CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 21 novembre 2023

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border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.4pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s39365D7A { height:29.55pt } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .fixListIndent { list-style-position: inside }     FIRST SECTION DECISION This version was rectified on 15 January 2024 under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.   Application no. 25240/20 Alvina GYULUMYAN and Others against Armenia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 21   November 2023 as a Chamber composed of:   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer , President ,   Arnfinn Bårdsen,   Alena Poláčková,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Jovan Ilievski,   Péter Paczolay , judges ,   Anna Margaryan , ad hoc judge , and Renata Degener, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged by four Armenian nationals (collectively “the applicants”) listed in the appendix, Ms Alvina Gyulumyan (“the first applicant”), Mr Hrant Nazaryan (“the second applicant”), Mr   Feliks   Tokhyan (“the third applicant”) and Mr Hrayr Tovmasyan (“the fourth applicant”), on 26   June 2020, Having regard to the observations submitted by the parties, Having regard to the decision of the President of the Chamber to appoint Anna Margaryan to sit as an ad hoc judge from a list submitted in advance by the Government (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court), Mr   Armen Harutyunyan, the judge elected in respect of Armenia, having withdrawn from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3). Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicants were born in 1956, 1959, 1956 and 1970, respectively. They were represented by Ms S. Sahakyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan. 2.     The Armenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters. 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4 .     In 1996 the first and the second applicant, and in 1997 the third applicant, were appointed as members of the Constitutional Court with life tenure, i.e., until their retirement. At that time, the retirement age for members of that court was seventy (see paragraph 29 below). 5.     In 2003 the first applicant’s term of office was terminated at her request. In 2014, after eleven years of service as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights, she was reappointed as a member of the Constitutional Court with life tenure. At that time, the retirement age for members of that court was sixty-five (see paragraph 30 below). 6 .     Significant changes were made to the appointment procedure, the appointing authorities and the term of office of judges [1] of the Constitutional Court in 2015 (see paragraph 31 below). The new rules entered into force on 9 April 2018. 7 .     In the meantime, on 2 March 2018, the fourth applicant, who had earlier been a Member of Parliament of the then-ruling party (until 16 February 2018) and the Minister of Justice (until 30 April 2014) was appointed as a member of the Constitutional Court with life tenure; the retirement age applicable to him was sixty-five, as in the case of the first applicant. G.H. The then President of the Constitutional Court, was entitled to remain in office until his retirement on 23 March 2018, but shortly before his retirement he was appointed as a member of the Supreme Judicial Council by the National Assembly and he thus resigned from his position as President of that court. On 21 March 2018 the National Assembly appointed the fourth applicant as President of the Constitutional Court with life tenure – that is, until his retirement in 2035 – at its last ordinary sitting before the entry into force of the new rules, which took place on 20-21 March 2018. 8.     In April and May 2018 large anti-government demonstrations, referred to in Armenia as the “Velvet Revolution”, took place. The “Velvet Revolution” led to a peaceful overturn of the previous government and the appointment of the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan as Prime Minister. It culminated in a landslide victory for the My Step alliance in parliamentary elections held in December 2018. The My Step alliance, supporting Nikol   Pashinyan, obtained 88 out of 132 seats in the National Assembly (which is a constitutional majority), while the former governing Republican Party did not receive any seats. One of the priorities of the new government was to combat an endemic corrupt system and to bring about judicial reform [2] . In the beginning, their intention was to introduce extraordinary vetting procedures to verify the suitability of current judges for continuing their judicial functions. However, after a process of dialogue within Armenian society and with its international partners, that idea was abandoned. 9 .     On 13 September 2018 Arman Dilanyan was appointed as a Constitutional Court judge for a twelve-year non-renewable term in accordance with the new rules (see paragraph 31 below). 10 .     On 19 May 2019, following a court decision to release former President Kocharyan [3] on bail, the Prime Minister of Armenia strongly criticised the courts, asked his supporters to block court-houses and called for a renewal of the judiciary [4] . Reportedly around 150 protesters gathered in front of the Constitutional Court on that day. It also appears from footage provided by the applicants, the authenticity of which was not contested by the Government, that on 5 June 2019 the first applicant had to be escorted out of the court’s building by police officers because of the presence of a small group of protesters. 11.     Soon afterwards, almost all the members of the Supreme Judicial Council who had been appointed before the “Velvet Revolution” resigned. 12 .     