CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 19 mars 2024

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He was represented before the Court by Ms I. Svechnikova, a lawyer practising in Moscow.    The circumstances of the case 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.    Proceedings regarding the applicant’s right to enter Lithuania      Motion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3 .     On 19 January 2021 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter “the Ministry”) requested the Migration Department of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter “the Migration Department”) to place the applicant on the list of aliens who were prohibited from entering the Republic of Lithuania. The Ministry referred to Article   133   §   5 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens (see paragraph   35 below). 4 .     The Ministry noted that the applicant was a popular music singer and producer in the Russian Federation and that he influenced a large population in that country and in other countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the former USSR), owing to his active concertising and organisational activities; those activities had been openly described by Russian Federation officials as a “soft-power” instrument of Russia. The Ministry also referred to the fact that the applicant had regularly visited and performed in the Crimean Peninsula, which had been unlawfully annexed by the Russian Federation, thus deliberately repudiating Ukraine’s territorial integrity as well as its sovereignty and indirectly justifying the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. For those reasons the applicant had been included on the list of persons in Ukraine who were prohibited from entering that country. 5 .     The Ministry stated that, considering that the applicant’s popularity had been taken advantage of by the Russian Federation in order to justify its aggressive foreign policy and to negatively indoctrinate the population of the Republic of Lithuania and that he himself had supported the occupational policy of the Russian Federation by his example and deliberate actions, the applicant’s visit to Lithuania might pose a threat to the Republic of Lithuania’s national security.      Decision of the Migration Department 6 .     On the same day, 19   January 2021, the Migration Department, referring to Article   133 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, took a decision to ban the applicant from entering Lithuania for a period of five years, until 18   January 2026. The Department noted that the applicant was a popular Russian performer and producer, who, because of his active concertising and organisational activities, had influence over a large part of society in the Russian Federation and in other States of the former USSR. His concert ‑ related activities were openly characterised as a tool of “soft power” by Russian Federation officials. The Migration Department stated that the applicant regularly visited and gave concerts in the Crimean Peninsula, which had been unlawfully annexed by the Russian Federation, thus intentionally denying Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and thereby indirectly justifying the Russian Federation’s aggressive actions. The applicant, because of his activities, had already been placed on the list of persons who had been banned from entering Ukraine. The Migration Department’s decision also noted that the Russian Federation used the applicant’s influence to justify its aggressive foreign policy and to negatively indoctrinate Lithuanian inhabitants, and the applicant, by his example and his deliberate actions, supported the Russian Federation’s occupational policy. The Migration Department thus considered that the applicant posed a threat to national security of the Republic of Lithuania.    Proceedings before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court      The parties’ submissions    The applicant 7 .     The applicant appealed. He argued, firstly, that the prohibition on his entering Lithuania had been based not on his behaviour but on third parties’ accounts of events that had no proper basis in fact, specifically, the Migration Department’s decision, which lacked facts relating to the specific period during which the applicant had visited the Crimean peninsula and his activities while he had been there which had resulted in his being banned from entering Lithuania. Instead, the Department’s decision had merely stated that he had supported the Russian Federation’s occupational policy by his example and his deliberate actions. Secondly, the applicant argued that he had been giving concerts in Crimea for the past thirty years, during music festivals in summertime, when Russian-speaking tourists visited the peninsula. The content of his songs had exclusively dealt with human nature ( apie žmogiškuosius dalykus ) – love, human relationships and nature – and had contained no hint whatsoever about politics, even less so any attempt to justify Crimea being joined to Russia. On the contrary, in his statements the applicant had expressed regret regarding the situation between Ukraine and Russia. Neither in his creative works ( nei savo kūryba ) nor by his behaviour or actions had he supported the occupational policy of any country. Rather, he was an artist and was not interested in politics. Thirdly, he argued that the Foreign Ministry and the Migration Department had had no basis for their attempts to impose on society the view that in the applicant’s case culture was