CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 février 2024

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margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s7BE5FA7D { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF90455E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s78D9F4EC { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid } .s2A91C753 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid }   SECOND SECTION CASE OF JAKUTAVIČIUS v. LITHUANIA (Application no. 42180/19)   JUDGMENT   Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Access to court • Domestic courts’ refusal in civil proceedings to reimburse costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in administrative-law violation proceedings in which he had successfully challenged a fine imposed on him for driving under the influence of alcohol • Core of the applicant’s complaint concerned a pecuniary claim which was “civil” in nature • Art 6 applicable under its civil limb • “Civil limb” of proceedings remained closely linked to the criminal limb, the outcome of the administrative-law violation proceedings being a decisive factor concerning the applicant’s pecuniary expectations • In case circumstances very essence of right to access to a court not impaired   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 13 February 2024   FINAL   13/05/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Jovan Ilievski,   Egidijus Kūris,   Saadet Yüksel,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Diana Sârcu,   Davor Derenčinović , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   42180/19) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Saulius Jakutavičius (“the applicant”), on 1 August 2019; the decision to give notice to the Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning the right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 16 January 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the issue of the reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in administrative-law violation proceedings in which he successfully challenged a fine imposed on him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant complained that the fact that his costs and expenses had not been reimbursed had violated his right to effectively defend himself, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Vilnius. He was represented by Mr K. Rugys, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms   K.   Bubnytė ‑ Širmenė. ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS 4 .     On 12 August 2014 the applicant was stopped by the police while driving his car in Palanga and asked to take a breathalyser test. The test detected 1.91 per mille of alcohol (the legal limit for driving was 0.4 per mille). The police drew up a record of an administrative-law violation under Article   126   §   4 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations (see paragraph   52 below). The record stated that the applicant had not disputed the violation. 5 .     Within one hour after being stopped by the police the applicant went to a hospital where a blood test was performed (see paragraph 53 below). It detected no alcohol in his blood. 6 .     The applicant challenged the police’s decision before the courts. He submitted that on the day in question he had drunk some vodka while having breakfast because he had not had any plans to drive a car that morning. However, he had unexpectedly been called to a meeting which could not be postponed. He had felt sober and fit to drive. While leaving the car park at his residential building, he had honked the horn of his car as a form of greeting to a neighbour. Immediately afterwards he had been stopped by the police, who had been patrolling nearby. The applicant submitted that he had been nervous because he had thought that he might have to take a breathalyser test; therefore, he had impulsively sprayed some perfume in his mouth and on his clothes, without realising that it contained a high concentration of alcohol. Accordingly, he contended that that had been the reason for the result of the breathalyser test. He relied on the results of the blood test (see paragraph 5 above) as proof that he had not been drunk. 7 .     One of the police officers who had stopped the applicant testified before the court that she had decided to stop his car because he had honked the horn. The officer had detected the smell of alcohol inside the applicant’s car and had thus asked him to take the breathalyser test. However, she had been surprised by the high result of the test because the applicant had not appeared to be as drunk as the test had shown. 8 .     During the court proceedings, doubts were raised as to whether the blood test had been performed on the blood of the applicant, rather than on another person. A DNA analysis was carried out which showed that it had indeed been the applicant’s blood. 9 .     On 20 January 2015 the Vilnius District Court found the applicant liable for the administrative-law violation of driving under the influence of alcohol, gave him a fine of 579 euros (EUR) and withdrew his driving licence for two years. It held that there were no objective reasons to question the accuracy of the results of the breathalyser test. Moreover, in view of the fact that the applicant had admitted that he had drunk alcohol before driving, the court had doubts concerning the accuracy of the blood test (see paragraph 5 above). 10.     The applicant lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision and on 19 March 2019 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the grounds that the lower court had not properly assessed all the available evidence. 11.     