CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 juin 2024

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page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }   FIRST SECTION CASE OF CVIKOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA (Applications nos. 615/21, 9427/21 and 36765/21)   JUDGMENT   Art 5 § 1 (c) and Art 5 § 3 • Lawful arrest or detention • Reasonableness of pre-trial detention • Detention of judge pending trial on charges of offences linked to suspicions of corruption, abuse of official power and interference with the independence of the judiciary in the context of a large-scale investigation of alleged organised corruption in the judiciary in the Bratislava region • Detention based on a reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence • Grounds for initial detention in remand “relevant” and “sufficient” • No indication of arbitrariness • Continued detention of the applicant, upon the dismissal of her request for release, not necessary Art 5 § 4 • Review of lawfulness of detention • Supreme Court ‘s decision on the applicant’s continued detention based on grounds not raised by the prosecution at first instance without giving the applicant an opportunity to comment   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 13 June 2024   FINAL   13/09/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Cviková v. Slovakia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Marko Bošnjak , President ,   Alena Poláčková,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Ivana Jelić,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos. 615/21, 9427/21 and 36765/21) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Ms Denisa Cviková (“the applicant”), on 23   December   2020 and 3 February and 12 July 2021; the decision to give notice to the Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article   5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 and Article   8 of the Convention concerning the search of the applicant’s home, her remand in custody and the dismissal of her request for release and to   declare the remainder of the applications nos. 9427/21 and 36765/21 inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 21 May 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicant, a career judge, was targeted, with a number of others from both within and outside the judiciary, by a large-scale investigation of alleged organised corruption in the judiciary in the Bratislava region. As part of the investigation, the applicant’s home was searched and she was detained pending trial, giving rise to her complaints under Article   5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 and Article   8 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Bratislava. She was represented by Ms E. Cubinková, a lawyer practising in Bratislava. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND 5.     The applicant is a lawyer. Between 2005 and 2012 she practised at the Bar. Since 2012 she has been a judge of the Bratislava I District Court. 6.     On 20 August 2019 the national organised crime investigation agency ( Národná kriminálna agentúra ) commenced an inquiry into suspected offences of accepting bribes, abusing official authority and interfering with the independence of the judiciary by an   unspecified number of perpetrators within and outside the judiciary. The general parameters of the suspicion were stated to be that certain judges in courts in the Bratislava region had been delivering biased judgments in return for bribes paid on the instructions of a   third person, transmitted through a judge and an agent of the Ministry of Justice. 7.     As would become known later: (i)     the central figure in this scheme was a private individual, A; (ii)     the intermediaries were a certain Judge B and a   career judge temporarily serving as a State Secretary ( štátna tajomníčka ) at the Ministry of Justice, C; (iii)     an essential body of evidence consisted of text messages passed among these individuals and others, exchanged through a secure instant messenger, a copy of which had been obtained from a mobile phone belonging to A that had been retrieved in the course of another investigation; and (iv)     Judge B cooperated with the inquiry, in exchange for which the bringing of charges against him had been temporarily suspended. 8 .     Subsequently, B, C and other judges were asked to surrender their mobile phones and the data they contained was subjected to expert analysis. That operation and the text messages from A’s mobile phone were then incrementally published by the media, implicating the persons referred to above and others. The published material included messages between A and   C in which the applicant was alleged to have assisted another judge, D, to deal with a case assigned to the latter and in which a company associated with A had pursued a claim for the payment of a large sum of money based on a   promissory note (“the promissory-note case”). In particular, the applicant was alleged to have acted at the request of C and, in return for payment provided by A and given to her by C, the applicant was alleged to have advised D on how to handle the objections of one of the defendants, to   have drafted a judgment allowing the claim, and to   have supported D by attending the hearing at which she, D, had delivered that judgment. 9 .     The various suspicions gleaned from the communication in question were investigated by the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic (“the Judicial Council”), the country’s highest body governing the judiciary. The applicant, D and some other of the judges involved gave their explanations to the Judicial Council on 14 November 2019. 10.     On 15 January 2020 the Minister of Justice asked the Judicial Council temporarily to suspend the applicant from judicial office, referring to the published information about her involvement in the promissory-note case and considering that she had not given a satisfactory explanation about it. On 23   January 2020 the applicant made observations in reply. 11.     Further context to these events may be seen in the Court’s decision in Molnár v. Slovakia ([Committee], no. 39818/20, 16 December 2020). HOME SEARCH AND RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT 12 .     