CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 27 juin 2023

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margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right }   SECOND SECTION CASE OF NURCAN BAYRAKTAR v. TÜRKİYE (Application no. 27094/20)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Refusal on the part of domestic courts to exempt applicant from statutory 300-day waiting period for divorced woman wishing to remarry without having to undergo medical examination to prove she was not pregnant • Aim of enabling determination of biological paternity obsolete in modern society • Question as to whether woman is pregnant closely tied to intimacy of private life • Reasons based on biological particularities of women reflect traditional idea of female sexuality, ignoring its physical and psychological relevance for self-fulfilment of women as people • Lack of relevant and sufficient reasons • Disproportionate measure Art 14 (+ Art 12) • Marriage • Narrow margin of appreciation • Direct discrimination on grounds of sex not justified by aim of preventing uncertainty as to parentage of possible unborn child • Difference in treatment neither objectively justified nor necessary Art 34 • Victim status • Applicant directly affected by statute providing for waiting period based solely on membership of category of divorced women who might remarry   STRASBOURG 27 June 2023 FINAL   06/11/2023 This judgment has become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Jovan Ilievski,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Saadet Yüksel,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Frédéric Krenc,   Davor Derenčinović , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   27094/20) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Ms   Nurcan Bayraktar (“the applicant”), on 27 June 2020; the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning Articles   6 §   1, 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 30   May 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present application concerned the domestic authorities’ refusal to grant the applicant’s request that she be exempted from the 300-day waiting period before remarrying imposed on divorced women under Article   132 du of the Civil Code, without undergoing a medical examination to determine whether she was pregnant. Relying on Articles   8, 12 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that the obligation for divorced women to observe a 300-day waiting period unless they proved that they were not pregnant constituted discrimination and an infringement of their right to respect for their private life and their right to marry. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in İzmir. She was represented by Ms   H.   Yılmaz Kayar, a lawyer practising in Istanbul. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr   Hacı Ali Açıkgül, Head of the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye. 4.     In its judgment of 19   December 2012 the Kadıköy Family Court declared the applicant and her husband divorced. Following a judgment of the Court of Cassation delivered on 27   November 2013 the part of the first-instance judgment pertaining to the divorce became final on 21   January 2014. 5.     On 9   July 2014 the applicant asked the Istanbul Anadolu Family Court (“the Family Court”) to exempt her from the 300-day waiting period under Article   132 of the Civil Code, without requiring her to undergo a medical examination to prove she was not pregnant. Submitting that Article   132 of the Civil Code, wherein the waiting period was prescribed, instituted discrimination on grounds of sex and was accordingly in breach of the Constitution and of several treaties signed by Türkiye for the protection of human rights and to combat discrimination against women, including the Convention, she requested that the case be referred to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling on the constitutionality of that provision. 6 .     On 11   July 2014 the Family Court directed the applicant to procure a medical certificate from a hospital indicating whether or not she was pregnant, which would be added to the file, and warned her that her application would be dismissed on procedural grounds should she fail to comply. In addition, it dismissed as unfounded the applicant’s allegation as to the unconstitutionality of Article   132 of the Civil Code. 7.     On 22   July 2014 the applicant sent a letter to the Family Court in which she declared that she would not procure the medical certificate in question. She alleged that both the court’s request to that effect and Article   132 of the Civil Code ran counter to Articles   8, 12 and 14 of the Convention. She also requested that the court re-examine her allegation as to the unconstitutionality of Article   132 of the Civil Code. 8 .     On 19   September 2014 the Family Court delivered a judgment on the merits of the case. It rejected the applicant’s application for exemption from the 300-day waiting period on procedural grounds. It noted that it had advised the applicant that she was to procure a medical certificate to the effect that she was not pregnant – which was necessary, according to the court, if she wished to remarry to someone other than her ex-husband –; that it had granted her a period within which to do so; and that the applicant, having declared that she refused to produce such a certificate, had requested unconditional exemption from the waiting period. In addition, the court again held that the allegation as to the unconstitutionality of Article   132 of the Civil Code was without pertinence. The judgment’s reasoning read as follows: “This court finds that the obligation imposed on any divorced woman wishing to remarry to someone other than her ex-husband that she produce a certificate to the effect that she is not pregnant is not solely a question of that woman’s freedom, but also of the freedom, ... status and future within society of a possible unborn child and of all married couples; that, in this sense, the certificate proving she is not pregnant that a woman is required to produce in order to be authorised to remarry [constitutes] a guarantee for herself and ... for her possible unborn child; that subsequent