CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 5 décembre 2023

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ROMANIA (Application no. 70267/17)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Automatic termination of employment of lay teacher of Orthodox religion at secondary public school after the withdrawal of her endorsement by a local Archbishop • Art 8 applicable following consequence-based approach • Scope of rights limited to a certain extent by contractual heightened duty of loyalty towards the Orthodox Church and corresponding professional and disciplinary constraints • Consequences of termination of employment, although very serious, not excessive • All relevant factors considered and competing interests weighed up within limits imposed by the need to respect the Church’s autonomy • It did not appear that domestic courts’ conclusions were unreasonable or Church’s autonomy improperly invoked • Interference, having regard to the State’s margin of appreciation, proportionate Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Ratione materiae • Refusal of national secular courts to review lawfulness of Archbishop’s decision for want of jurisdiction, given overall legal framework and existing domestic case-law, not arbitrary of manifestly unreasonable • Exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to the ecclesiastical courts • No arguable “right” under domestic law   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 5 December 2023   FINAL   05/03/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ţîmpău v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer , President ,   Faris Vehabović,   Branko Lubarda,   Anja Seibert-Fohr,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins,   Anne Louise Bormann,   Sebastian Răduleţu , judges , and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   70267/17) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Ms   Doina Ţîmpău (“the applicant”), on 14 September 2017; the decision to give notice to the Romanian Government (“the Government”) of the application; the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant; the comments submitted by the European Centre for Law and Justice (“the ECLJ”) and by the Institute for Legal Culture Ordo Iuris (“Ordo Iuris”), which were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section; Having deliberated in private on 17 October 2023, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant complained that the national courts’ refusal to examine her objections to a local Archbishop’s decision to withdraw the endorsement that he had granted to the applicant to work as a teacher of religion, resulting in the termination of her employment, violated her rights of access to court and to respect for her private life. The applicant relied expressly on Articles   6 and 9 of the Convention and in substance on Article 8. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Câmpulung Moldovenesc, Suceava County. She was represented by Mr R.L. Chiriţă, a lawyer practising in Cluj-Napoca. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms O.F. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Background to the case 5.     The applicant was a laywoman teacher of Orthodox religion at a secondary public school in Câmpulung Moldovenesc (“the school”) for twenty years. Professional report concerning the applicant 6 .     On 18 February 2015 the applicant was awarded the highest professional grade available for a secondary school teacher and achieved the highest mark possible. She was appraised by a commission consisting of two   university professors of theology and G.H., the local Inspector of Schools for religious teaching (“the inspector”). G.H. was both a priest and a professor of theology. 7.     The appraisal report produced by the above-mentioned commission on the same date concluded that the applicant had planned and conducted her professional activity by complying with the national curriculum and had proved that she had very good knowledge of the subject she taught. The report stated that the commission had drawn its conclusions from both a review of the school’s documents and the discussions that it had had with the school management and members of the parents’ committee. 8.     The report stated further that the head of the school, who spoke on behalf of the school’s management council, had positive things to say about the applicant’s teaching and extracurricular activities. 9 .     The report also stated that the efficient communication between the applicant and her students reflected the applicant’s affection for and attention to her students. The students’ parents were happy with the applicant’s teaching methods, which raised the students’ interest in the subject and encouraged their active participation during the class. Correspondence between the school, the inspector and the parents’ committee concerning the applicant 10 .     