CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 21 novembre 2023

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background-color:#dfdfdf } .s8C216CC2 { height:55pt } .sBD0E4D9E { width:6.96%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s230BBE34 { width:34.54%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sDF237D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:8pt } .sC5409033 { width:58.5%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s65561073 { height:27pt } .s7BE5FA79 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF PLESHKOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Applications nos. 29356/19 and 31119/19)   JUDGMENT   Art 35 § 1 • Authorities’ refusal to approve proposed locations for public events planned by the applicants • Judicial review of complaints about restrictions on the location, time or manner of conducting public events under the Code of Administrative Procedure as applied by the domestic courts, a remedy to be exhausted under Art   35 §   1 • Requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies fulfilled Art 11 • Freedom of peaceful assembly • Restriction on applicants’ rights not necessary in a democratic society • Domestic courts’ failure to apply standards in conformity with principles embodied in Art   11, strike a balance between competing interests or provide relevant and sufficient reasons   STRASBOURG 21 November 2023   FINAL   21/02/2024     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Pleshkov and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Yonko Grozev,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Andreas Zünd,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   29356/19 and 31119/19) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by seven Russian nationals (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appendix; the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints of violations of Article 11, Article 13 and Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of application no. 29356/19; the parties’ observations; the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the elected judges of the Court to sit as an ad hoc judge, applying by analogy Rule   29   §   2 of the Rules of Court (see Kutayev v.   Russia , no. 17912/15, §§ 5-8, 24   January 2023); Having deliberated in private on 17 October 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns alleged restrictions imposed by the authorities on the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly and the alleged lack of domestic remedies in that regard. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants’ names and other relevant details of the applications are set out in the Appendix. 3.     The Government were initially represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by his successor in this office, Mr M. Vinogradov. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Application n o .   29356/19 5.     On 5 October 2018 the applicant notified the prefect of the Central Administrative District of Moscow of his intention to hold a “picket” ( пикетирование ) from 12 noon to 3 p.m. on 11 October 2018. The event was to take place in front of the State Duma (lower chamber of the Russian Parliament) building in central Moscow, with twenty people expected to attend. The aim of the event was to protest against the increase in the State pension age recently voted by the State Duma. 6 .     On the same day a deputy prefect of the Central Administrative District of Moscow refused to approve the location chosen by the applicant. She indicated that the venue was unsuitable for public events because it would be impossible to meet safety requirements there. In particular, holding a “picket” might result in “disruption to the functioning of public utilities, transport, social or communications services, obstruction of pedestrian traffic or a breach of the rights and interests of citizens not participating in the notified event”. The deputy prefect proposed that the “picket” be held in Moscow’s Lermontov Park, some 3 km from the State Duma building. 7 .     The applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision before the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow. He submitted, in particular, that the aim of the public event was to make the State Duma deputies aware of the inadmissibility of raising the State pension age. It was therefore crucial to hold the event in front of the State Duma building, as the deputies were there daily. Moreover, the pedestrian pavement in front of the building was large enough to allow the “picket” to take place without any pedestrian traffic or access to the State Duma being obstructed. 8 .     On 10 October 2018 the Taganskiy District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It held, in particular, as follows: “The court agrees with the justification for [the prefect’s] proposal to change the location of the notified public event. It is common knowledge – and does not therefore have to be pointed out ... – that pedestrian and vehicle traffic at the location chosen by the organiser of the public event (Okhotnyy Ryad Street in Moscow) is heavy. The court takes into account that human life and health are fundamental values. The court is therefore convinced that [the prefect’s] finding that the location in question is unsuitable for public events is justified, as holding public events there might endanger the safety of their participants as well as people not taking part in them. It therefore meets the requirements of section 8 of the Public Events Act. The complainant’s notification has been examined in accordance with the established procedure. He has been given a decision in writing within the established time-limit indicating the reasons as to why it is impossible to hold public events at the chosen location and time. The complainant has not been deprived of an opportunity to enjoy his constitutional right to hold a public event in accordance with the procedure established by [the Public Events Act] by choosing another location for public events, including the location proposed by [the prefect]. The participants’ right to express opinions during public events and voice demands on issues related to political, economic, social or cultural life in the country has not been restricted.” 