CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 septembre 2023

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display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .sD00444C6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s3695F815 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sEECE831 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#474747 } .sE8934522 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF YORDANOV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA (Applications nos. 265/17 and 26473/18)     JUDGMENT   Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Disproportionate forfeiture of applicants’ assets as “unlawfully acquired” without specifying the prohibited conduct resulting in their acquisition or establishing any link between those assets and the conduct • Significant number of deficiencies in 2005 legislation identified in Todorov and Others v.   Bulgaria maintained in applicable 2012 repealing legislation • Approach similar to that in Todorov and Others followed • Individual assessment necessary to counterbalance heavy burden placed by 2012 legislation on defendants in forfeiture proceedings required to prove the lawful origin of their assets   STRASBOURG 26 September 2023   FINAL   19/02/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Yordanov and Others v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Jolien Schukking,   Yonko Grozev,   Darian Pavli,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Andreas Zünd,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos. 265/17 and 26473/18) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three individuals (holding different nationalities, as indicated in the appended table) and a company with its registered office in Bulgaria (“the   applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table; the decision to give notice to the Bulgarian Government (“the   Government”) of the complaints concerning the forfeiture of the applicants’ assets under the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Assets Act and to declare inadmissible the remainder of application no. 26473/18; the fact that the Belgian Government did not avail themselves of their right to submit written comments in view of the Belgian nationality of one of the applicants, Mr R. Yordanov (see the appended table); the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 5 September 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the forfeiture by the State of assets alleged to have been “unlawfully acquired”, and raises in particular issues under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants’ details, as well as the names of their legal representatives before the Court, are indicated in the appendix. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agents, Ms   I.   Stancheva ‑ Chinova and Ms A. Panova of the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Application n o . 265/17 – Yordanov v . Bulgaria 5 .     In 2008 the applicant – by himself or through a company wholly controlled by him – bought plots of land in Bulgaria considered to be worth about 496,000 levs (BGN), the equivalent of about 254,000 euros (EUR). Since the Bulgarian tax authorities had no information about income received by him in the preceding years they inquired about his financial situation. In response the applicant presented the tax authorities with customs declarations showing that between 2005 and 2008 he had brought EUR 345,000 into Bulgaria. In response to a further enquiry as to the origin of the money, the applicant explained that he had received income in Belgium, where he predominantly resided, and presented numerous documents to support that assertion. Several of those documents, namely contracts whereby other people had agreed to pay him for different services, turned out to have been forged. It was also established at that stage that the applicant had never declared income in Belgium and had never paid income tax there. 6 .     The applicant was subsequently charged with evading the payment of income tax amounting to about BGN 90,000 (EUR 46,000) on the sum he had brought into Bulgaria, and with the use of forged documents. He was convicted as charged by a judgment of the Targovishte Regional Court of 20   November 2012. As he had in the meantime paid the tax due, he was relieved of criminal liability and ordered to pay a fine of BGN 4,000 (EUR   2,046). 7 .     In 2013 the Commission for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Assets (hereinafter “the Commission”) opened proceedings under the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Assets Act 2012 (hereinafter “the   2012   Act”, see paragraphs 28 et seq . below) against the applicant, his wife and the company owned by him, which had acquired some of the plots of land. The Commission investigated their income and expenses between 2003 and 2013, and in March 2014 introduced a forfeiture application in the courts. It sought the forfeiture of a flat, several vehicles, sums of money in the defendants’ bank accounts, the value of shares in companies owned by the defendants, as well as the plots of land owned by them and the monetary equivalent of other plots of land which had been resold in the meantime to third parties. 8 .     The forfeiture application was allowed by the national courts – specifically by a judgment of the Targovishte Regional Court of 26 June 2015, a judgment of the Varna Court of Appeal of 10 February 2016, and a final decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation (hereinafter “the Supreme Court”) of 23 June 2016 refusing leave to appeal on points of law. The courts ordered in particular the forfeiture of assets owned by the applicant worth BGN 37,212 (EUR 19,034), and of assets jointly owned by the applicant and his wife valued at BGN 53,013 (EUR 27,116); the remaining forfeited assets belonged to the applicant’s company, which is not itself an applicant in the present proceedings. 