CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 7 mai 2024

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ALBANIA (Application no. 24228/18)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Positive obligations • Private life • Dismissal of applicant’s compensation claim for serious injury sustained by his son in an attack by another pupil with a rubber catapult at a private school during a break between classes • Educational institutions in principle under an obligation to supervise pupils during the entire time they spend in its care, including class breaks, and expected to take appropriate measures to prevent use of dangerous objects pupils on school premises or custody • Domestic courts’ failure to adequately address applicant’s factual claims concerning events preceding and following the incident • Civil remedy available did not provide adequate protection against attack on applicant’s son’s physical integrity • Children and vulnerable individuals entitled to effective protection by the authorities • Domestic legal mechanisms applied in a defective manner Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Deprivation of access to a court due to dismissal of constitutional complaint as being lodged outside four-month time-limit calculated from date of delivery of Supreme Court’s decision rather than date decision was served   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 7 May 2024 FINAL   07/08/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Biba v. Albania, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Jolien Schukking,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Andreas Zünd,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   24228/18) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Mr Tonin Biba (“the applicant”), on 15 May 2018; the decision to give notice to the Albanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention that the State had failed to fulfil its positive obligations in a situation of violence inflicted on the applicant’s son by his schoolmate, and two complaints under Article 6 § 1, that the length of the civil proceedings in which the applicant sought compensation for his son’s injury had been excessive, and that the applicant had not been afforded a right of access to the Constitutional Court; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 5 and 26 March 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention as regards the manner in which domestic legal mechanisms were applied by domestic authorities in relation to an assault on the applicant’s son by another pupil at the private school they both attended. It further concerns the length of the civil proceedings for compensation in that respect, and the applicant’s right of access to the Constitutional Court, both the subject of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in New York, the United States of America. The applicant was represented by Mr N. Progri, a lawyer practising in Tirana. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr O. Moçka, the State Advocate. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5 .     In 2011, the applicant’s son D.B., born on 6 June 2000, was attending a private school in Tirana, “Ylber”. On 20 September 2011, at about 11.45   a.m., he was hit in his right eye by a projectile from a rubber catapult used by another pupil, M.Sh., who at the time was not yet fourteen. The applicant’s son consequently suffered a 90% loss of vision in the right eye. 6 .     On 16 December 2011 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation in the Tirana District Court against the school in his own name, but on behalf of his son, seeking compensation for the injuries suffered by his son (90% loss of vision in the right eye) in the amount of 1,526,585   Albanian Lek (ALL) which were calculated on the basis of a report by an expert, and consisted of non-pecuniary damage in the amount of ALL 157,700, and pecuniary damage in the amount of ALL   1,368,885. The applicant claimed that the school authorities were responsible for failing to protect his son from an assault by another pupil and for failing to react adequately to the incident. The applicant alleged that the school bore sole responsibility for this damage, as it had failed to take all necessary precautions to prevent his son’s injury. The applicant claimed that one pupil had brought twenty catapults to school and had distributed them among pupils in the applicant’s son’s class and other classes, and that they had been used over several days on the school premises without restriction and that nobody had done anything about it. That lack of compliance with the school’s regulations and discipline had resulted in the assault on his son. The applicant maintained that the pupil who had injured his son was a minor, whom his parents had entrusted to the school during school hours and who had accordingly been under the school’s control. The school had failed to offer adequate first aid to his son. The applicant alleged that the school authorities had not informed him immediately of the incident, even though his daughter, who attended the same school, had insisted that they do so. The applicant had become aware of his son’s condition only after picking him up from the school at 1 p.m., the usual time, and then taking him to the nearest hospital. The lack of immediate first aid had exacerbated his son’s medical condition. He also argued that following the incident no one from the school administration had made any inquiry about his son’s condition, thus showing indifference to the serious incident. The cost of the medical treatment had been paid by the applicant’s family insurance. The applicant claimed that he had approached his son’s school and asked its administration to cover the medical expenses and pay compensation, but they had referred him to the school’s insurers. He further claimed that the school’s secretariat had denied him access to its rules and regulations. Relying on Articles 609, 640 and 641 of the Civil Code, the applicant contended that the school’s failure to protect his son in violation of the law and the school’s administrative and educational rules entailed the school’s direct liability for the injuries suffered by his son. He also asserted that the school had violated the admission contract signed by the parents and the school at the beginning of each school year. 7 .     