9 .     The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the authorities had no legal grounds for refusing to approve the “picket”. 10 .     On 11 October 2018 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It held, in particular, as follows: “The [District] Court found the authorities’ decision lawful and well-reasoned ... The [Regional] Court considers that this finding is correct and sufficiently reasoned ... The [Regional] Court notes that, by a decision of 5 October 2018, the organiser of the public event was informed of the reasons why it was not possible to hold the public event at the chosen location. A regional public authority has competence under section 12 [of the Public Events Act] to make to the organiser of a public event a well-reasoned proposal to change its location. Moreover, the complainant was not banned from holding a public event because he was offered an alternative location accessible to the public. The [Regional] Court therefore concludes that the contested decision by the respondent was within its statutory powers, the procedure for adopting it was complied with, there were reasons for adopting the decision, [and] its content meets the applicable statutory requirements.” 11.     On 25 January 2019 a judge of the Moscow City Court refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant with the Presidium of that court for examination. She referred, in particular, to Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no.   28 of 26 June 2018 (hereinafter “the Supreme Court Ruling”; see paragraphs 30-31 below) when endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. 12.     On 17 April 2019 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal for consideration by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. The judge found that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. Application n o . 31119/19 13.     The applicants are human rights activists.   On 10 December 2018 they notified the Moscow government of their intention to hold a public gathering from 2 to 5 p.m. on 22 December 2018 in Pushkin Square in central Moscow. About 1,000 people were expected to attend the event. Its aim was to mark the anniversary of the first post-war political protest held there on 5 December 1965 and urge the authorities to respect rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The applicants promised not to disrupt traffic. 14 .     On 12 December 2018 the Moscow Department of Regional Security informed the applicants that another public event was scheduled to take place in Pushkin Square on the same day. It proposed that the applicants’ gathering be held at a special venue for public events in Sokolniki Park. 15 .     On 13 December 2018 three applicants submitted to the Moscow government a written “proposal for an agreement over the location of the public event”. They pointed out the importance of holding the event in Pushkin Square, stemming from the fact that the protest of 5 December 1965 had also been held there. The alternative location proposed by the authorities was incompatible with the event’s purposes as it was too far away from the headquarters of the public authorities targeted by its intended message. The applicants requested further information about the event planned in Pushkin Square on 22 December 2018, in particular its time frame and the contact details of its organisers. They also asked that the Moscow government propose a time slot that would not overlap with the other event and assist in negotiations with its organisers. The applicants did not receive a reply to this request. 16 .     On the same date all applicants also challenged the refusal to approve the public gathering before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow, on the grounds that it was not sufficiently reasoned. In particular, the Moscow government had not explained why it was not possible to hold the two events simultaneously. Nor had it mentioned at what time the other event was planned and why it would be impossible to hold the applicants’ event before or after it. They stressed again that Pushkin Square was the only venue that would allow the event’s purposes to be achieved. The applicants also relied on the Supreme Court Ruling. In particular, they referred to its requirements that any interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of public assembly had to be lawful, necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim and be justified through the submission of evidence of specific facts making it impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location or time. 17 .     