CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 11 juillet 2023

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display:inline-block } .s88AD0518 { width:147.76pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF NEMTSOVA v. RUSSIA (Application no. 43146/15)     JUDGMENT This version was rectified on 6 September 2023 under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.   Art 2 (procedural) • Ineffective investigation into contract killing of prominent politician and opposition leader • Domestic authorities’ failure to address in a prompt and effective manner the identity of the persons who could have commissioned the murder • No meaningful attempt to verify if the murder was politically motivated or to otherwise establish the motive behind it • Deficiencies not remedied by domestic courts   STRASBOURG 11 July 2023   FINAL   11/10/2023   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Nemtsova v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Jolien Schukking , President ,   Yonko Grozev,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   43146/15) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Zhanna Borisovna Nemtsova (“the applicant”), on 27 August 2015; the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention concerning the alleged failure to conduct an effective investigation into the murder of the applicant’s father and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the sitting judges of the Court to act as an ad hoc judge, applying by analogy Rule   29 §   2 of the Rules of the Court (see, for the similar situation and an explanation of the background, Kutayev v.   Russia , no. 17912/15, §§   5-8, 24   January 2023); Having deliberated in private on 20 June 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the assassination of the applicant’s father, a prominent politician and opposition leader. The applicant complains that the Russian authorities failed to conduct an effective domestic investigation into the murder. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1984 and lived in Moscow at the time of the events. She was represented by Ms O. Mikhaylova and Mr V. Prokhorov, lawyers [1] practising in Moscow. 3.     The Government were represented initially by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by his successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.     The applicant is a daughter of Boris Nemtsov. Mr Nemtsov was a former Governor of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, and a former Minister of Energy. He was renowned as one of the leaders of the political opposition in Russia – a co-founder of the political party the Union of Right Forces ( Союз Правых Сил ) and subsequently of the political movement Solidarnost ( Солидарность ), and a member and one of the co-leaders of the Republican Party of Russia – People’s Freedom Party ( ПАРНАС ). At the time of the events, he was a member of the Yaroslavl Regional Duma. Boris Nemtsov’s assassination 6.     On 27   February 2015 Boris Nemtsov was shot dead on the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy bridge in the immediate vicinity of the Kremlin in Moscow. 7.     According to the official version of the events, several individuals (see paragraph   18 below) were hired by unidentified persons to kill Mr Nemtsov. Since autumn 2014 they had been conducting secret surveillance of Boris Nemtsov, and at a later stage had purchased a weapon. On 27   February 2015 one of them had followed Mr Nemtsov and his companion Ms D. from the GUM department store to the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy bridge in Moscow and at about 11.30   p.m. had fired six shots killing Mr   Nemtsov instantly. Two other persons had been in the immediate vicinity keeping a lookout. After the assassination, the gunman and two accomplices had escaped in a getaway car, which they had subsequently left in Trubnikovskiy Lane in Moscow. Criminal investigation into M r Nemtsov’s assassination 8.     On 28   February 2015 the Moscow City Investigative Committee opened a criminal investigation under Articles   105   §   2 (Murder committed in a group that had been hired or motivated by the promise of a reward) and 222   §   2 (Illegal possession of weapons) of the Criminal Code of Russia. On the same date the case was re-assigned to the Department for Investigation of Particularly Serious Crimes of the Chief Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (hereinafter “the investigation department”). 9 .     The investigators immediately inspected the crime scene and the victim’s body, searched Mr Nemtsov’s flat, examined logs of telephone calls made in the area around the time of the murder, conducted various searches, questioned several witnesses (including family members and various officials of the Yaroslavl Region), and performed or ordered several other urgent investigative measures. 10 .     On 24   March 2015 the applicant was granted victim status in the case, and on 3   April 2015 was granted access to items of case-file material, pursuant to her request. 