On 21 January 2013, the Tirana District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation against the school on the grounds that the harm caused to the applicant’s son had not been caused by the defendant but by a third party. In the District Court’s view there had been no causal link between the damage suffered by the applicant’s son and the actions or omissions of the school. Therefore, the defendant was not liable. It further held that the school had taken out third-party insurance covering all its students and that the applicant should have brought a civil action against the insurance company. The District Court found that the school had taken measures after the incident “to ensure better care and health services” for the applicant’s son “by collecting funds from other pupils’ parents and had contacted the insurance company Sigal asking it to cover compensation and the cost of medical treatment” of the applicant’s son, but that the applicant had refused to accept any of it. The applicant’s son’s injury had been caused by M.Sh., a pupil who was a minor, and therefore his parents were directly liable to pay compensation for that injury. Indeed, they had offered compensation to the applicant, but he had refused it. The District Court further held that the school had not assumed any legal obligation to cover medical expenses, contrary to what was claimed by the applicant, in the admission contract concluded between the applicant and the school. The admission contract had not provided for the school’s responsibility for any harm that could happen to the students during their stay at the school. 8 .     On 31 January 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tirana Court of Appeal. In addition to the arguments he had raised before the Tirana District Court, he also maintained that his son had been in the custody of the school when the incident had occurred and that that was sufficient to establish a causal link between the school’s actions and omissions and the injury suffered by his son. He argued that all conditions for the school’s liability had been met. As to the existence of actual damage he argued that it had been proven by an expert report. As to the unlawful action, he argued that the school had permitted students for many days to keep dangerous devices, namely rubber catapults, with one of which his son had been injured. The school had been at fault because his son had been injured while he had been in the school’s premises and custody. He also argued that there had been a causal link between the damage his son had suffered and the school’s inaction. He had only signed an admission contract with the school, not a contract with the insurance company. By signing the admission contract, he had entrusted his son to the school and the school had assumed the obligation to ensure his son’s safety at school. He asserted that the school exercised educational activities on the basis of Order no. 58 of the Minister of Education of 24 June 1999 and, as such, was obliged to respect domestic legislation and was not immune from liability for breaches of law. As to the contract with the insurance company, the applicant submitted that his son was a minor and he could not have been a party to any contract with the insurance company. Besides, it was the school which could have claimed compensation from the insurance company and not the applicant or his son. The applicant also argued that the defendant could have invited its own insurance company as a co-defendant in the proceedings. As to the offer of compensation from M.Sh.’s parents, the applicant claimed that he had never received any such offer. He had not asked them for anything because his contractual relationship was with the school. In respect of the school’s liability the applicant relied on Articles 608(1), 609(1), 625(1), 640 and 641 of the Civil Code. 9 .     On 1 April 2014 the Tirana Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision, adopting its findings of fact. It held that, for the school to be held liable for the injury caused to the applicant’s son, four conditions had to be fulfilled cumulatively: there had to be financial loss, an unlawful act or omission, fault, and a causal link. As to the applicant’s case, it noted that the causal link was missing between the acts and omissions of the school and the injury suffered by the applicant’s son. Also, the school had not committed any fault. In that respect the Appeal Court explained that it would have been impossible for the school to stop the students from keeping rubber bands since such bands were used for securing rolled-up banknotes and were not banned in school. For that reason, the school authorities could not have foreseen that such an incident might happen. Furthermore, even though the incident had occurred when the applicant’s son was at school, it happened during a break when he had been leaving his classroom to head for the physical education class, at a time when the pupils had not been under the direct control of a teacher, and therefore the school could not be held liable for the actions of its pupils. However, the Appeal Court disagreed with the District Court’s reasoning concerning the admission contract, finding that the contract could not exclude the school’s liability. Since the contract could not anticipate all hypothetical scenarios, the resolution of unforeseen events is governed by the general tort liability provisions of the Civil Code. The school had insurance covering all its pupils and on that basis the applicant was entitled to seek compensation from the insurance company but had refused to do so. Also, M.Sh.’s parents were liable for their son’s actions under Article 613 of the Civil Code. As to what the school had done after the incident, the Appeal Court held that the school “took measures after the incident to ensure care and the best medical treatment” for the applicant’s son, and had also collected donations from parents of other pupils and had contacted the insurance company to ensure the cost of the applicant’s son’s medical treatment in a “serious medical institution” was covered. 10 .     