On 18 June 2019 Vahe Grigoryan was appointed as a Constitutional Court judge for a twelve-year non-renewable term in accordance with the new procedure. He disputed the powers of all the court’s judges who had been appointed before 9 April 2018, the date on which the 2015 amendments entered into force (see paragraph 31 below) [5] . Shortly thereafter, the Venice Commission decided to ask the President of Armenia to follow the situation with respect to the Constitutional Court closely, with a view to making a public statement if appropriate. The relevant part of the report of the 119th Plenary Session of the Venice Commission read as follows: “The Commission was ... informed that a newly elected judge of the Constitutional Court had questioned the legitimacy of 7 of the 9 judges of the Court, who had been elected prior to the entry into force of the 2015 constitutional amendments. His main argument was that, according to the previous text of the Constitution, they had been elected as members of the Constitutional Court, while the new text referred to judges of the Constitutional Court. Article 213 of the revised Constitution, however, provided clearly and unambiguously that the chairman and members of the Constitutional Court appointed prior to the entry into force of the amendments shall continue to serve until the end of their term of office prescribed by the Constitution amended in 2005. It was disturbing that this statement by the judge had been applauded in parliament and there might be a risk of interference with the mandates of the sitting judges.” [6] 13 .     On 28 June 2019 Judge Vahe Grigoryan (see paragraph 12 above), in a letter to the authorities, repeated his claim that the Constitutional Court was undergoing a crisis, while acknowledging his personal respect for all of its judges. He stated in particular: “In what follows, the aim in indicating names is to ensure the accuracy of the facts, rather than to focus on individual people, in respect of whom I have no attitude other than personal respect”, and further: “Not having the least doubt of the professional integrity and honesty of the members of the Constitutional Court, as well as their high personal qualities ...”. 14 .     On 17 July 2019 the Prime Minister of Armenia said, in an interview with a journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, that the Constitutional Court was one of the most discredited institutions in Armenia because from 1996 onwards it had legitimised all election fraud, that there was a crisis of trust towards it, and that it had been decided to have a new such court. He added: “In 2019, Armenia must have a Constitutional Court for 2019. This is a political issue. No one should doubt that this issue must be solved”. 15 .     On 6 September 2019 the Armenian authorities asked the Venice Commission to prepare an opinion on a judicial reform package proposed by the government, which envisaged, inter alia , a voluntary early retirement scheme for a certain category of Constitutional Court judges (that is, those who had been appointed with life tenure in accordance with the old procedure, such as the present applicants). 16 .     On 4 October 2019 the National Assembly decided to apply to the Constitutional Court requesting that it terminate the fourth applicant’s term of office on the grounds set out in Article 164 § 9 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 33-34 below). On 14 October 2019 the Constitutional Court declared that request inadmissible. 17.     On 14 October 2019 the Venice Commission published its Opinion on the early retirement scheme mentioned in paragraph 15 above [7] . It concluded that, in principle, provided that such a scheme remained strictly voluntary and did not hamper the effective functioning of the Constitutional Court, there were no standards that would lead the Venice Commission to oppose it. The relevant part of the Opinion is reproduced in paragraph 54 below. 18.     On 29 October 2019 the President of the Venice Commission issued the following statement: “I have been closely following the situation in Armenia for several months already. I am very preoccupied about the open conflict between on the one side the Government and Parliament and on the other side the Constitutional Court. The quick succession and mediatisation of recent events do not contribute to a serene settlement of the problems. In a Democracy, the parliament is the depositary of popular sovereignty and thus enjoys the highest democratic legitimacy. The constitutional court is a safeguard institution, entrusted with upholding constitutional values. In a democratic country, all State institutions and office holders have to respect their own prerogatives, obligations and competences and acknowledge and respect those of the other institutions. They have to exercise appropriate institutional restraint, observe the relevant procedures in good faith and display respect for each other. If this is not done, if there lacks democratic culture and maturity, the functioning of the state institutions is compromised and the democratic, civil and economic progress of the society is jeopardised. I call on all sides to exercise restraint, mutual respect and constructive institutional co-operation in order to de-escalate this worrying situation and re-establish the normal operation of the constitution of Armenia.” 19 .     