9 .     The courts referred to information sent by the Belgian authorities under a mutual legal assistance procedure. According to that information, the applicant was being investigated in Belgium for offences allegedly committed in February 2011, namely human trafficking with the aim of labour exploitation, black market trade and breaches of employment law. He was additionally suspected of money laundering and breaches of the tax legislation, committed on unspecified dates. In particular, the applicant had brought Bulgarian workers to Belgium, who had then worked there for companies owned by him without employment contracts. In that way the applicant had allegedly gained more than EUR 1,150,000, which he had never declared as income in Belgium. The applicant had admitted in 2011 that he had used revenue from his companies in Belgium to cover his daily expenses, to finance a political party, and to acquire vehicles and immoveable property in Bulgaria. 10 .     However, the Bulgarian courts pointed out that there was no indication that the applicant had been formally charged or convicted in Belgium, and it was thus not proven that he had engaged in the unlawful activities described above. 11 .     The applicant claimed in the forfeiture proceedings that between 1999 and 2007 his brother had gifted him sums of money totalling BGN 900,000 (EUR 460,000), but the only evidence presented in that regard was a statement by his brother, which proved neither the gifts themselves, nor the lawful provenance of the money. While the applicant mentioned that witnesses could testify to the actual handover of the money, he did not challenge the Targovishte Regional Court’s failure to order the examination of those witnesses, and did not raise the matter in his subsequent appeals. 12 .     The applicant and his wife claimed in addition to have received remuneration as managers of the companies owned by them in Belgium, as well as dividends. Once again, those claims were based on their statements and on statements of their companies and employees, and were not substantiated by further evidence, such as entries in the companies’ accounting books; nor had it been shown that the companies’ financial situation had permitted the payment of such sums. The applicant and his wife had submitted income tax declarations in Bulgaria and Belgium declaring substantial income for the period 2006-2013, but that had only been done in 2014, after the initiation of the forfeiture proceedings, and did not prove anything about the actual source of their income or its lawful origin. The applicant claimed also to have received rent for several vehicles owned by him, but had not proved that to be the case. In addition, while it was established that in 2008 the applicant and his wife had brought into Bulgaria EUR 345,000, allegedly obtained from economic activities in Belgium, documents establishing what could have been the lawful provenance of that sum had already been found to have been forged in the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 5 above); the lawful origin of that money had therefore not been proven. Lastly, the information provided by the Belgian authorities (see paragraph 9 above) had disproved the applicant’s claims that he had received lawful income through his companies in Belgium. 13 .     Accordingly, the courts concluded that during the period under examination the applicant and his wife had only had a small income from lawful sources, namely BGN 5,800 (the equivalent of EUR 2,966) received from the sale of a vehicle in 2005. 14 .     At the same time, during the period under examination they had spent more than BGN 1,600,000 (EUR 818,000), a sum which included, among other things, their daily expenses (calculated on the basis of statistical data on average household expenses in Belgium) and the price of the assets acquired by them and the applicant’s company. 15 .     Given their very low lawful income, the conclusion was drawn that all the assets subject to the forfeiture application had been unlawfully acquired, namely with income for which no lawful source had been shown. 16 .     To the applicant’s objection that no link had been established between the offence he had been convicted of and the assets in respect of which forfeiture was being sought, the Varna Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court responded that no such link was required: under the 2012 Act, any finding of criminal activity was only the starting point enabling the Commission to initiate an investigation, while the preconditions for the actual forfeiture were “detached” from the criminal proceedings and their outcome. Application n o . 26473/18 – Bozadzhieva and Others v .   Bulgaria 17 .     By a judgment of the Razgrad Regional Court of 26 March 2014, which became final on an unspecified date, the first applicant, Ms Nevin Bozadzhieva, was convicted of two offences. First, despite having received between 2008 and 2013 through the Western Union and MoneyGram systems numerous payments from persons living abroad, totalling about EUR   163,000, she had failed to declare the income to the tax authorities, evading the payment of income tax for a total of BGN 52,317 (EUR 26,760). Second, between 2008 and 2011 the first applicant had fraudulently received BGN 2,300 (EUR 1,176) in child allowances when, given the income described above, she had not been entitled to receive it (the allowances had subsequently been restituted to the competent State body). During the trial the first applicant accepted the facts as alleged in the indictment and agreed to be convicted in summary proceedings. 