being used for the Kremlin’s political aims. The applicant had not been placed on a list of persons who might pose a danger to national security by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine; rather, he had not been allowed to enter Ukraine because, when travelling to Crimea, he had not followed the Ukraine border and customs procedures. Fourthly, he argued that the restriction on his entering Lithuania had damaged his economic interests, since he could not give concerts as planned. Fifthly, he argued that the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens did not establish clear and concrete criteria regarding when a foreigner could be restricted from entering Lithuania; besides, other European Union countries had not banned the applicant from entering them; sixthly, the applicant argued that he posed no danger to the safety of Lithuania or neighbouring countries and that the measures applied to him had been disproportionate, since he was an EU citizen and thus could move within EU territory. The applicant argued, seventhly, that when responding to his complaint to the court, the Migration Department had provided entirely new grounds which had not been present in the Department’s decision. The Migration Department had relied on the threat which the applicant might pose to Lithuania’s national security in future and had mentioned no threats in relation to the actions which the applicant had already carried out. The applicant’s visits to Lithuania and his concerts there had not been supported by the Kremlin – he had been exercising his concertising activities independently; the Migration Department’s decision had been based exclusively on the Foreign Ministry’s subjective opinion. Besides, the State Security Department had not initiated a ban on the applicant’s entering Lithuania, as it had seen no basis for that action.    Migration Department 8 .     The Migration Department asked that the applicant’s appeal be dismissed: the Department had received reasoned conclusions as to why the applicant might pose a danger to national security in Lithuania from the competent institution which provided such conclusions – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and the Department had no ground to doubt such information. The circumstances referred to by the Ministry – that the applicant had clearly supported the unlawful and aggressive expansionist policy of the Russian Federation – had been confirmed by information available in public domain (Lithuanian and foreign media and social networks). The Migration Department also referred to the Lithuanian State institutions’ and scientists’ conclusions that an information war being waged by the Russian Federation and propaganda comprised particularly dangerous tools of influence and disinformation, not only for inhabitants of Russia, but also for those of Lithuania, those tools being used to persuade the public in respect of the virtue of Russia’s policies, for the purpose of which that country’s artists ( kultūros veikėjai ), and “especially the applicant”, who was well known and was capable of influencing a significant part of the population, had been used. 9 .     The applicant’s public statements and actions – his frequent visits and concerts in the occupied Crimean peninsula, his support for the annexation of Crimea and participation in events organised for that occasion, his public expressions of support for the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, his accepting of presents and State awards from Vladimir Putin and other publicly available and accessible information in the media – had demonstrated that the applicant was being employed as tool of “soft power” in the Russian Federation’s policy against the States’ territorial sovereignty and against respect for human rights and freedoms. Although the applicant had asserted that his music was about love, human relationships and nature, taking into account the general context of his creative expression ( įvertinus bendrą jo kūrybinės raiškos kontekstą ), he had been broadcasting an entirely different message that, among other things, the “return” of Crimea to Russia had been a glorious and victorious event. When giving concerts in the unlawfully annexed Crimean peninsula the applicant had linked that annexation, not to the rights of the Ukrainian citizens who lived there, their interests or their misery, but to Russia’s “victory” or to “unification” of Crimea and Russia, which was indirectly and metaphorically linked to such values and feelings as love, happiness, joy and friendship. The applicant clearly supported Russia’s unlawful policies, condemned by the Republic of Lithuania, and wanted his listeners to believe that the goals of the political actions exercised by Russia corresponded to the applicant’s listeners’ interests and values; that was why his arrival, his stay and his concert activities in the Republic of Lithuania might pose a threat to the safety of the Lithuanian State and its society, that threat being “real and obvious”, not simply based on general prevention of threats. Contrary to what the applicant had suggested, the Migration Department’s decision had been adopted on the basis of objective and reasoned data ( objektyvūs ir pagrįsti duomenys ), rather than suppositions, because it had been the applicant’s actual physical presence in Lithuanian territory and his actions during such presence before giving concerts, during them and afterwards, when he had indirectly spread pro-Russia propaganda, that had demonstrated the threat which he posed to the Lithuanian State’s security. 