CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 5 décembre 2023

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display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 71200/17 Kristina BRAZAUSKIENĖ against Lithuania   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 5   December 2023 as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Jovan Ilievski,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Ivana Jelić, ad hoc judge,   Saadet Yüksel,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Frédéric Krenc , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 September 2017, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having regard to the decision of the President of the Chamber to appoint Ivana Jelić to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 of the Rules of Court), considering that Egidijus Kūris, the judge elected in respect of the Republic of Lithuania, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule   28), Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Ms Kristina Brazauskienė, is a Lithuanian national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Vilnius. She was represented before the Court by Mr G.   Černiauskas, a lawyer practising in Kaunas. 2.     The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms L.   Urbaitė and Ms   K.   Bubnytė-Širmenė. The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4 .     During the years of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr   Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas held various positions in the government of the Lithuanian SSR and the Communist Party of Lithuania. In particular, from 1977 to 1987 he was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Lithuanian SSR. 5 .     After the independence of the Republic of Lithuania was restored in 1990, from 25   February 1993 to 25   February 1998 Mr   Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas was the President of the Republic of Lithuania. Between 2001 and 2006 he was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania. 6 .     On 23   April 2002 the applicant married President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas. 7 .     On 26   June 2010 President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas died, leaving the applicant as his widow. The proceedings regarding the state annuity The applicant’s request and the authorities’ response 8 .     After President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas’s death, on 28   July 2010 the applicant asked the Ministry of Social Care and Labour to grant her, as the widow of a former President of the Republic, the respective State annuity (“the State annuity”) on the basis of Article   4 §   1 of the Law on the State annuity of the President of the Republic of Lithuania (“the Law on the State annuity”, see paragraph   65 below). 9 .     The Ministry then established that all the documents necessary for granting the annuity had been provided, and that the applicant had no insured income as of 23   July 2010, which was a condition for the annuity (see Article   5 §   4 in paragraph   65 below). The Ministry then prepared a draft Government resolution proposing that the annuity be granted to the applicant as of 23   July 2010. The Ministry of Justice, which also reviewed the draft resolution, stated that it had no remarks to add. 10.     On 25   August 2010 the press portal “ 15min.lt ” posted a story on the applicant’s request for the State annuity and quoted the then President of the Republic, President Dalia Grybauskaitė, as having stated that the applicant was entitled to it because such a rule was set out in the Law on the State annuity. 11.     The applicant’s request to be granted the State annuity received extensive public interest and was widely discussed in the media; it was noted that the applicant was already rather wealthy. 12 .     Politicians sought to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions of the Law on the State annuity. However, on 14   December 2010 the Seimas , sitting in corpore , refused to refer the question to the Constitutional Court. 13 .     On 15   December 2010 “ 15min.lt ” ran an article entitled “[Prime Minister] A.K.: the State annuity should be granted to the destitute, which is not the case for Kristina Brazauskienė”. The Prime Minister was reported as having stated that “in [the applicant’s] case, as we understand it, [the applicant] would not have any financial obstacles to attaining a decent standard of living”. The article also quoted the Speaker of the Seimas , I.D., as having stated that under the law, the applicant was entitled to the State annuity and that it was up to the applicant what she did with that money. 14 .     After the Seimas had refused in corpore to refer the question to the Constitutional Court (see paragraph   12 above), on 25   December 2010 this was done by the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour and thirty members of the Homeland Union political party group. In particular, they queried whether Article   4 §   1 of the Law on the State annuity, in so far as it established that the right to the State annuity of the President’s widow(er) also arose in respect of the widow(er) who had not been the spouse of the President of the Republic while the latter was in office, conflicted with Article   90 of the Constitution and the constitutional principles of social harmony, justice and a State under the rule of law. The members of the Seimas also questioned whether the right to the annuity arose irrespective of how wealthy the widow(er) was. 15 .     