On 12 and 20 March 2015 the head of the applicant’s school informed the inspector that on 12 November 2014 the Constitutional Court had delivered a decision which had entered into force on 9 March 2015 and which had given parents the choice of whether or not to enrol their children in a religious studies class (see paragraph 96 below). The head of the school stated that after the Constitutional Court’s decision had come into force, only ninety-three out of the school’s 402 students had opted to enrol in the religious studies class. The head also stated that the parents who had declined to enrol their children in the religious studies class had stated that they wanted to enrol their children in that class but only if it was not taught by the applicant. 11 .     The head of the school stated further that the applicant had marked those students who were not enrolled in the religious studies class as absent in the school register. That practice of the applicant was contested by the parents. At the same time the school had not been provided with any instructions as to what those students who opted out of the religious studies class were supposed to do while the class was going on and what the applicant’s prospects within the school would be since her post was a full-time one. 12.     The head of the school contended that the applicant had asked the teachers’ council to guarantee that she could teach at least half of her classes starting from the academic year 2015/16, but the teachers’ council did not have the power to grant such a request. 13.     The head stated that the atmosphere at the school had become tense and asked the inspector to appoint a team to visit the school, review the situation and take appropriate measures. 14 .     On 1 April 2015 a team of three inspectors, which included G.H. (see paragraph 6 above), visited the school and discussed the applicant’s situation with some of the students’ parents and the head of the school. According to the report of those discussions which was produced on the same day, some of the parents who were present wished to have the applicant replaced with a different teacher of religion because of her allegedly inappropriate and offensive conduct during class. 15 .     On the same date and again on 7 April 2015 the president of the parents’ committee and of the parents’ association complained to the inspector on his own and other parents’ behalf about the applicant’s conduct and actions towards those students who had refused to enrol in the religious studies class. 16.     On 6 April 2015 the inspector asked the head of the applicant’s school to instruct the school’s management council to review whether the conduct of which the applicant had been accused by some of the students’ parents (see paragraphs 10-15 above) had violated the school’s disciplinary rules and to take appropriate action. The inspector stated that on 12 March 2015 the Suceava School Inspectorate (“the Inspectorate”) had received a petition from some of the parents and had notified the head of the school of the petition. The decision by the Archbishop 17 .     On 15 May 2015 the inspector sent some of the information mentioned in paragraphs 10-15 above, along with other similar information about the applicant’s professional activities from 1997 to 2015 (see paragraphs 20-22, 25-26 and 28 below), to the Archdiocese of Suceava and Rădăuţi (“the Archdiocese”) and asked the Archdiocese to consider whether the endorsement ( binecuvântarea ) that the Orthodox Archbishop of Suceava and Rădăuţi (“the Archbishop”) had given the applicant to work as a teacher of Orthodox religion could be maintained. 18 .     On 19 May 2015, in response to the above-mentioned correspondence, the Archbishop informed the Inspectorate that he had decided to withdraw the endorsement ( binecuvântarea ) that he had granted to the applicant to work as a teacher of Orthodox religion in the schools of Suceava County. He asked the Inspectorate and the school to enforce his decision. 19.     The Archbishop stated that the reasons for his decision were based on the fact that during her twenty years of activity the applicant had failed to conduct her classes professionally, to integrate herself and to confirm that she was a true preacher of the word of God. In addition, her conduct towards and her interactions with parents, students and other teachers had generated only discontent. 20 .     The Archbishop noted that in July 1997 the applicant had breached education law and a protocol signed between the Orthodox Church and the Ministry of National Education ( Ministerul Educaţiei Naţionale – “the Ministry”) which was then in force. In particular, she had participated in a competitive examination for a tenured position ( concurs de titularizare ) as a teacher of religion even though the Iași Faculty of Orthodox Theology had informed the Inspectorate that the applicant was not authorised to obtain tenure. 21 .     The Archbishop noted that he had informed the Inspectorate of the breach mentioned in paragraph 20 above, and had asked it to revoke the applicant’s tenure, but he had received no response to his request. 22 .     