Following a four-month criminal investigation, on 27 December 2019 the fourth applicant was charged with abuse of office during his time as Minister of Justice. He was alleged to have compelled several notaries and the Notarial Chamber to rent premises belonging to him at inflated prices. His father and daughters were interviewed by law-enforcement authorities in the context of that case. It appears that that case is pending before the relevant court. It further appears that a case against the former Parliament Speaker and one of his former senior aides, concerning the appointment of the fourth applicant as President of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 7 above), is also currently pending before the relevant court. They are alleged to have accepted and announced the resignation of Judge G.H. before receiving the appropriate letter from him, and to have then backdated the letter to enable the fourth applicant to be appointed with life tenure shortly before the entry into force of the new rules. They have been charged with abuse of office and forgery. 20 .     On 27 December 2019 those judges of the Constitutional Court who had been appointed with life tenure in accordance with the old procedure, including the present applicants, were offered early retirement with benefits such as a pension in the amount of their salaries. 21.     On 3 February 2020 the President of the Venice Commission issued another statement concerning the Constitutional Court: “Following my statement of 29 October 2019, I remain preoccupied about the open conflict involving the Constitutional Court of Armenia. I share the concerns of the rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in this respect. I would like to recall the recommendations made in the opinion of the Venice Commission adopted in October 2019 that any early retirement scheme at the Constitutional Court has to remain truly voluntary, exclude any undue political or personal pressure on the judges concerned and must be designed not to influence the outcome of pending cases. Recent public statements and acts do not meet these criteria and will not be conducive to deescalating the situation. Democratic culture and maturity require institutional restraint, good faith and mutual respect between State institutions. I call again on all sides to exercise restraint and to de-escalate this worrying situation in order to ensure the normal operation of the constitution of Armenia.” 22.     On 6 February 2020 the parliamentary majority proposed that the term of office of all seven Constitutional Court judges who had been appointed prior to 9 April 2018 – the date of entry into force of the 2015 constitutional amendments – be terminated. A referendum was planned for 5 April 2020, but that proposal was eventually abandoned. 23.     The deadline for accepting the offer of early retirement (see paragraph   20 above) expired on 27 February 2020. None of the judges accepted that offer. 24.     In May 2020 the government invited the Venice Commission to give an opinion on draft constitutional amendments proposing, inter alia , that the terms of office of those judges of the Constitutional Court who had already served a total of twelve years be terminated, and that all other judges, even if they had been appointed prior to 9 April 2018, continue to serve until the completion of a twelve-year term. It was further proposed that the term of office of the President of the Constitutional Court be terminated, but as his twelve-year term was not up, that he continue to sit as a judge of that court. 25 .     On 22 June 2020 the Venice Commission published its Opinion on the matter [8] . The relevant part of the Opinion is reproduced in paragraph 55 below. In brief, it recognised that the aim of fully implementing the provisions of the Constitution of 2015 regarding the composition of the Constitutional Court was legitimate. To reconcile this aim with the need to preserve the judges’ security of tenure and their independence, the Venice Commission recommended that judges who had not yet completed a twelve-year term of office should be able to stay in office until the completion of that term, and that judges who had already served a twelve-year term should be able to benefit, before being replaced, from a new transitional period whose length should be determined by the Armenian authorities. The Venice Commission regretted that amendments which did not provide for such a transitional period had nevertheless been tabled in the National Assembly on 19 June 2020, the day of the adoption of the Opinion. 26 .     On the same day, the National Assembly adopted those amendments (see paragraph 32 below). Pursuant to section 86 of the Constitutional Act on the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly (see paragraph 40 below), a draft National Assembly resolution on applying to the Constitutional Court was put to a vote and rejected. It transpires from the parliamentary debate that one of the main reasons for rejecting the proposal to seek a prior constitutional review was the fact that seven out of nine judges of the Constitutional Court had a conflict of interest. During the debates, the rapporteur and the then Acting Minister of Justice referred also to a recent statement by the representatives of the Constitutional Court that the scope of a review by that court could cover the entire Constitution (see the Opinion of the Venice Commission cited in paragraph 55 below, § 69), notwithstanding the fact that such review had recently been limited to a control of conformity with unamendable provisions of the Constitution (see paragraph 40 below). They further added that the Constitutional Court should not be permitted to prevent the National Assembly from adopting the constitutional amendments in question, since the people clearly wanted an independent judiciary. Given that section 86 of the Constitutional Act on the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly was silent as to how to proceed when a draft National Assembly resolution on applying to the Constitutional Court was rejected, the Chairperson of the National Assembly concluded that it was, strictly speaking, not forbidden to adopt the amendments in question, on their second reading, without a prior review by that court [9] [10] . On 29 April 2021 the Constitutional Court held that the National Assembly had not acted contrary to the Constitution when it had decided not to seek a prior review (see paragraph 39 below). 