CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 20 février 2024

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margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid }   FOURTH SECTION CASE OF DANILEŢ v. ROMANIA (Application no. 16915/21)     JUDGMENT   Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Disciplinary sanction imposed by National Judicial and Legal Service Commission on judge on account of two posts on his Facebook page • Domestic judicial authorities’ decisions delivered without weighing up competing interests at stake in accordance with criteria laid down in European Court’s case-law • Insufficient evidence of impairment of dignity and honour of judicial office • Reasons not relevant and sufficient   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 20   February 2024   Referred to the Grand Chamber   24/06/2024   This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article   44 §   2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Danileţ v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President ,   Tim Eicke,   Faris Vehabović,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins,   Anne Louise Bormann,   Sebastian Răduleţu, judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar , Having regard to: the application (no.   16915/21) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr   Vasilică-Cristi Danileţ (“the applicant”), on 18   March 2021; the decision to give notice to the Romanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the alleged interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression and alleged damage to his professional reputation; the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant; the comments submitted by the association Romanian Judges’ Forum (Forumul Judecătorilor din România), which was granted leave to intervene as a third party by the President of the Section; Having deliberated in private on 4   July and 17   October 2023 and on 16   January 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The application concerns the consequences of a disciplinary sanction imposed by the National Judicial and Legal Service Commission on a judge who had posted two messages on his Facebook page (Article   10 of the Convention). It also relates to an allegation of damage to his professional reputation (Article   8 of the Convention). THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Cluj-Napoca. He was represented by Ms   N.   Popescu, a lawyer. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms   O.F.   Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. THE MESSAGES POSTED BY THE APPLICANT 4 .     At the relevant time the applicant was a judge at Cluj County Court. He was known for his active participation in debates on democracy, the rule of law and the judiciary and enjoyed significant nationwide renown as a former member of the National Judicial and Legal Service Commission ( Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii – “the CSM”), a former vice-president of a court, a former advisor to the Minister of Justice, a founding member of two non ‑ governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the field of democracy and justice and the author of several articles on legal matters. 5 .     On 9   January 2019 the applicant posted the following message on his Facebook page: “You might have noticed the string of efforts to attack, disrupt and discredit institutions such as the Directorate General of Information and Internal Protection, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the police, the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, the gendarmerie, the High Court of Cassation and Justice’s Public Prosecutor’s Office, the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the army. [The attacks in question] didn’t just happen randomly after ‘the abuses committed by the powers that be’. Do people realise what it would mean to weaken [these] institutions or, worse, to bring services, the police, the courts and the army back under political control? And speaking of the army, have you ever given much thought to Article   118 §   1 of the Constitution, which provides that ‘the army shall solely serve the will of the people in order to ensure   ... constitutional democracy’? What would happen if one day you happened to see the army on the streets defending ... democracy, because support appears to be waning these days? Would you be surprised to know that this solution would be ... constitutional?! I think we can’t see the wood for the trees ...” 6 .     On 10   January 2019, again on his Facebook page, the applicant posted a hyperlink to a press article headed “A prosecutor sounds the alarm. Living in Romania today represents a huge risk. The red line has been crossed when it comes to the justice system”, which had been published on a national news website. In the interview on which the article in question was based, C.S., a prosecutor, had given his point of view on how the public prosecutor’s office was handling criminal cases and on prosecutors’ difficulties in dealing with the cases assigned to them. This second post by the applicant was accompanied by the following comment: “Now here’s a prosecutor with some blood in his veins, speaking his mind about dangerous prisoners being freed, our leaders’ bad ideas on legislative reform, and judges and prosecutors being lynched!” 7 .     The first post (see paragraph   5 above) was quoted and discussed by some national media outlets the following day. 8.     The second post (see paragraph   6 above) also attracted several comments. 9.     