CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 octobre 2023

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display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s3DB046A9 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF ALTIUS INSURANCE LTD v. CYPRUS (Application no. 41151/20)     JUDGMENT   Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Reasonable time • Excessive length of proceedings Art 13 (+ Art 6 § 1) • Lack of effective remedy • Domestic judicial practice separating examination of length claims by level of jurisdiction at odds with Court’s approach to examining overall length of proceedings   STRASBOURG 24 October 2023     FINAL   19/02/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Altius Insurance Ltd v. Cyprus, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Jolien Schukking,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Andreas Zünd , judges , and Olga Chernisova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   41151/20) against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Altius Insurance Ltd (“the applicant company”), on 8 September 2020; the decision to give notice to the Cypriot Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning the length of the domestic civil proceedings; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 5 September and 26 September 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the length of civil proceedings and the effectiveness of domestic remedies in this regard. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Cypriot law, with its registered office in Nicosia. It was represented by Mr   A. Demetriades, a lawyer practising in Nicosia. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr George L.   Savvides, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. PROCEEDINGS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT Civil action no. 4099/2004 before the Nicosia District Court 5 .     On 6 May 2004 the company P.I.C. lodged a civil action against the applicant company with the Nicosia District Court for breach of contract. 6.     Between 21 May and 21 June 2004, the parties submitted their statements of case. 7.     Between 2 July 2004 and 27 January 2005 the case was listed for directions several times, either at P.I.C.’s request or by decision of the court. 8.     In the meantime, on 10 January and 21 February 2005 respectively the applicant company and P.I.C. filed an application for the disclosure of documents. From then until 4 May 2005 the court applied the relevant procedures, ordering the parties in turn to produce the necessary documents. 9.     On 31 May 2005 the hearing of the case was postponed because P.I.C.’s lawyer withdrew from the case. It was listed for directions on 16 September 2005. 10.     On 2 September 2005 P.I.C. filed an ex parte interim application for a freezing order in respect of the applicant company’s assets. Various procedural steps were undertaken by both parties. On 24 February 2006 the court dismissed the interim application. 11.     On 11 April 2006 the court fixed a hearing date of 16 November 2006 for the main proceedings, a date which was later postponed by the court until 10   May 2007. 12.     Between 10 May 2007 and 30 January 2008 the court adjourned the hearing twice following requests to that effect by P.I.C. 13 .     On 30 January 2008 the court adjourned the hearing by mutual agreement between the parties and the case was listed for directions on 6   February 2008. On that date, the hearing was adjourned for unknown reasons and the case was listed for directions on 5 March 2008. 14.     In the meantime, on 27 February 2008 the applicant company filed an application to amend its defence and counterclaim and the application was listed for a hearing on 5 March 2008. On 12 March the court allowed the aforementioned application and ordered the applicant company to file the amended documents within fifteen days. On 21 March 2008 the applicant company filed its amended defence and counterclaim. On 23 April 2008 P.I.C. filed its reply and amended defence to the counterclaim. The case was listed for directions on 19 June 2008. On that date, the court scheduled the case to be heard on 11 and 12 November 2008. 15 .     On 11 November 2008 the applicant company applied for an adjournment to allow the parties to draw up a document containing the agreed facts. On the same date, P.I.C.’s lawyer informed the court that they would be unable to attend the hearing on 12 November 2008 and asked for it to be adjourned. The court allowed the parties’ requests, informing them that it would assign a relatively early date for the hearing considering the delays that had already occurred in the case up to that date. The court listed the case for directions on 3 December 2008. 16 .     On 3 December 2008 the applicant company asked for the case to be postponed owing to a bereavement. The court listed the case for directions on 7   January 2009. 17.     On 7 January 2009 the applicant company informed the court that it was ready to proceed with the trial. P.I.C. asked the court to schedule the case for a hearing. The court scheduled the case for a hearing on 10 April 2009 and listed the case for directions on 3 February 2009 to allow the parties, in the meantime, to examine the possibility of narrowing the issues in dispute. 