On 28   March 2011 the Ministry of Social Care and Labour proposed that the Government not process the applicant’s request for the State annuity while the case was pending before the Constitutional Court. 16 .     By a ruling of 3   July 2014, the Constitutional Court held that Article   4 §   1 of the Law on the State annuity was in conflict with Article   52 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law (see paragraphs 64 and 69 below). As of the day the Constitutional Court’s ruling was delivered, that norm could no longer be applied (see Article   72 of the Law on the Constitutional Court in paragraph   72 below). 17 .     By a letter of 19   March 2015, the Ministry of Social Care and Labour informed the applicant that, having implemented the Prime Minister’s order based on Government’s Chancellor’s resolution no.   27-659 of 4   March 2015, the Ministry had examined the applicant’s request for the State annuity. The letter then referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 3   July 2014, and held that, as of the day of that, there was no legal basis to grant the applicant the State annuity, since Article 4 § 1 of the Law on the State annuity had been the only provision providing for such an annuity. 18.     Having regard to this ruling by the Constitutional Court, on 16   June 2016 the Seimas amended the Law on the State annuity: the provisions regarding the President’s widow(er)’s annuity were annulled. Instead, those matters were incorporated into the new version of the Law on State pensions, in force as of 1   August 2016, in Article 15 1 . The amendment set out a new condition to qualify for the annuity in question: the widow(er) had to have been married to the President and executed the functions of spouse for no less than three years of the President’s term of office (see paragraph 66 below). 19.     The applicant was thus barred from receiving the State annuity as the widow of President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas, since they had not been married when he was in office. 20.     On 16   June 2016 the Internet site of one of the biggest national newspapers, Lietuvos rytas , posted an article entitled “Bad news from the Seimas for K.   Brazauskienė concerning the widow’s pension”. The publication quoted one of the members of the Seimas , K.M., who stated that “the draft legislation had been prompted by very particular circumstances. We had a situation where a woman had been very quick to make use of benefits to which she had not been entitled. This woman had already been given a lot of [property] by her spouse”. The publication also noted that the question to the Constitutional Court had been referred by a group of Seimas members after the applicant had, in 2010, requested the State annuity once President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas had died. Court proceedings for damages on account of the unpaid annuity 21 .     On 1   March 2018 the applicant started court proceedings for damages under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code. She claimed that even though she had lodged a request to receive the widow(er)’s annuity with the Ministry of Social Care and Labour as early as in 2010 (see paragraph   8 above), until the date of lodging an application with the court she had not received any official response to her request. Her request had been forwarded to the Government, which had not taken a decision on the matter, even though the explanatory report of the Ministry had specified that the applicant satisfied all the criteria for such an annuity to be awarded. In her submission, the failure to grant her the widow(er)’s pension for the period up to the date of the Constitutional Court’s ruling amounted to legal nihilism. 22 .     The applicant nevertheless acknowledged that since the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 3   July 2014, the provisions of the Law on the State annuity concerning the widow(er)’s annuity could no longer be applied in her case. She likewise acknowledged that she was barred from receiving a widow(er)’s pension since the new legal regulation in the Law on State pensions had come into force on 1   August 2016. (a)    The decision by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court 23 .     On 29   June 2018 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The court established that the dispute had arisen because of what the applicant saw as the State authorities’ unlawful actions (inaction), that is, the non-payment of the President’s widow(er)’s pension for the period between 23   July 2010 and 3   July 2014. It was also clear that the applicant had based her claim on Article   4 §   1 of the Law on the State annuity, which had been in force until 3 July 2014, when the Constitutional Court had declared it to be in breach of the Constitution. Having examined the basis of the applicant’s claim and its nature, and having taken into account the factual circumstances of the case, the court established that the applicant had requested the widow(er)’s annuity on 28   July 2010, when she had lodged a request with the Ministry of Social Care and Labour (see paragraph   8 above). Accordingly, she had been aware or should have been aware of the breach of her rights, on account of not having been granted the widow(er)’s annuity as of the latter date, when she had lodged a request with the Ministry of Social Care and Labour and not received any response. 24 .     