On 10   January 2019 a spokesperson for the Judicial Inspection Board informed the Chief Inspector, L.N., of the content of the applicant’s two posts. That same day the Judicial Inspection Board took up the case, of its own motion, with a view to disciplinary proceedings. The Judicial Inspection Board’s Disciplinary investigation 10 .     On 17   January 2019 the Judicial Inspection Board opened a disciplinary investigation in respect of the applicant for impairing the honour and good reputation of the judiciary (Article   99(a) of Law no.   303/2004 on the status of judges and prosecutors   –   see paragraph   28 below). A judicial inspector analysed the applicant’s first post (see paragraph   5 above). He observed that it had been quoted and discussed by eleven different media outlets and that it contained a suggestion by the applicant that an intervention by the army to defend democracy would be a constitutional solution. With regard to the second post (see paragraph   6 above), the judicial inspector noted that the applicant had reposted a press article and had added comments of his own, encouraging judges and prosecutors to express their views publicly on issues relating to the functioning of the justice system; criticising reforms, “lynchings” of judges and prosecutors and the adverse effects of compensatory remedies; and endorsing the subject matter of the article in question. The judicial inspector, referring to the provisions of the code of ethics for judges and prosecutors, found indications that the applicant had failed to comply with his duty of discretion and thus may have tarnished the good reputation of the judiciary. 11 .     On 4   February 2019 the applicant first argued before the Judicial Inspection Board that the press articles quoting his two Facebook posts should not be admitted in evidence, because they could not be attributed to him. He then pointed out that his first message had been posted in the context of the appointment of the Army Chief of Staff, so it had had no connection with his judicial activities, his professional reputation or the prestige of the judiciary. With regard to his second post, he submitted that expressing his support for the prosecutor C.S. had been an unremarkable gesture and he confirmed that he still agreed with C.S.’s point of view. He requested that the Judicial Inspection Board take statements from two journalists, a linguist, a Romanian-language teacher, a colonel (to find out how those individuals had understood the disputed posts), the prosecutor C.S. (to verify whether he had sustained any damage after the messages in issue had been posted), a judge (N.G.), an artist and an academic (to attest to the applicant’s level of professional integrity and to the prestige of the judiciary before and after the two messages had been posted). 12 .     On 5   February 2019 the Judicial Inspection Board admitted in evidence the statement of Judge   N.G. for the purpose of assessing the applicant’s level of professional integrity and the prestige enjoyed by the judiciary before and after the messages in dispute had been posted. It rejected the other statements on the grounds that they were outside the scope of the case. Judge N.G., who had said that she had not paid much attention to how the media had presented the applicant’s allegations, stated that the first post in issue was inoffensive. She explained that the applicant was “an activist, a fighter and a very determined person”, who posted large amounts of content. She affirmed that she had not read the second post. As to the good reputation of the judiciary before and after the first message had been posted, she said that she had noticed no change and pointed out that the message in question had not made national headline news. 13 .     On 12   February 2019 the applicant was interviewed by an inspector from the Judicial Inspection Board. He stated that he had made regular media contributions by appearing on television since 2003 and by posting daily messages on his Facebook page   – where he had some 50,000   followers   – since 2011. He explained that he had posted the first message in the context of the debate triggered by the appointment of the Army Chief of Staff and had been seeking to draw readers’ attention to a highly important matter. Under the Constitution, the army was entrusted with ensuring democracy, so appointing an army leader on the basis of political criteria had potential ramifications for citizens’ lives, he said, in reference to the historical events of the 1989 revolution. He claimed that his message had been neither a warning nor a call to disobey the law, but rather a mere reminder of the relevant statutory provisions. He further stated that the message had not had any connection to his judicial activities, but had expressed one of his main concerns as a citizen. According to the applicant, he could not be held responsible for the fact that some journalists had failed to understand the intended meaning of the message, and people were free to leave comments on his Facebook page. Regarding the second post, the applicant confirmed that he had been championing judicial independence and supported all initiatives to that end. Freedom of expression, he submitted, entitled him to post messages on his Facebook page provided that he did not comment on pending cases or court rulings and that he did not attack other judges or prosecutors. Lastly, he requested that several individuals who knew him (judges, journalists, students and teaching staff) be interviewed to attest to his professional integrity and to the reputation of the judiciary. The Judicial Inspection Board interviewed five judges and a clerk and rejected the applicant’s other requests for evidence. Most of the individuals interviewed described the applicant as an honest judge who was highly active in the field of legal education for young people and who voiced discerning personal opinions in the public sphere. 