The Archbishop also noted that from 2012 to 2014 approximately 100   parents had withdrawn their children from the class taught by the applicant at the beginning of the school year, but that they had subsequently allowed their children to attend the class when the applicant was temporarily substituted by another teacher. In addition, following the Constitutional Court’s decision (see paragraph 10 above) the parents of several students had notified the Inspectorate between 12 March and 7 April 2015 that they would not enrol their children in a class taught by the applicant and had asked for a different teacher. 23.     In March 2015 the head of the school had reported to the Inspectorate that only ninety-three students had enrolled in the applicant’s class and that the applicant had registered the children whose parents had not agreed to their attending her class as absent (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). In addition, she had threatened and insulted the students in question and their parents. 24.     The Archbishop noted that he had also received numerous complaints from the children of those parents and from the school management concerning the same issues involving the applicant. 25 .     On 1 April 2015 a team of inspectors (see paragraph 14 above) had visited the school and had organised meetings with the teachers’ council and approximately sixty parents. The parents had claimed that the applicant had offended and sometimes humiliated the children and they had asked for the applicant to be replaced by a different teacher. 26 .     The applicant had attended the above-mentioned meetings and had denied all the accusations made against her by the parents and had threatened to sue them. 27.     The Archbishop stated that the applicant’s conduct mentioned in paragraph 26 above proved that she was litigious and prone to making accusations. 28 .     Even though she had consistently denied that she was in any way responsible for the withdrawal of the children from her class both in her correspondence with the Inspectorate and in two press articles that she had published in a local newspaper, she had also agreed to swap schools with other local teachers of Orthodox religion. However, no other local teachers or heads of schools had agreed to a swap. 29 .     Lastly, the Archbishop noted that on 7 April 2015 the applicant had written to the Minister of Education, the Inspectorate and the inspector and had accused the head of her school of not helping her to encourage the parents to enrol their children in the religious studies class. The decision by the head of the applicant’s school 30.     The Archbishop notified the Inspectorate of his decision (see paragraphs 18-29 above). 31 .     On 10 June 2015 the Inspectorate notified the applicant’s school that on 19 May the Archbishop had withdrawn his endorsement of the applicant. In addition, the Inspectorate asked the school to terminate the applicant’s employment contract within five working days. 32 .     By a decision of the same date the head of the applicant’s school terminated the applicant’s employment contract with effect from 11   June 2015, stating that her employment had been terminated automatically as a consequence of the Archbishop’s decision of 19 May 2015 to withdraw his endorsement of the applicant and in accordance with the provisions of Article   18 § 3 of Law no. 1/2011 (see paragraph 88 below), Article   9 §   17 of the Ministry’s order no. 4895/2014 (see paragraph 90 below), Article   4 of Protocol no. 9217/5120/2014 (see paragraph 89 below), Article   32   §§   2 and   3 of Law no. 489/2006 (see paragraph 86 below), Article   56 §   1   (g) of the Labour Code (see paragraph 85 below) and Article 22 of the Ministry’s order no.   5115/2014 (see paragraph 92 below). 33 .     The decision noted that the applicant’s degree did not include a specialisation in another field which could have allowed her to continue working for the school in another post. The applicant’s challenge against the Decisions of the archbishop and the head of the school 34 .     On 11 June 2015 the applicant was notified of the decision of the head of her school (see paragraphs 32-33 above). 35 .     On 17 June 2015 the applicant brought proceedings against the Inspectorate and the Archdiocese in the Suceava County Court (“the County Court”) and asked the court to declare the decisions of 19 May (see paragraphs 18-29 above) and 10 June 2015 (see paragraphs 32-33 above) null and void. 36 .     She argued that the decision of the head of her school was in breach of the provisions of Article 56 § 2 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 85 below). In particular, the head had failed to take the decision in question and to notify her of it within five days from the time at which the reasons for the termination of her employment had become known. Even though the Archbishop had decided to withdraw his endorsement on 19 May 2015, the head’s decision to terminate the applicant’s employment had not been issued until 10 June. 37.     The applicant also argued that she had not been notified of the Archbishop’s decision and that the head’s decision had not contained the reasons for the withdrawal of the endorsement. 38 .     