On 31 January 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court. He argued in particular that the incident in question had occurred on the school’s premises and that the school had been legally obliged to prevent such an incident. 11 .     On 26 September 2017 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera, without the presence of the applicant or his lawyer, dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that under Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court could assess on the merits an appeal against a Court of Appeal decision only if there had been an incorrect application of substantive or procedural law. The Supreme Court considered that the applicant’s grounds of appeal did not fulfil those requirements. 12 .     The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 10   January 2018, on which date the applicant became aware of the reasons for that decision. 13 .     On 8 February 2018 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint in the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 42 of the Constitution and Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, as well as Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, he complained that the decisions of the lower courts lacked adequate reasons and had not taken into account the best interest of his son. In particular he objected to the lower courts’ conclusion that the school had not been responsible for the injury sustained by his son and argued that the school was responsible for any damage caused to minor children at the school premises and as long as they were under the school’s care. He also argued that the school had the obligation to take all necessary measures to prevent the incident at issue. 14.     On 15 February 2018 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible because it had been lodged outside the statutory four ‑ month time-limit which had started to run on 26   September 2017, when the Supreme Court took the decision complained of. 15 .     On 19 November 2021 the applicant submitted to the Court an authorisation signed by his son to be represented before the Court by the applicant and Mr Progri (see paragraph 2 above). RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW         The Constitution 16.     The relevant part of Article 54 of the Constitution provides: “Article 54 1. Children [and] the young ... have the right to special protection by the State. ... 3. Every child has the right to be protected from violence, mistreatment ...”       The Constitutional Court Act 17 .     Law no. 99/2016 of 6 November 2016, published in the Official Journal no. 210 on 8   November 2016, amended the Constitutional Court Act. Section 30 was repealed. A newly-introduced Section 71(a) shortened the time-limit for lodging an individual constitutional complaint from two years to four months “of obtaining knowledge of the interference [with a constitutional right or freedom]” ( konstatimi i cënimit ). Section 86(3) of Law no. 99/2016 provided that section 71(a) of the Constitutional Court Act should enter into force on 1   March   2017. Law no. 99/2016 as such entered into force fifteen days after its publication in the Official Journal (section 88), that is on 23   November   2016.     The Civil Code 18 .     The relevant part of the Civil Code provides: TITLE IV LIABILITY IN TORT CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS Liability in tort Article 608 “A person who culpably and illegally causes harm to another person or damages another’s property shall be obliged to indemnify the other person for the damage they have caused. The person who caused the damage shall not be liable upon proving that he is not culpable. Causing damage shall give rise to liability wherever it is the consequence of the breach or impairment of the interests or rights of others as protected by the legal order or by custom.” Article 609 “Compensation shall be payable for harm and damage that is the direct and immediate consequence of the action or omission of the person who caused the harm and damage. Failure to prevent an occurrence by a person legally obliged to take steps to prevent it shall render him liable in tort. ...” Article 613 Torts by minors or persons without capacity to act “A minor under the age of fourteen and other persons lacking legal capacity shall not be held liable in tort. The parents, guardians and those with parental responsibility for minors ... shall be liable for the damage caused by the illegal conduct of children under fourteen, of persons under their control and those overseen by and living with them who lack capacity, unless they prove that they could not have prevented the damage from occurring.” Article 614 “A minor who has reached the age of fourteen may be liable in tort. The parents or those who have custody [of a minor] shall be liable for damage caused by them as described in the preceding sections, except when the minor receives income from his own work or possesses property, and unless they prove that they could not have prevented the damage from occurring.” Article 615 Damage caused by persons without legal capacity “Teachers and other persons in charge of minors or persons teaching a trade or profession shall be liable for any illegal harm or damage caused to others by the students or persons in their charge or by persons being instructed by them in a trade or profession, while they were directly under their control, unless they prove that they could not have prevented the harm or damage. ...” CHAPTER III INDEMNITY Article 640 “The pecuniary damage to be indemnified may consist of the value of the damage caused and consequential loss of profit. Expenses reasonably incurred in order to avoid or diminish the damage caused shall also be indemnified if they were incurred in order to mitigate liability for the harm and damage caused. as well as the reasonable expenses incurred to ensure indemnification in extra-judicial proceedings.” Article 641 “A person who has caused harm to another person’s health shall be obliged to indemnify that person for the loss and harm caused, taking account of any consequential restriction of the ability of the impaired person to work and any medical expenses or other consequential expenditure.”    The Civil Procedure CODE 19 .     