After a fresh examination, on 25 May 2015 the Vilnius District Court discontinued the administrative-law violation proceedings on the grounds that no such violation had been committed (see paragraph 51 below). The court held that it had no grounds to question the applicant’s account of the events, specifically that he had sprayed perfume into his mouth very shortly before taking the breathalyser test (see paragraph 6 above), which could explain the results of that test, which even the police officer had found surprising (see paragraph 7 above). In such circumstances, the results of the breathalyser test could not be considered reliable. On the other hand, the court found no reason to doubt the accuracy of the blood test (see paragraph 5 above). It therefore concluded that it had not been proved that the applicant had been driving under the influence of alcohol. 12.     The police lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision, but on 27 July 2015 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld that decision in its entirety. PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF the applicant’s COSTS AND expenses 13 .     In April 2017 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State in which he claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary damage caused by unlawful actions of the police, under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 20 below). He sought the reimbursement of EUR 1,502, consisting of EUR 202 which he had paid for the DNA analysis (see paragraph 8 above) and EUR 1,300 in lawyer’s fees. He submitted that he had the right to defend himself from an allegation that he had breached the law, and the law entitled him to do so with the assistance of a lawyer (see paragraph 19 below). Although neither the Code of Administrative Law Violations nor any other legal instrument provided for the possibility of a person in respect of whom an administrative fine had been annulled having his or her costs and expenses reimbursed, the Constitutional Court had held that the Constitution required the payment of compensation in respect of any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained by a person and that there could be no exceptions to this principle (see paragraph 21 below). 14 .     The applicant further submitted that the police officers had failed to carry out their duties diligently. In particular, they had admitted that the applicant’s car had been stopped only because he had honked the horn, and not because he had been driving in a dangerous manner, and that his behaviour had not indicated that he was drunk, even though the results of the breathalyser test had shown a high level of alcohol (see paragraph 7 above). Moreover, he had told the officers that he had sprayed perfume into his mouth. Despite the contradictions between the results of the breathalyser test and the other circumstances, the officers had not sought to clarify the situation and had acted formalistically by drawing up the record of an administrative-law violation. The applicant also contended that the breathalyser test had not been conducted in accordance with relevant rules. He submitted that the police officers’ negligent actions had made it necessary for him to defend himself in court and that his costs and expenses had been justified and properly substantiated. He argued that if the costs and expenses were not reimbursed, that would amount to a violation of his right to defend himself before a court and would be contrary to the Constitution. 15.     The applicant also asked the administrative courts to apply to the Constitutional Court for an examination of whether the fact that the Code of Administrative Law Violations did not provide for the reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred in administrative-law violation proceedings complied with the Constitution. 16 .     On 6 December 2017 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that, under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code, compensation for damage could be awarded only when such damage had been caused by the unlawful actions of the State or its officials. The court noted that the law entitled police officers to stop and check drivers, and if a driver had been driving under the influence of alcohol, the police were required to draw up a record of an administrative-law violation. The court considered it immaterial that, as the applicant had argued, the officers had stopped him only because he had honked the horn and not because he had been driving dangerously. It noted that the applicant had been stopped because he had not used the horn for its intended purpose and that after stopping his car, the police officer had detected the smell of alcohol in the car. The breathalyser test had detected an alcohol content of 1.91 per mille and the court found no grounds to believe that the test might not have been administered in accordance with the relevant requirements. It further noted that the applicant had admitted that he had drunk vodka before driving and that, after taking the breathalyser test, he had told the officers that he had sprayed perfume into his mouth. Moreover, he had not disputed the violation at the time (see paragraph   4 above). The court concluded that, in such circumstances, the officers had acted in accordance with the law by drawing up a record of an administrative-law violation. It also observed that even though the administrative-law violation proceedings had eventually been discontinued, the courts in those proceedings had not found that the police officers had committed any unlawful actions. Accordingly, the conditions under Article   6.271 of the Civil Code giving rise to the civil liability of the State had not been met. 17 .     The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court also dismissed the applicant’s request for the matter to be referred to the Constitutional Court. It held that, according to the Constitutional Court’s case-law, courts had the right to refer to it only questions regarding the constitutionality of legal provisions which were to be applied in the proceedings at hand. However, the Code of Administrative Law Violations had not been applied in the proceedings which the applicant had instituted against the State, and therefore the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court did not have the right to ask the Constitutional Court to examine its compliance with the Constitution. 