According to the relevant protocols concluded between the Ministry and the Orthodox Patriarchy, withdrawal of endorsement was a punishment that could be applied only in exceptional cases involving serious violations of the religious denomination’s morals and doctrine. Those conditions had not been met in her case. 39 .     The applicant argued further that the head’s decision had wrongly noted that the applicant was not specialised in other fields which could have allowed her to continue working for the school in another post (see paragraph   33 above). However, her administrative file indicated that she held a master’s degree in philosophy. 40 .     Lastly, the applicant pointed to the fact that she had been a tenured teacher of Orthodox religion since the 1990s and that she was supporting two minor children. First round of court proceedings Proceedings before the County Court 41 .     By an interlocutory judgment of 15 September 2015 the County Court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to examine the case. By a judgment of 23   February 2016, the said court dismissed the challenge brought by the applicant (see paragraph 35 above). 42 .     The court held, among other things, that the applicant had not asked the court to examine whether the Archbishop’s withdrawal of his endorsement had been lawful. Proceedings before the Suceava Court of Appeal 43 .     The applicant appealed against the County Court’s judgment to the Suceava Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). She argued that the lower court had been wrong in concluding that she had not contested the withdrawal of the Archbishop’s endorsement and that it had failed to examine that issue. 44.     On 20 September 2016 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the judgment of 23 February 2016 and referred the case back to the County Court for re-examination. The court agreed with the applicant’s argument exposed in paragraph 43 above. Second round of court proceedings Proceedings before the County Court The applicant’s and the Inspectorate’s submissions 45 .     On 5 December 2016, apart from reiterating her request to the County Court (see paragraph 35 above), the applicant also asked the court to order that (i) she be reinstated in her post and (ii) the school and the inspectorate pay her wages from the termination of her employment until her reinstatement, together with interest. 46.     On the same date the County Court joined the applicant’s school in the proceedings as a third party. It also raised of its own motion an objection concerning the jurisdiction of secular courts to examine the applicant’s challenge to the Archbishop’s decision and allowed the parties to submit observations on that issue and on the merits of the case. 47 .     The applicant argued that the Archbishop’s decision had several deficiencies and the secular courts had jurisdiction to examine them. In particular, the decision was null and void because under the relevant protocols concerning the teaching of religion at pre-university level, it should have been signed by the episcopal council ( consorţiul eparhial ), the only body competent to issue such a decision, and not by the Archbishop and the inspector as had been the case. 48 .     The above-mentioned protocols also provided that the applicant was entitled to contest the decision. However, she had not been afforded any opportunity to do so because she had not been notified of the decision and, in any event, the decision itself had not contained a statement that it could be contested. 49 .     The applicant also argued that even though the Constitutional Court had established that only ecclesiastical courts could examine the reasons on which such a decision rested, she had not been given an opportunity to contest those reasons before those courts. Any conclusion by the County Court that the secular courts lacked jurisdiction to examine the disputed decision therefore constituted a denial of justice because it denied the applicant any opportunity to seek justice before a court. 50 .     Lastly, the applicant denied the unprofessional conduct imputed to her by the decision and pointed to the mark she had been awarded on 18   February 2015 and the report produced on that date (see paragraphs 6-9 above). 51.     The Inspectorate argued that the inspector had signed the Archbishop’s decision as a member of the episcopal council and not as an inspector. Also, the fact that the document itself had not stated that the decision could be contested before the ecclesiastical courts could not have deprived the applicant of the opportunity to pursue that remedy. 52 .     The Inspectorate observed that the applicant had worked for more than twenty years without the Archbishop’s endorsement and that she had been granted that endorsement only a year before it had been revoked. 53.     The Inspectorate further argued that there was a difference between the applicant’s professional abilities and her disciplinary conduct and that there was evidence in the case file of numerous complaints lodged against her by parents and other teachers, which showed that the withdrawal of the endorsement was justified. 