In the light of the above, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court concluded that from the day of the applicant’s request of 28   July 2010 to the day of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 3   July 2014, when the applicant, under Article   7 §   1 of the Constitution, had lost “the right to be granted and paid the [President’s widow(er)’s] annuity” ( teisę į rentos skyrimą ir mokėjimą ), “there had possibly been a continuous breach of her rights” ( pareiškėjos atžvilgiu galimai buvo vykdomas tęstinis pažeidimas ): the Government, on the basis of the Law on the State annuity, which had been valid during the period between 28   July 2010 and 3   July 2014, had failed to fulfil its obligation to take a decision regarding the applicant’s request to be awarded the President’s widow(er)’s State annuity. However, applying the standard of an intelligent, prudent and considerate person, the court concluded that throughout that entire period “the applicant had known (or should have known) that her right to the President’s widow(er)’s annuity was being breached”. Once the Constitutional Court had adopted its ruling of 3   July 2014 the possible breach ( galimas pažeidimas ) of her rights had come to an end. The three-year time-limit imposed by the statute of limitations to lodge a claim for damages was to be counted from 3   July 2014 at the latest. The applicant had not presented any reasoned arguments to show that during the breach of her rights she had not known and could not have known about the breach of her rights, which could have led to a different calculation of the date from which the statute of limitations applied. 25 .     Given that the applicant had applied to the court on 1   March 2018, the limitation period within which to claim pecuniary damage for the period between 23   July 2010 and 3   July 2014 had expired. The court noted that the applicant had not provided to the court arguments why the statute of limitations should not be applied to her claim. Neither had she pointed to objective circumstances, which did not depend on her will, which would have obstructed her in the exercise of her right to the defence of her interests in court. For the court, the applicant had learned that her rights had potentially been breached (the President’s widow(er)’s State annuity not having been awarded or paid) not when the institution ( institutas ) of the President’s widow(er)’s State annuity had been abolished, but when the relevant legal provisions had been in force and should have been applied. The applicant, having lodged a request to be awarded the widow(er)’s annuity, and not having received a response, should have and could have realised that her rights to this annuity were potentially being breached. There was no information in the case file that she had been prevented from instituting court proceedings before the limitation period had expired. The court had also not of its own motion established grounds to renew the time-limit to lodge a claim, whereas “the applicant had unreasonably delayed for a long period lodging her claim with the court to protect her possibly breached rights”. 26 .     The court also noted that the Law on administrative proceedings, which had been in force since 1   May 1999, guaranteed a person’s right to start administrative court proceedings regarding, among other things, the lawfulness and reasonableness of the State authorities’ actions or their failure to act. In addition, on 27   February 2015 the applicant had signed a representation agreement with an advocate, A.R., who had the same day presented, in the applicant’s name, a request to the Government, urging the latter to take the decision to grant the widow(er)’s annuity to the applicant. Accordingly, already in February 2015 the applicant, “having been represented by a professional lawyer”, could have lodged a complaint with an administrative court regarding the Government’s refusal or delay to perform the actions within its competence and/or regarding compensation for damage. 27 .     Lastly, the court noted that under the pertinent legal regulation and applicable case-law, the applicant’s claim had to have been submitted within the three-year time-limit set out in Article   1.125 § 8 of the Civil Code, and that this time-limit was calculated backwards from the day when the claim had been electronically submitted to the court on 1 March 2018. That meant that, applying the statute of limitations (prescription), pecuniary damage could be awarded to the applicant only for the period between 1 March 2015 and 1 March 2018 (the three-year period), whereas the applicant had based her claim on the period from 23   July 2010 to 3   July 2014. It followed that, applying the three-year limitation period, the applicant no longer possessed a legal ground for an award in respect of pecuniary damage, and her claim had to be rejected. 28.     Lastly, given that the applicant’s claim had been rejected owing to the application of the statute of limitations, it was not pertinent to examine the question regarding whether her rights and interests had possibly been breached. Final ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court 29.     The applicant appealed, arguing that the question of the statute of limitations had been erroneously decided by the first-instance court. 30 .     By a final ruling of 18   December 2019, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decision, agreeing with the first-instance court’s finding that throughout the entire period after submitting her request for the annuity on 28 July 2010 the applicant had always known or should have known that her right to the widow(er)’s annuity was being breached, yet she had lodged a claim with the court only on 1   March 2018. 