18 .     The applicant lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision, in which he relied on essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised in his claim (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above). However, on 3 April 2019 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. The Supreme Administrative Court, referring to its previous case-law, held that although the law did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by a person against whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been instituted, when exercising his or her right to legal defence, that person could use the services of a paid lawyer, and according to the principle “loser pays”, those costs had to be reimbursed. The costs of legal defence constituted direct expenses and they could amount to damage which had to be compensated for under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code. However, under that provision, it had to be established that the public authorities or officials had acted unlawfully, and according to the consistent case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, the mere fact that the administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued did not suffice to demonstrate the existence of unlawful actions. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A COURT, THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER AND THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 19 .     The relevant domestic legal framework and practice concerning, inter alia , the right of access to a court, the right to be represented by a lawyer in court proceedings and the right to receive compensation for damage inflicted by others, including public authorities, have been summarised in Černius and Rinkevičius v.   Lithuania (nos. 73579/17 and 14620/18, §§ 23-46, 18 February 2020). 20 .     In particular, Article 6.271 § 1 of the Civil Code provides that damage caused by unlawful acts of public authorities or officials must be compensated for by the State, irrespective of fault on the part of an individual civil servant or employee. Article 6.249 § 1 of the Civil Code defines damage as, inter alia , loss of or damage to property, expenses incurred and loss of income. 21 .     In a ruling of 19 August 2006 the Constitutional Court held: “In the course of protection and defence of human rights and freedoms ... particular importance is attributed to the matter of compensation for damage. It is established in Article 30 § 2 of the Constitution that compensation for material and moral damage inflicted upon a person shall be established by law. Thus, the necessity to compensate material and moral damage inflicted upon a person is a constitutional principle ... This constitutional principle is inseparable from the principle of justice entrenched in the Constitution: all the necessary legal preconditions must be created by law in order to justly compensate for the damage inflicted. Thus, the Constitution requires the establishment by law of such legal regulation that a person who has sustained damage as a result of unlawful actions would be able in all cases to claim just compensation for that damage and to receive the relevant compensation. ... [It] should be emphasised that it does not follow from the Constitution that it is possible by law to establish some exceptions under which the moral and/or material damage inflicted upon the person is not compensated, for example, for the reason that it was inflicted by unlawful actions of officials or institutions of the State itself. If the law, let alone another legal instrument, established such legal regulation whereby the State would fully or partially avoid the duty to justly compensate for material and/or moral damage inflicted by unlawful actions of the State institution or [its] officials, it would mean not only that the constitutional concept of compensation for damage would be disregarded, that not being in line with the Constitution ( inter alia , Article 30   §   2 thereof), but it would also undermine the raison d’être of the State itself as a common good of the whole society. ... [It] should be noted that, under the Constitution, a person has the right to claim compensation for damage inflicted by unlawful actions of State institutions and officials, also when the corresponding compensation for damage is not specified in any law, while the courts deciding such cases have the constitutional power, by applying the Constitution directly (the principles of justice, legal certainty and legal security, proportionality, due process of law, the equality of persons and the protection of legitimate expectations, as well as other provisions of the Constitution) and general principles of law, pursuing, inter alia , the principle of reasonableness ... , to award the corresponding compensation for damage.” REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS AND EXPENSES Civil proceedings 22.     Under Article 93 § 1 and Article 98 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the party in whose favour a case was decided has the right to be awarded the costs of legal representation and other expenses which it incurred in relation to the case, to be paid by the other party. Proceedings concerning administrative disputes 23.     Proceedings concerning administrative disputes – that is to say, disputes between individuals and public administrative entities, or between several public administrative entities, or those concerning the civil service or elections – are conducted in accordance with the Law on Administrative Proceedings. 24.     