11 .     The voluminous case file includes ninety-five volumes of material (including seventy-five volumes of investigation documents), as well as subsequent court proceedings at two instances concerning the persons identified as perpetrators of the assassination. The case-file material, in so far as it is referred to by the parties in their submissions to the Court and concerns the main focus of the investigation, is summarised below. Attempts to obtain video footage of the crime scene and the surrounding areas 12.     From 28 February 2015 onwards the authorities issued several orders for the collection of video footage from surveillance cameras located along the route that Mr Nemtsov had taken on the night of the murder. 13 .     In March 2015 the investigators obtained video footage, notably from (i)   CCTV cameras belonging to the GUM department store, (ii)   cameras installed on several residential buildings in the vicinity of the bridge; (iii)   city surveillance video recordings of the entrance to the bridge and several Moscow streets apparently used by the hitman as an escape route; (iv)   cameras belonging to the State unitary enterprise Gormost (a company specialising in the construction and maintenance of bridges and embankments), apparently installed at the point where the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge meets Vasilyevskiy Spusk; and (v)   the dashboard cameras of private passenger cars – including one car that had crossed the bridge three minutes before the murder had taken place, and two others that had crossed minutes after the assassination. 14 .     The investigators also obtained video footage from a camera operated by a local television station, TV Centre, which had captured – from some distance – two persons resembling Boris Nemtsov and D. moments before the shooting, before the camera’s line of vision had been obscured (at the moment of the shooting) by a passing utility vehicle. The footage further captured another man running to a passenger car, which immediately drove away. 15 .     According to the applicant, the authorities refused to provide some video recordings, including recordings made by cameras aimed at the section of the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge where Mr Nemtsov had been killed. The applicant further submitted that the federal authorities had refused to grant the investigators access to video footage from the cameras located on the bridge. 16.     In particular, according to the transcript of 18   March 2015 of the questioning conducted by the investigators of an employee of the City Surveillance Unit of the Department of Information Technologies of Moscow, video footage from several cameras for certain time slots could not be provided to the investigators, because either the video cameras had not been working, or (in the case of some cameras) technical problems had arisen during the downloading of the footage. 17 .     On 6   November 2015 the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation ( Федеральная служба охраны – “the FSO”) informed the applicant’s lawyers, in response to a request lodged by them, that they were not in possession of video footage of the incident, as the area of the Bolshoy Moskvoretskiy Bridge was not an “object protected by the FSO”. The FSO specified that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation had seized footage from several unspecified FSO cameras covering the hours preceding and following the murder. Six suspects identified by the investigating authorities 18 .     On 6   March 2015 the chief investigator ordered the location and arrest of six individuals (“the six suspects”) on suspicion of Mr Nemtsov’s murder: (1)     Z.D., a military officer and a deputy commander of the Sever (Northern) Battalion, which at the time of the events formed part of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic. He had been dismissed from military service on 1   March 2015; (2)     An.Gub. (the brother of Sh.Gub. and a cousin of Z.D.); (3)     Sh.Gub., (the brother of An.Gub and a cousin of Z.D.); (4)     T.Esk., a former police officer of the Shelkovskiy district police station in the Chechen Republic; (5)     B.Sh., a police officer in the Chechen Republic, an officer of the Sever Battalion; (6)     Kh.B., a relative of Z.D. Arrest of the five of the suspects, their pre-trial testimony and related events 19 .     On various dates no later than 8   March 2015 Z.D., T.Esk., Sh.Gub., An.Gub. and Kh.B. (“the five co-defendants”) were arrested by the police. The sixth suspect, B.Sh., died during his arrest. 20 .     