Article 192 provides that any party to the proceedings has the right to call as a third party anyone with whom they believe they have a common interest in the case or from whom they may request a guarantee or compensation regarding the case in question. 20.     Article 195 also makes it possible for a third-party, with the consent of both parties, to replace one of the parties in the proceedings. 21.     On 30 March 2017 Law no. 38/2017 was enacted. It entered into force on 6 November 2017 and introduced amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 399 of that law introduced a new remedy for excessively protracted civil proceedings, allowing for orders for the proceedings to be accelerated and for compensation to be paid. It set a maximum of two years for the adjudication of a civil case in each of the courts of first instance, appeal courts and the Supreme Court. The process for seeking such a remedy was to lodge a request with a higher court, and in the case of the Supreme Court, with a different Chamber of that court.      Law N o . 7952 on educational institutions 22.     Law no. 7952 “On the pre-university education system” was enacted on 21 June 1995 and was amended by Law no. 8337 of 30 July 1998; Law   no.   8872 of 29 March 2002; Law no. 9903 of 17 April 2008; and Law   no.   9985 of 11 September 2008. 23.     Section 44 of Law no. 7952 allows the Ministry of Education and Science to issue licences to private educational institutions in which the teaching is carried out in the Albanian language. Such licences are granted when the [strategic] plans, educational programs and the conditions for their realisation do not conflict with the Albanian national interest or with legislation, public order, moral norms and public safety, and when the necessary resources and teaching personnel are available. The criteria and procedures for licensing private secular schools in which teaching is in the Albanian language are regulated by the Ministry of Education and Science. If those regulations are contravened by such an institution, the Ministry of Education and Science can withdraw its licence. 24.     Section 46 provides that, in order to obtain a licence, private educational institutions must prove that they have teaching personnel with relevant education and the appropriate qualifications and that they are equipped with teaching resources suited to the requirements of their [educational] plan and teaching programmes. 25 .     Section 66 provides that the State must ensure the safety of teachers and students as well as the security of educational institutions and their premises.    LAW N o . 10433 (2011) ON [ADMINISTRATIVE] INSPECTIONS 26.     Law no. 10433 entered into force, for its most part, on 20 July 2011. It was therefore in force, in the relevant parts, on the day of the school incident giving rise to the present case, and it was binding on the Ministry of Education Inspectorate in charge of overseeing private schools. 27 .     Under section 25 of Law no. 10433, a random inspection of a relevant entity may be carried out when it is considered necessary on the basis of information provided by another State body, or when particular events, accidents or incidents have affected or risk affecting the life or health of individuals. Such an inspection may also be authorised on the basis of a complaint or information provided by [private] third parties, which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that an entity [subject to inspection laws] may have breached legal requirements. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 28 .     The relevant part of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified by Albania on 27 February 1992) reads as follows: “Article 3 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. (...) 3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision. Article 19 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child. 2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.” THE LAW      THE APPLICANT’S STANDING 29.     The first issue to be determined is whether the applicant was entitled to bring an application in his own name for an alleged violation of the rights of his son. 30.     The Government argued that the rights under Article 8 of the Convention were of an eminently personal nature and not transferable to another person. In their view the applicant had brought a civil action in the domestic courts only as the father of a victim. The applicant’s son, the direct victim, did not suffer from any disability and had legal capacity to express his own will. The Government contended that the applicant had been acting only as a representative of his son and could not have had the standing of victim himself. The applicant’s son had reached the age of majority in June 2018 and had thus acquired full legal capacity. Furthermore, there was no direct link between the suffering of the applicant’s son and the application lodged by the applicant in his own name. 31.     The applicant argued that he had brought the application on behalf of his son, as he had done in the domestic proceedings, and that, even when his son reached majority, owing to his disability, he had not been able to participate in any proceedings. 32.     On this point the Court observes that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions, both procedural and substantive, be interpreted and applied so as to render its safeguards practical and effective. In this context, the position of children under Article 34 qualifies for careful consideration, as they must generally rely on other persons to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense. A restrictive or technical approach in this area is therefore to be avoided and the key consideration in such cases is that any serious issues concerning respect for a child’s rights should be examined (see Tonchev v. Bulgaria , no. 18527/02, §   31, 19 November 2009, with further references). 33.     