The Law on Administrative Proceedings provides that the party in whose favour a case was decided has the right to be awarded the costs of legal representation and other expenses which it incurred in relation to the case, to be paid by the other party (from 1 May 1999 to 31   December 2000 that regulation was provided in Article   59   §   1, from 1   January 2001 to 30 June 2016 in Article 44 § 1, and from 1   July 2016 in Article 40 § 1). Criminal proceedings (at the material time and until 30 April 2022) 25.     Articles 103 and 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide for reimbursement of procedural expenses to victims, witnesses, experts, specialists and interpreters participating in criminal proceedings. 26.     Article 105 establishes the conditions under which expenses incurred by participants in the proceedings may be awarded to be paid by the convicted person, except for expenses related to interpretation, which have to be borne by the State in all cases. Under Article   105   §   5, when the criminal proceedings are discontinued or when the accused is acquitted, the expenses incurred by victims, witnesses, experts or specialists have to be reimbursed by the State. 27 .     Article 106 § 1 provides that where the suspect, the accused or the convicted person has been granted State-guaranteed legal aid, his or her legal costs have to be borne by the State, whereas in other circumstances those costs have to be borne by the suspect or the accused or convicted person himself or herself. 28 .     At the material time and until 30 April 2022, the Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide for the reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred by a person who had been acquitted in criminal proceedings or in respect of whom such proceedings had been discontinued. Proceedings concerning administrative-law violations (at the material time and until 30 April 2022) Statutory provisions 29.     At the material time and until 31 December 2016, proceedings concerning violations of administrative law were conducted in accordance with the Code of Administrative Law Violations. 30 .     At the material time, Article 279 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided for the reimbursement, from the budget of the court or other entity examining the case, of the expenses incurred by victims, witnesses, experts and interpreters participating in administrative-law violation proceedings. 31 .     At the material time, Article 302 1 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided, inter alia , that in cases where a court set aside a decision on an administrative-law violation taken by another entity and discontinued the proceedings, any money or items which had been seized had to be returned and any previously applied restrictions had to be lifted. 32.     On 1 January 2017 the Code of Administrative Offences entered into force, and since that date, proceedings concerning violations of administrative law have been conducted in accordance with the provisions of that Code. 33.     From its entry into force until 30 April 2022, Article 666 of the Code of Administrative Offences provided that the reimbursement of procedural expenses was to be decided by applying, mutatis mutandis , the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 34 .     Article 643 of the Code of Administrative Offences lays down essentially the same regulation as that which was previously provided in Article 302 1 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations (see paragraph 31 above). 35 .     At the material time and until 30 April 2022, neither the Code of Administrative Law Violations nor the Code of Administrative Offences provided for the reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred by a person in respect of whom proceedings concerning a violation of administrative law had been discontinued. Courts’ practice (a)    Supreme Administrative Court 36 .     In a decision of 15 December 2003, in case no. A4-689-03, the Supreme Administrative Court examined a claim against the State lodged by an individual who had been given an administrative fine which had subsequently been annulled. Relying on Articles 6.249 and 6.271 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 20 above), the claimant claimed compensation for his legal costs incurred in the administrative-law violation proceedings. The Supreme Administrative Court firstly held that the fact that a fine had been annulled because the courts had found the evidence to be insufficient did not, in and of itself, constitute grounds to find that the entity or officer who had given that fine had acted unlawfully. It further held that legal costs incurred in administrative-law violation proceedings did not fall within the scope of Articles 6.249 and 6.271 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Law on Administrative Proceedings was not applicable to proceedings concerning administrative-law violations. Therefore, the question of reimbursement of legal costs incurred in such proceedings had to be decided in accordance with the Code of Administrative Law Violations, which did not provide for reimbursement of legal costs to persons in respect of whom a record of an administrative-law violation had been drawn up (see paragraphs 30 and 35 above). The Supreme Administrative Court further noted that the examination of cases concerning administrative-law violations did not fall within the scope of public administration; therefore, legal instruments which provided for compensation in respect of damage caused in the course of activities of public administration were not applicable in administrative-law violation proceedings. Accordingly, it dismissed the claim. 37.     