated laboratories, and the publication by Bellingcat and The Insider identifying the persons implicated in the applicant’s surveillance and poisoning. He complained about the investigator’s failure to assess the corpus delicti under Articles 105 and 277 of the Criminal Code. He also reiterated the complaints concerning the lack of an effective investigation and the lack of access to the inquiry material and other procedural rights which the applicant could not exercise for lack of victim status in the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, he complained about the retention of the applicant’s belongings. 60.     On 15 February 2021 the Novosibirsk Regional Court allowed the appeal against the Leninskiy District Court’s decision of 21 December 2020 (see paragraph 52 above). It found no proof that Mr G.’s request for an investigation had been forwarded to the Tomsk transport police and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 61 .     On 20 February 2021 the Leninskiy District Court, acting in fresh proceedings, rejected the complaint and found that Mr G.’s request for an investigation had been forwarded to the authority with jurisdiction, the Tomsk transport police. Mr G. challenged that decision on 26 February 2021. 62.     On 15 March 2021 the Kirovskiy District Court dismissed Mr L.’s challenge against the decision of 20 February 2021 (see paragraph 61 above). It found that there were no grounds to transfer the inquiry file to the Main Military Investigation Department of the Interior, noting that from 15   November 2020 to 10   February 2021, thirty-seven people had been questioned and five requests for information answered, before the inquiry had been closed on the latter date. The closure of the file did not mean that the inquiry had been ineffective. Mr L. appealed against that decision on 5   April 2021. 63.     On 22 March 2021 the 235 th Garrison Military Court of Moscow dismissed Mr L.’s complaint concerning the Investigative Committee’s refusal to open criminal proceedings against the FSS agents allegedly implicated in the applicant’s poisoning (see paragraph 54 above). It held that courts acting under Article   125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had no competence to verify the substance of an investigator’s decision as to whether a complaint contained information on the circumstances of an alleged offence. Those circumstances had, in any event, been the subject of the inquiry closed on 10   February 2021 (see paragraph 59 above). The contested decision had therefore been lawful. Mr   G.   appealed against that decision on 24 March 2021. He stated, in particular, that the impugned decision did not fall into one of the three categories provided for by Article   144 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that there was no evidence that any verifications or other actions had been taken at his request. That appeal was dismissed on 18 May 2021 by the Second Western District Military Court (whose decision was not made available to the Court). 64 .     On 29 April 2021 the Kirovskiy District Court dismissed Mr G.’s challenge against the decision of 10 February 2021 by which the Tomsk transport police refused to open a criminal investigation (see paragraph 59 above). Referring to report no.   156-k, it found that the diagnosis of poisoning had not been confirmed by the forensic medical experts (see paragraph 31 above). It also found that the presence of a toxic substance had not been confirmed by the inquiry. The material of the German, Swedish and French laboratory tests had not been made available to the inquiry bodies following the request for legal assistance because of the applicant’s objections or (in the case of Sweden) for public policy reasons. For the same reasons, it had not been possible to question the German doctors who had treated the applicant or to obtain his medical records from the German hospital. The origin of the bottle on which the toxic substance had been discovered was unknown, and the test had been carried out by a laboratory outside the Russian Federation. Having concluded that the applicant had objected to making the essential information available for the inquiry, the court concluded that the closure of the inquiry in the absence of elements of a criminal offence had been lawful. In addition, the court dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the investigator’s failure to assess the corpus delicti under Articles 105 and 277 of the Criminal Code, stating that “the conducting of an inquiry and the taking of decisions under Articles   144-145 of the Code in relation to the aforementioned offences [could not] be carried out by investigators of the transport police”. 65 .     On the same day the same judge of the same court, acting in separate proceedings, dismissed the complaint about the retention of the applicant’s belongings (see paragraph 59 above), stating that the refusal to institute criminal proceedings was the subject of concurrent judicial proceedings, and that in the event that the decision was reversed, the complaint in issue would become redundant. 66.     On 15 May 2021 Mr G. appealed against the Kirovskiy District Court’s decision upholding the finding that no criminal investigation was necessary. He argued, in particular, that the obligation to investigate the applicant’s poisoning also followed from the established use of chemical substances prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He reiterated that it was necessary to institute criminal proceedings to set the framework for an effective investigation, secure the applicant’s procedural rights and enable any requests for foreign legal assistance. He stated, in particular, that the applicant had not been notified of any requests for legal assistance referred to by the court or provided with copies of the relevant correspondence. 67 .     