On 24 January 2020 the Specialised Criminal Court (“the SCC”) issued a warrant for a search of the applicant’s flat, as it had concluded that there was a justified suspicion that evidence relevant to the criminal proceedings could be found there, in particular mobile phones and other information and communication technology devices (“ICT devices”) and the proceeds of crime. The warrant referred to the investigation that had been commenced on 20 August 2019 and the evidential basis for it, and it was noted that the persons who had previously been asked to surrender their mobile phones (see paragraph 8 above) had handed over new or outdated devices containing no relevant messaging data. This suggested that those persons had tampered with their phones once it became known that A’s phone and the messages on it had been exposed. It was nevertheless possible that those persons still had ICT devices containing relevant data, given the suspicion that judgments had been drafted by persons other than the lawful judge. That would have involved using ICT devices for the exchange of data and messages. A search could therefore have led to those suspicions being confirmed or dispelled and to establishing whether any further persons might be implicated. The interference with the applicant’s privacy was therefore justified. It would not have been feasible to achieve that aim by less intrusive means. Even though a relatively long time had passed since the other suspects’ phones had been obtained, reducing the potential for discovering relevant evidence, the need for the search had stemmed from the prosecution’s analysis of the situation and fell within the realm of legitimate investigative strategy. 13 .     The warrant was served on the applicant on 29 January 2020, and it was immediately followed by the search. The search records indicate that the applicant was first asked under Article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) to surrender the objects searched for voluntarily, in response to which she stated that there were such objects on the premises. The search was then carried out and led to the seizure of two mobile phones, a laptop computer, three portable data storage devices and a document which was referred to as concerning the promissory-note case (“the seized document”). It was further noted that the applicant had no objections or reservations as to the course of the search or the behaviour of the officers carrying it out. 14 .     On 5 May 2020 the applicant challenged the search warrant by a   complaint to the Constitutional Court, arguing that there had been no sufficient or relevant grounds for issuing the warrant and that it had been disproportionate and arbitrary to issue it. In particular, the warrant used standardised wording and the only specific reason for searching her premises had been that she had attended a hearing in the promissory-note case. She had done so in her own time as a member of the public, which had been perfectly lawful. Moreover, the court had refrained from ordering less intrusive measures, in particular the surrender under Article   89 of the CCP of an object required as evidence in the criminal proceedings, for reasons having to do with others but not with her. As a result of the execution of the warrant, “data with no substantive or personal connection with the proceedings [had] ended up at the disposal of third persons”. 15 .     On 7 July 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded, finding the reasoning in the warrant “combined with the actions of which the applicant was accused” to have been adequate. It noted also that even though the SCC had not ordered the applicant to   surrender the objects searched for under Article 89 of the CCP, she had been asked to do so by the investigators under Article 104 of the CCP and the search had been carried out only after her failure to respond to that request. 16.     On 7 January 2022 the objects that had been seized were returned to the applicant as they had been subjected to any analysis necessary and were no longer needed for the purposes of the proceedings. CHARGES, ARREST, REMAND IN CUSTODY AND RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT 17 .     Meanwhile, on 9 March 2020, the applicant, A, C, D and fourteen judges and other persons had been charged with thirty counts of various offences linked to suspicions of corruption, abuse of official power and interfering with the independence of the judiciary in connection with the information contained in the written communication from A’s phone. In addition to that written communication, the charges were based mainly on incriminating depositions made by B. The actions of which the applicant was accused consisted specifically of her alleged interference in the promissory ‑ note case as referred to above. 18.     On 11 March 2020 the applicant was arrested on the above charges, along with seven others who had also been charged, in an operation code ‑ named “storm” ( búrka ). The Prosecutor General then asked the Constitutional Court to consent to the filing of an application for her remand in custody. 19 .     On 12 March 2020 the Constitutional Court acceded to the request, observing that the applicant had been charged in accordance with the relevant procedural requirements, the procedure preceding the filing of the request had been adhered to, and the request for the consent of the Constitutional Court had been lodged within the applicable time-limit. The consent was not the decision to remand the applicant in custody itself, but merely a prerequisite for the examination of the grounds for her detention by the ordinary courts. The purpose of the constitutional proceedings was limited to examining whether the charges against the applicant were not “totally unfounded or extremely arbitrary”, in order to protect the judiciary from any abuse of executive or prosecutorial power. No such abuse had been established in the applicant’s case. 20 .     In her remand hearing, the applicant remarked on the level of media coverage of the case, although pre-trial proceedings were not supposed to be public. Because of that coverage, she had in fact known what she was being accused of since October 2019 and accordingly had had ample opportunity to   interfere with the course of justice, but she had done nothing of the kind. Her ability to do so had moreover been neutralised in practice by her suspension from judicial office, which excluded her from the workplace. 21 .     On 13 March 2020 the SCC remanded the applicant, C, D and five   others of the accused in detention. It did so in a single decision addressing the situation of all those being remanded. In view of the evidence specified above, there were no doubts that there was sufficient suspicion against them. In so far as she was specifically concerned, the applicant had a   close relationship with C and was suspected of having intervened in the promissory-note case at C’s request, so increasing the influence brought to bear on D. Moreover, according to the information given by B in his depositions, the applicant had been assigned to the commercial-law bench of her court at the request of A so that she would be able to cover up his unlawful activities. Just as with the other remanded persons, the actions of the applicant in individual cases had to be reviewed and there was the risk that she might attempt to frustrate the investigation. Her detention was accordingly necessary under Article 71 § 1 (b) of the CCP (see paragraph 41 below). The court considered that the purpose of the detention could not be served by alternative means, having regard to the nature of the case and the need to hear a greater number of witnesses who at that stage had not yet been identified. 22 .     