In a decision of 17 September 2007 in case no. A-469-751-07 and a decision of 28 December 2007 in case no. A-556-1197-07, the Supreme Administrative Court reiterated that the fact that an administrative fine had been annulled because the courts had found the evidence to be insufficient did not, in and of itself, constitute grounds to find that the entity or officer who had given that fine had acted unlawfully, and also that the legal costs incurred in administrative-law violation proceedings did not fall within the scope of Articles 6.249 and 6.271 of the Civil Code. 38 .     In a decision of 14 July 2011 in case no. A-63-2176-11, the Supreme Administrative Court examined a claim against the State lodged by an individual who had been given an administrative fine by the police for a violation of road traffic rules. That fine had subsequently been annulled, and the courts in the administrative-law violation proceedings had found that the police record had not been properly drawn up. The Supreme Administrative Court noted that, according to the well-established case-law of the Constitutional Court, the Constitution required that a person who had sustained pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of the unlawful actions of other persons or public authorities had to be able to claim compensation. In line with that principle, damage sustained by a person had to be compensated for, despite the fact that such a possibility was not explicitly provided for in the Code of Administrative Law Violations. The Supreme Administrative Court further held that pecuniary damage which a person had sustained in administrative-law violation proceedings had to be compensated for where the conditions laid down in Article 6.271 of the Civil Code had been met, including that the unlawfulness of the actions of public authorities or officials had to be established (see paragraph 20 above). In that case, it was found that the police officers had not properly drawn up the report in respect of fining the claimant. Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that their unlawful actions had been established and that the claimant’s legal costs incurred in the proceedings in which he had challenged that decision had to be reimbursed. 39 .     In a decision of 29 November 2016 in case no. eA-1615-261/2016, the Supreme Administrative Court examined a claim against the State lodged by an individual who had been given an administrative fine by the police, which had subsequently been annulled because the courts had considered the evidence to be insufficient. The Supreme Administrative Court found that, despite the fact that the Code of Administrative Law Violations did not provide for the reimbursement of the legal costs incurred by person challenging a fine for an administrative-law violation, that Code entitled such a person to use the services of a paid lawyer; therefore, the legal costs incurred had to be reimbursed in line with the “loser pays” principle. The court further stated that the costs of legal defence constituted direct expenses and could amount to damage within the meaning of Article   6.249 of the Civil Code, which had to be reimbursed under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 20 above). It also reiterated that the Constitution required that a person who had sustained damage as a result of unlawful actions on the part of other persons or public authorities had to be able to claim compensation (see paragraph 38 above). On the basis of those considerations, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the claimant’s legal costs incurred in the administrative-law violation proceedings had to be reimbursed. The claimant had also sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage, but the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed that part of the claim. It reiterated that the annulment of a fine because of insufficient evidence did not constitute grounds to find that the entity which had imposed that fine had acted unlawfully, and in the case at hand there was no indication that the police officers had been biased or that they had restricted the claimant’s fundamental rights. 40 .     In a decision of 26 June 2018 in case no. A-442-756/2018, the Supreme Administrative Court examined a claim against the State lodged by an individual who had been given an administrative fine by the police. That fine had subsequently been annulled and the courts in the administrative-law violation proceedings had found that the police had not properly followed the relevant procedure. The Supreme Administrative Court reiterated that the legal costs incurred by a person challenging a fine for an administrative-law violation had to be reimbursed in line with the “loser pays” principle (see paragraph 39 above). It also reiterated that the annulment of a fine on the basis of insufficient evidence did not constitute grounds to find that the entity which had given that fine had acted unlawfully. However, in the case at hand, it had been established that the police officers had failed to properly follow the relevant procedure when drawing up the disputed decisions, and thus their unlawful actions had been established and the claimant’s legal costs, incurred when he had challenged those decisions, had to be reimbursed under Article   6.271 of the Civil Code. (b)    Supreme Court 41 .     In a decision of 26 November 2012 in case no. 2AT-17-2012, the Supreme Court examined the question of reimbursement of legal costs in administrative-law violation proceedings. The claimant had been given an administrative fine which had subsequently been annulled by the courts. In those same proceedings, he had asked the courts to order the other party to cover his legal costs. The first-instance court had dismissed that request on the grounds that the law did not provide for such reimbursement, whereas the appellate court had quashed that decision and awarded the claimant his legal costs, to be paid by the other party (the appellate court’s decision was summarised in Černius and Rinkevičius , cited above, §   39). The Supreme Court reopened the administrative-law violation proceedings and quashed the appellate court’s decision. It held that the Code of Administrative Law Violations did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by a person in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued (see paragraph 35 above). Such costs could constitute damage, for which compensation could be granted under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 20 above), but compensation for damage caused by the unlawful actions of public authorities fell outside the scope of administrative-law violation proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the claimant had the right to institute new proceedings before the administrative courts, seeking compensation under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code, and that in the administrative-law violation proceedings his claim for the reimbursement of legal costs should be left unexamined. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 March 2021 42 .     In its ruling of 19 March 2021, the Constitutional Court examined whether Article 302 1 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations (see paragraph 31 above) was compatible with the Constitution, and in particular with the right of access to a court, in so far as it did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs to a person in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued on the grounds that no such violation had been committed. 43.     The Constitutional Court referred to the Court’s judgment in Černius and Rinkevičius (cited above, §§ 68 and 74). In that judgment, the Court had held, inter alia , that the Convention was intended to guarantee not rights that were theoretical or illusory but rights that were practical and effective; that the possibility of bringing legal proceedings did not, in and of itself, satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; that the applicants’ intention in going to court had not been to participate in court proceedings as an academic exercise, but rather to obtain a result; that going to court to defend their rights was pointless if in the end they were in a worse situation than they had been before litigating; and that the ex post facto refusal to reimburse the applicants’ costs had constituted a hindrance of their right of access to a court. 44.     The Constitutional Court also referred to its extensive case-law regarding the right of access to a court, in particular that any person who believed that his or her rights had been violated had the right to defend those rights before a court; that the defence of rights had to be practical and effective; that the right of access to a court could not be artificially restricted or its exercise made unjustifiably difficult; and that a person’s right to legal defence, including the right to be defended by a lawyer, could not be denied or restricted on any grounds or by any means (see, for a summary of some of the relevant case-law, Černius and Rinkevičius , cited above, §§ 28-30 and 33). 45.     In the light of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court concluded that the fact that the Code of Administrative Law Violations did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by a person in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued on the grounds that no such violation had been committed was not consistent with the right of access to a court guaranteed by the Constitution. In particular, that legal regulation meant that a person who had successfully challenged an administrative fine with the help of a lawyer might find himself or herself in a worse situation than he or she would have been in without having defended his or her rights, which amounted to an unjustifiable burden on the exercise of the right of access to a court. 46 .     The Constitutional Court also noted that, similarly, Article 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by an acquitted person (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above) and that that regulation was not in compliance with the Constitution either. Legal amendments following the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19   March 2021 47 .     After the adoption of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 March 2021, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Administrative Offences regarding reimbursement of legal costs were amended. The amendments were enacted on 12 April 2022 and entered into force on 1 May 2022. 48.     Following the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article   106   §   3 states that if a person is acquitted, the court must decide on the reimbursement of his or her legal costs, provided that those costs were necessarily incurred and properly substantiated, and taking into account the circumstances of the case. 49 .     Following the amendment of the Code of Administrative Offences, Article 666 § 2 provides that if the proceedings against a person are discontinued on the grounds that a violation of administrative law has not been committed, that person’s legal costs are to be reimbursed by applying, mutatis mutandis , the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. OTHER RELEVANT CASE-LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 50 .     In a ruling of 13 December 2004, the Constitutional Court held as follows: “Legal instruments (or parts thereof) are considered to be in compliance with the Constitution and legitimate until the moment when, following the procedure established by the Constitution and the Law on the Constitutional Court, they are ruled to be in conflict with the Constitution ... Thus, until the moment when a legal instrument (or parts thereof) ... is ruled to be in conflict with the Constitution ... the legal regulation established therein is compulsory for the subjects of the legal relationship in question.” OTHER RELEVANT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 51 .     