proceedings, if any, taken to contest or establish the child’s parentage, would involve even greater [inconvenience] for the individuals concerned; that such proceedings are in effect more harmful and damaging [than the certificate in question], given the DNA tests and medical examinations [which must be carried out in such cases] and the accusations [which the parties thereto make] against each other; and [that it is natural to see] gender equality as an equality of virtues and rights ... , but that a concept of equality that disregards the natural particularities of individuals, such as their birth, maternity and paternity, or an argument that boils down to saying “why am I being examined to see whether or not I am pregnant when men are not subjected to any examination?” cannot be countenanced. Moreover, this court does not agree with the argument that this situation deprives women of their legal capacity or restricts that capacity. Indeed, ... men and women are equal in every respect as to their humanity and their rights and entitlements, but ... this conception of equality and freedom cannot be regarded as undermining the main dynamics, interests and serenity of the parties or of any as-yet unborn child. While equality between men and women, as set forth above, is accepted as a rule, one must nevertheless not lose sight of the fact that they each have qualities that make them superior to the other. For example, men’s [physical] strength cannot be [compared] to that of women, but, through the sensitivity and emotions that characterise them in their role as mothers, women are far stronger than men ... the ability to give birth is specific to women ... Nor does this court agree with the argument that women are not obliged to disclose a potential pregnancy. In fact, in view of the nature of certain institutions, the obligation to determine certain situations ... is important with regard to persons who are parties to an act, namely, [in the present case,] to the persons who are marrying and to the unborn child, who are liable to be affected by the act [of remarrying]. Just as it cannot be regarded as normal for a person wishing to remarry to refuse to state whether or not he or she is already married or to consent to having his or her marital status verified, so too must the scheme provided for by the legislature in this context be deemed pertinent, given that remarriage can affect not only the woman herself but a number of other individuals as well, in a direct and more forceful manner.” 9.     On 6   May 2015 the Court of Cassation, with which the applicant had lodged an appeal on points of law, upheld the Family Court’s judgment, which it considered to have complied with the requisite procedure and law. 10.     The applicant lodged an application for rectification of that decision. On 2   December 2015 the Court of Cassation dismissed the application, finding that it did not correspond to any of the statutory grounds for such a remedy. 11.     On 22   January 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. She submitted that the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women under Article   132 of the Civil Code constituted discrimination on grounds of sex and that the judgments that had been delivered by the courts in this regard had infringed her rights to a fair hearing, to respect for her private life, to marry and to an effective remedy. 12.     On 3   April 2020 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s individual application inadmissible. It considered that her complaints relating to respect for her private life and the principle of equality were manifestly ill-founded, taking the view that there had been no interference with the rights and freedoms in issue or, if there had been such interference, that it had not involved any infringement of those rights and freedoms. As to the allegation of an infringement of the right to a fair hearing, the Constitutional Court considered that this complaint was inadmissible ratione materiae as it concerned the alleged unconstitutionality of a legislative provision. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK Domestic legislation 13 .     Article   132 of the Civil Code (Law no.   4721 of 22   November 2001, having come into force on 1   January 2002), entitled “Waiting period for women [before remarrying]”, reads as follows: “If the marriage has ended, the woman may not [re]marry until three hundred days have elapsed from the end of the marriage. If the woman gives birth in that time, the waiting period shall thereby be terminated. If it is [shown] that the woman is not pregnant from her previous marriage or if the spouses whose marriage has ended wish to remarry [to one another], the court shall waive that [waiting] period.” 14.     Article   154 of the Civil Code, entitled “Failure to comply with the waiting period [before remarrying]”, reads as follows: “A marriage [entered into] before the expiry of the female spouse’s waiting period shall not, however, be null and void.” 15 .     Article   285 of the Civil Code, entitled “Presumption of paternity”, provides as follows: “The father of a child born during the marriage or within three hundred days following its [dissolution] shall be the husband. The paternity of a child born after the expiry of that period may be attributed to the husband if it is proved that the mother’s pregnancy began during the marriage. If the husband has been declared absent, the three-hundred-day period shall commence from the date of his presumed death or [from the date on which he was last heard from].” 16 .     