CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 9 janvier 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s448F0C15 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 77048/17 Ágnes Júlia CSÉFFAI against Hungary   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9   January   2024 as a Committee composed of:   Alena Poláčková , President ,   Péter Paczolay,   Gilberto Felici , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   77048/17) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 24 October 2017 by a Hungarian national, Ms Ágnes Júlia Cséffai (“the applicant”), who was born in 1954, lives in Békéscsaba, and was granted leave to represent herself; the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the fairness and the adversarial character of a litigation, with the applicant as the plaintiff, in which the appeal hearing was foregone. 2.     The applicant’s son and X entered into a pre-contract in May 2015 pursuant to which the parties were to exchange the vehicles owned by the applicant and X, and the applicant was to pay the difference in value to X. The parties agreed that the final contract was to be concluded on the condition that the air conditioning system of the applicant’s car had been repaired. On 12 May 2015, X refused to purchase the applicant’s car due to its malfunctioning air conditioner. On 13 May 2015, the applicant got her car checked by mechanics, who, after finding no issue with the air conditioner system, issued a record of maintenance. 3.     As X opposed the applicant’s ensuing order for payment, a civil case for damages was brought before the Buda Central District Court. The District Court held several hearings, heard witnesses of all parties, and established that X carried the burden of proof for the refusal to fulfil the pre-contract. In June 2016 the District Court found that the record of maintenance, as the only objective piece of evidence, proved the fulfilment of the condition set out in the pre-contract and that X had refused to complete his part of the pre ‑ contract, giving rise to his civil liability for damages. 4.     X appealed against the first ‑ instance decision, arguing that the record of maintenance could not prove the proper functioning of the air conditioner system the day before which he claimed was the contract date. 5.     The applicant did not make any submission and neither the applicant nor X asked for a hearing to be held. 6.     On 31 January 2017 the Budapest High Court reversed the first ‑ instance decision without holding a hearing. It found that the functioning of the air conditioner system on 12 May 2015 was to be proven by the applicant, not X. It found that while the applicant had submitted in the first ‑ instance proceedings that the system had been repaired prior to 12   May   2015 by the same mechanics who had issued the record of maintenance on 13 May 2015, she had failed to provide proof corroborating this claim (such as the invoice for the said repair). Consequently, it had not been proven beyond doubt that the air conditioner system had been repaired before the planned conclusion of the final contract, and therefore the High Court dismissed the applicant’s civil claim with respect to X. 7.     The applicant submitted a constitutional complaint alleging a violation of her right to a fair hearing and of her right to an effective remedy. In decision no.   3253/2017 (X.10.) of 3 October 2017, the Constitutional Court dismissed her complaints finding that she had had ample opportunity to gain knowledge of the appeal and that she could have requested a hearing on appeal. 8.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the absence of a hearing before the High Court and the alleged lack of adversarial procedure at the appellate level amounted to a violation of her right to a fair hearing. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention relating to a lack of public hearing on appeal 9.     The applicant submitted that, as a matter of fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, the High Court should have held a hearing. The Government argued that the applicant’s conduct during the appellate proceedings must be interpreted as a tacit waiver of the right to an oral hearing. 10.     The general principles concerning the right to a public hearing and its exceptions have been summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v.   Portugal ([GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 190-91, 6 November 2018). Principles relating to the reassessment of evidence by a higher-level jurisdiction to the detriment of the applicant without holding a hearing in civil (administrative) appeal proceedings are set out in Pákozdi v. Hungary (no.   51269/07, §§ 26-29, 25   November 2014, concerning a tax-law matter). 11.     The Court reiterates that the manner in which Article 6 of the Convention applies to proceedings before courts of appeal depends on the special features of the domestic proceedings viewed as a whole. Even where the court of appeal has jurisdiction both over the facts and in law, Article   6 does not always require a right to a public hearing. The publicity requirement is certainly one of the means whereby confidence in the courts is maintained. However, the Court has also accepted that there are other considerations, including the right to a trial within a reasonable time and the related need for an expeditious handling of the courts’ case-load, which must be taken into account in determining the necessity of public hearings in the proceedings subsequent to the trial at first-instance level (see, for example, Rippe v.   Germany , no. 5398/03, 2 February 2006, with further references). 12.     The Court observes the present case concerns the applicant’s civil rights and obligations. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is therefore applicable to the present case under its civil limb (see, a contrario , Pákozdi , cited above, §   22). Article 6 § 1 implies a right to an oral hearing at least at one level of jurisdiction ( Salomonsson v. Sweden , no. 38978/97, § 36, 12 November 2002)   – which requirement the District Court satisfied in that public hearings were held at first instance, where the parties and their witnesses were heard and evidence was taken. 13.     The Court reiterates that the obligation to hold a hearing is not absolute and that the character of the circumstances that may justify dispensing with an oral hearing essentially comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by the competent national court ( Jussila v. Finland [GC], no.   73053/01, §§ 41-42, ECHR 2006-XIV). It further notes that Chapter 6 on Small Claims, section 393 (2)-(3) of Act no. III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a hearing to be held on appeal, if requested by any of the parties. As part of the information on appeals, the first-instance decision expressly set out this condition. In view of this, the Court attaches particular importance to the applicant’s conduct, who, given her knowledge of the grounds of appeal and the condition to request a hearing on appeal, decided not to do so. 14.     Lastly, the Court finds that the appeal contested the probative value of the report of maintenance, a point of law of no particular complexity (see Ramos Nunes de   Carvalho e Sá , cited above, § 190 (b), with further references). While the High Court exercised full jurisdiction over facts and law, the mere fact that it disagreed with the first-instance court’s stance on the legal significance of a piece of evidence did not require, in the Court’s view, a public hearing to be held so as to hear witnesses or take other oral evidence. Indeed, the Court accepts that, in the present case, all questions of fact and law could be adequately resolved on the basis of the case file and that no pertinent additional information could have been gathered by hearing the applicant in person. Consequently, there is no appearance of a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this regard (compare and contrast, Pákozdi , cited above, § 39). 15.     Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the principle of adversarial proceedings 16.     The applicant also complained that the reversal of the burden of proof without the quashing of the first-instance decision and the subsequent possibility to have her case heard again at first instance resulted in a breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings. The Government disagreed. 17.     The Court considers that in the present case the applicant could actively participate in the second-instance proceedings by making submissions in reply to the other party’s appeal arguments. She could also have requested a hearing, which as noted above, she did not. 18.     In so far as the applicant’s complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts ( García Ruiz v.   Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). 19.     The Court notes that the High Court reached its own conclusions on the basis of evidence, in particular the parties’ submissions. The applicant has not claimed that she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to present her case or that she was placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis her opponent. Moreover, as noted above, she had knowledge of, and could comment on the grounds of appeal formulated by X. The applicant therefore had ample opportunity to convince the High Court of the merits of her arguments (see Dallos v.   Hungary , no. 29082/95, § 50, ECHR 2001-II). 20.     Accordingly, the Court finds that the proceedings, taken as a whole, were adversarial and fair. For these reasons, this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 1 February 2024.     Liv Tigerstedt   Alena Poláčková   Deputy Registrar   President