10 .     The Migration Department pointed out that various means of propaganda were used by Russia in the Baltic States: television, internet websites, social networks, movies and popular music singers who came from Russia to give concerts. Propaganda was firstly aimed at local Russian communities, however, it was also meant to influence a wider audience: Russian speakers or those who were sympathetic ( prijaučia ) towards Russian culture and those who yearned for the “glorious Soviet Union” era. The applicant was a famous and popular singer, therefore his interviews, public statements and declarations between the songs during his concerts were effective tools with which to spread the Kremlin’s propaganda. The applicant himself had not denied that he was a tool used for spreading the ideology of the President of the Russian Federation – the applicant publicly called himself Vladimir Putin’s “representative on stage” and constantly and publicly supported the President of the Russian Federation and his policies. Listening to the applicant’s songs online and over the radio did not allow him to spread propaganda, so the applicant had to physically travel to a country to give concerts and to meet the media there. The applicant, through his actions, contributed – not as a politician, but as an intentional broadcaster of Russia’s narrative – to disseminating Russia’s disinformation and propaganda and could be seen as an important part of that effort. 11 .     Neither the Ministry in its proposal regarding the applicant’s not being allowed to enter Lithuania (see paragraphs   3-5 above) nor the Migration Department in its decision (see paragraph   6 above) indicated that the applicant had been placed on the list of persons who posed a danger to Ukraine’s national security. Rather, the Migration Department’s decision stated that the applicant had been placed on the list of persons who were not allowed to enter the territory of Ukraine and that those circumstances had not been contested by the applicant. In fact, the applicant had misled the court by suggesting that he had been restricted from entering Ukraine on grounds of a simple breach of border crossing procedures, portraying it as a simple violation of technical rules. In fact, foreigners were forbidden from entering the territory of Ukraine from Crimea and they were also forbidden from entering Crimea from other territories besides Ukraine. Taking into account that the applicant had not been allowed to be present in Ukrainian territory and that, notwithstanding that fact, he had regularly given concerts in Crimea, the conclusion which followed was that he had entered Crimea, not from Ukraine, but from Russia, thus seriously breaching the laws of Ukraine and clearly demonstrating that he supported Russia’s occupational policy and disrespected Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. 12 .     The applicant had visited Lithuania rather frequently and planned to travel to Lithuania in future. Accordingly, the possibly negative influence on Lithuanian society and on the State on account of propaganda that was useful to Russia was obvious. The applicant’s presence in Lithuania might give rise to a threat to national security and the five-year entrance ban had to be seen as well-reasoned, proportionate and meeting the requirements of Lithuanian law. 13 .     The Migration Department asserted that the State’s right to control aliens’ entrance into its territory had been recognised both in the Supreme Administrative Court’s practice (in rulings A 858 -1810/2010, and A ‑ 4161 ‑ 756/2015) and by the Court (it referred to Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no.   46410/99, §   54, ECHR 2006-XII). Similarly, the States retained the discretion to regulate foreigners’ entrance to the country ( the Department referred to Auad v. Bulgaria , no.   46390/10, §   96, 11   October 2011). The applicant had not acquired a right to reside in the Republic of Lithuania and his family members did not live in Lithuania, where he had no other lawful interests which could be protected under the Convention. The Migration Department’s decision had not failed to strike a fair balance between the State’s and the applicant’s rights and lawful interests. The inconveniences which the applicant mentioned that he would experience if he were not able to enter Lithuania and give concerts there were insufficient to declare the Department’s decision unlawful, unfounded or disproportionate. 14 .     Lastly, Lithuanian law had been coordinated with EU law, in particular with Directive 2004/38/EC, in which Article   27 provides that States may restrict an EU national’s right to move freely within the territory (see paragraph   42 below). The Directive had been implemented by Article   98 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens (see paragraph   35 below) and that provision of law was imperative. In addition, the assessment of the threat to national security lay within the discretion of each EU member State; accordingly, the fact that the applicant had not been banned from entering the territory of other member States did not mean that he did not pose threat to Lithuania’s security. By the Migration Department’s decision, the applicant had only been banned from entering the Republic of Lithuania, with which he had no family, social or other important ties, leaving him a possibility of travelling to other Schengen countries.    Ministry of Foreign Affairs 15 .     