As to paternity challenges, the relevant articles of the Civil Code read as follows: “Article   286. The husband may [rebut] the presumption of paternity by bringing an action to deny paternity. Such an action shall be brought against the mother and the child. The child shall also be entitled [to bring a paternity suit]. Such an action shall be brought against the mother and the husband. Article   287. Where the child [was conceived] in wedlock, it shall fall to the claimant to prove that the husband is not the father. A child born no fewer than one hundred and eighty days after the marriage and at most three hundred days after the [dissolution] of the marriage shall be deemed to have been [conceived] in wedlock. Article   288. If the child was [conceived] before the marriage or during the [process of separation], the claimant shall not be required to provide further proof. However, where there is convincing evidence that the husband had sexual intercourse with his wife during the period [of conception], the presumption of paternity in respect of the husband shall remain valid. Article   289. The husband must bring the action within one year from the date on which he learned of the birth and [that] he was not the father or that the mother had had sexual intercourse with another man during the [period] of conception. The child must bring the action at the latest within one year from reaching the age of majority. In the event of justified delay, the one-year period shall commence on the date on which the reason for such delay ceases to apply. Article   290. If a child is born within three hundred days from the [dissolution] of the marriage and the mother has since remarried, her new husband shall be presumed to be the father. If that presumption is [rebutted], her former husband shall be deemed to be the father.” 17.     Section   26 of Civil Registry Services Act (Law no.   5490 of 25   April 2006), entitled “Commencement of the waiting period for women [before remarrying]” provides as follows: “The waiting period for women [before remarrying] shall commence on the date when the court decision becomes final.” 18 .     Article   2 – headed “Definitions” – of the regulation on marriage adopted by the Council of Ministers on 10   July 1985 defines the waiting period prior to remarrying as follows: “... (i)     Statutory waiting period [before remarrying]: ... period of three hundred days during which a woman whose marriage has ended may not remarry in order to avoid confusion as to bloodlines. ...” the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 19 .     The relevant articles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution   34/180 of 18   December 1979, which entered into force on 3   September 1981 and was ratified by Türkiye on 20   December 1985, provide as follows: Article 1 “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” Article   2 “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: (a)     To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; (b)     To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c)     To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d)     To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e)     To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise; (f)     To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women; (g)     To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. ...” Article   5 “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a)     To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; (b)     To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases. ...” Article   16 “1.     States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (a)     The same right to enter into marriage; (b)     The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent; (c)     The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; (d)     The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (e)     The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; (f)     The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (g)     The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; (h)     The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration; 2.     The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. ...” Concluding observations of 16 AUGUST 2010 OF the committee on the elimination of discrimination against women in respect of Türkİye 20 .     At its forty-sixth session (12-30   July 2010), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, instituted by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in order to assess the progress made in applying that convention, adopted its concluding observations on the elimination of discrimination against women in respect of Türkiye (CEDAW/C/TUR/CO/6), which it published on 16   August 2010. Paragraphs   40 and 41 of that document read as follows: “... Family relations 40.     Recalling its previous concluding observations of 2005, the Committee is concerned that the 2002 amendment to the Civil Code regarding joint ownership of property acquired during marriage has not been applied retroactively, thus continuing to disadvantage women who were married prior to its entry into force. Despite a 2004 decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which granted a woman the right to solely retain her maiden name, the Committee notes that, in accordance with article   187 of the Civil Code, married women can only retain their maiden name if it is accompanied by their spouses’ surname. The Committee also notes that a waiting period of 300 days is still required for women to remarry after divorce. 41.     In line with its previous concluding observations of 2005, the Committee recommends that the State party consider the impact of the lack of retroactive applicability of the 2002 amendment to the Civil Code regarding joint ownership of acquired property on women married prior to its entry into force. It invites the State party to consider a further amendment of the Civil Code to include marriages concluded before 2002. The Committee further urges the State party to review and amend without delay existing discriminatory legislation and provisions, including with respect to the retention of women’s surnames after marriage and the waiting period for remarriage, to bring them fully into line with articles   2 and 16 of the Convention [on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women]. ...” THE LAW GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 21.     