18 .     Since the offences fell within the scope of the 2012 Act, in 2014 the Commission opened proceedings against the first applicant, her husband (Mr   Gyulver Hasan, “the second applicant”) and a company owned by him (Ruzh-Dil EOOD, “the third applicant”), in order to investigate their financial situation between 2004 and 2014. In 2015 it introduced a forfeiture application against them, seeking the forfeiture of the following assets: a flat in Razgrad and several plots of land, some of which with buildings constructed on them; sums of money received from the sale of other plots of land and a car; the value of the second applicant’s shares in the third applicant (a company) and monetary contributions to the company on his part; sums of money placed by the first and second applicants in numerous bank accounts; and a sum of money equalling the remainder of the EUR 163,000 received by the first applicant, that is to say minus the investments in the assets described above. According to the Commission, at the time of submission of the forfeiture application the total value of the assets in respect of which forfeiture was being sought was BGN 535,624 (about EUR 274,000). 19 .     The applicants contested the forfeiture application, claiming that their assets had been lawfully acquired, that the authorities had to prove any unlawfulness, and that the Commission was applying wrongly the de facto presumption contained in section 1(2) of the 2012 Act (see paragraph 38 below). 20 .     By a judgment of 19 October 2016 the Razgrad Regional Court dismissed the forfeiture application, finding that while the origins of the income of EUR 163,000 (received by the first applicant between 2008 and 2013) had not been established, that did not mean that it had been unlawful. 21 .     However, on 24 February 2017 the Varna Court of Appeal reversed that decision and allowed the forfeiture application in its entirety. 22.     It noted that the salient issue before it was whether the money received by the first applicant from abroad – EUR 163,000 in total – could be considered to be of lawful origin, namely whether the applicants could establish a lawful ground for receiving it. The applicants claimed that the money had been from gifts on the occasion of marriages and other family celebrations, and from loans. However, the Varna Court of Appeal considered that those unsubstantiated claims were insufficient to prove the money’s lawful provenance; nor could the tax authorities’ finding that the money was taxable income prove such provenance. 23.     During the period under examination the first and second applicants had thus received revenue of about BGN 62,500 (EUR 32,000) of lawful provenance, namely from salaries, from the sale of different assets and in bank loans. During the same period, the applicants’ daily and extraordinary expenses had amounted to BGN 118,010 (EUR 60,360), while the value of the assets acquired by them was assessed at BGN 555,955 (EUR 284,000). All of the above meant that the discrepancy between their lawful income and their expenses amounted to BGN 681,117 (EUR 348,400). 24 .     The above considerations meant that the preconditions for forfeiture had been met. 25 .     In a final decision of 6 December 2017 the Supreme Court refused to accept for examination the applicants’ appeal on points of law. It reiterated that the 2012 Act did not require a link between the predicate offence and the assets to be forfeited because it was concerned with all unlawfully acquired assets and not necessarily with proceeds of crime. 26 .     After the end of the forfeiture proceedings, three of the forfeited plots of land, with buildings on them, were put up for public sale and sold to third parties. The remaining assets have not been subject to enforcement measures. No part of the sums of money due has been collected from the applicants. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK the 2012 Act Adoption of the 2012 Act 27 .     The Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act ( Закон за отнемане в полза на държавата на имущество, придобито от престъпна дейност , hereinafter “the 2005 Act”) was enacted in 2005. It provided for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime and thus required a conviction, as well as, in accordance with the practice of the national courts, a causal link between the offence committed and the assets to be forfeited. The relevant provisions of the   2005   Act have been described in more detail in Todorov and Others v.   Bulgaria (nos. 50705/11 and 6 others, §§ 90-110, 13 July 2021). 28 .     The 2005 Act was repealed in 2012 when the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Assets Act ( Закон за отнемане в полза на държавата на незаконно придобито имущество , hereinafter “the 2012 Act”) was enacted. The 2012 Act’s main novelty was that it provided for the forfeiture of “unlawful” assets and not necessarily proceeds of crime. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill in Parliament explained the need for the   2012 Act as follows: “[The changes in Bulgaria in the 1990s] facilitated [the development of] organised criminal structures which opposed society’s democratic functioning and negatively influenced the social order, while imposing corrupt practices. The perception that these people were untouchable and unpunishable seriously eroded the sense of social justice and rule of law. Their assets are there for all in society to see as ‘unexplained wealth’ ... For the citizens, corruption is categorically the most important problem the country faces ... There is no doubt that we need an institutional approach against schemes and practices of corruption ... This Bill represents a decisive step towards the elimination of this deficit in anti ‑ corruption measures, [and is] aimed at the elimination of possibilities for organised crime to generate corruption of any kind. ... Forfeiture of assets of unestablished origin is considered in Europe and in the world to be an effective means to combat organised crime and corruption. ... In this way, and through guarantees for the rights of law-abiding citizens, we will be able to advance in our fight against criminality, depriving it of financial gain, which is one of the main reasons for its existence. Civil-law forfeiture is a different action for the protection of the common interest, distinguishable from criminal prosecution. What is decisive for civil-law forfeiture is not the commission of a criminal offence and the perpetrator’s guilt. The confiscation of assets is not a punishment for a guilty person, but a measure in the public interest. It has a preventive effect and makes the rule that ‘an offence should not enrich’ a reality.” 29 .     The main deficiency of the 2005 Act was identified as the need to await the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against the defendant in order to proceed with the forfeiture application (see Todorov and Others , cited above, § 102). The fact of a criminal conviction being a prerequisite for a civil forfeiture claim was considered to frequently render the State interference “ineffective”. 30 .     The Bulgarian Government have subsequently claimed, for example before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the context of its supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgment in the case of Dimitrovi v. Bulgaria (no. 12655/09, 3 March 2015), that the 2012 Act’s aim was “to fight corruption and organised crime through enabling the State to recover assets derived from criminal activity or administrative violations” (see Action Report DH-DD(2017)740). 31 .     In a judgment of 13 October 2012, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court found that the 2012 Act’s general approach was in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to property ( Решение   №   13 от 13.10.2012 г. на КС по к. д. № 6/2012 г. ). It held in particular the following: “What is subject to forfeiture are not assets acquired through lawful sources, but assets of unlawful origin ... The Act aims at countering the consequences of unjustified enrichment at the expense of other individuals or the society as a whole, that is to say enrichment resulting from activities which are forbidden.” The Constitutional Court gave examples of such forbidden activities – tax evasion, smuggling, corruption, trafficking in human beings or drugs, large ‑ scale thefts – pointing out however that forfeiture proceedings under the 2012 Act did not aim to establish the details of such activities. 32 .     It considered furthermore that the 2012 Act was sufficiently clear and its consequences foreseeable: “[It is not true that] the addressees of the [2012 Act] would not understand what behaviour is necessary to avoid the application of the Act to them – they must not enrich themselves with assets acquired through activities which are outside the law... If the sources of lawful enrichment are evident from the Constitution and the legislation, the failure to establish such sources, which in fact indicates their absence, leads to the logical conclusion that the enrichment of the defendants concerned has an unlawful provenance.” 33 .     The Constitutional Court pointed out nevertheless that it was assessing the 2012 Act in the abstract, and that this did not relieve the competent State bodies from their obligation to make assessments and decisions in the light of the specific circumstances of each case. 34 .     Lastly, the Constitutional Court considered the previous approach under the 2005 Act to be ineffective in some cases: “for instance, where the evidence shows explicitly that certain assets are of unlawful origin, but is at the same time insufficient for a conviction for an offence proven beyond reasonable doubt, as well as where a criminal prosecution is temporarily or permanently barred by an obstacle such as the death of the perpetrator, amnesty, the expiry of a limitation period for criminal prosecution, immunity, an objective impossibility of finding the perpetrator to ensure his participation in the criminal proceedings, mental disorder excluding criminal liability etc.” 35 .     The body in charge of initiating and pursuing proceedings under the   2012 Act was the Commission for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Assets (“the Commission”). 36 .     The 2012 Act remained in force until 2018 when it was repealed with the adoption of the Counteraction Against Corruption and Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Assets Act ( Закон за противодействие на корупцията и отнемане на незаконно придобито имущество , hereinafter “the 2018 Act”). The 2018 Act provides essentially for the same mechanism for the forfeiture of “unlawfully acquired assets”, namely assets “for which no lawful origin is established” (section 5(1)), and does not require a criminal conviction. 37 .     The 2018 Act, together with other legislation, is currently deemed to transpose into Bulgarian law Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime (see paragraphs 59 ‑ 63 below). Substantive provisions 38 .     