The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked that the applicant’s appeal be dismissed. It referred to the Seimas ’ resolution of 2017 (see paragraph 39 below) and stated that between 2015 and 2021 the applicant had visited the Crimean peninsula numerous times and that he had publicly conveyed in various mass media outlets and on social networks messages to the effect that Crimea was part of the Russian Federation and that he essentially supported the unlawful, aggressive expansive policy of Russia and its President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine; he had also expressed his support for Vladimir Putin in public statements in which he had stated that he was Vladimir Putin’s “representative on stage”.    State Security Department 16.     The State Security Department, which had been given leave to intervene as third party in the proceedings, disagreed with the applicant’s complaint. The Migration Department’s decision had been taken on the basis of its own conclusion; the State Security Department had not provided any information or conclusions in relation to the applicant, the Ministry or the Migration Department. Even so, the State Security Department supported the Migration Department’s decision, holding that it was just and reasoned, and that when adopting the decision of 19   January 2021 the Migration Department had thoroughly evaluated the Ministry’s conclusions of 19   January 2021, the factual circumstances therein and the relevant legal norms.      Decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court 17 .     On 14   June 2021 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court had regard to Article 133 §§   6 and 8 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens (see paragraph 35 below) and point   37.1 of the Rules regarding the criteria to be assessed when a foreigner is placed on the list of persons prohibited from entering the Republic of Lithuania ( Kriterijų, kuriais vadovaujamasi nustatant ar sutrumpinant draudimo užsieniečiui atvykti į Lietuvos Respubliką laikotarpį arba išbraukiant duomenis apie užsienietį iš Užsieniečių, kuriems draudžiama atvykti į Lietuvos Respubliką, nacionalinio sąrašo, vertinimo tvarka – hereinafter “the Rules”; see paragraph   36 below) and concluded that a decision to the effect that a foreigner posed a threat to national security could be based on: (i) documents confirming the grounds of such ban, (ii) reasoned conclusions, and (iii) information relating to the fact that the foreigner might pose danger to national security. In the applicant’s case, the information about him had been provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which under the relevant provisions of the Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania was entrusted with the mandate of protecting national security. The information received by the Migration Department from the Ministry regarding the applicant had been sufficient for the Migration Department to take the decision regarding the threat which the applicant posed to national security. Besides, under the law, the Migration Department did not have a right to question the information provided by another competent institution (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or to assess it differently. In any event, the applicant had essentially not contested the facts given in the Ministry’s conclusion, that is, he had acknowledged that he had given concerts in the occupied Crimea and that he had been banned from entering Ukraine. 18 .     The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court then referred to the Supreme Administrative Court’s practice (in its ruling of 10   July 2019 in case no.   eA-4603-629/2019) to the effect that the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, in so far as it allowed for the expulsion of aliens on national security grounds, did not specify what constituted a threat to national security or public order. For its part, the Court had held that Article   8 of the Convention did not compel States to enact legal provisions which listed in detail any conduct that might prompt a decision to expel an individual on national security grounds; threats to national security might vary in character and might be unanticipated or difficult to define in advance; the notion of “national security” was not capable of being comprehensively defined and might be very wide, with a large margin of appreciation left to the executive to determine what is in the interests of that security (the court referred to C.G.   and Others v. Bulgaria , no.   1365/07, 24   April 2008). 19 .     The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court then referred to the Seimas ’ resolution of 2017 (see paragraph 39 below). The court also noted that, under the Supreme Administrative Court’s constant position (its rulings of 5   February 2015 in administrative case no.   A-506-624/2015 and of 8   March 2015 in administrative case no. A-2744-756/2017), it was important to take into account the entirety of data existing in the file when assessing a person’s behaviour. The Regional Court, having regard to the Seimas ’ resolution of 2017 (see paragraph 39 below) and taking into account the content of the information provided by the Ministry, had reached a conclusion that the Migration Department had had a basis for holding that the nature of the applicant’s actions had allowed a conclusion that he posed a danger to national security. 20 .     