18.     On 3 February 2009 the parties informed the court that there were no further undisputed facts. 19.     On 10 April 2009 P.I.C. applied for an adjournment. The applicant company’s lawyer expressed his disagreement, explaining that his client had been affected by the fact that the case had been adjourned multiple times by P.I.C. The court acknowledged the effect of the adjournments on the applicant company but, considering all the relevant factors, decided to allow the adjournment and scheduled the case for a hearing on 22 and 23 September 2009. 20.     On 22 September 2009 the first hearing took place. This was followed by hearings on 23 September 2009; 5 and 9 October 2009; 6 and 17   November 2009; 12, 14 and 18 January 2010; 23 February 2010; and 18   March and 14 June 2010. 21 .     The case was adjourned twice at the request of the applicant company, first from 23   October to 6 November 2009 and then from 12 to 18   March 2010. 22.     The case was also adjourned on two other occasions at P.I.C.’s request, first from 4 December 2009 to 12 January 2010 and then from 21   January to 3 February 2010. 23.     On 14 June 2010, when the hearing was concluded, the applicant company’s lawyer requested a three-week extension to file his final submissions. The court instructed the parties to do so by 17 September 2010. On that date, the applicant company’s lawyer requested a further extension. The court rescheduled the case for final submissions on 27 September 2010. 24.     On 27 September 2010 the parties filed their final submissions in writing and the court reserved judgment. 25.     On 6 December 2010 the court delivered its judgment and dismissed the case. Legal costs and expenses were awarded to the applicant company. Civil appeal no. 28/2011 before the Supreme Court 26.     On 17 January 2011 P.I.C. lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court, challenging the judgment of the Nicosia District Court. 27.     On 23 November 2011 the appeal was listed for directions and the Supreme Court instructed the parties to file the outline of their arguments. 28.     On 5 January and 16 February 2012 respectively P.I.C. and the applicant company filed the outline of their arguments. 29.     On 18 October 2016 the hearing of the appeal began and concluded on that date. The Supreme Court reserved judgment. 30 .     On 20 December 2017 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, allowing the appeal and reversing the Nicosia District Court’s judgment by two votes to one. The applicant company was ordered to pay 1,823,767 euros (EUR) in damages, plus legal costs and expenses. 31 .     On 9 January 2018 the Supreme Court’s judgment was amended to include statutory interest from 6 May 2004, the date on which civil action no.   4099/2004 was filed. It was calculated at EUR 1,350,000. 32.     The applicant company unsuccessfully challenged the imposition of that interest. Eventually, on 19 January, 21 March and 16 April 2018 respectively it paid the following amounts: EUR 1,823,767 to P.I.C. for the judgment debt, EUR 50,000 to P.I.C.’s lawyers in legal costs, and EUR   1,350,000 to P.I.C. corresponding to the interest due. PROCEEDINGS UNDER LAW 2(I)/2010 33 .     On 19 November 2018, relying on Law 2(I)/2010, the applicant company filed a civil action (no. 2/2018) against the Attorney General with the Supreme Court complaining about the overall length of the domestic proceedings (cases nos. 4099/2004 and 28/2011). It claimed, inter alia , that the first-instance proceedings had lasted approximately seventy-nine months, while the appeal proceedings had lasted eighty-three months. Given that the reasonable time for concluding the first-instance and appeal proceedings had been three years for each (thirty-six months), the applicant company claimed that the first-instance proceedings had been delayed by forty-three months, while the appeal proceedings had been delayed by forty-seven months. The applicant company claimed EUR 362,812.50 (corresponding to forty-three months out of one hundred and sixty-two) and EUR   396,562.50 (corresponding to forty-seven months out of one hundred and sixty-two) in respect of pecuniary damage for the statutory interest it had had to pay because of the delays in the first-instance and appeal proceedings. It also made a claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the alleged uncertainty it had suffered while the proceedings were pending. It claimed EUR   415,353 for the alleged delay in civil action no. 4099/2004 and EUR 800,551 for the alleged delay in appeal no. 28/2011. The applicant company further supported in its written pleadings, with reference to case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, that the Supreme Court should abstain from its established case-law (see paragraph   41 below) and examine the delays which occurred at the domestic proceedings as a whole. The applicant company challenged the Supreme Court’s approach and maintained that in the present case the Supreme Court had the possibility of taking into account the delay which occurred at first instance arguing that the pecuniary damage it had sustained had only materialised upon appeal. The applicant company specifically claimed that had the Supreme Court failed to consider the delay before the first instance court, it would be deprived of an effective remedy as required by Article   13 of the Convention, as the damage it had sustained had been caused due to the retroactive application of the legal interest from the day of the filing of civil claim no. 4099/2004. 