The Government raised two objections on grounds of inadmissibility concerning the applicant’s complaints under Articles   8, 12 and 14 of the Convention: they argued first that she lacked victim status and second that she had not suffered a significant disadvantage. As to the first objection, they explained that the applicant had failed to produce any tangible evidence that she had had prospective plans to remarry when she had lodged her claim with the domestic courts, and that she had not remarried since. They therefore considered that the applicant had not shown that the impugned waiting period had had an unfavourable impact on her life. They submitted that, as a consequence, the applicant, who in their view had not been directly affected by the 300-day waiting period, could not claim victim status. The Government argued, in consequence, that the main objective of the application was to criticise, in the abstract, an alleged incompatibility between Article   132 of the Civil Code, which prescribed that measure, and the Constitution and certain international conventions, and that the application amounted to an actio popularis . 22.     As to their second objection, the Government noted that the applicant had requested exemption from the waiting period on 9   July 2014, whereas the court decision as to her divorce had become final on 21   January 2014. They submitted that the applicant had not described her plans to remarry in a manner that was sufficiently detailed and convincing to demonstrate that the remaining four months of the 300-day waiting period had been the source of a significant disadvantage for her. Consequently, they asked that the Court declare the application inadmissible for lack of a significant disadvantage. 23.     The applicant disputed the objections raised by the Government. She submitted that, under the legislation in force, she could not, following her divorce, have taken any steps with a view to remarrying so long as the waiting period that had been imposed on her had not expired or been waived and that the arguments concerning her private life by which the Government had sought to substantiate their objections were designed to deflect attention away from that fact. She added that her victim status was undeniable since she had been unable to exercise her right to remarry before the expiry of the waiting period and that the fact that she had pointed out that Article   132 of the Civil Code was incompatible with the Constitution and with international conventions had by no means stripped her of that status. She further argued that she had undeniably sustained damage since exemption from the waiting period that had been imposed on her had been subject to the condition that she undergo a medical examination, a fact she alleged had prevented her throughout that period from exercising her right to take steps with a view to remarrying. 24.     The Court reiterates that, in order to claim to be the victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure. The Convention does not, therefore, envisage the bringing of an actio popularis for the interpretation of the rights set out therein or permit individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention (see Burden v.   the   United Kingdom [GC], no.   13378/05, §   33, ECHR 2008, and Tănase v.   Moldova   [GC], no.   7/08, §   104, ECHR 2010). Consequently, the existence of a victim who has been personally affected by an alleged violation of a Convention right is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid and inflexible way (see Aksu v.   Turkey   [GC], nos.   4149/04 and 41029/04, §   51, ECHR 2012, and Bitenc v.   Slovenia (dec.), no.   32963/02, 18   March 2008). 25.     In addition, the Court would point out that it interprets the concept of “victim” autonomously and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see Sanles Sanles v.   Spain (dec.), no.   48335/99, ECHR 2000-XI), even though it should have regard to the fact that an applicant had been a party to the domestic proceedings (see Micallef v.   Malta [GC], no.   17056/06, §   48, ECHR 2009). 26.     The Court also reiterates that it is open to a person to contend that a law violates his or her rights, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, and therefore to claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, if he or she is required to either modify his or her conduct or risk being prosecuted, or if he or she is a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation (see Burden , cited above, §   34; Norris v.   Ireland , 26   October 1988, §§   33-34, Series   A no.   142; Dudgeon v.   the United Kingdom , 22   October 1981, §   41, Series   A no.   45; Marckx v.   Belgium , 13   June 1979, §   27, Series   A no.   31; and Michaud v.   France , no.   12323/11, §   51, ECHR 2012). 27.     In the present case, the applicant asked the national authorities to authorise her to remarry following her divorce without being required to observe the 300-day waiting period provided for by law or to prove that she was not pregnant by means of a medical examination. Admittedly, the applicant failed to provide any evidence that she had had a plan to marry at the relevant time or that she had actually entered into a marriage thereafter. However, it is not for the Court to speculate as to whether she had serious prospects of remarrying when she made her request. The right to marry has a close affinity with the right to respect for private life (see Frasik v.   Poland , no.   22933/02, §   90, ECHR 2010 (extracts), and, mutatis mutandis , Dadouch v.   Malta , no.   38816/07, §§   47-48, 20   July 2010) and marriage primarily comes down to a purely personal decision taken by an individual in the subjective and changing circumstances of his or her private life. Nor is it relevant that the applicant did not remarry after the waiting period had expired. 28.     In the Court’s view, the very fact that, under Article 132 of the Civil Code, the applicant was subjected to a waiting period before being able to remarry and that it was necessary, in order to have that period waived, for her to bring proceedings specifically to that end before the domestic authorities, in the course of which it was required of her that she produce a medical certificate proving she was not pregnant, all solely for the reason that she belonged to the category of divorced women who might remarry, suffices for her to have victim status (see, mutatis mutandis , Ternovszky v.   Hungary , no.   67545/09, §   21, 14   December 2010). 29 .     Accordingly, the applicant was directly affected by the legislation providing for the impugned waiting period and can thus claim to be a victim of the discrimination she alleged in the exercise of her right to respect for her private life and her right to marry (see, mutatis mutandis , Vallianatos and Others v.   