27 .     The amendments entered into force on 26 June 2020. As a result, the terms of office of the first, second and third applicants, who had already served more than thirteen, twenty-four and twenty-two years respectively, were terminated. The term of office of the fourth applicant as President of the Constitutional Court was also terminated, but he remained in office as a judge of that court. 28.     On 15 September 2020 three new judges of the Constitutional Court and in 2022 two new judges of the Constitutional Court were appointed for a twelve-year non-renewable term in accordance with the new procedure. On 12 October 2020 Arman Dilanyan was elected by his peers as the President of the Constitutional Court for a six-year non-renewable term. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE          DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE    As regards the judges and the President of the Constitutional Court 29 .     The Constitution, adopted in 1995, stipulated that five members of the Constitutional Court were to be appointed by the National Assembly and four members by the President of the Republic. The President of the Constitutional Court was to be appointed by the National Assembly from among the members of that court. Members and the President of the Constitutional Court were to be appointed with life tenure, i.e. until their retirement at the age of seventy (see Article 96 of the Constitution). As to the termination of office of members of the Constitutional Court, the rules were in substance the same as today (see Article 164 §§ 8 and 9 of the Constitution cited in paragraph 33 below). 30 .     The Constitution was amended in 2005. The appointment procedure for members and the President of the Constitutional Court was generally maintained (as to the appointment procedure for the President, see Article 83 § 2 of the Constitution). At the same time, the retirement age was reduced from seventy to sixty-five, by an amendment to Article 96 of the Constitution. The new rule did not apply to the incumbent members, who were to continue to hold office until attaining the age of seventy (Article 117 § 13 of the Constitution). As to the termination of office of members of the Constitutional Court, the rules were in substance the same as today (see Article 164 §§ 8 and 9 of the Constitution cited in paragraph 33 below). 31 .     Significant changes were made to the appointment procedure and the term of office of judges of the Constitutional Court in 2015. According to Article 166 § 1 of the Constitution, judges of the Constitutional Court are now to be “elected” (“ ընտրվում են ”) [11] by the National Assembly for a non-renewable term of twelve years, by at least three-fifths of votes of the total number of deputies. Three judges are to be “elected” on the recommendation of the President of the Republic, three judges on the recommendation of the Government, and three judges on the recommendation of the General Assembly of Judges. The General Assembly of Judges may nominate only judges. A six-year non ‑ renewable term of office was established for the President of the Constitutional Court, who is to be “elected” by his or her peers. The new rules entered into force on 9 April 2018. 32 .     Article 213 of the Constitution initially provided that the old rules would continue to apply to the judges and the President of the Constitutional Court who were appointed before 9 April 2018, as was the case of the present applicants. That provision was amended on 22 June and entered into force on 26 June 2020, immediately terminating the term of office of judges of the Constitutional Court who were appointed before 9 April 2018 and who had served for an overall term of at least twelve years. Other judges of the court appointed before 9 April 2018 were to remain in office until the expiry of a twelve-year term. The term of office of the President of the Constitutional Court was also immediately terminated, and a new President was to be elected by his or her peers for a six-year non-renewable term, pursuant to the new procedure. The old and the current versions of that provision read as follows: Article 213 of the Constitution (in force from 9 April 2018 until 26 June 2020) “The President and members of the Constitutional Court appointed prior to the entry into force of Chapter 7 of the Constitution shall continue holding office until the expiry of the term of their powers specified in the Constitution with the amendments of 2005. After the entry into force of Chapter 7 of the Constitution, the nominations for vacant positions of judges of the Constitutional Court shall be made successively by the President of the Republic, the General Assembly of Judges, and the Government.” Article 213 of the Constitution (in force since 26 June 2020) “1. The powers of a member or a judge of the Constitutional Court, appointed prior to the entry into force of Chapter 7 of the Constitution and having served as a member (a judge) of the Constitutional Court for an overall term of not less than twelve years, shall be considered terminated and his or her tenure shall cease. 2. A member of the Constitutional Court appointed prior to the entry into force of Chapter 7 of the Constitution, whose tenure does not cease under paragraph 1 of this Article, shall remain in office as a judge of the Constitutional Court until the expiry of his twelve-year service, taking into account the period of his or her term of office before and after the entry into force of Chapter 7 of the Constitution. 3. After the entry into force of Chapter 7 of the Constitution, nominations for vacant positions of judges of the Constitutional Court shall be made successively by the Government, the President of the Republic and the General Assembly of Judges. Nominations for the vacant posts of a judge of the Constitutional Court, arising on the basis of paragraph 1 of this Article, shall be made within two months after the position becomes vacant. 