On 20 December 2018 the Tverskoy District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint. Referring to Article 11 of the Convention, the applicable domestic provisions and the Supreme Court Ruling, it held as follows: “... regional and local law-enforcement authorities have an obligation to ensure public order and safety during public events. They should take these and other circumstances into account when proposing to change the location of a public event, giving reasons for their decision. The court has established that the law-enforcement authorities complied with the above statutory requirements ... It is apparent from the case material that the complainants’ rights have not been breached ... The public authority must submit to the court evidence of specific facts making it impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location or time. The ... Moscow government, when preparing its proposal in reply to the notification of the public event lodged on 11 December 2018, sent a ... [request for information] to the office of the prefect of the Central Administrative District of Moscow. The [above authority] replied that another event had already been planned to take place in Pushkin Square on [22 December 2018] from 7.30 a.m. to 8 p.m., namely the “Moscow Traditions of New Year Celebrations” ... The holding of that event had been approved on 21 November 2018 ... The respondent ... therefore complied with its obligation to submit to the court evidence of specific facts making it impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location and/or time. The law does not provide for any obligation to submit such evidence to the organisers of public events. ... The court has no reason to believe that it will be impossible to achieve the event’s purposes if it were to be held at another location. The [applicants’] arguments about the restriction of their right to freedom of assembly cannot be taken into account as they are based on their erroneous belief that their rights cannot be restricted ... The law-enforcement authorities complied with the statutory prohibition on putting public order and safety of citizens at risk if holding a public event at the same venue where a popular cultural event has already been approved. They have therefore complied with the requirements of international law. At the same time, non-compliance by the [applicants] with that statutory prohibition could amount to an abuse of that right, which falls outside of the scope of judicial protection.” 18 .     On the same date three applicants appealed, extensively relying on the Court’s findings in the case of Lashmankin and Others v.   Russia (nos.   57818/09 and 14 others, 7 February 2017). They reiterated the arguments they had made before the first-instance court. 19 .     On 21 December 2018 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court’s judgment. It endorsed the court’s reasoning, referring to the Supreme Court Ruling. The relevant parts of the appeal judgment read as follows: “The appellants’ arguments that the law-enforcement authorities had not considered the possibility of holding two events simultaneously do not warrant the quashing of [the District Court’s] judgment because they contradict ... the circumstances of the case. It is apparent from the case file that before sending a reply to the event organisers, the respondent had received information from the office of the prefect of the Central Administrative District of Moscow, the Moscow Department of Cultural Heritage and the Moscow Department of Commerce. According to attachment no. 5, the celebrations in Pushkin Square will occupy 3,000   sq. m, making it impossible to hold [the applicants’] public event. [The appellate court] concludes that the contested decision was within the statutory powers of the respondent, the procedure for its adoption was respected, there were reasons for adopting that decision, [and] its content meets the applicable statutory requirements.” 20 .     On 25 December 2018 the other three applicants lodged an appeal against the Tverskoy District Court’s judgment. On 6 June 2019 the Moscow City Court dismissed their appeal. The parties did not provide a copy of that judgment. 21.     The applicants lodged two separate cassation appeals. On 18 June and 29 August 2019 respectively a judge of the Moscow City Court refused to refer them to the Presidium of that court for examination. The parties did not provide a copy of those decisions. 22.     On 15 August and 24 September 2019 respectively the applicants lodged cassation appeals with the Presidium of the Supreme Court. They reiterated their previous arguments, stressing that the domestic courts had failed to apply Article 11 of the Convention interpreted in the light of the Court’s case-law. 23.     On 17 September and 22 November 2019 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicants’ cassation appeal for consideration by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. She found no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings in the applicants’ case. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE Relevant legislation 24 .     The Code of Administrative Procedure (Law no. 21-FZ of 8   March 2015, hereafter “the Code”) entered into force on 15 September 2015. It replaced Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the procedure for examining complaints about decisions, acts or omissions of State and municipal authorities and officials, and the Judicial Review Act (Law   no.   4966-1 of 27 April 1993 on judicial review of decisions and acts violating citizens’ rights and freedoms). 25.     The Code provides that a complaint against the authorities’ decisions concerning the change of location or time of a public event must be lodged with a court within ten days of the date on which the complainant learnt of the breach of his rights (Article 219 § 4). Such complaints must be examined by courts within ten days. If the complaint is lodged before the planned date of the public event, it must be examined at the latest on the eve of that date (Article 226 § 4). A reasoned judicial decision must be prepared as soon as possible on the same day and immediately served on the complainant (Article   227 §§ 4 and 6). The judicial decision is subject to immediate enforcement (Article 227 § 8). 26.     If an appeal has been lodged against the first-instance decision before the planned date of the public event, it must be examined at the latest on the eve of that date (Article 305 § 3). 27.     