34 .     On 15 July 2020 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment. First, it rejected as inadmissible the complaints concerning civil action no.   4099/2004, finding that a separate action should have been filed within a year from the delivery of the judgment of the first-instance court as, according to the court, Law 2(I)/2010 separated the examination of claims regarding the length of first-instance and appeal proceedings. As regards the separate stages of actions brought under Law 2(I)/2010, the court stated, inter alia , as follows: “As stated on appeal in Application no. 1/2018, Zia and others, 9.9.2019, in which a similar matter was examined: There are two ways of making a claim under the Law: (a) By filing a civil action , if the case has been concluded by a final judgment ( εάν η υπόθεση περατώθηκε με τελεσίδικη απόφαση ). This is true whether it is a final judgment of the District Court or a final judgment of the Supreme Court ( τελεσίδικη απόφαση Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου ). As we previously mentioned with reference to Kaoula v. The Attorney General, civil case no. 1/2017,4.7.2018 and previous case ‑ law, the term ‘final’ has the meaning of a final judgment without it being connected to the right of appeal ( ο όρος τελεσίδικη απόφαση έχει την έννοια της τελικής απόφασης χωρίς να συναρτάται με το δικαίωμα έφεσης ). In fact, if the claim falls under this provision of the Law, it should be raised within one year from the date of conclusion of the case by a final judgment . Similarly, the president of the District Court has jurisdiction to hear such claims ... when it is a concluded final judgment. If the claim concerns a concluded appeal, the jurisdiction [to hear the case] belongs to three members of the Supreme Court (with the specifications set out in the Law). (b) By filing an application. Claims concerning a non-concluded case, which precisely is not considered finalised (in the above sense of a final judgment), may be raised this way, it being noted that there is no deadline for such claims ... The structure and philosophy of the Law as it appears from a unified reading of the aforementioned sections, and in the light of the considerations in Dimitriou v.   Attorney-General of the Republic, application no. 2/13, 27.3.2014, cannot lead to any other reasonable interpretation, as suggested by the applicant’s lawyer. A clear distinction is made between the remedies and their conditions, on the one hand in a District Court or Supreme Court case, following a final judgment, in which only a civil action can be lodged, and on the other hand, in a case which has not been concluded as above, in which the action is filed in the form of an originating application, with a separate context always between the first-instance and the appellate jurisdiction. ...These are independent claims concerning compensation for delays [in] first ‑ instance and appeal [proceedings] and this is not related to the content of the first decision...As a result, the court can consider as relevant time and related claims or testimony, those that are included in time in the context of the appeal only ... In our opinion, the claim that the claimant was not aware of its damages after the conclusion of the proceedings, as raised by [its lawyer], is irrelevant. The law is clear and each party must proceed based on its existing data.” 35 .     As regards the applicant company’s claim concerning the length of the appeal proceedings, the court held as follows: “Considering the overall period from the filing of the appeal (17.1.2011) to the issuance of the decision (20.12.2017), almost [seven] years must be considered an unreasonable time. In the circumstances of this particular case, the appeal would have to be heard and a decision delivered within a period of up to three years. During the rest of the time, there was a breach. It is a not particularly complicated case, at least in its legal aspects, and the parties did not contribute with their actions or omissions to the delay. Despite the existence of a minority decision, the whole process could have been concluded within [three] years. We will agree with Mr. Demetriades that the research of the Council of Europe CEPEJ (European Judicial Systems – Efficiency and Quality of Justice CEPEJ STUDIES no.   26 of 2018) is indicative of the average length of civil proceedings. Table 5.8. [on] page 250 presents the time for completing civil and commercial cases at first instance [namely five hundred and thirteen days at first instance in 2010] and Table 5.17 [on] page 264 presents the time for completing civil and commercial cases on appeal [namely one thousand one hundred and ninety-four days in 2010 and three hundred and forty in 2012]. Mr. Demetriades is also correct in his observation that it is not entirely the responsibility of the judicial authorities but generally of the State, which ought to furnish the judicial authorities with the means for the short adjudication of cases. It is not necessary to enter into statistics and numbers of pending appeals. The volume of cases is well known, and counsel sets out the facts correctly. ...On the basis of the above, the appeal was heard in breach of the reasonable time [requirement] by approximately [four] years and the claimant is entitled to general damages in this respect. We certainly have no doubt that the claimant as a company may be the victim of a violation of an individual right, in this case the [right to a hearing within a] reasonable time. ...” 