The ban on the applicant’s entering Lithuania and the duration of that ban corresponded to the goal sought – to prevent a threat to national security – and it was necessary for the protection of public interest. The applicant’s arguments that the ban was disproportionate were unfounded. The applicant had no family ties in Lithuania and under the relevant legal regulation – point 40.3 of the Rules (see paragraph 36 below) – an EU citizen who had no family ties in a country could be banned from entering that country for five years on national security grounds. The applicant was also a Bulgarian citizen and the Migration Department’s decision did not restrict his freedom of movement among other EU member States. 21 .     The court also explicitly stated that the ban on the applicant’s entering Lithuania, as established by the Migration Department’s decision, had a basis in the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, had been established with a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article   10 §   2 of the Convention and had been a necessary means of protecting national security. When adopting the decision, the Migration Department had followed the Rules and the Department’s decision was in compliance with Article   133 §   6 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens and with the requirements of Article 10 § 5 of the Law on Public Administration (see paragraph   37 below). Measures which had been undertaken by the Lithuanian State in the applicant’s case could not be considered to violate or restrict his rights under the Convention or under the Constitution. 22.     Lastly, although the applicant had also raised other arguments in his complaint (see paragraph   7 above), they were not essential for the resolution of the case and did not change the conclusion reached. The Court had also ruled that not every argument must be answered ( the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court referred to Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands , 19   April 1994, §   61, Series A no.   288, and Helle v. Finland , 19 December 1997, §   55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII).    Proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court      The parties’ submissions    The applicant 23 .     The applicant appealed, reiterating his previous arguments (see paragraph   7 above). He also stated that, at that time, he was not banned from giving concerts in other EU member States (Latvia, Estonia and Germany), and that, therefore, he posed no danger to Lithuania’s or neighbouring countries’ national security. Such restriction was unnecessary and did not meet the principle of proportionality under EU law. The applicant also referred to several Russian performers who had not been banned from entering Lithuania and further noted that the President of the Russian Federation, his press secretary and the President of the Republic of Belarus had not been banned from entering Lithuania. The Migration Department’s decision thus lacked logic and was discriminatory. The applicant considered that the Department’s decision had been based not on the applicant’s behaviour, but on third parties’ statements, which lacked an objective basis. The Department’s decision, based on the Ministry’s conclusion, had thus been taken “on the basis of the applicant’s beliefs and his political views” ( dėl pareiškėjo įsitikinimų ir politinio požiurio ) and not because of his specific behaviour. The applicant also questioned why it was not until 19   January 2021 that the Ministry had decided that he posed a danger to national security, given that such “threat” had not been noted by the previous Ministers of Foreign Affairs and also given that Crimea had been annexed in 2014 and the applicant had been giving concerts there for at least twenty-five years. The applicant also argued that most of the reasons which the Department had referred to in its response to the first-instance court (see paragraphs   8-14 above) had not been noted in the Department’s decision of 19   January 2021 (see paragraph   6 above). The applicant also considered that the Migration Department had made no attempt to substantiate in what way, by what actions and when the applicant had allegedly been supported by the Kremlin – the Department had not provided any such evidence in the case. 24 .     The applicant, who had provided the Court with a copy of a contract between him and a Lithuanian concert organising agency, lastly stated that the ban on his entering Lithuania was in breach of his economic interests, since, on account of the Department’s decision, the applicant would not be able to receive income from concerts planned in Lithuania in June.    Migration Department 25 .     The Migration Department asked that the appeal be dismissed: the assessment that the applicant posed a threat had been based, not on general prevention, but on the applicant’s specific behaviour which might pose a danger to national security. Besides the aforementioned arguments regarding the applicant’s dispersal of Russian propaganda, the Department referred to the Seimas ’ approved national security strategy, wherein “information threat” ( informacinė grėsmė ) was listed among the elements which might pose threats to national security (see paragraph   38 below). The Department noted that by way of the performances ( renginiais ) organised in Crimea, Russia sought to justify and enforce ( įtvirtinti ) the annexation, and the applicant, by giving concerts in Crimea, expressed his support for the Russian Federation’s criminal policy; thus, the applicant’s presence in the Republic of Lithuania and his spreading of Russian propaganda contradicted Lithuania’s national values and posed a danger to its national security. Pecuniary