54.     On 6 December 2016 the applicant submitted written observations to the County Court and argued that the measures taken against her had destroyed her reputation as a teacher, had had a very serious impact on her family and had humiliated her in the eyes of all her family and friends. The County Court’s judgment 55 .     By a judgment of 14 December 2016, the County Court, sitting as a bench of one judge and two judicial assistants, rejected the applicant’s challenge to the decision of 19 May 2015 (see paragraphs 18-29 above) as inadmissible and dismissed her challenge against the decision of 10   June 2015 (see paragraphs 32-33 above) as ill-founded. 56 .     The court held that under Article 32 §§ 2 and 3 of Law no.   489/2006 (see paragraph 86 below) and Article 119 § 5 of the Statute of the Orthodox Church (see paragraph 87 below), an endorsement granted to a teacher of religion could be withdrawn for serious violations of the religious denomination’s morals and doctrine. These were disciplinary problems which were resolved under the rules specific to every faith and therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of the secular courts. 57.     As indicated also by the Constitutional Court’s case-law, whether there had been a breach of disciplinary standards in such circumstances could be determined only by the ecclesiastical courts because only they could assess the compatibility of the acts committed with the religious denomination’s spiritual role. 58.     The applicant’s breach of professional discipline had not arisen from a failure to comply with the conditions of her employment contract but rather was connected to the specific nature of the subject taught by her, which involved compliance with certain religious doctrines. The provisions of the Labour Code that gave jurisdiction to the secular courts which specialised in labour law disputes were therefore inapplicable in that connection. 59.     The national courts had no jurisdiction to deliver justice with regard to acts violating the internal disciplinary rules of religious denominations because liability for such violations was not governed by ordinary legal norms but by norms specific to each religious denomination. The courts therefore could not examine whether the withdrawal of the endorsement of the applicant was lawful or justified. 60.     The County Court further held that the applicant’s assertions to the effect that the Archbishop’s decision was null and void because it had not been issued and signed by the episcopal council and had not included the grounds for the withdrawal of the endorsement were ill-founded. Under the Statute of the Orthodox Church, the endorsement in question could also be withdrawn by the Archbishop at his discretion. 61 .     In any event, the only courts which had jurisdiction to examine the procedure for the withdrawal of the endorsement, or the form and content thereof, were the ecclesiastical courts as these were matters of canon law. 62 .     The fact that the Archbishop’s decision had not itself included the information that it could be contested in the ecclesiastical courts had not prevented the applicant from pursuing that remedy. On 11 June 2015 the applicant had become aware of the fact that the endorsement granted to her had been withdrawn because her employer had notified her of the decision of 10 June 2015 (see paragraphs 32 and 34 above). That latter decision had stated expressly that the Archbishop had withdrawn his endorsement. The applicant had not submitted any evidence to the court that in the meantime the competent authorities had revoked the Archbishop’s decision. In any event, the applicant’s argument on this issue could not give the County Court jurisdiction to examine the measure imposed on her by the Archbishop. 63.     As to the decision of 10 June 2015 (see paragraphs 32-33 above), the County Court held that the Archbishop’s endorsement was a mandatory condition for a person to be employed and able to work as a teacher of religion. Once the endorsement was withdrawn the employment contract was automatically terminated pursuant to Article 56 § 1(g) of the Labour Code (see paragraph 85 below). 64.     The court held also that the decision of the head of the school had complied with the time-limit provided for by Article 56 § 2 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 85 below). The Archbishop’s decision of 19 May 2015 had been notified to the school on 10 June 2015 (see paragraph 31 above). The head of the school had issued her decision on the same date, as soon as she had become aware of the Archbishop’s decision, and she had notified the applicant of it on the following day (see paragraphs 32 and 34 above). 65 .     The court further held that the applicant’s arguments to the effect that she was also qualified in philosophy (see paragraphs 39 above) were irrelevant. Given the relevant provisions of the Labour Code applicable to her case, her employer was not obliged to offer her another post based on her other qualifications. 66 .     