On 7 and 8   March 2015 Z.D. confessed to participating in Mr   Nemtsov’s assassination, together with An.Gub. and B.Sh. The questioning on the latter date was recorded on video. According to Z.D., one “Rusik” had incited Z.D., An.Gub. and B.Sh. to kill Mr Nemtsov in retaliation for the latter’s support for cartoons published in the Charlie Hebdo magazine depicting the Prophet Muhammad and had offered fifteen million Russian roubles (RUB) as a reward; he had found a ZAZ car that they could use to secretly follow Mr Nemtsov and had provided them with a gun. Z.D. allegedly had volunteered (motivated by a wish to take religious revenge) to murder the applicant’s father and had begun covertly surveilling the victim. Z.D. had been the “hitman”, while An.Gub. and B.Sh. had undertaken surveillance and had helped Z.D. to escape in the ZAZ car. “Rusik” had further sent an unidentified person to Z.D. to recover the gun from him, and on 1   March 2015 had driven Z.D. to the airport in a Mercedes ML car (its licence plate contained numbers “007”). 21 .     On 26 July and 14   August 2015, during further rounds of questioning, Z.D. retracted his above-mentioned confession, stating that he had given it under duress. He gave an alibi, stating that on the date of the murder he had met an acquaintance of his – one R.Ger. (a commander of one of the Sever Battalion’s units) – at the latter’s flat at 46   Veyernaya Street in Moscow. Z.D. had also gone that day to a mosque and then to a restaurant together with R.Ger.; had returned to R.Ger.s’ place; and later had gone to the Ts. restaurant-club in Moscow together with Ar.Ger. and a friend, Mr Sh.Taz. Having met R.Ger. once again on that day, Z.D. had then returned to his flat at 3   Veyernaya Street. On 1   March 2015 one R. Mukh. had driven Z.D. and R. Ger. to the Vnukovo airport, from there they (Z.D. and R. Ger.) had taken a flight to Grozny. The suspect further stated that beginning in January 2015 he had on several occasions joined R.Ger. and one “Aslanbek” (apparently a police officer) in a hotel in Moscow, where R.Ger. had regularly met people of Chechen origin; on 19   January 2015 Z.D. had gone to the hotel together with T.Esk. 22 .     On 18 and 30   March 2015 An.Gub., having originally denied the allegations, confessed to participating in Mr Nemtsov’s murder. He stated that at some point in the autumn of 2014 he had noticed “pro-American” political statements criticising the Russian government that Mr Nemtsov had been making, as well as his “negative attitude” towards Islam. Since October 2014 he had started searching for information about Mr Nemtsov, reading his social media posts and listening to his interviews (mainly on the radio station Ekho Moskvy). Shortly after the killing of the Charlie Hebdo journalists on 7 January 2015 and Mr Nemtsov’s statements condemning the attack and his alleged call for the Charlie Hebdo cartoons to be disseminated in Russia, A.Gub. and Z.D. had decided to kill Mr Nemtsov for his insulting remarks about Muslims and the Prophet Mohammad, and at a later stage B.Sh. had agreed to join them. A.Gub. also referred to a certain “Rusik” or “Ruslan” – an acquaintance of his and Z.D.’s who was of Chechen origin – who had rented a flat for them at 3 Veyernaya Street in Moscow and had on several occasions met them there. On 17   September 2015 An.Gub. retracted his confession, stating that he had given it under duress. 23 .     Sh.Gub. denied the allegations against him but indicated that Z.D., An.Gub. and B.Sh. had organised and committed the crime, having been motivated by religious hatred. Sh.Gub. later complained to the authorities of being subjected to duress during his questioning. 24 .     T.Esk. denied the allegations against him. He stated that R.Ger., an acquaintance of his, had introduced him to Z.D. in February 2015; he recalled that Z.D. had been R.Ger.’s deputy when the latter had been commanding the Sever Battalion. He also confirmed that he had met Z.D. a couple of times at R.Ger.’s flat at 46 Veyernaya Street and that R.Ger. had owned a “Mercedes GL”(licence plate 007) that Z.D. (like many of R.Ger.’s acquaintances) had frequently used. T.Esk. later complained that duress had been exerted on him during his questioning. 25 .     Kh.B. denied any involvement in murder. He stated that he had known An.Gub., Sh.Gub. and Z.D.; and that the latter had been driving a Mercedes GL car. 26 .     In early March 2015 the investigators began to explore a theory that Mr Nemtsov could have been killed in revenge for his support for the murdered journalists of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo . Specifically, he had made comments condemning the murder of the journalists in a Facebook post, subsequently published on the Echo Moskvy radio station website in the wake of the shooting. 27 .     Shortly after the arrest of the suspects, Ramzan Kadyrov, the President of the Chechen Republic, posted on Instagram: “I knew Z.[D.] as a true patriot. He has served in the [Battalion] from the ... day it was established. ... Z. has been one of the most fearless and courageous soldiers of the battalion. ... I am strongly convinced that he is sincerely loyal to Russia and was ready to give up his life for the Motherland. ... Everyone who knows him says that he is a deeply religious man and that – just like any Muslim – he was stunned by the activities of Charlie [ Hebdo ] and comments [that have been made] in support of the publishing of caricatures [of the Prophet Mohammad] ... B.Sh., who died during his arrest, ... was an equally brave warrior. ...” Some of the subsequent steps taken by the investigators Identities of other persons referred to by the suspects 28 .     