14 .     On 20   February 2019 the Judicial Inspection Board decided to pursue the case, opened of its own motion, on grounds of damage to the honour and good reputation of the judiciary (Article   99(a) of Law no.   303/2004   –   see paragraph   28 below), to initiate disciplinary proceedings and thus to refer the matter to the CSM’s disciplinary board for judges. The disciplinary sanction imposed on the applicant by the CSM’s disciplinary board for judges 15 .     On 16   April 2019 the CSM’s disciplinary board for judges, meeting as a nine-judge panel, noted that the applicant was absent, found it unnecessary to hear the witnesses again, took note of the Judicial Inspection Board’s submissions and postponed the delivery of its decision until 7   May 2019. 16 .     In a decision of 7   May 2019 the disciplinary board approved the disciplinary action by a majority. It found that the applicant had committed the disciplinary offence provided for in Article   99(a) of Law no.   303/2004 and, in accordance with Article   100(b) of that same law (see paragraph   28 below), ordered his pay to be cut by 5% for two months. In reaching that finding, the disciplinary board observed that an online newspaper had published the applicant’s first post (see paragraph   5 above) and then several other media outlets had published articles on that post in turn. It further noted that the applicant had posted a second message on his Facebook page concerning an article on an interview with the prosecutor C.S., to which the applicant had added a comment (see paragraph   6 above). The disciplinary board considered that the applicant had breached the rules of conduct that generally applied to judges and prosecutors and had caused harm to the justice system as a whole. 17 .     The disciplinary board pointed out that judges had a duty not to impair the dignity of their office or the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, along with a duty to exercise restraint each time the judiciary’s authority and impartiality was at stake and a duty to express their opinions cautiously so as to avoid the risk of jeopardising public respect for and confidence in judicial bodies. In that connection, the disciplinary board referred to Morissens v.   Belgium (no.   11389/85, Commission decision of 3   May 1988, Decisions and Reports   56, p.   127), Wille v.   Liechtenstein ([GC], no.   28396/95, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII) and, mutatis mutandis , Özpınar v.   Turkey (no. 20999/04, §   68, 19   October 2010). It considered that, unlike the factual situation considered by the Court in the case of Baka v.   Hungary ([GC], no.   20261/12, §§   168-76, 23   June 2016), the manner in which the applicant in the present case had presented his views was inappropriate given his office as judge and had been such as to cast doubt on the credibility of the institutions of the State. It found that, by insinuating that public institutions were politically controlled and suggesting an intervention by the army as a possible solution for ensuring democracy, the applicant had breached the duty of discretion incumbent on judges and prosecutors. Regarding the second post in dispute, the disciplinary board found that the language used, in particular the expression “a prosecutor with some blood in his veins”, had overstepped the limits of decency and had been unworthy of a judge. 18 .     The disciplinary board considered that, despite the applicant’s use of rhetorical devices, the message that he had sought to convey had been clear and easily understandable for those who had read and commented on the posts. His statements had not, therefore, been value judgments but plain defamatory allegations, with no supporting arguments, that had been such as to call in question the credibility of the institutions of the State. Accordingly, the applicant’s initiative had not been aimed at starting a debate on matters of public interest or of major importance for the justice system. The disciplinary board further found that the fact that the applicant had used social media to make the statements in issue was additional evidence that he had wanted to share his messages with anyone who had access to his Facebook page. Moreover, the applicant had confirmed that intention in his statements to the Judicial Inspection Board (see paragraph   13 above). The disciplinary board considered that the defence chosen by the applicant, in particular the argument that he had voiced his opinion as an ordinary citizen, could not discharge him from disciplinary liability, because judges were required to show moderation and caution when exercising their freedom of expression   – be it in the exercise of their office or in their private lives   – to prevent public scepticism of the impartiality, independence and prestige of the judiciary. It considered that the manner in which the applicant had chosen to address the issue of the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office and to comment on the interview with the prosecutor C.S. had been such as to upset the fair balance between his right to freedom of expression and a democratic State’s legitimate interest in ensuring that civil and local-government services were in line with the aims laid down in Article   10 §   2 of the Convention. In consequence, the disciplinary board found that the applicant’s opinions, which had been expressed publicly and outside the scope of his professional duties, and the manner in which he had described the events in question, using inappropriate and indecent terms, had undermined the dignity of his office and impaired the impartiality and good reputation of the judiciary. 