When examining the case, the court must review the lawfulness of the contested decision (Article 226 § 8). The court must examine, in particular, whether the State or municipal authority had competence to make the contested decision, whether the procedure prescribed by law for its adoption was respected, whether the contested decision was taken on the grounds prescribed by law, and whether the contents of the contested decision met the requirements of law (Article 226 § 9). The burden of proof as to the lawfulness of the contested decision lies with the authority concerned. The complainant however has to prove that his rights and freedoms have been breached by the contested decision and that he has complied with the time ‑ limit for lodging the complaint (Article 226 § 11). 28.     The court allows the complaint if it has been established that the contested decision is unlawful and breaches the complainant’s rights or freedoms. In that case it requires the authority to remedy the breach of the citizen’s rights or to stop hindering such rights (Article 227 § 2). When necessary, the court determines specific steps to be taken to remedy the violation and sets out the time-limit (Article 227 § 3). 29 .     After unsuccessful recourse to the appeal court, the complainant can lodge a cassation appeal within six months from the delivery of the appeal decision (Article 318 §§ 1 and 2). At the time such a cassation appeal should have been lodged with the presidium of the regional supreme court (Article   319 § 2.1 as revised by Law no. 103-FZ of 5 April 2016) and subsequently to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court (Article 319 § 2.3 as in force at the time). Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018 30 .     On 26 June 2018 the Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation adopted Ruling no. 28 “On certain questions arising during judicial examination of administrative cases and cases on administrative offences related to the application of the legislation on public events”. With a view to ensuring consistency in judicial practice, the Supreme Court provided the judiciary with guidelines on the application of, inter alia , the Public Events Act when examining administrative complaints. 31 .     The Supreme Court Ruling is summarised in Kablis v.   Russia (nos.   48310/16 and 59663/17, §§ 29-33, 30 April 2019). The parts directly relevant to the present case read as follows: “29.     Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018 deals with the application of legislation governing public events during judicial examination of administrative complaints ... It provides that a refusal to approve a public event, its location or time or the manner in which it is to be conducted may be challenged before a court either by the event organiser or by a person appointed by the organiser to fulfil certain organisational tasks (point 2). When examining such administrative complaints, the courts have to examine whether the interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of public assembly was lawful, necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim. The courts must examine all the grounds advanced by the public authority and all the evidence submitted by it and assess whether the reasons for the interference were relevant and sufficient (point 9). ... 30.     Ruling no. 28 also provides that the courts must take into account that a proposal to change the location or time of a public event or the manner in which it is to be conducted must not be arbitrary or unreasoned. They must mention specific facts showing that public interest considerations make it manifestly impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location or time. Such public interests may include: normal functioning of essential public utilities, social and transport infrastructure and communications (such as emergency maintenance work on engineering and technical networks); maintenance of public order and safety of citizens (both those participating in the public event and passers-by, including on account of a risk of building collapse or an expected number of participants in excess of the maximum capacity of the location); disruption of pedestrians or traffic or of citizens’ access to residential premises or to social or transport facilities); and other similar considerations. At the same time, inconvenience caused to citizens by a public event or an assumption by the authorities that there might be a risk of such inconvenience may not in themselves be considered valid reasons for changing the location or time of a public event. For example, a necessity to temporarily divert pedestrians or traffic may not be considered a valid reason for changing the location or time of a public event, provided that it is possible to ensure that the traffic and the conduct of everyone involved in the event will comply with the established rules and will not lead to traffic accidents. On the other hand, disruption of pedestrians or traffic or a risk of disruption of essential public utility services may be considered valid reasons for proposing to change the location or time of a public event, provided that holding the public event will breach traffic or public transport safety requirements or limit citizens’ access to residential premises or public facilities, irrespective of measures taken by the public authority to ensure compliance with such requirements. The public authority must therefore submit to the court evidence of specific facts making it impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location or time. The courts may not take into account any circumstances which were not mentioned in the proposal to change the location or time of the public event (point   12). 31.     