On 28 June 2021 the Tomsk Regional Court examined and dismissed the appeal against the decision of the Kirovskiy District Court of 29 April 2021 (see paragraph 64 above). Upholding the lower court’s findings, the Regional Court noted that the diagnosis of poisoning had not been confirmed and that the requests for foreign legal assistance had been refused, while the publication by Bellingcat and The Insider reflected only the authors’ views, which did not call for additional verification by the investigator. 68 .     On the same day the same court dismissed the appeal against another decision concerning the retention of the applicant’s belongings (see paragraph 65 above). It found that at the time of the first-instance hearing, parallel proceedings were pending in relation to the refusal to open a criminal investigation. In those circumstances, the decision of the lower court to reject the applicant’s complaint had been correct. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL LAW 69.     Article 125   of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the judicial review of decisions and acts (or failures to act) by an investigator or a prosecutor which are capable of adversely affecting the constitutional rights or freedoms of the participants in criminal proceedings. The court must examine such a complaint within five days. The complainant, his or her counsel, the investigator and the prosecutor are entitled to attend the hearing. The complainant must substantiate his or her complaint (Article   125   §§ 1, 2, 3 and   4). 70.     Following the examination of the complaint, the court must either declare the challenged decision, action or inaction unlawful or unjustified and instruct the responsible official to rectify the indicated shortcoming, or dismiss the complaint (Article 125   § 5). 71.     Article 144 establishes that every criminal complaint (report of a crime) must be accepted, verified and decided upon within three days by an inquiry officer, an inquiry agency, an investigator or a prosecutor. They may proceed, with experts’ assistance or on their own, to conduct documentary verifications, checks and examinations of documents, objects or bodies, and may issue compulsory instructions on the operational-search activities to be carried out (Article 144   § 1). The aforementioned period of three days may be extended to ten days, and where it is necessary to conduct documentary verifications, checks, forensic examinations or examinations of documents, objects or bodies, to thirty days (Article   144   §   3). 72.     Following the examination of a report of a crime, the competent authority decides either to open a criminal case, to refuse to open a criminal case or to forward the report of a crime to another law-enforcement agency with the relevant jurisdiction (Article 145 § 1). In such a case, the same authority must take measures to preserve the evidence (Article   145   §   3). The complainant may challenge the decision taken pursuant to Article 145 § 1 (Article 145 § 2). 73 .     The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code read as follows: Article 105 – Murder “1.     Murder, that is, the intentional causing of death to another person, shall be punishable by imprisonment of six to fifteen years, with or without restriction of liberty for up to two years.” Article 277 – Attempt on the life of a State official or public figure “An attempt on the life of a State official or public figure, committed with a view to terminating his State or other political activity, or out of revenge for such activity, shall be punishable by imprisonment of twelve to twenty years, with restriction of liberty for up to two years, life imprisonment or the death penalty.” Article 355 – Development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or sale of weapons of mass destruction “The development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or sale of chemical, biological, toxic and other types of weapons of mass destruction prohibited by an international treaty of the Russian Federation shall be punishable by imprisonment of five to ten years.” RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MATERIALS Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons Convention 74 .     The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental organisation comprising 193 Member States, is the implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force on 29 April 1997 (5 December 1997 in respect of Russia). 75 .     Under the CWC, the States Parties undertake never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; to use chemical weapons; or to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the CWC (Article I). Each State Party undertakes to prohibit natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under the CWC, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity (Article VII). OPCW technical assistance in the applicant’s case 76 .     On 4 September 2020 the German government requested technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat in relation to the applicant’s suspected poisoning. The OPCW conducted a technical assistance visit to Germany to collect biomedical samples from the applicant at the Charité Hospital in Berlin, with his consent. On 6 September 2020 blood and urine samples were taken by the hospital staff under the direct supervision and continuous observation of members of the OPCW technical assistance team. The chain of custody was maintained, and the samples were transported to the OPCW Laboratory, which sent them to two designated laboratories for analysis. 77.     On 6 October 2020 the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a summary of the report, stating that the results of the analysis demonstrated that the applicant had been exposed to a toxic chemical acting as a cholinesterase inhibitor. The biomarkers of the cholinesterase inhibitor found in his blood and urine samples had similar structural characteristics to the toxic chemicals beArticles de loi cités
Article 2 CEDHArticle 2-1 CEDH
Citations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG
- Formation
- 6
- Dispositif
- Satisfaction
- Date
- 6 juin 2023
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:0606JUD003641820