36 .     As regards the applicant company’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage, the court held: “...The [applicant company’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage] ignores the fact that since the [applicant company] was not liable for the above amount on account of the first-instance decision, legally owed nothing and had therefore been in a position to possess the aforementioned amount of interest for its own benefit or accrue interest on it by way of deposits or otherwise. This amount cannot therefore be recovered as actual damages. The issue should be given a more rational approach than that proposed by the [applicant company]. The appeal was registered on 17.1.2011 and had the appeal decision been delivered in January 2014, the [applicant company] could not have maintained any complaint regarding the appeal process. But what was the consequence of the fact that the judgment on appeal was not delivered in January 2014, but three years and eleven months later, on 20.12.2017? The appeal judgment, regardless of when it was delivered, would have had the same content, namely the award against the [applicant company] of the amount of EUR 1,823,767 plus statutory interest from 6.5.2004 when the action was registered. The result of the delay complained of by the [applicant company] was that instead of being asked to pay the amount plus interest in January 2014, it was asked to pay it in December 2017.   On the one hand, [the applicant company] received extra time of [forty-seven] months, but on the other hand, [it] was charged statutory interest on the amount of EUR 1,823,767 for a period of [forty-seven] months, from January 2014 to December 2017. [The applicant company] calculated this amount as EUR 396,562.50, which we accept as correct. In order to determine [the applicant company’s] pecuniary loss, the extra time [it] received as a benefit should be quantified in money and deducted from the amount of EUR 396,562.50, to determine whether there is a remaining balance. No such testimony has been offered and therefore no pecuniary loss has been demonstrated.” 37 .     Lastly, in making the assessment for its award for damages, the court considered that the above issue should be considered in the framework of general damages, not strictly pecuniary damage, for the overall inconvenience caused while waiting for a decision. The court agreed that the uncertainty as to the debt constituted an element that should be taken into account, especially bearing in mind the level of the amounts and the nature of the applicant company’s activities as an insurance company. Guided by the principles of the Court in Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal ([GC], no.   35382/97, §   29, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV) and making an overall assessment, the Supreme Court awarded the applicant company EUR 5,000 plus interest from the date on which the claim was filed, as well as costs. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Domestic law and practice The Courts of Justice Law (Law no. 14/1960, as amended) 38.     Section 33(2) currently provides as follows: Section 33 - Interest on debts ... and decisions “(1)     ... (2)     Each decision, including the part thereof relating to legal costs, unless otherwise provided for in subsection (1), shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (4), bear interest at 5.5% per annum from the date of registration of the civil action, or with respect to pending civil actions, from the date of entry into force of the Courts (Amendment) (No. 2) Law of 2008, until final repayment of the debt: It is understood that the court may, when appropriate, award interest: (a)     in the full amount awarded in the decision, for only part of the period between the date of registration of the civil action and the date of the decision, or (b)     in respect of only part of the amount awarded in the decision, for all or only part of the period between the date of registration of the civil action and the date of the decision: ...” 39.     The Courts (Amendment) (No. 2) Law of 2008, mentioned in section   33 above, changed the statutory interest rate from 8% to 5.5% per annum. Law on Effective Remedies for Violations of the Right to a Determination of Civil Rights and Obligations within a Reasonable Time (Law 2(I)/2010) 40 .     