One of the judicial assistants sitting on the bench (see paragraph 55 above) wrote a separate opinion. She stated that the secular courts had jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s complaint concerning the Archbishop’s decision because on 15 September 2015 the County Court had concluded that it had jurisdiction to examine the case (see paragraph 41 above). The parties had not appealed against the court’s interlocutory judgment of that date and it remained final. 67 .     The judicial assistant also stated that the head’s decision of 10   June 2015 was unlawful because the applicant had been employed by the school without the Archbishop’s endorsement. There was therefore no endorsement that could have been withdrawn. Moreover, the decision of 19 May 2015 could not have constituted a lawful withdrawal of the endorsement and, in any event, was unlawful because it had been delivered in violation of the rules of the Statute of the Orthodox Church. Proceedings before the Court of Appeal The applicant’s appeal 68 .     The applicant appealed against the County Court’s judgment (see paragraphs 55-65 above). She argued that in January 2015 the head of the school had asked her to apply for a transfer to a different school because the school wanted to employ younger staff in her post. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court of 12 November 2014 and its entry into force (see paragraph 10 above), the school management, the Inspectorate and some of her students’ parents had initiated a widespread defamatory campaign against her in order to put pressure on her. 69 .     The applicant argued further that the secular courts had jurisdiction to examine the Archbishop’s decision and referred to the separate opinion of the first-instance judicial assistant (see paragraph 66 above). The Constitutional Court’s case-law had established that the secular courts could not examine whether a disciplinary punishment for violations of Church doctrine and norms was well-founded. In her opinion, however, that case-law suggested that the secular courts could nevertheless examine whether such punishment was applied in accordance with the required procedure. 70 .     The applicant reiterated the arguments she had raised before the lower court (see paragraph 47-48 above) and contended that the manner in which the Archbishop’s decision had been delivered had denied her the opportunity to contest it before both the ecclesiastical and the secular courts. 71 .     The applicant also submitted that her administrative file showed that she had had only good appraisals and had never been disciplined. She also pointed to the report about her produced on 18 February 2015 (see paragraphs   6-9 above). Only three months after the said report was produced both the head of her school and the inspector had changed their mind about her completely. Their change of mind was both suspicious and inexplicable given the available evidence. The alleged complaints against her by some of the students’ parents had been lodged by parents who were not of the Orthodox religion. 72.     As to the decision of 10 June 2015 by the head of her school, the applicant reiterated her previous arguments (see paragraph 36 above). 73 .     Lastly the applicant argued that she had suffered both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage because of the head’s decision and had lost her livelihood. The Court of Appeal’s judgment 74 .     By a final judgment of 21 June 2017, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal (see paragraphs 68-73 above). It held that the applicant’s arguments concerning the County Court’s interlocutory judgment of 15   September 2015 (see paragraphs 66 and 69 above) were ill-founded. The interlocutory judgment could not have produced the effects claimed by the applicant given that during the first round of the proceedings the County Court itself had taken the view that the applicant had not asked it to examine the Archbishop’s decision (see paragraph 42 above). 75.     As to the applicant’s claims concerning the Archbishop’s decision, apart from upholding the findings of the County Court set out in paragraph   56 above, the Court of Appeal held also that Article 26 of Law no.   489/2006 (see paragraph 86 below) recognised in effect that religious denominations could have their own courts that could examine problems of internal discipline. Moreover, the relevant provisions of the Labour Code were inapplicable in this connection. 76.     In its decision of 10 June 2008 (see paragraphs 93-95 below) the Constitutional Court had acknowledged that Article 26 of Law no. 489/2006 was constitutional. The Constitutional Court had found that the State could not exercise power over the internal activities of religious denominations. The State’s legal norms concerning work discipline were therefore inapplicable to the staff of religious denominations. The fact that actions in breach of the rules of internal discipline of religious denominations could not be examined by secular courts did not violate a person’s right of access to court because legal liability in this area was governed by legal rules specific to each religious denomination. 