At the material time, Article 302 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided that a court examining a complaint against a decision on an administrative penalty could take one of the following decisions: (1) to dismiss the complaint and uphold the impugned decision; (2)   to quash the decision and discontinue the proceedings; (3)   to change the decision and impose a different administrative penalty; (4)   to quash the decision and remit the case for additional investigation; (5)   to change the decision and impose a more lenient penalty or no penalty at all. 52 .     At the material time, Article 126 § 4 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided, inter alia , that driving under the influence of alcohol with a medium level of intoxication (between 1.51 and 2.5   per mille) or a high level of intoxication (2.51 per mille and above) was punishable by a fine of 2,000 to 3,000 Lithuanian litai (approximately EUR 579 to EUR   869) and the withdrawal of the driving licence for a period of two to three years, or by ten to thirty days’ administrative detention and the withdrawal of the driving licence for a period of two to three years. 53 .     At the material time, the Rules on determining the level of intoxication of persons driving motor vehicles and other persons, adopted by the government on 12 May 2006 and subsequently amended several times, provided, inter alia , that a person who disagreed with the results of an alcohol test administered by the police had the right to present himself or herself at a healthcare facility and carry out a medical examination at his or her own expense (point 27). THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 54.     The applicant complained that his right to effectively defend himself had been violated on account of the fact that the costs and expenses which he had incurred in the administrative-law violation proceedings had not been reimbursed. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), considers that the main issue arising in the present case is whether the lack of the reimbursement of the applicant’s costs and expenses was compatible with the right of access to a court guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. That provision reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” Admissibility 55.     At the outset, the Court considers it necessary to determine whether the present case falls to be examined under the civil or the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention. It reiterates that the applicability ratione materiae of the Convention defines the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not prevented from examining this question of its own motion (see Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no.   53080/13, § 71, 13   December 2016, and Vegotex International S.A. v.   Belgium [GC], no. 49812/09, §   59, 3   November 2022). 56.     The applicant was involved in two sets of proceedings before the domestic courts: administrative-law violation proceedings, in which he challenged the penalty imposed on him for driving under the influence of alcohol, and civil proceedings, which he instituted against the State, seeking reimbursement of his costs and expenses incurred in the administrative-law violation proceedings. 57 .     In a number of previous cases, the Court has found that road-traffic offences punishable by fines or driving restrictions fell within the scope of the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention, irrespective of their classification under domestic law, in view of the general character of the legal provisions regulating such offences and the fact that the penalties served a purpose which was both deterrent and punitive (see Lutz v.   Germany , 25   August 1987, §§   51-55, Series A no.   123; Malige v.   France , 23 September 1998, §§ 35-40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VII; and Igor Pascari v. the Republic of Moldova , no.   25555/10, §§ 20-23, 30   August 2016). 58.     However, in the present case, the applicant did not complain about the fairness of the proceedings concerning the administrative-law violation of driving under the influence of alcohol. Instead, he complained about the fact that, after those proceedings had been terminated, he had not been reimbursed for his costs and expenses (see, mutatis mutandis , Topolovčan v. Croatia (dec.), no.   67405/10, §§   19-22, 11   December 2012). The Court is mindful that the costs at issue originated in proceedings which fell under the criminal limb of Article 6 (see the Government’s argument in paragraph 66 below). However, it considers that the core of the applicant’s complaint concerned a pecuniary claim, which is “civil” in nature (see Leuska and Others v. Estonia , no. 64734/11, § 51, 7 November 2017, and Kamenova v. Bulgaria , no.   62784/09, § 41, 12 July 2018). At the same time, having in mind that the outcome of the administrative-law violation proceedings, which fell within the scope of the criminal limb of Article 6 (see paragraph   57 above), was the decisive factor concerning the applicant’s pecuniary expectations, the Court is of the view that this “civil limb” of the proceedings remained closely linked to the criminal limb (see, mutatis mutandis , Topolovčan , cited above, § 19). 59.     The Court has consistently held that the Convention does not grant a person who is “charged with a criminal offence” but subsequently acquitted a right to reimbursement of costs incurred in the course of criminal proceedings against him or her, however necessary those costs might have been (see Lutz , cited above, § 59; Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands , 28 September 1995, § 49, Series A no. 327 A; Yassar Hussain v. the United Kingdom , no. 8866/04, § 20, ECHR 2006 III; Ashendon and Jones v. the United Kingdom (revision), nos. 35730/07 and 4285/08, § 49, 15 December 2011; and Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25424/09, § 98 (c), ECHR 2013; see also the Government’s submissions in paragraph 67 below).