The relevant provisions of Law 2(I)/2010 are set out in detail in Panayi v. Cyprus ((dec.), no. 46370/09, 23 September 2010). For the purposes of the present case, the following sections are set out: Preamble “Whereas Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 30 §   2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provide for the right to a determination of civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time, And whereas in a number of individual cases against Cyprus the European Court of Human Rights found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on the grounds that the civil rights and obligations of the applicants in civil cases and appeals had not been determined by the Cypriot courts within a reasonable time as required by the above ‑ mentioned Article and also found a violation of Article 13 on the grounds that there were no effective remedies in the Republic as required by Article 13 regarding the applicants’ allegations of a violation of the requirement under Article 6 § 1, And whereas the Republic’s obligation under Article 46 of the Convention to comply with the aforementioned judgments of the European Court of Human Rights is under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and requires the adoption of measures preventing future violations such as those found by the Court in the above-mentioned individual applications, And whereas a number of individual cases against the Republic are pending before the European Court of Human Rights for violations of Article 6 § 1 and [Article] 13 of the Convention regarding determination of the applicants’ civil rights and obligations in civil cases and appeals, And whereas the Republic is bound by Article 1 of the Convention to secure the rights of the Convention, including the right to effective domestic remedies for a violation of the right to a determination of civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time ...” Section 4 - Actionable right “The right to a determination of civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time in a case to which this Law applies is actionable,   and anyone who alleges   that he or she is   a victim of a violation of that right may have recourse to the court   with jurisdiction   by way of an action against the Republic, by virtue of this Law,   seeking the remedies for the violation provided for in this Law.” Section 5 – Bringing an action for violation of the right “(1)   An action under section 4 may be brought for violation of the right in a case concluded by a final court judgment concerning a violation of the right at any stage of the case,   including that of the execution of a court judgment, irrespective of whether responsibility for the violation at the execution stage rests on the judicial or any other authorities of the Republic. The action shall be brought within one year of the date of conclusion of the case by a final court judgment or the date of execution, as the case may be, unless the court considers that, in the circumstances of the case, it was not reasonably possible to bring the action within the above period ...” Section 6 - Court with jurisdiction to examine an action for violation of the right “(1)     Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the court with jurisdiction under this Law to examine and determine an action under sections 4 and 5 for a violation of the right to a determination of civil rights or obligations within a reasonable time in cases concluded by a final judgment are: (a)     in relation to district court cases, the administrative president of any district court who,   in a   case in which,   according to the action,   the claimant’s right to determination of his civil rights or obligations within a reasonable time   has been   violated, did not   exercise duties in the court in which the case was pending and did not participate at any stage of its examination, or if there is no administrative president who did not exercise duties in the court in which the case was pending and did not participate at any stage of its examination, the immediately senior president of the district court or any other judge satisfying the above   whom the Supreme Court may wish to   designate. (b)     in relation to Supreme Court cases, [any] three judges of the Supreme Court [whom it] may wish to designate. (2)     The judgment of the   court with jurisdiction   under subsection (1)(b) is final and not subject to appeal.” Section 7 - Right to an examination of allegations of a violation of right in pending cases “(1)     Without prejudice to the right to bring an action under sections 4 and 5, a person who is a party to a pending case to which this Law applies has the right, at any stage of the proceedings whilst the case is pending, to have recourse to the legal remedies provided under subsection (2) in relation to the claim that his right to determination of his civil rights or obligations within a reasonable time has been violated. (2)     For the purposes of subsection (1), a party who alleges that there has been a violation of his right to determination   of his civil rights or obligations within a reasonable time in a pending district court or Supreme Court case   may, at any stage of those proceedings, have recourse by   bringing an originating   application against the Republic in the court   with jurisdiction   under section 8 for examination of the claim and the provision of remedies for the violation provided for in this Law, and for ... a decision on these matters. ... (4)     No proceedings