31 .     Taking into account that the applicant had lodged the request for the widow(er)’s annuity on 28   July 2010, that as of 23   July 2010 she had had no insured income and that she had not received the widow(er)’s annuity “for even one month” up until 3   July 2014 (when the legal basis to grant the annuity ceased to exist after the Constitutional Court adopted its ruling), “the last date when the applicant learned” that the annuity had not been awarded and was not being paid was 25   August 2017, given the fact that under the Law on the State annuity, the annuity would be paid for the previous month up until the twenty-fifth day of the current month. Given that the applicant was requesting compensation for damage under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code, in the applicant’s case Article 1.125 §   8 of the Civil Code applied, which set out a shorter limitation period of three years (see paragraph   73 below). The applicant had lodged a claim for damages with the court only on 1   March 2018, which meant that she had missed the statutory time-limit which had expired on 25   August 2017. The first-instance court had been correct in rejecting the applicant’s claim as time-barred. 32 .     It was also apparent from the material in the case file that the Ministry of Social Care and Labour, having received information that the applicant had had no insured income as of 23 July 2010, had on the basis of Article 7 § 1 of the Law on the State annuity prepared a draft Government resolution to award the applicant the annuity as of 23   July 2010. That draft resolution had been presented to the Prime Minister’s Office on 12   January 2011. Accordingly, the applicant’s request to grant her the widow(er)’s pension “had been set in motion” ( pradėtas spręsti ), but “the decision had not been implemented” ( sprendimas nebuvo įvykdytas ), “even though the applicant had such expectation” ( nors pareiškėja tokį lūkestį turėjo ). 33.     The Supreme Administrative Court referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13   December 2004 in which it had stated that in certain situations a person’s expectation or rights were to be protected and defended even where they stemmed from a legal instrument which was subsequently declared to be in breach of the Constitution (see paragraph   71 below). That notwithstanding, in the same ruling the Constitutional Court had also held that the Constitution did not protect or defend the acquired rights of persons which were in essence privileges (see paragraph 71 in fine below). The Supreme Administrative Court then referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 3   July 2014, in which it had held that the legal provision which had been declared unconstitutional had created a privilege (see paragraph 69 below). That being the case, it followed that there remained no legal basis either for the legislature or for the courts to defend and protect that right for a person which had not been implemented before the legal provision had been declared to be contrary to the Constitution. 34.     Lastly, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s plea that the first-instance court, having rejected her claim for damages as lodged outside the limitation period, had “unjustifiably not examined the merits of her claim” ( nepagrįstai netyrė skundo reikalavimo pagrįstumo ). On this matter the Supreme Administrative Court’s practice had been constant: it had more than once ruled that when the first-instance court found that the plaintiff had lodged a claim outside the limitation period without a justifiable reason, it was to be rejected. Such a ground for rejection of the claim was independent and sufficient not to grant the demands of the claim. In sum, the first-instance court had correctly interpreted and applied the law and reached a reasoned and lawful court decision. Most recent information provided by the Government 35 .     In a letter of 5   January 2021, the Government informed the Court of the following developments. 36 .     On 13   August 2020 the Office of the Seimas (the competent authority) had received the applicant’s request to be granted the State annuity of the widow of a signatory of the Lithuanian Act of Independence, which had been signed by her late husband, President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas. On 11   November 2020 the Government had granted the request and awarded the applicant that annuity, which was calculated from 23   July 2010. The applicant received in total 35,150 euros (EUR) for the period from 23   July 2010 to 30   November 2020; the sum was paid in full on 11   December 2020. The applicant received EUR   10,485 as part of that sum in relation to the period from 23   July 2010 to 2   July 2014 (inclusive) during which she did not receive the State annuity as the President’s widow, which the Government saw as relevant for the present case before the Court. Further monthly payments of the State annuity of the widow of a signatory were to be paid to the applicant on a regular basis; in 2020 the amount was EUR   331 per month. 37 .     