The Court has dealt with a similar situation in several cases. Thus, in the above-cited case of Tonchev the application was brought by the father, in his own name, of a child who was injured by a private person. The Court accepted the father as the applicant, given that the child had been a minor at the time of the events, as well as at the time when the application was lodged with the Court, and that the father had brought the domestic proceedings, on behalf of his son ( idem ., §§ 32 and 33). The Court concluded that there had been no violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, given that “the treatment complained of did not entail adverse effects for the physical or moral integrity of the applicant’s son” ( idem ., §§ 41 and 42). 34.     In the case of M.S. v. Ukraine (no. 2091/13, 11 July 2017) the application was also brought by the father of a child who had allegedly been sexually abused, in his own name and in the name of the child. In that case the domestic proceedings, namely a request that a criminal investigation be carried out, were brought by the applicant’s mother. The Court accepted as applicants both the father and the child ( idem ., §§ 51-53). The Court found violations of Article 8 of the Convention “on account of the lack of an effective investigation into the alleged sexual abuse of the applicant’s child” ( idem ., § 68) and because “of the determination of the applicant’s child’s place of residence” ( idem ., § 86). 35.     In the case of Blyudik v. Russia (no. 46401/08, 25 June 2019) the application was brought, in his own name, by a father, complaining under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention about the placement of the child in a closed educational institution. The Court accepted the father as applicant, given that the child had been a minor at the time of the domestic proceedings and at the time the application had been brought with the Court. Furthermore, the father had been entitled to act on the daughter’s behalf and defend her interests by virtue of the Russian Family Code, and he had requested that the supervisory review proceedings concerning the child’s placement in the said institution be initiated by the prosecutor ( idem ., §§ 41-44). The Court found a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, holding that “the applicant, acting in the interests of his daughter, did not have an ‘enforceable right to compensation’ under Article   5 § 5 of the Convention for his daughter’s placement in the closed educational institution for minors” ( idem ., § 64). The Court also found a violation of “the applicant’s and his daughter’s right to respect for their family life under Article 8 of the Convention” ( idem ., § 76). 36.     The Court sees no reason to depart from the above approach in the present case. In that connection it observes that at the time of the events in issue, as well as when the application was lodged, the applicant’s son was still a minor (see paragraph 5 above). It was also the applicant who brought the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 6 above, and compare Tonchev , cited above, § 32). Moreover, upon reaching majority age, the applicant’s son authorised both the applicant and the lawyer representing the applicant to also represent him before the Court (see paragraph 15 above). Therefore, in the light of the above principles, it can be concluded that the applicant was entitled to apply to the Court to protect his son’s interests. 37.     The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant was entitled to lodge the application on behalf of his son (compare the above cited-cases of Tonchev , § 33; M.S. , §§ 51-53; and Blyudik , §§ 41-44; as well as Caamaño   Valle v. Spain , no. 43564/17, §§ 33 and 34, 11 May 2021).        ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 38.     The applicant, relying on Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention, complained that the State had failed to fulfil its obligations as regards the incident in which his son had suffered a serious injury. The Court being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 114, 20 March 2018; see also Darboe and Camara v. Italy , no. 5797/17, § 111, 21   July 2022), will examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention alone, the relevant part of which reads as follows: Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”    Admissibility      The parties’ submissions 39.     The Government argued that the applicant had not raised any issue under Article 8 of the Convention in the domestic courts. They claimed that the applicant only sought compensation of damage before the domestic courts, claiming that “the damage caused to our child is a direct consequence of the omission of the management staff of the defendant party”, and that his claim concerned pecuniary damage. They also argued that before the Constitutional Court the applicant had only raised complaints concerning due process and “illegality of the courts’ decisions”. 40.     The applicant contested these arguments.      The Court’s assessment    Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention 41.     The Court has previously held, in various contexts, that the concept of private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, § 95, 25 September 2018; see also Remetin v. Croatia , no.   29525/10, § 90, 11 December 2012). However, the Court emphasises that not every act or measure of a private individual which adversely affects the physical and psychological integrity of another will interfere with the right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8. It reiterates that a severity threshold is necessary for the applicability of Article 8 in such a situation (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, § 128, 25 June 2019, with further references). 42.     As to the present case, the Court notes that it is not disputed between the parties that another pupil at the private school attended by the applicant’s son had injured the applicant’s son by launching a catapult projectile into his eye, resulting in 90% loss of vision in that eye (see paragraph 5 above). The nature of these consequences is such that they have, without a doubt, impacted the everyday life of the applicant’s son ever since to such an extent that they have had an adverse effect on his private life. Furthermore, there appears to be no reason in principle why the notion of “private life” should be taken to exclude attacks on one’s physical integrity (see X and Y v.   the   Netherlands , 26 March 1985, § 23, Series A no. 91; M.C. v. Bulgaria , no.   39272/98, § 150, ECHR 2003‑XII; Sandra Janković v. Croatia , no.   38478/05, §§ 30 and 31, 5 March 2009; and V.C. v. Italy , no. 54227/14, §   85, 1 February 2018). 