19 .     Regarding the disciplinary offence committed by the applicant, the disciplinary board noted his concession that, on account of his conduct (posting the disputed messages on his Facebook page, where he had some 50,000   followers   – see paragraph   13 above), he had breached the statutory provisions (see paragraph   28 below) and social norms concerning universally accepted moral values. It therefore found a disciplinary offence, committed without direct intent, that had had an impact on public confidence in and respect for judges and on the good reputation of the judiciary, because the applicant’s opinions in those messages had been quoted and discussed by a significant number of media outlets, giving rise to substantial public debate. As to the sanction, the disciplinary board made reference to the damage caused to society’s interactions with the justice system in general, to the actual personal circumstances of the applicant and to the educational and preventive role played by the disciplinary proceedings and noted that the applicant’s messages, which had been quoted by the media, had generated public suspicion as to whether judges and prosecutors were fulfilling their statutory duties. After taking into account the seriousness of the disciplinary offence in question, its consequences and the long-standing lack of public confidence in the justice system, it considered that an objective, dispassionate dialogue on the shortcomings of the justice system would have been preferable in the present case. Those elements, taken together, justified a sanction (a two-month, 5% pay cut for the applicant   – see paragraph   16 above) that was to serve as a warning to him of the potential consequences of adopting similar behaviour in the future. 20 .     Three of the nine members of the disciplinary board issued a dissenting opinion, emphasising that the disciplinary offence found against the applicant was not made out. They explained that in his first message the applicant had expressed a personal opinion on a topical issue at the relevant time, namely the court-ordered suspension of the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office, which had initially been upheld by the appellate court but then had been overturned by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”). The three judges considered that forbidding judges and prosecutors from making any critical comments on matters of public interest, without further formalities or consideration, amounted to an excessive restriction of their freedom of expression. As to the second message in dispute, they considered that, by posting a comment on an article about the prosecutor C.S. (an article that had, moreover, been discussed in a forum organised for judges and prosecutors), the applicant had committed no disciplinary offence, nor had the honour and good reputation of the judiciary been impaired. In any event, according to the statements taken by the Judicial Inspection Board, the applicant was someone who was highly active on social media and interested in issues concerning civil society – given that he was involved in legal education for young people – and whose posts had made only a neutral impression on his peers (see paragraphs   12 and 13 in   fine above). The three judges in the minority further stated that the media’s different interpretations of the applicant’s posts could not be attributed to him and that the mere fact that the applicant had expressed a personal opinion on a matter of public interest, without referring to the court in which he held office or to other judges or prosecutors, was not sufficient to find that he had breached his duty of discretion. In that connection, the dissenting judges referred to the Baka judgment (cited above, §   165). They considered that the manner in which the applicant had expressed his opinion on a matter giving rise to significant public debate at the relevant time was not such as to impair the independence, impartiality or good reputation of the judiciary. Lastly, according to the three judges in question, the applicant had expressed value judgments with the aim of defending the rule of law and had not overstepped the limits of freedom of expression. The appeal to the High Court against the disciplinary sanction 21 .     The applicant appealed against his disciplinary sanction, arguing that it was unlawful and unfounded. He first pointed out that sanctions could only be imposed on judges and prosecutors for the disciplinary offences provided for in Article   99 of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   28 below). He also challenged the disciplinary board’s decision on the grounds that it had been based on a breach of rules of conduct, which, he argued, could no longer be used to justify a disciplinary sanction in his case, especially following legislative amendments in 2005. He then criticised the disciplinary board’s vague assessment of whether the expressions he had used deserved rebuke and its failure to provide specific examples. He indicated that his first post had not sparked any debate but that certain media outlets which regularly criticised the judiciary had twisted his words in bad faith. He submitted that the aim of his message was to express the need to keep the army sheltered from any political influence and thereby prevent it from being used by leaders at a given time to “defend democracy”. According to the applicant, the message was in line with what he had been teaching about the legal system for several years. He contended that there was no evidence, including in the statements taken by the Judicial Inspection Board (see paragraphs   12 and 13 in   fine above), of any damage done to the good reputation of the judiciary. The duty of discretion, he asserted, applied only to his office of judge and to pending cases assigned to him, not to his engagement with the community. 