The 2012 Act defined unlawfully acquired assets as “assets for which no lawful origin [was] established” (section 1(2)). The burden to prove the “lawfulness” of their assets was on the defendants ( Решение № 1 от 6.01.2017 г. на ВтАС по гр. д. № 254/2016 г. ; Решение № 85 от 6.06.2017   г. на ВнАС по в. гр. д. № 167/2017 г. ; Решение № 147 от 16.09.2019 г. на ВКС по гр. д. № 1998/2018 г. ; Определение № 103 от 21.03.2022 г. на ВКС по гр. д. № 3979/2021 г. ). That de facto presumption of unlawfulness of assets was considered by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 13 October 2012 (see paragraph 31 above) to be justified, because it facilitated the establishment of the truth and represented “proportionate means to achieve the aim of the Act, which is in accordance with the Constitution”. 39 .     The aim of the 2012 Act, as explained in section 3(1), was to “protect the common interest, by removing and restricting the possibilities for the unlawful acquisition and disposal of assets”. Under section 3(2) the Act had to be applied while respecting the rights of the persons affected and avoiding “any risk of unfairness”. 40 .     Forfeiture could be sought after criminal charges had been brought against the defendant if they concerned the offences enumerated in section   22(1) of the 2012 Act. The list was largely the same as in section 3(1) of the 2005 Act (see, for more detail, Todorov and Others , cited above, § 95), with the addition of some corruption offences, offences against the tax and fiscal systems, and human trafficking. By section 22(2), forfeiture proceedings could also be opened where, owing to an amnesty, the expiry of a limitation period, the death of the defendant or his or her incapacitation, the defendant had not been formally charged, no criminal proceedings had been opened or the pending proceedings had been discontinued; a national court has applied that provision noting that there were “available data” that an offence might have still been committed ( Решение № 7 от 6.01.2020 г. на ОС-Пловдив по гр. д. № 1121/2017 г. ). 41 .     Forfeiture proceedings could also be triggered where a final decision of the relevant authorities found that an administrative offence had been committed which had resulted in substantial profit – at least BGN 150,000 (EUR 76,700), lowered to BGN 100,000 (EUR 51,150) in 2016 – and where such profit could not be recovered by the State by other means. 42 .     The Commission had to establish a “significant discrepancy” between the defendant’s revenue and the value of the assets acquired, namely in the amount of at least BGN 250,000, the equivalent of EUR 128,000 (reduced to BGN 150,000, or EUR 76,700, in 2016) for the whole period under examination. Any asset was to be assessed for that purpose taking into account its actual market value at the moment of its acquisition or disposal. The Constitutional Court noted in its judgment of 13 October 2012 (see paragraph 31 above) that what had to be established was the defendant’s assets at the beginning and at the end of the period under examination, any increase of these assets from lawful sources, as well as the defendant’s expenses. 43 .     Under the 2012 Act “unlawfully acquired assets” were subject to forfeiture (section 62). Specifically, the national courts had to compare the defendant’s “net income” – the overall income reduced by the daily expenses and extraordinary expenses such as the payment of taxes – and the value of the assets acquired during the period under examination. 44 .     Section 1 of the supplementary provisions of the 2012 Act contained a non-exhaustive list of lawful sources of income – such as remuneration under a labour contract; net profit from economic activity, dividends and interest; rent from properties acquired with lawful income; lottery and gambling winnings; sums received from the sale of properties acquired with lawful income; and court awards. 45 .     “Unlawfully acquired assets” for the purposes of the Act could include assets acquired by the defendant’s spouse or minor children, as well as assets acquired unlawfully by a legal entity under the defendant’s control (sections   63 and 66). 46 .     The State’s right to confiscate or seek the forfeiture of an asset expired ten years after the asset had been acquired (section 73 of the 2012 Act). Interpretative Decision no. 4 of 7 December 2018 47 .     As forfeiture proceedings under the 2012 Act could be opened after charges had been brought against the defendant, and did not need to await a conviction by the criminal courts (see paragraph 40 above), the practice of the national courts initially varied as to whether the forfeiture could still be pursued in cases where the criminal proceedings had been discontinued after the initiation of forfeiture proceedings on a ground not among those enumerated in section 22(2) of the Act (see paragraph 40 above), including where the criminal proceedings had resulted in an acquittal. 48 .     The matter was settled in a binding interpretative decision of the Supreme Court – Interpretative Decision no. 4 of 7 December 2018 ( Тълкувателно решение № 4 от 7.12.2018 г. по тълк. д. № 4/2016 г, ОСГК ). The Supreme Court held that the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings on a ground outside of those enumerated in section 22(2) represented an absolute procedural bar to forfeiture. That was so because, in order to remain a proportionate interference with the right to property, forfeiture could only be sought under the 2012 Act against people meeting the requirements which had allowed for such proceedings to be initiated. Holding otherwise would mean that “the law [did] not provide for a link between the commission of crimes and the possibility to seek forfeiture”. The Supreme Court considered significant the fact that the Government had claimed, for instance before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, that the 2012 Act aimed to aid the fight against corruption and organised crime (see paragraph 30 above). 49 .     