loss, which the applicant argued that he had sustained from being unable to enter Lithuania to give a concert, had not been substantiated by any documents, and, in any event, did not serve as a basis for finding the Migration Department’s decision disproportionate. The Migration Department stated that it was important to note that by its decision, the applicant had been banned only from entering Lithuania, where he had no family, social or other important ties, and that he retained the right to go to other Schengen countries. His rights as an EU citizen were therefore not seriously restricted. The Department’s decision had been taken in compliance with the principle of proportionality, given the applicant’s individual circumstances, thus the applicant’s references to other individuals who had not been banned were irrelevant. It was also irrelevant that the ban had not been established previously. 26.     The Department noted that it had comprehensively responded to the applicant’s arguments, which was why the content of the document provided to the first-instance court had been detailed. That did not mean that the response to the first-instance court had contradicted the Department’s decision or that new grounds had been presented in that response. The Department’s decision complied with the requirements of Article   10 of the Law on Public Administration, that fact being noted by the first-instance court, since the decision contained both factual and legal grounds.    Ministry of Foreign Affairs 27 .     The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the court to dismiss the applicant’s appeal, reiterating its previous arguments (see paragraphs   3-5 above). The Ministry referred to the Supreme Administrative Court’s practice of assessing foreigners’ potential to threaten national security from the perspective of potential for future threat (see paragraph   31 below). In the applicant’s case, the first-instance court had reached a reasoned conclusion that data in the file, that is, information which was not supposition or suspicion but established facts, confirmed that by organising concerts in Crimea the Russian Federation sought to justify its annexation and that the applicant had been clearly publicly supporting such policy.    State Security Department 28.     The State Security Department stated that the applicant had not provided any arguments contesting the circumstances established by the first ‑ instance court. The Migration Department’s decision had been neither discriminatory nor disproportionate.      Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court 29 .     By a final ruling of 1   September 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and left the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court’s decision unchanged. The court held that the first ‑ instance court had performed a comprehensive assessment of the evidence and its decision had been lawful and reasoned. The appellate court only wished to add the following points to the first ‑ instance court’s decision in response to arguments raised by the applicant in his appeal. 30 .     The Supreme Administrative Court noted that under the Convention, the States had a right to control the arrival of foreigners into their territory (it referred to Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no.   46410/99, §   54, ECHR 2006 ‑ XII) and, under Article   133 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, an EU citizen could be banned from entering Lithuania for up to five years if he or she posed a possible threat to national security or public order. Neither that Law nor other legal acts specified ( nedetalizuoja ) what those threats might be; the notion of “possible threat” depended on the particular circumstances of the case (the Supreme Administrative Court referred to its rulings of 23   June 2010 in case no. A 858 -1810/2010 and of 5   February 2015 in case no.   A-2744-756/2017). The Court had also held that threats to national security could differ, thus granting a wide margin to the authorities in defining it (the Supreme Administrative Court referred to C.G. and Others v.   Bulgaria , cited above, §   43). The Supreme A dministrative Court also referred to Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC (see paragraph 42 below) and the Court of Justice of the European Union’s judgment in case C ‑ 331/16 to the effect that a person’s behaviour which showed that he or she had breached the fundamental values established in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter “the TEU”) could be considered to pose a real and present danger to the main interests of society (see paragraph   43 below). 31 .     The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to its settled case ‑ law to the effect that each particular foreigner’s situation was unique: when assessing whether a foreigner’s presence in Lithuania might pose a threat to national security, the assessment was essentially from the perspective of potential for future threat. This meant that a certain prediction of a situation was unavoidable; even so, that process had to be based on established facts, especially on the person’s previous actions and their nature; it was on the basis of those actions that it was possible to draw a conclusion on whether a sufficiently “real and present” ( reali ir akivaizdi ) threat to national security was possible (the Supreme Administrative Court referred to its rulings of 23   June 2010 in case no.   A 858 -1810/2010, of 14   July 2016 in case no.   eA ‑ 3484-662/2016 and of 16 October 2019 in case no. eA-5322-520/2019). 