22 .     Regarding his second post, the applicant confirmed that he had expressed his admiration for the prosecutor C.S. and had shown his agreement with his statements, in which C.S. defended the good reputation of the judiciary and advocated the separation of executive and judicial powers, at a time when many judges and prosecutors had spent several months protesting against what they had considered to be an attack on judicial independence by Parliament and the government by means of legislative reforms. The applicant further submitted that no sanction had ever been imposed on the prosecutor C.S. for his interview. Lastly, he claimed that the disciplinary board had refused to impose a less severe sanction on him. He stated that the Judicial Inspection Board had not brought the matter of his second post before the disciplinary board and referred, mutatis mutandis , to a decision of the Constitutional Court finding a provision of the law governing the profession of lawyer unconstitutional. The provision in question defined misconduct as any actions that were “such as to impair the good reputation of the profession”, an expression the Constitutional Court had criticised as lacking clarity and precision. The applicant also filed his written submissions with the High Court. 23 .     In a judgment of 18   May 2020 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the disciplinary decision adopted on 7   May 2019 (see paragraphs   16-19 above). In its examination of the lawfulness of the sanction, the High Court noted that the disciplinary board had taken into account the essential elements of the disciplinary offence provided for in Article   99(a) of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   28 below) and not the aspects addressed in the code of ethics, which, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, could in any event provide the basis for a disciplinary offence. 24 .     With regard to the merits of the disciplinary decision, the High Court observed that the disciplinary board had analysed the facts in the light of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and his duty of discretion. It considered that such duty, which was protected under Article   99(a) of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   28 below), was rooted in the general principles of professional ethics (independence, impartiality and integrity) and required judges and prosecutors to exercise moderation and restraint in their professional, social and private lives. It found that it was impossible to list all activities that might breach that duty of discretion, because judges and prosecutors were required to adapt their conduct to the generally accepted moral and ethical principles of society, acting in good faith in all circumstances and displaying fairness and decency. While emphasising the need to ensure a fair balance between freedom of expression and protection of judicial authority, the High Court pointed out that judges and prosecutors had an obligation to exercise caution when expressing their views so as to preserve the right of citizens to an independent, balanced judiciary free of political influence. It considered that the manner in which the applicant had expressed himself (which had been inappropriate given his position and had been such as to cast doubt on the credibility of the institutions of the State) had upset that balance. More specifically, according to the High Court, the applicant had suggested that the institutions of the State were controlled by politicians and had therefore mentioned the possibility of the army “being mobilised”. As the disciplinary board had found, such statements qualified, in the applicant’s case, as overstepping the limits of freedom of expression. The High Court further noted that, contrary to the applicant’s claim that his posts had not received significant media coverage (see paragraph   21 above), the disciplinary board had observed that they had been the subject of press articles in five leading media outlets and had been likely to prompt readers to draw a parallel with historical events. 25 .     According to the High Court, the applicant’s claim that the Judicial Inspection Board’s reference had contained no specific mention of his second post (see paragraph   22 above) was unfounded, because the reasoning for the disciplinary decision stated that the expression “a prosecutor with some blood in his veins”, which the applicant had used in his post of 10   January 2019 (see paragraph   6 above), had significantly overstepped the limits of decency required by his office. The High Court found that neither the disciplinary board nor the court were able to examine whether the applicant’s allegations were true or legally sound and thus to assess whether or not they had a factual basis. They amounted to a personal opinion that cast doubt on the credibility of the institutions of the State (including the justice system) and to a form of expression which was inappropriate for a judge to use in the public sphere. 26 .     