in a pending case shall be suspended or postponed because of an application made under this section   or pending the conclusion of its examination. ...” Section 8 - Court with jurisdiction to examine an issue of violation of the right in a pending case “(1)     Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the court with jurisdiction to examine and determine a claim and to grant remedies in an   originating   application under section 7 is: (a)     in relation to a district court case pending at that stage before a district court, the administrative president of any district court who did   not   exercise duties at the court in which the case was pending and   did not participate   at   any stage of its examination, or if there is no administrative president who did not exercise duties in the court in question and did not participate   at any stage of its examination, the immediately senior president of the district court or any other judge satisfying the above [whom] the Supreme Court may wish to   designate. (b)     in relation to a district court case pending at that stage before the Supreme Court or to a Supreme Court case pending before that court at any stage, [any] three judges of the Supreme Court [whom it] may wish to   designate; [It shall be understood] that by virtue of this [subsection], [only] judges of the Supreme Court who did not participate at any stage of the case   shall be appointed. (2)     The judgment of the   court with jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b) is final and not subject to appeal.” Section 9 - Delivery of judgments “In an action under sections 4 and 5 and in an   originating   application under sections   7 and 8, the court   with jurisdiction   shall give judgment at the conclusion of the examination of the action or the application, as the case may be, or   in the event that it reserves judgment, shall deliver it without delay.” Section 11 – Factors taken into account “The court, in deciding whether the right of the claimant or applicant to determination within a reasonable time of his civil rights or obligations in an action under sections 4 and 5 and in an originating application under sections 7 and 8 has been violated, shall take into account: ... (g)     any other factors taken into account by the European Court of Human Rights as relevant to the matter in issue as they arise from its relevant case-law on the subject.” Section 12 - Remedies in actions and originating applications for violation of the right “Where in an action under sections 4 and 5 or in an application under sections 7 and   8 the court considers that the right of the claimant or applicant to a determination of his civil rights or obligations within a reasonable time has been violated,   the claimant or applicant is entitled to: (a)     compensation for any pecuniary damage,   loss, costs and expenses proven to have been sustained as a result of the violation; (b)     compensation for non-pecuniary damage or injury suffered as a result of the violation; (c)     to legal costs proven to have been incurred as a result of the violation. (2)     In order to ascertain the damage sustained as a result of the violation as set forth in subsection (1) and assess and award the compensation under subsection (1),   the court shall take into account the criteria and factors taken into account for this purpose by the European Court of Human Rights as can be determined from its case-law in similar cases of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the amounts of compensation awarded by [it] in similar cases.” Section 14 - Directions by the Supreme Court to expedite proceedings in pending cases in which a violation of the right has been found “(1)     Where in an application under sections 7 and 8 the court decides, pursuant to this Law, that there has been a violation in a pending case of the applicant’s right to determination of his civil rights or obligations within a reasonable time, [it] shall immediately refer its judgment to the Supreme Court. (2)     If the case in respect of which the competent court delivered its judgment and referred it to the Supreme Court under subsection (1)   is still pending,   the Supreme Court shall issue such directions as it considers necessary under the circumstances to expedite the procedure in the pending case in order to prevent any continued delay or further delays   and avoid the possibility of a continued violation or further violations of the rights of any party in the pending case; [It shall be understood] that no judge or judges of the Supreme Court who participated at any stage of the examination of the pending case shall participate in the issuing of directions. (3)     Directions under subsection (1) may include, amongst other things: (a)     the immediate setting down   of the pending case for directions before the court   or for trial (b)     the filing of pleadings which have not yet   have   been filed   within the   deadlines specified in the directions, (c)     the preparation of minutes; (d)     the approval of any costs awarded; (e)     the hearing of the case or any interim applications as a priority; (f)     the processing of any interim application procedures or of other interim procedures as a priority, (g)     the delivery of a reserved judgment in the case or in an interim application, (h)     the processing, as a   priority, of the procedures for execution of a judgment given in the case by the judicial authorities, to the extent that those authorities are involved. (4)     Directions under subsection (3) are given to expedite the procedure in a pending case irrespective of whether the relevant referred judgment has been given in accordance with [section 8(1)(a)],   and/or   has been appealed against by the Attorney General.” Relevant domestic case-law concerning Law 2(I)/2010 Supreme Court decisions 41 .     