4. The term of office of the President of the Constitutional Court shall cease. After the post of the President of the Constitutional Court becomes vacant, the new President of the Constitutional Court shall be elected pursuant to the procedure set under Article 166 of the Constitution, after filling the vacancies for Constitutional Court judges which arose under paragraph 1 of this Article.” 33 .     Article 164 of the Constitution regulates the status of the judges of the Constitutional Court and the other courts. It reads as follows: “1.   When administering justice, a judge shall be independent, impartial and act only in accordance with the Constitution and laws. 2.   A judge may not be held liable for opinions expressed or judicial acts carried out during the administration of justice, except where elements of a crime or disciplinary offence are present. 3.   Criminal prosecution of a judge of the Constitutional Court with respect to the exercise of his or her powers may be initiated only with the consent of the Constitutional Court. A judge of the Constitutional Court may not be deprived of liberty, with respect to the exercise of his or her powers, without the consent of the Constitutional Court, except where he or she has been caught at the time of or immediately after the commission of a criminal offence. In this case, the deprivation of liberty may not last more than seventy-two hours. The President of the Constitutional Court shall be immediately notified of the deprivation of liberty of a judge of the Constitutional Court. 4.   Criminal prosecution of a judge with respect to the exercise of his or her powers may be initiated only with the consent of the Supreme Judicial Council. A judge may not be deprived of liberty, with respect to the exercise of his or her powers, without the consent of the Supreme Judicial Council except where he or she has been caught at the time of or immediately after the commission of a criminal offence. In this case, the deprivation of liberty may not last more than seventy-two hours. The President of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be immediately notified of the deprivation of liberty of a judge. 5.   The grounds and procedure for subjecting a judge to disciplinary liability shall be prescribed by the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Code. 6.   A judge may not hold any position not related to his or her status in other State or local self-governing bodies, any position in commercial organisations, or engage in entrepreneurial activities or perform other paid work, except for scientific, educational and creative work. The Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Code may prescribe additional conditions of incompatibility. 7.   A judge may not engage in political activities. 8. The powers of a judge shall cease upon the expiry of the term of those powers, in the case of the loss of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia or the acquisition of citizenship of another State, the taking effect of a criminal conviction against him or her, the termination of a criminal prosecution on non-acquittal grounds, the taking effect of a civil judgment declaring him or her to have no active legal capacity, the fact of being missing or dead, or in the case of his or her resignation or death. 9.   In the case of a breach of the conditions of incompatibility, engaging in political activities, the inability to hold office for health reasons, or committing a fundamental disciplinary offence, the powers of a judge of the Constitutional Court shall be terminated by a decision of the Constitutional Court, whereas the powers of a judge shall be terminated by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council. 10.   The remuneration of a judge shall be determined in conformity with his or her high status and responsibility. The amount of remuneration of a judge shall be prescribed by law. 11.   Details relating to the status of judges shall be prescribed by the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Code.” 34 .     Article 169 § 1 of the Constitution provides that the National Assembly may decide by three-fifths of the total number of deputies to apply to the Constitutional Court requesting that it terminate the term of office of one of its judges. In accordance with section 83(1) of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court, [12] the National Assembly may rely in its request on one of the grounds set out in Article 164 § 9 of the Constitution (see paragraph 33 above). 35 .     Section 16 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court deals with the issue of “impossibility” for a Constitutional Court judge to sit in the case. The relevant part of that provision reads as follows: “... 3. The issue of impossibility for a judge of the Constitutional Court to sit in the case may be raised by each of the judges of the Constitutional Court. 4. The Constitutional Court shall decide on the issue of impossibility for a judge of the Constitutional Court to sit in the case within the framework of the procedural decision on accepting the case for examination. 5. The procedural decision of the Constitutional Court with regard to that issue shall be adopted by at least two thirds of votes of the total number of judges of the Constitutional Court.” 36 .     Pursuant to sections 10(2) and 88(5.1) of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court, a pension shall be granted to Constitutional Court judges whose term of office expired on 26 June 2020 (namely, the first three applicants), regardless of their age. The right to a pension shall not cease in the case of their taking up other employment, except for public service employment.    