On the basis of the available evidence, the investigators identified the persons referred to by the suspects as follows: (1)     R.Ger. was one of the senior officers of the Sever Battalion, in which Z.D. and B.Sh. had served, and its deputy commander; (2)     “Rusik” was identified as R.Mukh., whom the suspects referred to as R.Ger.’s chauffeur and assistant; (3)     Ar.Ger. was identified as a relative of R.Ger.’s and a former police officer at the Shelkovskiy district police station. 29 .     The investigators further identified the above-mentioned “Aslanbek” as Mr As.Kh., another officer of the Shelkovskiy district police station whose professional activities had apparently involved escorting high-ranking officials in the Chechen government. Some items of expert and physical evidence 30 .     According to an expert forensic examination report, traces of gunshot residue were found on Z.D.’s body. Cartridges with the same markings as those on the casings found at the crime scene were discovered at his mother’s house. The similarity of the markings, size, year and place of production, and other pertinent parameters was subsequently confirmed by experts. 31.     According to an expert forensic molecular and genetic reports, DNA traces from Z.D., An.Gub., Sh.Gub. and B.Sh. were found in the ZAZ car used for the surveillance of Mr Nemtsov and the getaway after the murder, and on various objects discovered in the car. As confirmed by an expert report, gunshot residue was discovered in the ZAZ car. DNA traces from the same persons and from T.Esk. were found in the two above-mentioned flats situated at Veyernaya Street in Moscow used by the suspects. 32.     Traces of gunshot residue were found on items found in a car that Sh.Gub. had used to escape the Moscow Region. 33 .     Several items of video footage showed the ZAZ car following Mr   Nemtsov at various locations prior to the murder. 34 .     In March 2015 the investigators began studying the call logs of the suspects’ mobile telephones. It was subsequently established that the suspects had routinely conducted numerous telephone conversations with each other and with R.Ger., Ar.Ger. and As.Kh. before and after the murder. Search of the flats and relevant witnesses’ statements 35 .     On 7   March 2015 the investigating authorities searched the flats used by the suspects, as well as a house in Kozino, Moscow Region. At the latter address, documents and mobile telephones belonging to some of the co ‑ defendants were found. 36 .     As regards the flat at 3 Veyernaya Street, the investigators found that it had been formally rented in the name of R.Mukh. and used by the arrested suspects. Z.D. and An.Gub. had lived there. 37 .     The flat at 46 Veyernaya Street had formally been owned by Ar.Ger., but had been primarily used by R.Ger. In that flat the investigators found, among other things, the sale and purchase agreement in respect of the Mercedes ML car and a certificate of title in the name of R.Mukh.; a rental agreement in respect of the flat at 3 Veyernaya Street signed by R.Mukh.; written military operational orders issued to Z.D. and R.Ger. in September and October 2014 by the Chechen interior forces and signed by Al.Del.; a pension certificate in the name of T.Ekh.; and electronic keys to a room in the President Hotel in Moscow registered in the name of Sul.Ger. (R.Ger.’s relative and a member of the Federation Council representing the Chechen Republic). 38 .     In both flats, the investigators found documents relating to mobile telephones, which, as the investigation further established, had been used for surveillance and planning. 39 .     In respect of the military operational orders issued to Z.D. and R. Ger. (see paragraph   37 above), the investigators subsequently established that (i)   Z.D. might have used them to facilitate surveillance of the victim, and (ii)   those documents had not corresponded to any service mission with participation of Z.D. or R.Ger. (as confirmed by the records of the Ministry of Interior). 40 .     On the same date the investigators questioned the owner of the flat at 3   Veyernaya Street, who stated that prior to signing the rental agreement in respect of that flat, in spring 2014, one “Ruslan” (subsequently identified as R.Mukh.) and a certain “Aslanbek” – serving members of the Chechen Republic’s police force – had visited her flat, which they had planned to rent for R. Mukh. and another “Ruslan” (allegedly, a relative of Aslanbek). On 2   March 2015 R.Mukh. informed the landlord that he had to leave the flat as he had been recalled to Chechnya for operational reasons, and that on 2 or 3   March 2015 he planned to leave Moscow. A real estate agent in charge of the rental agreement also remembered that R.Mukh. had been accompanied by “Aslanbek”. 