77.     The Constitutional Court had considered that it was fair for the ecclesiastical courts to examine alleged breaches of discipline by staff of religious denominations who belonged to the clergy because only those courts could assess the compatibility of the actions in issue with the religious denominations’ spiritual role. Religious denominations were not administrative bodies but were autonomous and had a spiritual role in society. 78.     The Constitutional Court had held that in terms of discipline, the staff of religious denominations who belonged to the clergy were in a different position from that of ordinary people. They were obliged to comply with special ordinary and canon law rules. 79.     The Court of Appeal held that the Constitutional Court’s case-law had also acknowledged that different situations allowed for different legal treatment as long as the treatment in question could be objectively and reasonably justified. 80.     In view of the above, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the applicant could not challenge the Archbishop’s decision in the secular courts. The withdrawal of the endorsement in the applicant’s case concerned disciplinary problems and the secular courts lacked jurisdiction to examine allegations of breaches of the internal disciplinary rules of a religious denomination because legal liability in such matters was governed by laws specific to that religious denomination and not by ordinary law. 81 .     The Court of Appeal in essence reiterated the County Court’s findings as set out in paragraphs 61-56 above. In addition, the Court of Appeal held that the applicant could have brought proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts when she had become aware of the full content of the Archbishop’s decision. The court could not accept the applicant’s allegations that it would have been impossible to bring such proceedings because in the court’s view there were no genuine obstacles preventing her from pursuing that remedy. The Court of Appeal also noted that the Archbishop’s decision had been signed by the Archbishop and G.H. (see paragraph 6 above) and therefore complied with the requirements of Article 119 § 5 of the Statute of the Orthodox Church (see paragraph 87 below). 82 .     Lastly, the Court of Appeal held that in the light of its findings above it did not need to examine the applicant’s requests concerning her reinstatement in her post and the wages due to her as from the date when her employment was terminated (see paragraph 45 above). Other information 83 .     On 17 June 2015 the applicant brought criminal proceedings against several employees of the Inspectorate, including the inspector, the head of the school and the president of the parents’ association (see paragraph 15 above). The applicant argued that the employees of the Inspectorate, including the inspector, had misled the Archbishop when they had stated in their correspondence with the Archdiocese that she had participated in the competitive examination for a tenured post without the necessary authorisation or endorsement (see paragraphs 20-21 above). The applicant contended that her participation in the procedure without the necessary endorsement would have been impossible. 84 .     In addition, she argued that most of the other information that had been provided to the Archbishop was either misleading or false. The case-file does not contain information about the outcome of the applicant’s criminal complaint. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Domestic law 85 .     The relevant provisions of the Labour Code, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 56 “(1)     An existing employment contract shall be terminated automatically ( de drept ): ... (g)     from the moment the appropriate authorities or bodies withdraw the necessary authorisations ... or approvals for practising a profession; ... (2)     In the situations provided for at paragraph 1(c)-(j), the situation leading to the automatic termination of the individual employment contract shall be acknowledged within five working days from the moment it arises, by a decision of the employer in writing, and shall be notified to the persons concerned within five working days. 86 .     The relevant provisions of Law no. 489/2006 on freedom of religion and the general status of religious denominations, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 26 “(1)     For matters of internal discipline, religious denominations may have their own ecclesiastical courts, according to their own rules and statutes. (2)     Matters of internal discipline shall be exclusively subject to the provisions of internal regulations and canon law. (3)     Having their own ecclesiastical courts shall not preclude the application of the [ordinary] legislation concerning administrative and criminal offences ...” Article 32 “(1)     For the recognised denominations the teaching of religion in public and private schools shall be protected by law. (2)     The teaching staff who teach religion in public schools shall be appointed in accordance with the law with the agreement of the denomination the staff [in question] represent. (3)     In the event that a teacher commits serious violations of the denomination’s doctrine and morals, the denomination may withdraw its endorsement [of that person] as a teacher of religion, resulting in the termination of the individual employment contract. ...” 