The Supreme Court noted furthermore that Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Union on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime (see paragraphs 59-63 below) provided for minimum standards guaranteeing the rights of the individuals affected, such as that there should be a criminal conviction. Accepting that the national courts could order forfeiture under the 2012 Act even where there was no conviction would mean the abandonment of those guarantees. 50 .     On 10 December 2018, three days after the adoption of the above Interpretative Decision, a Member of Parliament introduced a Bill to amend the 2018 Act (see paragraph 36 above). The Bill, which was passed on 20   December 2018, provided that: (1) the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings against defendants in forfeiture proceedings, including as a result of acquittal, would not preclude the State’s right to seek forfeiture (section   153(6) of the 2018 Act), and (2) the above rule would also apply to pending forfeiture proceedings under the 2012 Act (section 5(2) of the concluding and transitional provisions of the 2018 Act). 51 .     The amendments above were justified by the contention that this had been “the actual intent of the legislator” when adopting the 2012 Act. Procedure 52 .     Once it was notified by other competent bodies that there were grounds on which to open forfeiture proceedings, the Commission would open an investigation in one of its regional offices in order to establish the assets, income and expenses of the person under investigation. At that stage it could seek the imposition of injunctions and other interim measures. After the imposition of such measures, the Commission was obliged to disclose to the individuals under investigation the evidence it had collected, and to give them an opportunity to comment or to present further evidence. On the basis of the findings of its investigation the Commission would take a decision at that point to discontinue the proceedings or to bring a forfeiture application. 53 .     A forfeiture application was examined by the courts in a public hearing under the rules of civil procedure and before courts at up to three levels of jurisdiction. 54 .     The forfeited assets could be used by the State to compensate victims of the offence perpetrated by the defendant if his or her remaining assets were insufficient to do so (section 90a of the 2012 Act). 55 .     The State was liable for any damage caused through unlawful decisions or actions of its bodies under the 2012 Act (section 91). The Code of civil procedure 56 .     Article 303 § 1 (7) of the Code provides that an interested party may request the reopening of civil proceedings in a case where a “judgment of the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of the [Convention]” and “a new examination of the case is required in order to repair the consequences of the violation”. 57 .     Under Article 309 § 2, read in conjunction with Article 245 § 3 of the Code, if an application to reopen a case has been granted and the claim initially allowed is ultimately dismissed, the court hearing the reopened case is to order the reimbursement of any expenses paid by the initial losing party. Relevant international and European union law 58.     Relevant international materials have been summarised in G.I.E.M.   S.R.L. and Others v. Italy ([GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, §§   139 ‑ 53, 28 June 2018) and Todorov and Others (cited above, §§ 116-20). 59 .     As to European law, Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union establishes “minimum rules on the freezing of property with a view to possible subsequent confiscation and on the confiscation of property in criminal matters” (Article 1 § 1 of the Directive). 60 .     Article 4 of the Directive, entitled “Confiscation”, provides in paragraph 1: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to enable the confiscation, either in whole or in part, of instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such instrumentalities or proceeds, subject to a final conviction for a criminal offence ...” 61 .     Article 5 § 1 of the Directive provides in addition for so-called “extended confiscation” in the following manner: “Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to enable the confiscation, either in whole or in part, of property belonging to a person convicted of a criminal offence which is liable to give rise, directly or indirectly, to economic benefit, where a court, on the basis of the circumstances of the case, including the specific facts and available evidence, such as that the value of the property is disproportionate to the lawful income of the convicted person, is satisfied that the property in question is derived from criminal conduct.” 62 .     Article 8 of the Directive provides, among other things: “In proceedings referred to in Article 5, the affected person shall have an effective possibility to challenge the circumstances of the case, including specific facts and available evidence on the basis of which the property concerned is considered to be property that is derived from criminal conduct.” 63 .     