Greece   [GC], nos.   29381/09 and 32684/09, §   49, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v.   Ireland , 29   October 1992, §   44, Series   A no.   246 ‑ A; and S.L. v.   Austria (dec.), no.   45330/99, 22   November 2001). 30.     Consequently, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection as to a lack of victim status. 31.     As to the second objection concerning an alleged lack of a significant disadvantage, the Court notes that the Government complained that the applicant had lodged her request with the national authorities at a late stage, namely four months prior to the expiry of the 300-day waiting period that had been imposed on her. The Court notes that it is not for it to speculate as to the appropriate time for the applicant to have decided to remarry following her divorce. It takes the view that, even though the applicant waited until there were only four months left before the waiting period expired in order to lodge her request for its curtailment, the effect of its imposition on her was to restrict her freedom to choose the date on which she might remarry – which was undeniably a matter of considerable importance for her private life – and that this effect cannot be underestimated (see, mutatis mutandis , Schmidt v.   Latvia , no.   22493/05, §§   73-75, 27   April 2017). Accordingly, this objection must also be dismissed. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE   8 OF THE CONVENTION 32.     The applicant complained that, in order to authorise her to remarry before the expiry of the statutory 300-day waiting period that had commenced on the date of her divorce, the national authorities had required that she disclose whether or not she was pregnant and that she undergo a medical examination to verify that she was not. She alleged that this practice amounted to interference with her right to respect for her private life and relied in this regard on Article   8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility 33.     Noting that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded, nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention, the Court declares it admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicant 34.     The applicant alleged that the imposition on divorced women of a 300-day waiting period before remarrying, the fact that its curtailment was subject to a court decision – which was in turn conditional on a medical examination to verify that the woman in question was not pregnant –, and the prohibition of remarriage which was thus imposed on pregnant, divorced women constituted interference with women’s right to respect for their private and family life. 35 .     She submitted that Article   132 of the Civil Code, which formed the legal basis for the impugned measure, was incompatible with the Convention. She complained that the authorities, which had submitted that this provision sought to protect the interests of others, had failed to take into account a woman’s right to respect for her private and family life. In that connection, she argued that this right belonging to women could not be disregarded in favour of the idea – which she considered abstract – of protecting the parentage of an unborn child. She submitted, consequently, that the prevention of disorder could not be regarded as a legitimate aim in the present case. 36.     In particular, the applicant pointed out that the waiting period was imposed on pregnant women without exception and that, for those who were not pregnant, it could only be waived on condition that the woman concerned initiated the relevant proceedings and agreed, as part of those proceedings, to undergo a mandatory medical examination to prove she was not pregnant. She submitted that it was neither necessary nor proportionate to place such a burden on divorced women in a democratic society. (b)    The Government 37.     The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life in the present case. They submitted that the waiting period for divorced women was not imposed in an absolute fashion; that, in accordance with the relevant legislation, it had been possible for the applicant to have the waiting period waived in the context of the ex parte proceedings she had brought to that end in the Family Court; that producing a medical certificate indicating that she was not pregnant, as requested by the court as part of those proceedings, could not be regarded as having imposed an impossible burden on the applicant; that, in this connection, there had been no coercion on the part of the authorities that might have caused her physical harm; and that the applicant’s request for exemption from the waiting period had been rejected because she had refused, of her own free will, to undergo the requisite medical examination in order to obtain the medical certificate in question. 38 .     Should the Court find that there had been interference, the Government argued that such interference had been in accordance with Article   132 of the Civil Code, which they claimed satisfied the requirements of clarity, accessibility and foreseeability, and that it had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder, given, they argued, that the purpose of the rule under Article   132 of the Civil Code was to ensure that parentage was determined accurately. 39 .     As to the necessity of the interference, the Government submitted that the purpose of the requirement that a woman seeking exemption from the waiting period produce a medical certificate proving that she was not pregnant was to determine accurately the parentage of any child born after the end of a marriage and to avoid any confusion in that regard. They emphasised that this requirement was thus designed to protect the interests at stake, namely those of the parties, those of society and above all those of the unborn child. They added that the medical examination which the woman concerned was required to undergo to obtain the certificate consisted in a blood or urine test and did not require a gynaecological examination, arguing that this examination was therefore not a significant or unbearable medical procedure for the woman to have to undergo. 