41 .     On 7   March 2015 the investigators searched the Mercedes ML car and found documents issued to R.Ger. and Ar.Ger. 42 .     On 17   March 2015 the investigators seized the household logbook for the apartment block at 46 Veyernaya Street; it recorded R.Ger. as the resident of the above-mentioned flat and his car as a “Mercedes”. Based on the logbook, witness statements, and CCTV footage of the building’s entrance, the investigators further established that in February 2015 R.Ger. and Ar.Ger. had been frequenting the flat together with the suspects and other men. 43 .     In April 2015 a real estate agent testified that in December 2014 R.Mukh. had assisted Ar.Ger. in the purchase of the flat at 46 Veyernaya Street and had told her that he was looking for a flat for his “boss’s nephew”. 44 .     The investigators established that the suspects had also searched –using the computers seized in the flats – for information concerning Boris Nemtsov. A video recording of Boris Nemtsov taken in April 2014 was found on T.Esk.’s mobile telephone. It was marked as having been received on 5   March 2015. Flight records, ticket purchases and airport video footage 45 .     On the basis of video footage from Vnukovo Airport’s cameras, flight records, Vnukovo Airport documents and witnesses’ and co-defendants’ statements, the investigators established that: -     On 28   February 2015 An.Gub., together with B.Sh., had taken a flight from Moscow to Grozny; -     On 1   March 2015 Z.D. and R.Ger. had taken a flight from Moscow to Grozny; -     R.Mukh. had taken them to the airport using the Mercedes ML car; on 2   March 2015 he had also left Moscow for Grozny; -     On 16   February 2015 R.Ger. and Ar.Ger. had purchased flight tickets from Moscow to Grozny, and had returned with T.Esk. and Z.D.; -     R.Ger. had purchased tickets from Moscow to Ingushetia and Chechnya, and had returned with As.Kh. in November 2014 and January 2015. Some other investigative measures 46 .     On 16   June 2015 the investigators questioned two witnesses (the first served as a cleaner and cook at 3   Veyernaya Street; the second was her friend, a waitress at the Ts. restaurant-club in Moscow who had also occasionally helped her to clean flats). The second witness stated that R.Ger., Ar.Ger., R.Mukh., As.Kh. and Z.D. had regularly visited the restaurant since the autumn of 2014, and T. Esk. since January 2015. Both witnesses believed that R.Ger. had been the leader of the group. The first witness further stated that: (i)     R.Ger. had lived at 3   Veyernaya Street, before having moved into a flat at 46   Veyernaya; (ii)     she had met Ar.Ger., An.Gub., T.Esk., B.Sh. and As.Kh. at 3   Veyernaya Street; (iii)     in December 2014 she had got to know Ar. Ger., and in January 2015 Z.D.; both had moved into the flat at 3   Veyernaya Street; (iv)     since January 2015, she had also regularly cleaned the flat at 46   Veyernaya Street; R.Ger. had explained to her that he had bought it but that it had been registered in Ar.Ger.’s name; (v)     Z.D. and Ar.Ger. had frequently visited R.Ger. at his residence, and the witness believed that the latter had treated Z.D. and Ar.Ger. as friends, while “Rusik” (R.Mukh.) had clearly been a subordinate. 47 .     The witnesses identified the above-mentioned suspects, as well as R.Ger. and R.Mukh., with the aid of photographs provided by the investigators. 48 .     On 22   June 2015 the investigators examined video footage which showed that in January and February 2015 R.Ger., Z.D., As.Kh. and T.Esk. had visited two hotels in Moscow on several occasions, together with other men. The Mercedes ML had been spotted near the hotels on the days of their visits. 49 .     On 29   June 2015 the investigators ordered (i) that the bank accounts of the suspects and R.Ger. and R.Mukh. be examined; and (ii) the collection of information stored in police databases and the military personal files of the suspects and of R.Ger. and R.Mukh., and the questioning of their relatives and friends. 50 .     For identification purposes, investigators showed to various witnesses photographs of As.Kh., R.Mukh., R.Ger. and Ar.Ger. and questioned witnesses about them. Statements of Mr Nemtsov’s colleagues and friends during the investigation 51 .     