Ruling no. 28 further provides that the courts should take into account that the public authority must suggest a specific alternative location and time for the public event compatible with its purposes and its social and political significance. If approval was denied because it was prohibited to hold public events at the chosen location, the public authority may suggest an alternative location for that event. The organiser must reply in writing, stating whether he or she accepts the proposed alternative location and/or time, no later than three days before the planned date of the event. The organiser may also propose another location or time for approval. However, if the organiser wants to change the date of the event, he must submit a new notification (point 13).” Domestic practice on the application of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018 32 .     The Government submitted seventeen judgments delivered by the domestic courts between July 2018 and November 2019, with references to the Supreme Court Ruling, and sometimes Article 11 of the Convention and the Court’s relevant case-law. In most cases, first-instance courts found local authorities’ refusals to approve public events unjustified due to insufficient evidence regarding the unsuitability of the selected location or timing, or the inability to hold two events simultaneously for security reasons. Courts also deemed any refusal unjustified where the authorities failed to propose an alternative location or time for the public event, or where such suggestions did not align with the organisers’ intended message of the event. 33 .     In cases where the authorities’ refusals to approve the location and time of the public event were found to be lawful and well ‑ reasoned, first ‑ instance courts scrutinized the reasons behind these decisions. Examples included the assessment of potential participant numbers, making it impossible to host two events concurrently at one place, or consideration of construction works planned at the chosen location and time of the event. 34 .     In some instances, appellate courts overturned lower courts’ decisions, finding that local authorities’ refusals to approve public events were not well-reasoned because they lacked reference to specific facts or evidence. Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled in several cases that such refusals were unlawful or ill-founded, overturning lower courts’ decisions and either ordering re-examination of the case or issuing a new decision. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL Council of Europe materials The European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) 35 .     The document entitled “The Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions Concerning Freedom of Assembly”, issued by the Venice Commission on 1 July 2014 (CDL-PI(2014)0003), reads insofar as relevant as follows: “... 4.2.     Restrictions on Place, Time and Manner of holding Assemblies Location is one of the key aspects of freedom of assembly. The privilege of the organiser to decide which location fits best for the purpose of the assembly is part of the very essence of freedom of assembly. Assemblies in public spaces should not have to give way to more routine uses of the space, as it has long been recognised that use of public space for an assembly is just as much a legitimate use as any other. Moreover, the purpose of an assembly is often closely linked to a certain location and freedom of assembly includes the right of the assembly to take place within ‘sight and sound’ of its target object ... Proper restrictions on the use of public places are based on whether the assembly will actually interfere with or disrupt the designated use of a location. ... The mere possibility of an assembly causing inconvenience does not provide a justification for prohibiting it ... ... the Venice Commission stresses that it is the privilege of the organiser to decide which location fits best, as in order to have a meaningful impact, demonstrations often need to be conducted in certain specific areas in order to attract attention (‘Apellwirkung’, as it is called in German). Respect for the autonomy of the organizer in deciding on the place of the event should be the norm. The State has a duty to facilitate and protect peaceful assembly ... 5.3 Regulatory authority and decision-making ... It is recommended in addition that a co-operative process between the organizer and the authority be established in order to give the organizer the possibility to improve the framework of the assembly ... It is necessary that the decision-making and review process is fair and transparent ... The organizer of an assembly should not be compelled or coerced either to accept whatever alternative(s) the authorities propose or to negotiate with the authorities about key aspects, particularly the time or place, of a planned assembly. To require otherwise would undermine the very essence of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ... The Committee of Ministers 36 .     The implementation of the judgment in Lashmankin and Others (“the Lashmankin group”) with seventy-two other repetitive cases fell under the enhanced supervision procedure of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (“the Committee of Ministers”). 37 .     At its 1377bis (Human Rights) meeting from 1 to 3 September 2020, the Committee of Ministers examined the status of execution in the Lashmankin group and adopted decision CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46 ‑ 33. The Committee of Ministers noted that “although certain positive steps were taken, these were insufficient to attest to tangible progress”. At the same time, the deputies welcomed the ruling by the Supreme Court of 2018 which provided important clarifications in respect of the relevant practice, and noted the positive examples provided by the authorities in their action plan (twenty judicial decisions delivered by courts of all levels between July 2018 and February 2020 in various Russian regions). 38 .     