As regards constitutional amendments 37 .     Article 203 of the Constitution provides that Articles 1, 2, 3 and 203 of the Constitution cannot be amended. 38 .     Article 202 of the Constitution regulates the adoption of constitutional amendments. It reads as follows: “1.   The Constitution, amendments to Chapters 1-3, 7, 10 and 15 of the Constitution, and amendments to Article 88, the first sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 89, paragraph   1 of Article 90, paragraph 2 of Article 103, Articles 108, 115, 119-120, 123 ‑ 125, 146, 149 and 155, and paragraph 4 of Article 200 of the Constitution shall be adopted only through a referendum. The right to initiate adoption of or amendment to the Constitution lies with at least one third of the total number of MPs, the Government or two hundred thousand citizens having voting rights. The National Assembly adopts the decision, after putting the draft to referendum, by at least two thirds of votes of the total number of MPs. 2.   With the exception of the Articles specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, amendments to other Articles of the Constitution shall be adopted by the National Assembly by at least two thirds of votes of the total number of MPs. The right to the corresponding initiative lies with at least one quarter of the total number of MPs, the Government or one hundred and fifty thousand citizens having voting rights. 3.   In case the National Assembly fails to adopt a draft of constitutional amendments pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, it may be put to referendum upon a resolution adopted by at least three fifths of votes of the total number of MPs․” 39 .     Since 9 April 2018, all draft constitutional amendments must be sent to the Constitutional Court for a prior constitutional review. The relevant provisions read as follows: Article 168 “The Constitutional Court, as prescribed by the Act on the Constitutional Court, shall: ... (2) prior to the adoption of draft amendments to the Constitution, as well as draft legal acts put to referendum, determine the compliance thereof with the Constitution; ...” Article 169 § 2 “In the cases prescribed by point 2 of Article 168 of the Constitution, the National Assembly shall apply to the Constitutional Court in respect of amendments to the Constitution ...” The Constitutional Court has held that this review is in principle mandatory, except when draft amendments concern the rights of a majority of judges of that court and have no direct legal consequences for any other person (decision SDV-1590 of 29 April 2021 [13] , § 5.8). In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, in such circumstances all of the judges concerned would have to withdraw, leaving the court without a quorum (as regards the quorum, see paragraph 41 below). 40 .     Section 86 of the Constitutional Act on the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly regulates in more detail the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. It entered into force on 9 April 2018 (pursuant to section 166(1) of that Act). By an amendment to that Act adopted on 3 June 2020, the scope of review by the Constitutional Court was limited to a control of conformity with unamendable provisions of the Constitution. The amendment in question entered into force on 25 June 2020. The current version of that provision reads as follows: “1.   The draft of constitutional amendments is debated in the National Assembly in two readings in the manner prescribed for draft laws pursuant to Chapters 16-17 of the Rules of Procedure. 2.   Prior to adopting constitutional amendments entirely in the second reading, the draft National Assembly resolution on applying to the Constitutional Court regarding constitutional amendments is put to a vote. If the decision is adopted, the Chairperson of the National Assembly shall, within two working days, sign this resolution and send it to the Constitutional Court, together with the draft amendment to the Constitution debated in the second reading, for the assessment of constitutionality of the draft from the perspective of conformity with the unamendable Articles of the Constitution. The debate on the issue is interrupted until receiving the decision of the Constitutional Court. 3.   If, while assessing the constitutionality of the draft constitutional amendments from the perspective of conformity with the unamendable Articles of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court declares the draft to be not in compliance with the Constitution, the draft is withdrawn from circulation. 4.   If, while assessing the constitutionality of the draft constitutional amendments from the perspective of conformity with the unamendable articles of Constitution, the Constitutional Court declares the draft to be compliant with the Constitution, after the entry into force of its decision, voting on the issue shall be held in the upcoming regular session of the National Assembly pursuant to the following procedure: 1)   In the case stipulated in section 84 paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure [which refers to Article 202 § 1 of the Constitution], the draft National Assembly resolution on putting the draft constitutional amendments to referendum is put to a vote, which shall be adopted by at least two thirds of the votes of the total number of MPs. 2)   In the case stipulated in section 84 paragraph 4 of the Rules of Procedure [which refers to Article 202 § 2 of the Constitution], the draft constitutional amendments is put to a vote, which shall be adopted by at least two thirds of the votes of the total number of MPs. 5.   