The Government acknowledged that the legal provision on the State annuity of the widow of a signatory was not the subject matter of the present case before the Court, which instead dealt with another kind of annuity – the State annuity of the President’s widow(er). That notwithstanding, the State annuity of the widow of a signatory had been granted to the applicant for the following reason. Under Article   5 §   3 of the Law on the State annuity (see paragraph 65 below), where a widow(er) of the President was entitled to both the widow(er)’s annuity and a State pension and/or pension-type payments, paid from the State budget, only one of those benefits was to be granted and paid upon the widow(er)’s request. Accordingly, pursuant to the above-mentioned legal provision, the annuity of the widow(er) of the President could not have been granted to the applicant, as she had been granted a pension-type payment from the State budget – the State annuity of the widow of a signatory – upon her own request, from 23   July 2010. 38 .     On 12   January 2021 the information presented by the Government was forwarded to the applicant for information, who did not comment on it. The proceedings regarding housing under the loan-for-use agreement The applicant’s request to be provided with the house where she and the President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas lived 39.     After the death of President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas (see paragraph   7 above), the applicant asked the Government to provide her with housing, as provided for in Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President of the Republic of Lithuania (“the Law on the President”), as that provision was valid at that time (see paragraph 67 below). 40 .     On 7   July 2010 the Government passed Resolution no.   1002, transferring into the applicant’s use under a loan-for-use agreement ( panaudos sutartis ), a State-owned house, managed by the Chancellery of the President of the Republic (“the Chancellery”), situated in the Turniškės district in Vilnius. As the legal basis for the resolution, the Government referred to Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President (see paragraph   67 below), and points 1.7 and 6.6 of the Circular regarding the procedure on the temporary management and use of State assets transferred under a loan-for-use agreement (“the Circular”, see paragraph 68 below). Resolution no.   1002 did not set out any time-limit for the house being transferred for the applicant’s use. As subsequently noted by the courts (see also paragraphs   53 and 57 below), this was the house in which the applicant and President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas had lived until the latter’s death, and where objects of value to the State – State awards, President’s collections, books – were kept. 41 .     On 11   October 2010 the Chancellery and the applicant entered into a loan-for-use agreement for the house in question for “a five-year period”. The contract referred to Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President, the Circular and Government resolution no.   1002 as the legal basis for the agreement. The applicant signed the loan-for-use agreement; the same day she also signed a document accepting the property for her use. 42 .     In the meantime, by Resolution no.   725 of 8   July 2009, the Government, referring to Article   23 §§   2 and 3 of the Law on the President as the legal basis, and to points 1.7 and 6.6 of the Circular, transferred to another President of the Republic, President Valdas Adamkus, a residence in the Turniškės district to use “for life” ( iki gyvos galvos ). 43.     On 25   August 2015 the Chancellery wrote to the applicant that the agreement for using the house in the Turniškės district was going to expire on 12 October 2015, and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 44 .     On 21   September 2015 the applicant asked the Chancellery to extend her loan-for-use agreement by ten years. She referred to Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President (see paragraph 67 below), considering that that legal provision gave her the right to use the house in question until her death. 45.     On 25   September 2015 the Chancellery refused the request, referring to the agreement signed on 11   October 2010, in which it was specified that use of the house had been granted for a period of five years (see paragraph 41 above). The Chancellery also pointed out that Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President did not specify a particular location (town, district, street) where housing should be provided to the spouse of the dead President – it only referred to the fact that such housing was to be provided by the Government, and in accordance with the rules set out by the Government. The Chancellery also noted that the house in question was a house which was to be used in the interests of the State. In addition, it was situated in an area protected by the State Government Security Department ( Vadovybės apsaugos departamentas ), and as such should be given for use only to persons who had been granted State protection (which was not the case of the applicant). 46 .     In reply to the applicant’s request of 21   September 2015, on 30   September 2015 the Government, referring to Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President, proposed a 105 sq. m flat in the Antakalnis district in Vilnius to be granted to her on the basis of a loan-for-use agreement. 47 .     