32 .     The Supreme Administrative Court found it established that the Migration Department had banned the applicant from entering Lithuania on the grounds that he posed threat to national security as a tool of “soft power” of the Russian Federation. The court then held that, after assessing the publicly available evidence referred to by the Department, it considered that the applicant’s behaviour – his previous actions and their nature – provided sufficient ground to conclude that he posed threat to national security and that, therefore, the Department’s decision had been justified and necessary to the aim sought: that of preventing a foreigner, whose presence in Lithuania was not desired ( nepageidaujamas ) and was assessed as posing a threat to national security, from entering Lithuania. The applicant’s abstract arguments, related to general prevention or to the fact that he had not been banned previously, that is, in 2014, did not alter the court’s findings. 33 .     Regarding proportionality, the Supreme Administrative Court referred to Article   133 §§ 6 and 8 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens. There was no information in the case file showing that the applicant had family ties to persons living in Lithuania. Taking into account the fact that the ban was aimed at protecting an essential value ( apsaugoti esminę reikšmę turinčią vertybę ) – the safety of the Lithuanian State ( Lietuvos valstybės saugumą ) – and the fact that point   40.3 of the Rules established a specific term of the prohibition on entering the country when a particular ground set out in the Law was present, the Migration Department’s decision to ban the applicant from entering Lithuania was an appropriate and proportionate measure for the aims sought. For the court, no circumstances had been established as to why a ban of a length of other than five years should have been imposed. The Migration Department’s decision had banned the applicant only from entering Lithuania, taking into account that no family, social or other important connections linked him with Lithuania; his rights as an EU citizen to give concerts in other EU member states had not been curtailed. 34.     Regarding the applicant’s complaint that he was being discriminated against vis-à-vis Russian politicians and other artists ( kultūros veikėjais ), the Supreme Administrative Court held that each person’s situation was unique. The Migration Department had taken a decision after receiving information that the applicant posed a specific threat to national security. As correctly noted by the first-instance court, the Department had had no right to question the information provided by another competent institution or to assess it differently. The applicant’s other arguments were not essential for the resolution of the case. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE    Domestic law      Legislation and sub-statutory legal acts regarding aliens entering Lithuania 35 .     The relevant parts of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens ( Įstatymas “Dėl užsieniečių teisinės padėties” ), as in force at the material time, read as follows: Article 98. Grounds for refusing admission into the Republic of Lithuania to a national of an EU member State and his family member “A national of an EU member State and his family member shall be refused admission into the Republic of Lithuania if: ... (2) their stay in the Republic of Lithuania may represent a threat to national security ( valstybės saugumui ) or public order ( viešajai tvarkai ); ...” Article 133. Ban of entry into the Republic of Lithuania “5. A foreigner shall be subject to an entry ban prohibiting his entry into the Republic of Lithuania where he may represent a threat to national security or public policy. The length of the entry ban may exceed five years. 6. A national of an EU member State and/or his family member or another person who enjoys the right of free movement under legal acts of the European Union may be subject to an entry ban prohibiting his entry into the Republic of Lithuania for a period not exceeding five years solely in the event that his entry into and stay in the Republic of Lithuania may represent a threat to national security or public order. ... 8. A decision whether to ban a foreigner’s entry into the Republic of Lithuania shall be taken by the ... Migration Department... The length of the ban of entry into the Republic of Lithuania shall be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to all relevant circumstances of the individual case.” 36 .     By a decision of 14   April 2014 the director of the Migration Department adopted the Rules, which provide that an EU citizen, who has no family connection with persons living in the Republic of Lithuania and who exercises freedom of movement within the EU may be prohibited from entering Lithuania for a period of five years if his or her presence in the country may pose a danger to national security or public order (points 40 and 40.3 of the Rules). The decision to prohibit a foreigner from entering Lithuania is to be taken on the basis of a reasoned conclusion or information by a competent State institution that a foreigner may pose threat to national security or public order (point 37.1 of the Rules).      The Law on Public Administration 37 .     The Law on Public Administration reads that an administrative decision must contain a legal and factual basis as well as its reasoning (Article   10 §   5).      Other relevant materials 38 .     