CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 12 décembre 2023

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s9F46BEC9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4598CDF { width:70.9pt; display:inline-block } .sB6A7F5BF { width:17.54pt; display:inline-block } .s235C1871 { width:137.76pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 27186/21 H.H. against Norway   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 12   December 2023 as a Committee composed of:   Jovan Ilievski , President ,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Diana Sârcu , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   27186/21) against the Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7   May 2021 by a Norwegian national, Ms H.H. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1979 and lives in Oslo, and was represented before the Court by Mr   F.P.   Gundersen, a lawyer practising in Oslo; the decision not to disclose the applicant’s name; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns proceedings in which a care order was issued in respect of the applicant’s daughter and the applicant’s contact rights during her daughter’s placement in foster care were decided. 2.     On 27 April 2019 the County Social Welfare Board issued a care order in respect of the applicant’s daughter, X., born in 2018. 3 .     On 8 June 2020 the District Court, on an appeal by the applicant, upheld the care order and set the applicant’s contact at two hours six times per year. The District Court had appointed an expert psychologist, who had submitted a report and attended the hearing of the case, which was conducted over three days. The applicant was represented by counsel and gave evidence. In addition, fifteen witnesses gave evidence and several documents were submitted in evidence. In its judgment, the District Court took into account the applicant’s history of using alcohol and narcotics and multiple treatments she had undergone in psychiatric institutions. It also considered her prolonged stay at a division of the regional hospital dedicated to the treatment of alcohol abuse, both during the applicant’s pregnancy and together with her daughter in the period following X’s birth. The District Court extensively examined, moreover, the child’s development and care needs and the court-appointed expert psychologist’s findings in that respect. It concluded that the applicant was incapable of providing her daughter with the personal contact and security that she needed in view of her age and development. As to the issue of contact rights, the District Court considered that contact had to be sufficiently extensive so as to facilitate reunification of the family, but at the same time the daughter had had various adverse reactions to the contact sessions that had been conducted up to that point, which the District Court examined in detail. 4.     On 14 September 2020 the High Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 5.     On 11 November 2020 the Supreme Court’s Appeals Committee dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the High Court’s decision. 6.     In her application lodged with the Court, the applicant submitted that the issuance of the care order and the limited contact rights that she had been granted had amounted to a violation of her right to respect for her family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 7.     The Court finds that the decisions to issue a care order in respect of X and to limit the applicant’s contact rights amounted to an “interference” with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life enshrined in Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, it has not been disputed, and the Court also finds it unequivocally established, that the interference had a basis in domestic law, namely the 1992 Child Welfare Act, which was applicable at the material time, and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting X’s “health” and her “rights”. The remaining issue is solely whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. 8.     The general principles relevant to the necessity test were extensively set out in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway ([GC], no.   37283/13, §§   202 ‑ 13, 10 September 2019) and have since been restated in a number of cases, including Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway ([GC], no. 15379/16, §   145, 10   December 2021). From those principles, it follows in particular that the Court must determine whether, in the light of the entirety of the case, the reasons adduced to justify the measures in question were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 and whether the parents have been adequately involved in the decision-making process seen as a whole (see Strand Lobben and Others , cited above, §§ 203 and 212). 9.     As concerns whether relevant and sufficient reasons were advanced by the domestic authorities in the context of the instant case, the Court observes that, during extensive proceedings in which the applicant was fully involved, the domestic courts gave thoroughly reasoned decisions, setting out in detail both why they considered a care order to be necessary and why the applicant should not be granted more extensive contact rights for the time being (see   paragraph 3 above). It finds no basis for considering that the reasons advanced were not both relevant and sufficient to justify the issuance of the care order. 10.     Turning to the issue of contact rights, the Court bears in mind that it has recently given judgments in several cases involving the respondent State in which it found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention relating to the justifications provided by the domestic authorities for the establishment of particularly restrictive contact regimes (see, for cases where shortcomings in relation to decisions on contact rights in themselves led to the finding of a violation, K.O. and V.M. v. Norway , no. 64808/16, §§ 67-71, 19   November 2019, and A.L. and Others v. Norway , no. 45889/18, §§ 47-51, 20   January 2022; see also, for cases where similar shortcomings formed important parts of the context in which violations had occurred, Strand Lobben and Others , cited above, §§ 221 and 225; Pedersen and Others v. Norway , no.   39710/15, §§   67-69, 10 March 2020; Hernehult v. Norway , no. 14652/16, §§   73-74, 10   March 2020; and M.L. v. Norway , no. 64639/16, §§ 92-94, 22   December 2020). 11.     The Court considers, however, that there are important differences in the facts of this case compared to those cited in the previous paragraph. In particular, the Court observes that in the instant case, the District Court expressly noted that the contact had to be fixed at such a level that the ultimate goal of reunification of the family would not be undermined and it provided specific reasons as to why, nonetheless, contact had to be limited at that time. Those reasons related to the child’s adverse reactions to the contact sessions, which were examined in detail in the District Court’s judgment (see   paragraph 3 above). The Court has no basis for questioning the District Court’s assessment of the level of contact which was in the child’s best interests in the specific circumstances of this case and considers that the reasons provided by the District Court were both relevant and sufficient. 12.     In the light of the above, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and thus “necessary in a democratic society”, for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must accordingly be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.   For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 18 January 2024.     Dorothee von Arnim   Jovan Ilievski   Deputy Registrar   President