The Committee of Ministers next examined the Lashmankin group at its 1406th (Human Rights) meeting from 7 to 9 June 2021 and adopted decision CM/Del/Dec(2021)1406/H46-29. The deputies, among other things, welcomed the Supreme Court’s ruling of 2018 and other domestic measures. According to the Russian authorities’ action plan, in 2020 the first-instance courts found the authorities’ refusals to approve the location, time or manner of conducting public events unlawful in 312 cases out of 815 similar challenges. Nonetheless, the deputies recalled the necessity of further changes to the Public Events Act with a view to introducing proper notification rules narrowing down the local authorities’ discretion in authorising public events and obliging the authorities to assess thoroughly the proportionality of their decisions. The deputies exhorted the authorities to complete this work without further delay. 39 .     In its most recent decision, adopted during the 1459th (Human Rights) meeting on 9 March 2023, the Committee of Ministers emphasised that the Russian Federation, despite having ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe as of 16 March 2022, was still obliged to implement the judgments of the Court. The Committee of Ministers also urged the authorities to improve the notification rules on public events and to limit the discretion of local authorities in authorising public events (CM/Del/Dec(2023)1459/H46-21). United Nations documents 40 .     In his Report of 21 May 2012 (A/HRC/20/27) the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association of 21 May 2012 stressed that States have a negative obligation not to unduly interfere with the right to peaceful assembly (§ 39 of the Report). Any restrictions imposed on that right must be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued. In addition, assemblies must be facilitated within “sight and sound” of their object and target audience, and “organisers of peaceful assemblies should not be coerced to follow the authorities’ suggestions if these would undermine the essence of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly”. In that regard the Special Rapporteur warned against the practice whereby authorities allow a demonstration to take place, but only in the outskirts of the city or in a specific square, where its impact will be muted (§   40 of the   Report). Other international documents 41 .     Joint Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly (CDL ‑ AD(2019)017, third edition) issued by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe read as follows: “Restrictions on an Assembly 28.     Limited grounds for restriction . Any restrictions imposed on assemblies must have a formal basis in law and be based on one or more of the legitimate grounds prescribed by relevant international and regional human rights instruments: national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. These grounds should not be supplemented by additional grounds in domestic legislation and should be narrowly interpreted by the authorities. 29.     Necessity and proportionality . Any restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, whether set out in law or applied in practice, must be both necessary in a democratic society to achieve a legitimate aim, and proportionate to such aim. The least intrusive means of achieving a legitimate aim should always be given preference. The principle of proportionality requires, for example, that authorities do not routinely impose restrictions which would fundamentally alter the character of an event, such as relocating assemblies to less central areas of a city. Banning or prohibiting an assembly should always be a measure of last resort and should only be considered when a less restrictive response would not achieve the [aim]. 30.     Illegitimacy of content-based restrictions . Any restrictions on assemblies should not be based on the content of the message(s) that they seek to communicate within the limits set by Article 10 § 2 ECHR. Restrictions must not be justified simply on the basis of the authorities’ own disagreement with the merits of a particular protest – and so both criticism of government policies or ideas contesting the established order by non-violent means are deserving of protection. ... The location of assemblies 61.     Freedom to choose the location or route of an assembly . People also have the right in principle to choose the location or route of an assembly in publicly accessible places. The location or route may include, but need not be limited to, public parks, squares, streets, roads, avenues, sidewalks, pavement, footpaths, and open areas near public buildings and facilities. ... 62.     Assemblies as a legitimate use of public space . Given the importance of freedom of assembly in a democratic society, assemblies should be regarded as an equally legitimate use of public space as other, more routine uses of such space, such as commercial activity or pedestrian and vehicular traffic. In this context, both the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have stressed the need to facilitate, rather than hinder, assemblies in the public space. ... Core State Obligations 78.     Facilitation of simultaneous assemblies . Where prior notification is submitted for two or more assemblies at the same place and time, simultaneous events should be facilitated where possible. If this is not practical (for example, due to lack of space), the organisers should be encouraged to explore alternative options that might yield a mutually satisfactory resolution. Where such a resolution cannot be found, the authorities should still seek to accommodate the different assemblies – ensuring, insofar as possible, that any alternative locations remain within sight and sound of the target audiences. Attempts by assembly organisers to ‘block-book’ particular locations, especially for significant dates or anniversaries, may constitute an abuse of rights since they aim to exclude other assemblies from using that location at that time. As such, a ‘first come, first served’ rule must not be implemented in a way that enables some assembly organisers to ‘block-book’ particular locations. Simply prohibiting an assembly in the same place and at the same time as an already notified or planned public assembly in cases where both can reasonably be accommodated is likely to amount to a disproportionate and possibly discriminatory response. ... 