The first judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in relation to the application of Law 2(I)/2010 was the case of Dimitriou v. the Attorney General (no. 2/2013, 27 March 2014). The claimant filed an originating application ( πρωτογενή αίτηση ) under Law 2(I)/2010 with the Supreme Court complaining of delays in his civil action before the Nicosia District Court and in the then pending appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that his application would only be examined in relation to the alleged delay in the pending appeal proceedings. According to the court, Law   2(1)/2010 made a clear distinction between district court cases and cases before appellate courts or the Supreme Court in general. The Supreme Court held, inter alia , as follows: “In cases where the proceedings were concluded by a final judgment, a civil action can be filed under sections 4 and 5 of the Law. It seems that in the Law there is a separate jurisdiction for this kind of action. Section 6(1)(a) states that in relation to district court cases, the competent court to hear the action is the administrative president (or most senior president of the district court). On the other hand, section 6(1)(b) states that in relation to cases before the Supreme Court, the competent court to hear the action is a court composed of three Supreme Court judges. Section 5 concerns actions that have been concluded by final judgments ... However, nowhere in the law is there a clear and explicit provision that the pending proceedings also concern an action filed with the district court for which an appeal is pending. The Law does not provide that the determination of civil rights concerns the entire [district court and appeal] proceedings.” As to the merits, the Supreme Court held that four years had lapsed since the commencement of the appeal proceedings, which were still pending. In this connection, the court found a violation of the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time and awarded the claimant EUR 1,500 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. At the same time, it forwarded the judgment to the registry of the Supreme Court to bring the judgment to the attention of the Supreme Court in accordance with section 14(2) of Law 2(I)/2010. 42 .     In civil action Kaoullas and Kaoullas v. Attorney General (no. 1/2017, 4   July 2018), the claimants filed an action with the Supreme Court under Law 2(I)/2010 complaining of a delay in civil appeal no. 77/12, which they later withdrew. The Supreme Court examined whether the withdrawal of the appeal could be held to mean that the appeal had “been concluded with a final court judgment” as required by section 5 of Law 2(I)/2010. In determining the meaning of “final court judgment”, the Supreme Court referred to an extract from the judgment of Huntly (Marchioness) v. Gaskell [1905] 2 Ch. (CA) 656, 667 of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, which stated: “When the word ‘final’ is used as I think it is in some authorities with reference to judgments, that does not mean, I apprehend, a judgment which is not open to appeal, but merely ‘final’ as opposed to ‘interlocutory’. A judgment is, in my opinion, not the less estopped between the parties to the action because it may be reversed on appeal to the House of Lords.” As a result, the Supreme Court held that the withdrawal and dismissal of the appeal could not mean that there was a “final court judgment” in which a civil right or obligation had been determined, given that the withdrawal of the appeal had brought the proceedings to an end without determination. The Supreme Court dismissed the claimants’ claim on the grounds that they had no actionable right under the law. 43 .     In Zia v. The Attorney General (application no. 1/2018, 9 September 2019), the claimant filed an originating application complaining about the length of pending appeal proceedings and of a delay in the concluded first ‑ instance proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the claim concerning the delay at first instance and only examined the claim concerning the delay in the determination of the pending appeal proceedings (see the Supreme Court’s reasoning in paragraph 34 above). The court considered that there had been an unjustifiably long period of inactivity while the appeal had been pending and awarded the claimant EUR 2,500 for non-pecuniary damage. It also forwarded the judgment to the registry of the Supreme Court to bring the judgment to the attention of the Supreme Court in accordance with section   14(2) of Law 2(I)/2010. 44.     