If the draft constitutional amendments mentioned in point 2 of paragraph 4 of this section is not adopted, the main rapporteur may make a statement for maximum twenty minutes introducing a draft National Assembly resolution on putting the draft to referendum. After the statement of the main rapporteur the representatives of factions may make statements for maximum ten minutes after which the draft resolution is put to a vote. The resolution shall be adopted by at least three fifths of the votes of the total number of MPs. If the resolution is not adopted, the draft is withdrawn from circulation. 6.   The Chairperson of National Assembly submits the National Assembly resolution on putting the draft constitutional amendments to referendum together with the relevant draft to the President of Republic within one week. The President shall set a referendum within three days after receiving those documents. 7.   The Chairperson of the National Assembly promulgates the Constitutional Amendments adopted by the National Assembly within one week.” 41 .     Section 62(4) of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court provides that the court will render decisions on the constitutionality of draft constitutional amendments by the majority of votes of the total number of judges.    As regards the Supreme Judicial Council 42 .     The Supreme Judicial Council is an independent body that guarantees the independence of ordinary courts (including the Court of Cassation) and the judges of those courts. It was established in 2018 by virtue of Article 173 of the Constitution. Pursuant to Article 174 of the Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Council has ten members appointed for a non-renewable term of five years: five members appointed by the General Assembly of Judges, from among judges having at least ten years of experience as a judge; and five members appointed by the National Assembly, from among prominent lawyers with at least fifteen years of experience. The President of the Council is elected by his or her peers, successively from among the members appointed by the General Assembly of Judges and those appointed by the National Assembly.       INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL    As regards the period of appointment 43.     In a report on the Independence of the Judicial System Part I: The Independence of Judges, adopted at the 82nd plenary session on 12 and 13   March 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)004), the Venice Commission found as follows: “34.   Opinion No. 1 of the CCJE [14] adds (at 48): ‘European practice is generally to make full-time appointments until the legal retirement age. This is the approach least problematic from the viewpoint of independence.’ ... 35.   This corresponds to the position of the Venice Commission which has, apart from special cases such as constitutional court judges, always favoured tenure until retirement.”    As regards security of tenure      The United Nations 44.     The relevant points of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary [15] read as follows: “12.   Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists. ... 20.   Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.” 45.     In General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial), published on 23 August 2007, the UN Human Rights Committee stated as follows (footnotes omitted): “20.   Judges may be dismissed only on serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring objectivity and impartiality set out in the constitution or the law. The dismissal of judges by the executive, e.g. before the expiry of the term for which they have been appointed, without any specific reasons given to them and without effective judicial protection being available to contest the dismissal is incompatible with the independence of the judiciary. The same is true, for instance, for the dismissal by the executive of judges alleged to be corrupt, without following any of the procedures provided for by the law.”      The Council of Europe 46 .     The relevant part of the European Charter on the Statute for Judges [16] reads as follows: “1.1.   The statute for judges aims at ensuring the competence, independence and impartiality which every individual legitimately expects from the courts of law and from every judge to whom is entrusted the protection of his or her rights. It excludes every provision and every procedure liable to impair confidence in such competence, such independence and such impartiality ... ... 1.3.   In respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary. 1.4.   The statute gives to every judge who considers that his or her rights under the statute, or more generally his or her independence, or that of the legal process, are threatened or ignored in any way whatsoever, the possibility of making a reference to such an independent authority, with effective means available to it of remedying or proposing a remedy. ... 5.1.   The dereliction by a judge of one of the duties expressly defined by the statute, may only give rise to a sanction upon the decision, following the proposal, the recommendation, or with the agreement of a tribunal or authority composed at least as to one half of elected judges, within the framework of proceedings of a character involving the full hearing of the parties, in which the judge proceeded against must be entitled to representation. The scale of sanctions which may be imposed is set out in the statute, and their imposition is subject to the principle of proportionality. The decision of an executive authority, of a tribunal, or of an authority pronouncing a sanction, as envisaged herein, is open to an appeal to a higher judicial authority. ... 7.1.   A judge permanently ceases to exercise office through resignation, medical certification of physical unfitness, reaching the age limit, the expiry of a fixed legal term, or dismissal pronounced within the framework of a procedure such as envisaged at paragraph 5.1 hereof. 7.2.   The occurrence of one of the causes envisaged at paragraph 7.1 hereo