The relevant parts of the Seimas ’ Resolution ( nutarimas ) on the Approval of the National Security Strategy, adopted on 28   May 2002 and re ‑ worded on 17   January 2017, read as follows: THREATS, DANGERS AND RISK FACTORS “13. In the dynamic, complex and unpredictable security environment of the Republic of Lithuania the external, internal, military and non-military threats, dangers and risk factors are interlinked. Taking into account the changed security environment, conventional military threats to the Republic of Lithuania or any other country in the region are no longer theoretical, as military and non-military (diplomatic, information, cyber, economic, energy, financial and legal) measures against the national security of the Republic of Lithuania may be used concurrently, seeking to affect the most vulnerable areas of the State. 14. Threats, dangers and risk factors which must be given particular attention by the national security institutions are as follows: ... 14.6. threats to information : military propaganda spread by certain States and non ‑ State actors, warmongering and incitement to hatred, attempts to distort history and unsubstantiated and misleading information directed against the national security interests of the Republic of Lithuania which lead to the distrust of and dissatisfaction with the State of Lithuania and its institutions, democracy and national defence, seeking to widen national and cultural divides and to weaken national identity and active citizenship, attempts to discredit Lithuania’s membership of NATO, NATO capabilities and the commitment to defend allies and activities which undermine citizens’ will to defend their State; also information activities that are aimed at influencing the country’s democratic or electoral processes or the party system, or that are targeted at the societies and policy makers of other member States of the EU and NATO, seeking unfavourable decisions for the Republic of Lithuania; ...” 39 .     On 16   March 2017 the Seimas adopted Resolution ( rezoliucija ) no.   XIII-233 on Ongoing Occupation and Annexation of Crimea. The Resolution reads as follows (bold and italics in the original text): “The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, reminding   that three years ago the Russian Federation, by using armed military force, occupied and annexed a part of the Ukrainian territory – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol; having regard to   the UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 expressing support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and affirming the commitment of the United Nations to recognise Crimea as part of the Ukrainian territory; having regard to   the International Criminal Court’s Report on Preliminary Examination Activities of 14   November 2016 in relation to the international armed conflict in Ukraine, stating that the military aggression, which was unleashed by the Russian Federation three years ago in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and has currently expanded to Eastern Ukraine, gravely infringes the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and other international agreements; having regard to   the UN General Assembly Resolution of 19   December 2016 on the situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine); having regard to   the [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Parliamentary Assembly Resolution of 4 July 2016 on violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Crimea; expresses   its strong support for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine and the inviolability of its internationally recognised borders; strongly condemns   the ongoing occupation and annexation of part of the sovereign territory of Ukraine – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol – by the Russian Federation; reiterates its call on the Russian Federation to end the unlawful occupation and annexation of Crimea, withdraw its armed forces from the Ukrainian territory, immediately implement the Minsk agreements and comply with international law and its own obligations under international law; points out   that the intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula carried out by the Russian Federation poses a threat to the security and stability of the whole of Europe; ... expresses support   for the Ukrainian authorities’ raising the issues of recovery of the occupied and annexed territory and claims for damage incurred in the course of the occupation and annexation in international organisations and courts; appeals to   the political leaders, parliaments and governments of the transatlantic ‑ community and the European Union, urging them to pursue an active policy of non-recognition of the occupation and annexation of Crimea and to uphold the sanctions regime in a principled manner, preventing any attempts to evade it; furthermore, to unanimously uphold the position that the termination of the occupation and annexation of Crimea is one of the conditions for the resumption of full cooperation with the Russian Federation and the sanctions applied by the Western democratic communities for the actions that undermine the independence of Ukraine and infringe its territorial integrity should be maintained until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is restored in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine and international law.”    International law and material      Council of Europe 40 .     On 10   April 2014 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted resolution no.   1990 (2014) on Reconsideration on sub