The High Court then endorsed the disciplinary board’s observations concerning the applicant’s lack of direct intent and how, by posting the two messages, he had accepted the risk of impairing the good reputation of the judiciary. It also pointed out that “honour”, “professional integrity” and “good reputation of the judiciary” were “complex and dynamic [concepts and] could not be circumscribed or regulated rigidly”. It observed that, according to the disciplinary board, it was therefore impossible to examine those three concepts by taking statements or carrying out opinion polls, as the applicant had wanted. Behaviour contrary to that required of a judge or prosecutor as in the present case had to be examined in the light of international documents, laws and recommendations. The High Court further noted that the disciplinary board had lawfully reviewed all the relevant criteria (the direct consequences of the actions, the impairment of the good reputation and prestige of the judiciary, the applicant’s conduct, non ‑ compliance with the obligations inherent in his office and use of language that overstepped the limits of decency and integrity) before imposing the sanction in issue on the applicant. Given that the applicant’s inappropriate conduct had been covered in a negative light in the media and that he had positioned himself as a thought leader, a less severe sanction would have been impossible. In any event, the sanction imposed on the applicant was one of the most lenient provided for in Article   100 of Law no.   303/2004 (see paragraph   28 below). RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DOMESTIC PRACTICE DOMESTIC LAW The Constitution 27 .     The relevant provisions of the Romanian Constitution read: Article   30 Freedom of expression “(1)     Freedom of expression of ideas, opinions and beliefs and freedom of creation of any kind ... shall be inviolable. ... (2)     Freedom of expression shall not be prejudicial to any individual’s dignity, honour or private life or to the right to one’s own image.” Article   31 Right to information “(1)     There shall be no restrictions on individuals’ right to access information of public interest. ...” Article   118 Armed forces “(1)     The army shall solely serve the will of the people in order to ensure the sovereignty, independence and unity of the State, its territorial integrity and constitutional democracy ...” Law no.   303/2004 28 .     Law no.   303/2004 on the status of judges and prosecutors was in force until 15   December 2022, at which time it was repealed and replace by Law no.   303/2022. The relevant provisions of Law no.   303/2004, which are not included in the more recent legislation, read as follows at the relevant time: Article   44 “Competitions for promotion to a higher professional grade shall be open to judges and prosecutors who were ranked in the top performance band in their most recent appraisal, who have not had any sanctions imposed on them in the past three years and who fulfil the following seniority conditions: ...” Article   99 “Disciplinary offences shall comprise: (a)     Any behaviour that impairs the honour, the professional integrity or the good reputation of the judiciary, displayed either in or outside the exercise of professional duties; ...” Article   100 “The following disciplinary sanctions shall be imposed on judges and prosecutors in proportion to the seriousness of the offences [that they commit]: (a)     a warning; (b)     a reduction of up to 25% of their gross monthly remuneration for a period of one year; (c)     a disciplinary transfer to another court, including at a lower level, for a period of one to three years; (d)     a suspension of duties for up to six months; (e)     a demotion; (f)     indefinite removal from office; ...” INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW MATERIALS United Nations 29 .     The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary were adopted at the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan in 1985. They were subsequently approved by the General Assembly in Resolution   40/32 of 29   November 1985 and Resolution   40/146 of 13   December 1985. The relevant part reads: Freedom of expression and association “8.     In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.” 30 .     On 24   June 2019 the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers submitted to the Human Rights Council his report on the freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly by judges and prosecutors, both offline and online. The relevant recommendations read: Freedom of expression “101.     In exercising their freedom of expression, judges and prosecutors should bear in mind their responsibilities and duties as civil servants, and exercise restraint in expressing their views and opinions in any circumstance when, in the eyes of a reasonable observer, their statement could objectively compromise their office or their independence or impartiality. 102.     As a general principle, judges and prosecutors should not be involved in public controversies. However, in limited circumstances they may express their views and opinions on issues that are politically sensitive, for example when they participate in public debates concerning legislation and policies that may affect the judiciary or the prosecution service. In situations where democracy and the rule of law are under threat, judges have a duty to speak out in defence of the constitutional order and the restoration of democracy.” 31 .     The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 2019), in so far as their relevant parts are concerned, read: “1.6.     A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence. ... 2.2.     A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. ... 3.1.     A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer. 3.2.     The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. ... 4.1.     A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities. 4.2.     