43.     Therefore, given the nature and substance of the applicant’s complaints, they fall to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention, which entails an obligation on the State to safeguard the physical and psychological integrity of a person (see   A and B v. Croatia , no. 7144/15, §   106, 20 June 2019, with further references).    Exhaustion of domestic remedies 44.     The general principles on exhaustion of domestic remedies have been summarised in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ([GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29   others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014, and Gherghina v. Romania ((dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, §§ 83‑89, 9 July 2015). 45.     The Court has held, in particular, that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances (see Vučković and Others , cited above, § 71). Article 35 § 1 also requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently before the Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance ( idem ., § 72). 46.     As to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant chose to bring civil proceedings against the school his son attended. The applicant claimed compensation of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the school had failed to protect his son and had not adequately reacted to the incident (see paragraphs 6, 8 and 10 above). 47.     In his constitutional complaint, the applicant complained about the domestic courts’ findings that the school had not been responsible for the injury his son had suffered while he had been in the care of the school and in school premises. 48.     Before the Court the applicant brought the same arguments he had presented in the civil proceedings, namely, that the school had done nothing in the period leading to the incident to address the problem of catapults at school premises which had led to his son being seriously injured; that the school personnel had failed to monitor the conduct of the pupils; and that their reaction after the incident had been insufficient, in not promptly asking for medical assistance to his son, and not informing the parents immediately (see paragraphs 6, 8 and 13 above). 49.     Comparing the applicant’s arguments before the domestic courts with the complaints he brought before the Court, the Court considers that the applicant brought the substance of his complaints under Article   8 of the Convention before the domestic courts, including in his constitutional complaint, even though he did not rely expressly on Article 8 of the Convention. 50.     It follows that the Government’s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies has to be dismissed.    Conclusion as to admissibility 51.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.    Merits      The parties’ arguments 52.     The applicant maintained that the State had failed to adequately supervise a licensed private school. He maintained that on the day of the incident his son had not received any medical assistance between 11.45 a.m. and 1 p.m. and that the school had not informed him promptly that his son had been injured. He argued that his son had suffered grave pain and long ‑ term loss of balance, and that if there had been immediate medical intervention, the permanent damage caused to his son could have been minimised. 53.     He further argued that the school was responsible for the injury of his son, but so was the State which had licensed the school and had a legal obligation to supervise it. 54.     He also objected to the national courts’ findings that the school bore no responsibility, despite the fact that the domestic courts had admitted that the injury had been inflicted on his son during the school day. He submitted that the domestic courts had not addressed his argument that one pupil had brought twenty catapults into school and that these had been “openly” used by students on school premises over several days and that no one had controlled or stopped their use. 55.     As to the domestic courts’ holding that he should have brought an action against the school’s insurance company, the applicant submitted that it had been open to the school, as the defendant in the civil proceeding he had instituted, to invite the insurance company to join those proceedings, under Article 192 of the Civil Procedure Code (see paragraph 19 above). 56.     The Government disagreed with the applicant’s claims and submitted that the injury to the applicant’s son had been the result of an incident that had occurred while children were playing at school. The school had taken all necessary measures, such as starting disciplinary proceedings against the child who had caused the damage and eliminating the presence of such devices for the future as they might present a potential risk to the children. 57.     The Government argued further that, instead of suing the school, the applicant should have brought a claim for compensation against the parents of the pupil who had caused the injury to his son. He could have also asked for compensation from the insurance company with which the school had insured all its pupils. The national courts had given adequate reasons for their decisions dismissing the applicant’s claim.      The Court’s assessment    General principles 58 .     In the case of Đurđević v. Croatia (no. 52442/09, §§ 103-107, 18   October 2011) which concerns violence among pupils, the Court established general principles as follows: “103. As regards school discipline, the Court held as follows in its above-cited judgment in Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom : ‘27. The Court notes first that, as was pointed out by the applicant, the State has an obligation to secure to children their right to education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ... It recalls that the provisions of the Convention and its Protocols must be read as a whole (see the Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark judgment of 7   December 1976, Series A no. 23, pp. 26 and 27, paras. 52 and 54, and the Soering v. the United Kin