40.     Consequently, the Government considered that, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation they claimed the member States enjoyed in determining legal parent-child relationships, which was a matter of public policy, and given that the proceedings for waiving the waiting period and the medical certificate required as part of those proceedings had not imposed an excessive burden on the applicant, the impugned interference had met a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The Court’s assessment (a)    Whether there has been an interference 41.     The Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which does not lend itself to exhaustive definition and encompasses the right to personal development (see K.A. and A.D. v.   Belgium , nos.   42758/98 and 45558/99, §   83, 17   February 2005), whether in terms of personality (see Bensaid v.   the United Kingdom , no.   44599/98, §   47, ECHR 2001-I, and Christine Goodwin v.   the United Kingdom   [GC], no.   28957/95, §   90, ECHR 2002 ‑ VI) or of personal autonomy, which is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the Article   8 guarantees (see Pretty v.   the United Kingdom , no.   2346/02, §   61, ECHR 2002 ‑ III, and Fe dotova and Others v.   Russi a   [GC], nos.   40792/10 and 2 others, §   141, 17   January 2023). 42.     The Court has found that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion of private life to the most intimate aspects of an individual’s life (see, in particular, Niemietz v.   Germany , 16   December 1992, §   29, Series   A no.   251 ‑ B). Article 8 thus guarantees a right to “private life” in the broad sense, including the right to lead a “private social life”, that is, the possibility for the individual to develop his or her social identity. In that respect, the right in question enshrines the possibility of approaching others in order to establish and develop relationships with them (see Bărbulescu v.   Romania   [GC], no.   61496/08, §   70, 5   September 2017, and the authorities cited therein). Accordingly, a person’s “private life” embraces multiple aspects of the person’s social identity (see López Ribalda and Others v.   Spain   [GC], nos.   1874/13 and 8567/13, §   87, 17   October 2019, and Denisov v.   Ukraine   [GC], no.   76639/11, §   95, 25   September 2018). The Court has found, for example, that a person’s civil status, be it married, single, divorced or widowed, forms part of his or her personal and social identity protected under Article 8 (see Dadouch , cited above, §   48) and that the right to marry has a close affinity with the right to respect for private life (see Frasik , cited above, §   90). 43.     In the present case, the Court notes that, following her divorce, the applicant had to bring proceedings to seek exemption from the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women before remarrying and that, as part of those proceedings, it was requested of her that she provide a medical certificate to the effect that she was not pregnant. It finds that the present case falls within the scope of Article   8, since it concerns a most intimate aspect of the applicant’s private life as a woman (see, mutatis mutandis , Dudgeon , cited above, §   52; Smith and Grady v.   the United Kingdom , nos.   33985/96 and 33986/96, §   90, ECHR 1999-VI; and S.L. v.   Austria , no.   45330/99, §   29, ECHR 2003 ‑ I; and see also, mutatis mutandis , Dadouch , cited above, §   48). 44.     The Court observes that the waiting period imposed on the applicant following her divorce and the authorities’ requirement that she undergo a medical examination to verify that she was not pregnant, on pain of having her application for the waiver of that period dismissed, clearly had an impact on her private life. Accordingly, it finds that the waiting period imposed on the applicant and the requirement that, in order to have it waived, she undergo a medical examination to verify that she was not pregnant constituted interference with her right to respect for her private life, which is protected under Article   8 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis ,   Vavřička and Others v.   the Czech Republic   [GC], nos.   47621/13 and 5 others, §   263, 8   April 2021 , and Dadouch , cited above, §   50). (b)    Whether the interference was justified 45.     To determine whether this interference entailed a violation of Article   8 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether it was justified under the second paragraph of that Article, that is, whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims specified therein, and to that end was “necessary in a   democratic society”. 46.     The Court observes that it is common ground between the parties that this interference was in accordance with the law, namely with Article   132 of the Civil Code (see paragraph   13 above). It takes note of the applicant’s argument that this provision is incompatible with the principles embodied in the Convention (see paragraph   35 above). That being so, it finds that this argument goes to the necessity of the interference rather than calling into question its legal basis. 47.     The Government submitted that the interference had pursued the aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder (see   paragraph 38 above). The applicant disputed the aims put forward by the Government. She argued that the national authorities had failed to take account of the interest of women in securing respect for their private life (see paragraph   35 above). While it has reservations as to the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the measure at issue, the Court will nevertheless proceed on the assumption that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of preventing disorder. 48.     As to the necessity of the interference, the Court reiterates that an interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” (see L.B. v.   Hungary   [GC], no.   36345/16, §   115, 9   March 2023). 49.     It next reiterates the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention system and recognises that the national authorities have direct democratic legitimation in so far as the protection of human rights is concerned. Moreov