Responding to the Chancellery and to the Government, on 6   October 2015 the applicant again asked the Chancellery to extend, by ten years, the loan-for-use agreement in respect of the house in the Turniškės district, or, alternatively, to provide her with “a similar quality living space of a similar standard” – in her view, this was not the case of the flat in the Antakalnis district. The same month, October 2015, both the Chancellery and the Government refused to grant the applicant’s request to extend the loan-for-use agreement in respect of the house in the Turniškės district. Civil court proceedings regarding the applicant’s removal from the house in the Turniškės district 48 .     On 21   October 2015 the Chancellery started court proceedings to evict the applicant from the house in the Turniškės district. The applicant lodged a counterclaim, asking to be permitted to use that house for ten more years. The Vilnius City District Court 49.     By a decision of 13   May 2016, the Vilnius City District Court granted the Chancellery’s claim, dismissed the applicant’s counterclaim and ordered that she move out of the house in question in the Turniškės district. 50.     The legal basis for granting the applicant the residential premises had been Government Resolution no.   1002 (see paragraph   40 above). To establish under what conditions and for what duration the loan-for-use agreement had been entered into with the applicant it was imperative to refer to the legal provisions that had been in force at the time of that resolution. The loan-for-use agreement (see paragraph   41 above) had only formalised the loan-for-use legal relationship which had already been established on the basis of the above-mentioned resolution. At the relevant time the Circular provided that State property could be assigned for free use and management to persons set out in its point   1.7, which was applicable to the applicant, and not to the President of the Republic, and set out a time-limit for this use of no more than five years. 51 .     The court dismissed the applicant’s submission that the right to housing, as established by the legislature in Article   23 §§   3 and 4 of the Law on the President and implemented by the Government, was identical in respect of the President of the Republic and in respect of the President’s widow(er). In fact, point   6.6. of the Circular set out different time-limits for the use of property for the President of the Republic and for the President’s widow(er). When by Government Resolution no.   1002 of 7   July 2010 it had been decided to grant the applicant the right to use, on the basis of the loan-for-use agreement, the house in the Turniškės district, no other time-limit for such use had been established, and the duration had therefore been regulated by point 6.6 of the Circular. Had the applicant considered that the conditions proposed by the Chancellery did not satisfy the requirements of the law, she had had the right not to sign the loan-for-use agreement or to contest the Chancellery’s actions. Yet, the applicant had agreed with the time-limit set out in the loan-for-use agreement; she had also entered into the agreement with the Chancellery to use the house in question for a five-year time-limit without specifying in that agreement that it could be prolonged. Throughout the whole period of the loan-for-use agreement, as well as after its expiry, the applicant had made no claims that the time-limit for the loan-for-use agreement had been set out incorrectly. Such behaviour showed that the applicant had agreed that the house in question would be granted to her for a concrete five-year period. The applicant thus “had had no basis to expect” ( neturėjo pagrindo tikėtis ) that after the expiry of the time-limit for the loan-for-use agreement she would continue to have a right to use the house in question. 52 .     The court also dismissed as unfounded the applicant’s suggestion that Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President entitled her, as the President’s spouse, to use the house in question or other residential premises of “the same size and same characteristics”. None of the legal instruments provided that, when implementing the social guarantee provided for in Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President, the President’s widow(er) should be left the same residence which had been granted to the President or which the President had used until his death. Besides, contrary to what had been suggested by the applicant, her social guarantee to a residence could not be implemented on equal terms to that of President Valdas Adamkus (see paragraph   42 above), who was the President of the Republic, otherwise the specificity of the President’s status would be denied. The content of social guarantees that were set out by law for Presidents whose terms of office have expired was different and much wider than that for the President’s widow(er). The difference in the social guarantees that were applicable to the President and to his spouse was the basis for applying different requirements also as regards the residence which had been granted when implementing the social guarantee in respect of the President and of his spouse. 53 .     The court noted, lastly, that, even though the applicant had pleaded that she should be allowed to reside in the house in question because it contained the personal collection of President Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas, that house had been designated as residential premises, and not as a storage facility. The Chancellery was therefore correct to ask the court to remove the applicant from the house in question. (a)    The Vilnius Regional Court 54.     