87 .     The relevant provisions of the Statute on the organisation and management of the Orthodox Church of 16 January 2008, approved by Government Decision no. 53/2008, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 119 “... (3)     Teaching staff who teach religion in public and private teaching institutions shall be appointed with the endorsement of the [Archbishop] of each diocese. ... (5)     In the event that a teacher, whether a member of the clergy or a lay person, from amongst those who teach the subject of religion commits violations of a Church’s doctrine and morals, after an investigation the [Archbishop] may withdraw the endorsement [of that person] as a teacher of religion, resulting in the termination of the individual employment contract ...” 88 .     The relevant provisions of Law no. 1/2011 on national education, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 18 “... (3)     Religion may be taught only by teaching staff qualified in accordance with the provisions of the present Law and authorised under the protocols concluded between the Ministry of Education ... and the religious denominations officially recognised by the State.” 89 .     The relevant provisions of Protocol no.   9217/5120/2014 of 29   May 2014 on the teaching of Orthodox religion classes at pre-university level and the organisation of pre-university and university level Orthodox theological studies concluded between the Ministry of National Education, the Orthodox Patriarchy and the State Secretariat for Religious Denominations, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 4 “(1)     Teaching staff shall be employed in the post of teacher of the Orthodox religion in pre-university [level] teaching institutions with the written endorsement of the [Archbishop ( chiriarhului )]. ... (3)     The [Archbishop’s] written endorsement shall be withdrawn for serious violations of the denomination’s doctrine and morals. (4)     The withdrawal of the [Archbishop’s] written endorsement and the reasons [for   it] shall be notified in writing to the pre-university [level] teaching institution and shall result in the automatic termination of the individual employment contract, in accordance with [the provisions] of Law no. 489/2006 on freedom of religion ... and the Labour Code. The employer shall be under an obligation to issue the decision terminating the individual employment contract within the lawful time-limit.” Article 24 “The procedure for ... withdrawing the written endorsement of the [Archbishop] shall be drawn up by the ... Patriarchy and shall be approved by a decision of the Holy Council of the ... Orthodox Church. Once approved, the procedure shall be notified to the Ministry of National Education and to the State Secretariat for Religious Denominations.” 90 .     The relevant provisions of Order no. 4895 of 10 November 2014 of the Ministry of National Education on the procedure for the mobility of teaching staff at pre-university level during the academic year 2015-2016, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 9 “... (17)     Religion may be taught only by university graduates with [appropriate] majors ... on the basis of an endorsement given by the denominations officially recognised by the State under Article 18 § 3 of Law no. 1/2011... ...” 91 .     The relevant provisions governing the procedure for the grant and withdrawal of the Archbishop’s written endorsement for conducting activities concerning religious and theological teaching, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 24 “The [Archbishop’s] written endorsement shall be withdrawn for serious violations of the denomination’s doctrine and morals (under Article 4 § 3 ... of the Protocol ... [see paragraph 89 above].” Article 25 “The withdrawal of the [Archbishop’s] written endorsement and the reasons [for it] shall be notified in writing to the teaching institution and shall result in the automatic termination of the individual employment contract ... The employer shall be under an obligation to issue the decision terminating the individual employment contract within the lawful time-limit under Article 4 § 4 ... of the Protocol ... [see paragraph 89 above].” Article 26 “The penalties for serious violations of the denomination’s doctrine and morals for persons who are the subject of the present procedure shall be: (a)     without a right of appeal for the person concerned, [the following penalties,] to be applied by the [Archbishop] at a meeting of the Permanency of the Episcopal Council, based on a lawful investigation [or] on a report ... of the subordinate administrative bodies; -     the Archbishop’s written or verbal rebuke ...; -     withdrawal of the distinctions granted