As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, a judge shall conduct himself or herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. ... 4.6.     A judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but, in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.” 32 .     The Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Social Media by Judges, prepared by the Global Judicial Integrity Network (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and published in January 2019, read as follows in so far as relevant: “16.     Judges should avoid expressing views or sharing personal information online that can potentially undermine judicial independence, integrity, propriety, impartiality, the right to fair trial or public confidence in the judiciary. The same principle applies to judges regardless of whether or not they disclose their real names or judicial status on social media platforms. ... 18.     Judges should be circumspect in tone and language and be professional and prudent in respect of all interactions on all social media platforms. It may be helpful to consider in respect of each item of social media content (such as posts, comments on posts, status updates, photographs, etc.) what its impact on judicial dignity might be if disclosed to the general public. The same caution applies when reacting to social media content uploaded by others. ... 23.     A judge may use social media platforms to follow topics of interest. It may be worth following a diverse range of topics and commentators to avoid creating their own ‘echo chambers’. However, a judge should be wary of following or liking particular advocacy groups, campaigns, or commentators where association with them could damage public confidence in the judge’s impartiality or the impartiality of the judiciary in general.” Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 33 .     The relevant part of the Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted on 17   November 2010 at the 1,098th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, reads: “19.     Judicial proceedings and matters concerning the administration of justice are of public interest. The right to information about judicial matters should, however, be exercised having regard to the limits imposed by judicial independence. The establishment of courts’ spokespersons or press and communication services under the responsibility of the courts or under councils for the judiciary or other independent authorities is encouraged. Judges should exercise restraint in their relations with the media. ... 21.     Judges may engage in activities outside their official functions. To avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest, their participation should be restricted to activities compatible with their impartiality and independence.” Venice Commission 34 .     The Report on the Freedom of Expression of Judges, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 103rd Plenary Session (19-20   June 2015), reads as follows in so far as relevant: “80.     European legislative and constitutional provisions and relevant case-law show that the guarantees of the freedom of expression extend also to civil servants, including judges. But, the specificity of the duties and responsibilities which are incumbent to judges and the need to ensure impartiality and independence of the judiciary are considered as legitimate aims in order to impose specific restrictions on the freedom of expression, association and assembly of judges including their political activities. 81.     However the ECtHR has considered that, having regard in particular to the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and the importance of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, any interference with the freedom of expression of a judge calls for close scrutiny. ... 84.     In the context of a political debate in which a judge participates, the domestic political background of this debate is also an important factor to be taken into consideration when assessing the permissible scope of the freedom of judges. For instance, the historical, political and legal context of the debate, whether or not the discussion includes a matter of public interest or whether the impugned statement is made in the context of an electoral campaign are of particular importance. A democratic crisis or a breakdown of constitutional order are naturally to be considered as important elements of the concrete context of a case, essential in determining the scope of judges’ fundamental freedoms.” 35 .     The successive amendments to Romania’s justice laws have attracted the attention of the Venice Commission (see Opinion No.   924/2018 on draft amendments to Law No.   303/2004 on the statute of judges and prosecutors, Law No.   304/2004 on judicial organisation and Law No.   317/2004 on the Superior Council for Magistracy [National Judicial and Legal Service Commission], adopted by the Venice Commission at its 116th   Plenary Session, Venice, 19-20   October 2018, and Opinion No.   950/2019 on Emergency Ordinances GEO No.   7 and GEO No.   12 amending the Laws of Justice, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 119th   Plenary Session, Venice, 21-22   June 2019) and the Group of States against Corruption (Interim Compliance Report, Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, adopted by GRECO at its 83rd   Plenary Meeting, Strasbourg, 17-21   June 2019). Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) 36 .     Opinion No.   3 (2002) of the CCJE to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the principles and rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and impartiality, reads as follows in so