The applicant appealed, arguing that the law had been erroneously applied, but on 21   December 2016 the Vilnius Regional Court, having agreed with the reasoning in the first-instance court’s decision, left that decision unchanged. 55 .     On the facts, the Regional Court pointed out that the loan-for-use agreement, entered into on the basis of Resolution no.   1002, provided that the house in question was being transferred to the applicant for ex gratia use for a term of five years (point   2 of the agreement). The agreement did not provide for a possibility to prolong it after the expiry of the five-year time-limit. In accordance with point 8.14 of the agreement, the applicant was under the obligation to return the property to the Chancellery in the same state as it was received. If the applicant had been dissatisfied with those conditions when they had been proposed to her, she could have contested them and not signed the agreement. The fact that she had signed the agreement meant that she had agreed with its conditions, including with the five-year time-limit without the possibility of prolonging the contract. Throughout the duration of the agreement and even upon its expiry she had not claimed that she had agreed to the time-limit of the loan-for-use agreement erroneously. Such behaviour by the applicant demonstrated that she had agreed that the house in question would be granted to her for a concrete five-year period. Accordingly, the applicant could not have expected that she would have the right to use the house after the loan-for-use term had expired. 56 .     The court also shared the Chancellery’s view that the President’s and his spouse’s legal status differed. That difference was based on the particular legal status of the President, which stemmed from the Constitution and the Law on the President. That status had also been noted by the Constitutional Court in its rulings of 23   May 2004 and 3   July 2014. Among other things, it noted that while the President’s status was set out in the Constitution, his or her spouse’s status was not. Even though the Law on the President set out not only the President’s, but also his or her family members’ material and social guarantees, it regulated them differently. Under Article   23 §   2 of that Law, social guarantees were provided for life only for the President. As had been correctly noted by the first-instance court, in its ruling of 3   July 2014 the Constitutional Court had explained that after the President’s death welfare support was granted to his or her family members on the same basis as to other persons whose spouse or parent had died. Accordingly, the social guarantees applicable to the President were not applicable to his or her family members, unless this was provided for by law. The first-instance court had been correct in concluding that the fact that the social guarantee to a residence of the President’s widow(er) and the President had been implemented under different conditions was owing to the particularity of the President’s legal status, because the content of the President’s social guarantees, once his term of office expired, was more extensive than the President’s widow(er)’s. These more extensive social guarantees stemmed from Article   23 §   2 of the Law on the President. As correctly noted by the first-instance court, it was precisely the exceptional legal status of the President and the content of the social guarantees that had been set up by law that determined the particular requirements of the residence which was granted to the President. The difference in social guarantees between the President and his spouse that had been established by law formed the basis for applying different criteria also in respect of the residence which was granted when implementing the social guarantees of the President and his or her spouse. 57 .     Lastly, the Regional Court noted that the house in issue was located in the Turniškės district, a secured area, and that therefore the house should be assigned only to persons who were entitled to State protection (which the applicant was not). If the applicant wished to continue benefiting from the social guarantees provided by law, it was for the Government to decide which residential premises could be granted to the applicant. In any case, she had to vacate the house in question in the Turniškės district. (b)    The Supreme Court 58.     On 28   March 2017 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s subsequent appeal on points of law. Subsequent developments as regards housing 59 .     On 14   April 2017 the applicant asked the Chancellery and the Government to be provided with a list of available housing (residential premises) and the description thereof which could be allocated to her under a loan-for-use agreement. She referred to Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President as the legal basis for her request, and pointed out that it had not been contested either by the Chancellery or by the Government during the civil proceedings, which by then were over, that she did in fact have such a right. 60 .     