Recitals 15, 20 and 21 contain further clarifications: “(15)     Subject to a final conviction for a criminal offence, it should be possible to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, or property the value of which corresponds to such instrumentalities or proceeds. ... (20)     When determining whether a criminal offence is liable to give rise to economic benefit, Member States may take into account the modus operandi, for example if a condition of the offence is that it was committed in the context of organised crime or with the intention of generating regular profits from criminal offences. However, this should not, in general, prejudice the possibility to resort to extended confiscation. (21)     Extended confiscation should be possible where a court is satisfied that the property in question is derived from criminal conduct. This does not mean that it must be established that the property in question is derived from criminal conduct. Member States may provide that it could, for example, be sufficient for the court to consider on the balance of probabilities, or to reasonably presume that it is substantially more probable, that the property in question has been obtained from criminal conduct than from other activities. In this context, the court has to consider the specific circumstances of the case, including the facts and available evidence based on which a decision on extended confiscation could be issued. The fact that the property of the person is disproportionate to his lawful income could be among those facts giving rise to a conclusion of the court that the property derives from criminal conduct. Member States could also determine a requirement for a certain period of time during which the property could be deemed to have originated from criminal conduct.” 64 .     On 28 October 2021 the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the   CJEU”) gave a judgment concerning the 2018 Act (which replaced the   2012 Act, providing essentially for the same forfeiture mechanism – see paragraph 36 above), following a request for a preliminary ruling (see Komisia za protivodeystvie na koruptsiyata i za otnemane na nezakonno pridobitoto imushtestvo , C ‑ 319/19, EU:C:2021:883). The questions raised concerned the compatibility of the 2018 Act with the requirements of Directive 2014/42. 65.     At the domestic level, Z.V. had been charged with abuse of office. The criminal proceedings against her remained pending. In the meantime, the Commission had introduced a forfeiture application against her, her husband and a company, considering that there had been a significant discrepancy between their assets and income. The matter had been referred to the CJEU by the first-instance Sofia City Court, which had been concerned that the   2018   Act might not provide for the minimum procedural safeguards required by the Directive. 66 .     The CJEU held in particular the following (citations omitted): “36.     [G]iven the objectives and the wording of the provisions of Directive 2014/42 and the context in which it was adopted, it must be held that that directive ... is an act aimed at obliging Member States to establish common minimum rules for confiscation of crime-related instrumentalities and proceeds, in order to facilitate the mutual recognition of judicial confiscation decisions adopted in criminal proceedings. 37.     Directive 2014/42 does not therefore govern the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds resulting from illegal activities that is ordered by a court in a Member State in the context of or following proceedings that do not concern the finding of one or more criminal offences. Such confiscation falls outside the scope, in fact, of the minimum rules laid down by that directive, in accordance with Article 1(1) thereof, and the rules governing it fall within the scope of the power of the Member States, referred to in recital 22 of that directive, to provide more extensive powers in their national law. 38.     In the present case, it appears that the confiscation proceedings pending before the referring court are civil in nature and that those proceedings coexist, in national law, with the regime for confiscation under criminal law. It is true that, pursuant to Article   22(1) of the [2018 Act], such proceedings are initiated by the [Commission] where the latter is informed of the fact that a person is accused of having committed certain criminal offences. However, it is clear from the evidence in the file before the Court that, in accordance with the provisions of that law, once commenced, those proceedings, which only concern assets alleged to have been illegally obtained, are conducted independently of any criminal proceedings brought against the person accused of committing the offences at issue, and of the outcome of such proceedings, and, in particular, of the possible conviction of that person. 39.     In those circumstances, it must be held that the decision which the referring court is called upon to adopt in the main proceedings does not fall within the context of, or follow on from, proceedings relating to one or more criminal offences. Furthermore, the confiscation that that court might order following the examination of the request before it does not depend on a criminal conviction of the person concerned. Any such measure does not therefore fall within the scope of application of Directive 2014/42. ... 41.     Having regard to the foregoing considerations, ... Directive 2014/42 must be interpreted as not applying to legislation of a Member State which provides that confiscation of illegally obtained assets is to be ordered by a national court in the context of or following proceedings which do not relate to a finding of one or more criminal offences.” THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 67.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of protocol n o . 1 68.     The applicants complained that the forfeiture of their assets had been unfair and arbitrary. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention. 69.     Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), the Court is of the view that the complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see also Todorov and Others v. Bulgaria , nos. 50705/11 and 6   others, § 129, 13 July 2021). The provision reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” Ad