In April-June   2015 the investigators questioned several witnesses (former colleagues and friends of Mr Nemtsov), asking each of them similar questions concerning: Mr Nemtsov’s conduct during the first and second Chechen wars; any public statements made by Mr Nemtsov about the authorities of the Chechen Republic; Mr Nemtsov’s attitude towards religions (mainly Islam); any known threats Mr Nemtsov had received; his recent major projects; and any known personal issues or conflicts of interest – including any related to his work in Yaroslavl. The replies could be summarised as follows: -     During the first Chechen war Mr   Nemtsov – then the Governor of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region – had collected one million signatures from people living in the region in a petition to stop the war. -     Mr Nemtsov had systematically and openly criticised both the Federal Government and the President of the Chechen Republic, referring to: unfair distribution of federal funds; corruption; a de facto absence of the rule of law in the Chechen Republic, which had become an authoritarian “State within a State”; the creation of a de facto independent army, answerable solely to Ramzan Kadyrov; and, most recently, Mr Kadyrov’s having sent Chechen military servicemen to Ukraine in 2014. -     One of the witnesses questioned in April-June   2015, R., remembered that Mr Nemtsov had received threats from “several young men, including Ramzan Kadyrov”, in 2002, when he and the witness had participated in a “Congress of Chechen People” in Gudermes, at the invitation of Mr   Kadyrov’s father, Akhmat Kadyrov. Both Mr Nemtsov and Akhmat Kadyrov had taken the threats seriously, and the latter had provided Mr   Nemtsov with guards until the end of his visit to the Chechen Republic. Two more witnesses mentioned that they had heard about the threats. -     Mr Nemtsov’s attitude towards Islam was assessed by witnesses as either positive or neutral. The witnesses confirmed that Mr Nemtsov had strongly condemned the Charlie Hebdo massacre in a Facebook post, which had subsequently been posted on Ekho Moskvy’s website. -     Mr Nemtsov had regularly received threats, including on Facebook; on one occasion he had complained to the police about one such threat received in the spring of 2014, in which an unidentified person had directly threatened to kill Nemtsov, but the investigation had not produced any results. -     Mr Nemtsov had openly and fervently criticised the Russian authorities (including President Putin), had exposed rampant corruption at all levels of government, and had published detailed reports on the matter; he had been one of the leaders of public protest in Russia and had on several occasions been subjected to administrative sanctions for his participation in public events; he had been due to lead a large-scale opposition rally in Moscow on 1 March 2015. -     He had exposed corruption in Yaroslavl’s local governing bodies. -     Prior to his death, Mr Nemtsov had been working on a report entitled “Putin. The War.” The report had addressed Russia’s direct military involvement in eastern Ukraine since 2014. -     None of the witnesses had been aware of any family problems or business conflicts involving Mr   Nemtsov. Some of the applicant’s procedural requests Dismissal in April 2015 of a request for the questioning of certain witnesses, and subsequent court proceedings 52 .     On 22   April 2015 the applicant requested investigators to question Ramzan Kadyrov, R.Ger., V.Ger., Al.Del., Ad.Del. and Sul.Ger. She detailed their close professional and family links with the suspects – which were never disputed by the parties either at the domestic level or in their submissions to the Court – as follows: –     two of the suspects, B.Sh. and Z.D., had been officers of the Sever Battalion, which had at the time of the events been under the command of Al.Del.; –     Al.Del. was a commander of the Sever Battalion and a brother of Ad.Del. – a deputy of the State Duma and an advisor to Ramzan Kadyrov, his close ally and reportedly a relative; –     one of the Sever Battalion’s companies had been commanded by R.Ger. (a nephew of Ad.Del. and Sul.Ger., and a member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation representing the Chechen Republic); –       V.Ger. – a brother of Sul.Ger., a cousin of Ad.Del. and an uncle of R.Ger. – was the head of the Shelkovskiy district police department, where T.Esk. had been an officer. 53 .     The applicant also referred to: Mr Nemtsov’s book ( Confessions of a Rebel , published in 2007) in which he had mentioned death threats that he had received from Ramzan Kadyrov in 2002; her father’s strong criticism of Ramzan Kadyrov, including Mr Kadyrov’s having sent Chechen military servicemen to Ukraine in 2014; threats that her father had received in 2014 from unidentified persons; and Mr Kadyrov’s post on Instagram concerning Z.D.’s arrest (see paragraph   27 above). In view of those considerations, she inferred that the above-mentioned high-ranking officials of the Chechen Republic could, for political reasons, have been involved in Mr Nemtsov’s assassination. The applicant also requested to be informed of any investigative measures already taken in an effort to identify the organisers of the crime. 54 .     On 27   April 2015 the investigator granted the applicant’s request in part and ordered that R.Ger. be questioned. He found no reason to question the other officials referred to in the request. 55 .     