In Maria Prokopiou v. Attorney General (civil appeal no.   364/2010, 2   December 2015), the Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s finding that there had been no violation of the appellant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention given that she had contributed to the delay. 45.     In Marios Eliades and Others v. Attorney General (civil action no.   1/2014, 31 May 2016), the claimants filed an action under Law 2(I)/2010 alleging that there had been a delay in the determination of appeal no. 319/08. The Supreme Court held that there had been no delay in the determination of the civil appeal, having regard to the complexity of the case and the claimants’ conduct. 46.     In M.D. Cyprus Soya Ltd v. Attorney General (civil action no. 1/2018, 25   February 2019), the Supreme Court held that there had been a delay in the determination of a review appeal that had been pending for three and a half years, and that this delay was not attributable to the claimant. It awarded the claimant EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. District court decisions 47.     In Parisinou and Others v. Attorney General (application no.   379/2014), the claimants relied on Law 2(I)/2010 in relation to the non ‑ execution of a court order within a reasonable time for approximately two years. Each claimant was awarded EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damage, plus EUR   750 jointly for costs and expenses. 48 .     In C.S.G. Neokleous Brothers v. Attorney General (originating application no. 264/2018, 19 March 2019), the claimants invoked Law   2(I)/2010 in relation to the excessive length of pending proceedings. They were awarded EUR 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and the court ordered the registrar to forward the judgment to the registry of the Supreme Court in accordance with section 14(1) of Law 2(I)/2010. 49 .     In Prime Insurance Company Ltd v. Attorney General (civil action no.   5497/13, 27 October 2021), the claimant claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage and pecuniary damage for a breach of its right to a fair trial within a reasonable time. As regards pecuniary damage, it claimed EUR   12,965 plus the VAT it had had to pay in legal expenses owing to the re-hearing of the civil proceedings, as well as EUR 20,000 for the interest it had had to pay because of the re-trial and the delay in its conclusion. The relevant district court awarded the claimant EUR 2,500 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage, plus EUR 12,965 plus VAT for pecuniary damage. The court dismissed the claimant’s claim for EUR 20,000 on the grounds that it had not provided any evidence concerning the alleged claim. Lastly, the court noted: “I could not fail to notice with sadness as a conclusion, that while this civil action is based on the breach of the right to the determination of civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time, the civil action was concluded in over eight years, namely more than the time for the civil proceedings which constitute the basis [of the claim]. It was filed on 28.8.2013 and a judgment was delivered on 27.10.2021. There is more than an imperative need to resolve the issue of delays in the hearing of cases and I agree with the reference in the case of Altius (above) that the State must furnish the judiciary with the means for a speedy hearing of cases.” Other relevant material Report on the Supreme Court - On the operational needs of the courts and other related issues (Erotocritou Report 2016) 50.     A committee appointed by the Supreme Court and chaired by Judge George Erotocritou issued a report in June 2016 on the operational needs of the courts in Cyprus and related matters highlighting gaps and problems encountered in the administration of justice, identifying the various needs of the courts and making recommendations. Similar reports had been issued in 1989 and 2012 respectively by Supreme Court Judges Pikis and Kramvis, documenting problems in the courts system in Cyprus. 51.     The 2016 report highlighted, among other issues, that one of the biggest problems facing the courts in Cyprus were delays. Borrowing from the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard report issued by the European Commission, the report noted, inter alia, that: “Despite the points made in the Pikis (1989) and Kramvis (2012) Reports, most recommendations unfortunately did not materialize, for various reasons, with the tragic result that Cyprus is now amongst the member states at the bottom of the list in the European Commission’s Report ‘The 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard’ with regard to the efficiency of justice. We note that the ‘Scoreboard’ is considered the most reliable indicator in Europe regarding the effectiveness of the judicial system and the administration of justice in each Member State of the EU. Below are several indicators of the Report which show the current tragic situation of the judicial system in Cyprus. For example, Cyprus holds the last position regarding the time needed for case determination ...” 52 .     As regards cases before the Supreme Court, the report noted, in so far as relevant, as follows: “...But in view of the rapid increase in the number of appeals, these limited reforms have proved insufficient to p