On 20   April 2017 the television channel LNK announced that the applicant had asked the Government for a list of free-for-use flats to which she could move from the house in the Turniškės district. The television channel quoted President Dalia Grybauskaitė, as having stated to journalists that “free housing” was “a nomenklatura privilege” and, having suggested that the Government would refer the question whether the applicant had a right to free housing to the Constitutional Court, stated as follows: “Such [Soviet] nomenklatura privileges, as established in our laws, do not exist anywhere else in the European Union. We have already seen the Constitutional Court’s reaction as regards the State annuity, and, I would think, in this case it would be pertinent for the Government to refer the matter of this particular privilege to the Constitutional Court so that the question can be resolved.” The LNK television channel also quoted Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis, who seemed inclined to agree with the President’s proposal. He was quoted as having stated: “If [the applicant] was going to have to live on the street, we would probably seek and find [housing]; the Government is preparing its position and will announce it ... during the Government hearing. The President has urged that the question be referred to the Constitutional Court, and this will be done.” 61 .     In reply to the applicant’s request (see paragraph   59 above), on 15   May 2017 the Government wrote to the applicant that on 26   April 2017 it had decided to refer to the Constitutional Court the question regarding the constitutionality of Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President. That being so, the question regarding granting residential premises to the applicant would be examined after the Constitutional Court had ruled on the matter. 62 .     In a Resolution of 26   April 2017, the Government asked the Constitutional Court to rule on whether, in the case of the spouse of a President who had married him after he was no longer in office, Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President, which created a privilege on the basis of a person’s social status, was in conflict with Article 29 § 2 of the Constitution. 63 .     On 15 December 2017 the Constitutional Court held that Article   23 §   4 of the Law on the President was in conflict with Articles   29 and 90 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law (see also paragraph 70 below). RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE The Constitution 64 .     The relevant parts of the Constitution read as follows: Article 29 “All persons shall be equal before the law, courts, and other State institutions and officials. Human rights may not be restricted; no one may be granted any privileges on the grounds of ... social status ...” Article 52 “The State shall guarantee its citizens the right to receive old-age and disability pensions, as well as social assistance in the event of unemployment, sickness, widowhood, the loss of the breadwinner, and in other cases provided for by law.” Article 90 “The President of the Republic shall have a residence. The financing of the President of the Republic and of his residence shall be established by law.” Article 105 “The Constitutional Court shall consider and adopt decisions on whether the laws of the Republic of Lithuania or other legal instruments adopted by the Seimas are in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. ...” Article 106 “The Government, no less than one-fifth of all the members of the Seimas , and courts shall have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court concerning the legal instruments specified in the first paragraph of Article 105. ... An application by the President of the Republic to the Constitutional Court, or a resolution of the Seimas , asking for an investigation into the conformity of a legal instrument with the Constitution shall suspend its validity. ...” Article 107 “A law (or part thereof) of the Republic of Lithuania or another legal instrument (or part thereof) of the Seimas ... may not be applied from the day of the official publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court that the instrument in question (or part thereof) is in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. The decisions of the Constitutional Court on the issues assigned to its competence by the Constitution shall be final and not subject to appeal. ...” Legislation and secondary legislation As to the State annuity of the widow(er) of the President of the Republic 65 .     The relevant parts of the Law on the State annuity of the President of the Republic of Lithuania ( Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidento valstybinės rentos įstatymas ), as in force between 1   January 2007 and 2   July 2014, read as follows: Article   4 Persons who have the right to receive the State annuity of the widow(er) ... of the President of the Republic “1.     The spouse of a deceased President of the Republic (hereinafter referred to as the widow(er)) ... shall have the right to receive the State annuity of the widow(er) of the President of the Republic ...” Article 5 The conditions for granting and paying the State annuity of the widow(er) ... of the President of the Republic “1.     The State annuity of the widow(er) ... of the President of the Republic is granted after the death of the President of the Republic who was receiving or could have received the State annuity of the President of the Republic. 2.     The State annuity of the President of the Republic is granted and/or paid to the widow(er) irrespective of his or her age, the pensions he or she receives or other permanent pension-type payments he or she receives, with the exception of the cases set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article. 3.     In the event the widow(er) of the President of the Republic is entitled to the annuity of the widow(er) of the President of the Republic and a State pension and/or pension-type payments, granted under the laws of the Republic of Lit