On 19   August 2015 the applicant complained to court about the investigators’ decision of 27   April 2015 (see paragraph 54 above). She also complained of the investigators’ inactivity in respect of the organisers of her father’s assassination (that is, their failure to identify the organisers of the assassination, to question them or to bring charges against them) and noted that she had not been granted full access to the case-file material, despite the decision of 13   April 2015 (see paragraph   10 above). 56 .     On 14   October 2015 and 21   December 2015 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow and the Moscow City Court, respectively, dismissed the complaint at two instances. The courts found that investigating authorities were autonomous in their activities and that the courts were not empowered to interfere with the proceedings in question. The courts also found that the applicant had been afforded full access to the case file. Refusal to reclassify the charges, and subsequent proceedings 57 .     On 14   September 2015 the applicant requested that the suspects’ actions be reclassified from Article   105 (Murder) to Article   277 (Attempt on the life of a State official or a public figure) of the Russian Criminal Code. 58 .     On 21   September 2015 the investigator advised the applicant that the crime had not been committed with the intent of preventing the victim’s political activities (an essential element of the crime under Article   277), and refused the request. According to that decision, the investigators “[had] convincingly established that Mr Nemtsov’s murder had not been related to his political or public activities”. The decision contained no further reasoning in respect of that conclusion. 59 .     On 25 December 2015 and 14 March 2016 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow and the Moscow City Court dismissed complaints that the applicant had lodged regarding that decision, referring to the investigators’ autonomy and noting that they (the courts) had no authority to oversee the investigators’ decisions and had found no evidence that the investigators had been inactive. Subsequent requests for witnesses to be questioned 60 .     On 5   November 2015 the applicant again requested the questioning of the persons referred to in her request of 22   April 2015 (see paragraph 52 above). She further requested the questioning of V.Z., the Commander ‑ in ‑ Chief of the National Guard of Russia, as both some of the persons referred to in her above-mentioned request and the suspects were his formal subordinates. She also pointed to his alleged personal links with Ramzan Kadyrov and the above-mentioned persons. On 11   November 2015 the investigator refused the request, having found that such questioning was unnecessary. Questioning of As.Kh. and attempts to locate Sh.Taz. 61 .     On 22   June 2015 the investigators ordered that As.Kh. be questioned. 62 .     After several failed attempts to summon As.Kh. for questioning, on 18   December 2015 he was located and questioned by an investigator of the Investigative Committee of the Shelkovskiy District of the Chechen Republic. Mr As.Kh. stated that he did not know Z.D., B.Sh., A.Gub., Sh.Gub. or Kh.B. and had never had their telephone numbers. He had known T.Esk. as a former fellow police officer. He knew R.Ger. and Ar.Ger., as they were relatives of his, and had visited R.Ger. in Moscow at Veyernaya a couple of times. He also knew R.Mukh., since they had lived in the same village in Chechnya. He denied having any information about the assassination, participating in the meeting with the real estate agent (see paragraph   40 above) or purchasing flight tickets. 63 .     On 22   July 2015 the investigators ordered the questioning of Sh.Taz., to whom Z.D. had referred as a friend (see paragraph 21 above) and who could have visited the flats at Veyernaya Street before and after the murder. The investigators determined that Sh.Taz. was a high-ranking officer in the Chechen riot police. On 8   September 2015 the investigators ordered that he be summoned (as well as As.Kh. and Ar.Ger.) for questioning. It appears that he was not questioned. Attempts to question R.Mukh., Ar.Ger.   and R.Ger. as witnesses 64 .     On 16   March 2015 an investigator issued an order ( поручение ) to the head of the Federal Security Service of the Chechen Republic to establish the whereabouts of R.Ger. and R.Mukh. and to “bring them to the Investigative Committee [of the Russian Federation] to arrest them under Articles   91 and   92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to take urgent investigative steps, with their participation”, as the investigators had determined that those two persons and unspecified persons from their entourage “[had been] implicated (причастны) in the assassination of Mr   Nemtsov and organisation [thereof]”. 65 .     On 23   March 2015 the Chechen Republic department of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) reported that several operational and search activities had been carried out in an effort to execute the above order, and undertook to further report any progress. 66 .     