82.     Duty to facilitate assemblies at the organiser’s preferred location and within ‘sight and sound’ of the intended audience . Assemblies should be able to effectively communicate their message and must therefore be facilitated within ‘sight and sound’ of their target audience unless compelling reasons (that conform with the permissible justifications for imposing limitations under Article 21 ICCPR or Article 11(2) ECHR) necessitate a change of venue. In those cases, alternative sites should be provided that are as close as possible to the initially proposed site. ... Notification procedures 124.     Voluntary participation of organizers in pre-event planning with relevant authorities . Dialogue and other forms of co-operation between organizers of an assembly and the relevant state authorities may be useful to ensure the smooth conduct of the assembly. At the same time, involvement in prior negotiations on the part of the organizers should be entirely voluntary, and an unwillingness or refusal to engage in dialogue with the authorities should not have negative repercussions for the organizers or their assembly in relation either to the processing of the notification or the performance of the State’s positive obligations to facilitate and protect a peaceful assembly. Legal remedies 125.     Right to an effective remedy . Those seeking to exercise the right to freedom of peaceful assembly should have recourse to a prompt and effective remedy against decisions disproportionately, arbitrarily or illegally restricting or prohibiting assemblies. Where assemblies are prevented or unreasonably restricted due to potentially unlawful inaction or negligence of the administrative authorities, the organizers or representatives of the assembly should be able to initiate direct legal action in courts or tribunals. The relevant court decisions should be issued prior to the planned events. The right to a remedy includes being able to access independent and impartial administrative and judicial appeals mechanisms. The availability of effective administrative review can reduce the burden on courts and help build a more constructive relationship between the authorities, the organizers, and the public in general. In both administrative and court proceedings, the burden of proof should be on the relevant state authority to prove that the restrictions imposed are justified. Courts or tribunals should have the authority to review all circumstances of the case, and to annul or, where applicable, correct any error or omission made at the administrative or first instance review stage. ... Restrictions Imposed Prior To or During an Assembly 131.     Restrictions should be necessary and proportionate to achieving a legitimate aim. Restrictions to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, whether set out in law or applied in practice, must be both necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, and proportionate to such aim. Necessity denotes a ‘pressing social need’ for the restriction in question; this means that a restriction must be considered imperative, rather than merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘expedient’. The means used should be proportional to the aim pursued, which also means that where a wide range of interventions may be suitable, preference should always be given to the least restrictive or invasive means. The relevant state authorities should review and debate a range of restrictions, rather than viewing the choice as simply between non-intervention or prohibition. The reasons provided by the authorities for any restriction(s) should be relevant and sufficient, convincing and compelling, and based on a comprehensive assessment of the relevant facts. Moreover, the interference should go no further than is justified by a legitimate aim. The principle of proportionality requires that there be an objective and detailed evaluation of the circumstances affecting the holding of an assembly. Thus, the State must demonstrate that any restrictions promote a substantial interest that would not be achieved, or would be achieved less effectively, without the restriction. The principle of proportionality also requires that authorities should generally not impose restrictions which would fundamentally alter the character of an event (such as relocating assemblies to less central areas of a city). ... Categories of Restrictions 145.     Time, Place and Manner restrictions . The types of restriction imposed on an assembly should in principle relate only to its ‘time, place, and manner’, not to the message that is being communicated... Unlike with content-based restrictions, where States hardly have a margin of appreciation, they enjoy a certain discretion in relation to time, place and manner restrictions. For instance, they may proportionally regulate, restrict or prohibit occupation of the essential public space, such as main roads or entries to essential facilities, while offering suitable alternative, when possible. ... 147.     Restrictions on ‘place’ . At the core of the right to freedom of assembly is the ability of the assembly participants to choose the place where they can best communicate their message to their desired audience. It would be disproportionate if authorities