On 18   May 2015 an investigator requested the Operative and Search Unit of the 2 nd Department of the FSB to establish R.Ger.’s and R.Mukh.’s whereabouts and to bring them to the Investigative Committee in Moscow for questioning. 67 .     In June 2015 the Anti-terrorist Unit of the FSB reported that R.Ger. and R.Mukh. had taken flights from Moscow to Grozny on 1 and 3   March 2015, respectively, using their internal passports (see also paragraph   45 above), and that it had been impossible to locate them since then. The FSB provided (i) information regarding R.Ger.’s driving licence and (ii) filled-in copies of the so-called Form   1” used by R.Ger. and R.Mukh. to lodge applications for an internal passport. 68 .     On 18   August 2015 the chief investigator of the investigation department ordered the Investigative Committee of the Chechen Republic to deliver summonses to R.Ger. and R.Mukh. to be questioned as witnesses, and instructed the local investigating authorities not to delegate that task to any employees of the Ministry of Interior, given the possible involvement of several former and acting officers of that Ministry in the crime. On the same date the chief investigator requested the head of the Investigative Committee of the Chechen Republic to arrange for the questioning of several acquaintances of R.Ger. and R.Mukh., as that had not been done previously. 69 .     On 28   August 2015 the Investigative Committee of the Chechen Republic reported that it had been impossible to deliver a summons to either R.Ger. or R.Mukh., as the addressees “had been absent from their residences”. 70 .     On 31   October 2015 an investigator of the investigation department requested the head of the operations and investigations unit of the FSB to deliver summonses to R.Ger., Ar.Ger. and R.Mukh. for questioning as witnesses. 71 .     In three separate reports dated 9   November 2015 a federal investigator (a member of the investigation department) reported that on 31   October 2015 he had travelled to the Chechen Republic to deliver summonses to R.Mukh., R.Ger. and Ar.Ger., respectively. He had been unable to deliver them since “no one [had] opened the door”, so at each address he had left the summons in the mailbox of the respective premises. In respect of R.Mukh. he reported that he had been told that the latter’s family were no longer living at the address, and the neighbours had been unaware of that family’s whereabouts. 72 .     Similarly, on 13   November 2015 the head of the operations and investigations unit of the FSB reported that on 31   October 2015 several FSB officers had attempted to deliver a summons at Ar.Ger.’s two known addresses and at R.Ger.’s and R.Mukh.’s respective registered addresses; however, no one had opened the door at those addresses, so they had left the summonses in the mailboxes of each residence. According to neighbours’ statements cited in the report, no one had been living at R.Mukh.’s registered address for about six months. The FSB officers had been unable to obtain information regarding the former residents’ whereabouts. Charges against R.Mukh. and other persons, and the disjoining of the proceedings concerning the organisers of the murder 73 .     On 31   October 2015 the investigators charged R.Mukh. in absentia with murder committed in a group that had been hired or motivated by the promise of a reward. The investigators established that “approximately in the second half of September 2014” R.Mukh., together with other unidentified persons, had commissioned Mr   Nemtsov’s murder and had offered a reward of RUB   15 million to Z.D. and the remaining suspects, which the latter accepted as “they had had not permanent job or source of income”. R.Mukh. had also allegedly placed at the disposal of the suspects the two flats on Veyernaya Street, handed them the Mercedes   ML car, bought mobile telephones and SIM cards for them and, at some point no later than 27   February 2015, purchased a gun. After the murder, R.Mukh. and other unidentified persons provided Z.D., B.Sh. and An.Gub with the “hideout” flats in Moscow, transported them to various locations in Moscow and the Moscow Region, and made other related arrangements to help them to escape. 74.     On 5   November 2015 R.Mukh.’s name was put on the federal wanted list, and on 11   November 2015 on the international wanted list. On 18   November 2015 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered R.Mukh.’s arrest. 75 .     On 27   January 2016 the investigators severed the criminal proceedings against R.Mukh. and other unidentified persons “who [had] offered [the suspects] at least RUB   15 million to kill Mr Nemtsov” from the criminal proceedings against the remaining suspects. The investigators noted that it was impossible to establish R.Mukh.’s and the above-mentioned unidentified persons’ whereabouts. The indictment in respect of five of the suspects and the applicant’s procedural requests 76.     On 28 January 2016 the investigation was completed. 77 .     On 29   June 2016 an indictment in respect of five of t