The applicant filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that she had no criminal record, that the charges against her were unfounded, that there was no basis for any conclusion that she as an individual would interfere with the course of justice, and that the grounds given by the court were general and abstract. She disputed having any close relationship with C and asserted that it was unclear what elements of her judicial activities were to be reviewed. Since the proceedings had commenced in 2019, the authorities had had enough time for any inquiries. Moreover, in his depositions B himself had also admitted that, while she had sat on the commercial-law bench of her court, no cases associated with A had been assigned to her. Irrespective of that, his statements were to be taken with caution because he had an obvious motivation for saying anything he was asked to say in order to avoid being prosecuted for his own criminal activities, the charges relating to which had been temporarily suspended. 23 .     On 20 March 2020 the Third Appellate Section of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The decision again addressed the situation of all those remanded in the earlier hearing. In the part of the decision that concerned all the accused, the court held that the level of suspicion against them justified the steps taken in the proceedings. Nevertheless, it noted that since the charges had been brought no relevant new evidence had been obtained, and in the absence of such evidence the validity of the suspicion as the prerequisite for pre-trial detention would gradually diminish. The court also made findings about C, observing that the findings were relevant for all those on remand, including the applicant. The evidence available suggested that C had been a part of “a well-functioning machine demolishing fundamental principles of the rule of law and destroying confidence in the judiciary and in its fair and equal approach to the parties to disputes”. Such conduct had given rise to a concern that, if left at liberty, the applicant would interfere with the course of justice. As regards the applicant specifically, the court summarised the accusation against her as being that, in return for a bribe provided by A through C as intermediary, she had actively assisted D in delivering a   judgment in the promissory-note case that was unlawful in that it was biased. As regards the need for concrete grounds for the concern that she would interfere with the course of justice, which was a statutory requirement for detention under Article 71 § 1 (b) of the CCP, it was observed that the concern could also stem from the person’s actions, before or after charges had been brought, “on an objective view covering not only the person of the culprit and all the constitutive elements of the crime [but] also the actions and behaviour of the culprit as a whole”. The court also endorsed the findings of the first-instance court to the effect that it was not possible to replace the detention with an alternative measure and added that the level of risk of collusion exceeded the acceptable limits of the court’s trust in those who were on remand. 24 .     The applicant subsequently turned to the Constitutional Court with an   individual complaint, arguing that her detention was arbitrary in that it had been based on grounds identical to the charges against her, combined with an   abstract presumption of collusion and a reference to the grounds justifying the detention of a third person, C. In other words, there had been no grounds specific to the applicant herself and no analysis as to the necessity of her detention. Contending that public opinion was not a   valid ground for a   detention pending trial, she reiterated her previous arguments. 25 .     On 9 June 2020 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. In so far as the applicant had contended that there was no substantiated suspicion that she had committed any offence and no   substantiated concern that she would interfere with the course of justice, that had been convincingly addressed by the Supreme Court. REQUEST FOR RELEASE AND RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT 26.     On 13 July 2020 the applicant asked to be released from detention, reiterating her previous arguments and referring to depositions made by Judge   D on 27 April 2020. D had explained that the promissory ‑ note case had received extensive media attention and that the applicant had been helping her as a friend to cope with that attention, including by attending the hearing. D admitted having consulted the applicant as a more experienced judge on various legal issues in the cases assigned to her, but insisted that she had drafted the judgment in the promissory-note case by herself and denied that the applicant had been involved in that in any way. The applicant argued that the level of suspicion against her had therefore diminished, that all relevant evidence had already been taken, that all her co-accused had been interviewed, and that there had been nothing to   show that there had been any unlawfulness in her assignment to the commercial-law bench of her court. The applicant also asked for alternatives to detention to be considered. She suggested that the court accept an undertaking from her that, if released, she would live in accordance with the law and respect any conditions set under Article 80 § 1 (b) of the CCP, or that her detention be replaced by the supervision of a probation officer under Article 80 § 1 (c) of the CCP. In a   subsequent hearing before the SCC, the applicant also argued that there had been delays in the investigation. 27.     The prosecution service opposed the request, saying that the reasons for the applicant’s detention had been established at the time of her remand and remained valid, and arguing that further checks on the facts alleged by B were necessary. 28 .     On 5 August 2020 the SCC decided that the applicant should be released. Relying on a line of reasoning accepted by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court in the case of two of the applicant’s co-accused, it found that all the evidence with which the applicant could potentially tamper had already been taken by the investigators. That included further depositions taken from B on 22 and 25 June 2020. None of that evidence had increased the suspicion against the applicant, either as to the charges against her or as to any risk that she would interfere with the course of justice. B and another of the accused judges had testified that, at the request of C, the applicant had enquired whether they would appear before the Judicial Council to explain themselves. However, there was no indication that that had been aimed at influencing their position. B had likewise acknowledged that the applicant had been assigned to the commercial-law bench of his court at the request of A, but he had also confirmed that no cases concerning A had been assigned to the applicant. Moreover, it was observed that Judge D was being prosecuted at liberty and that there was no concrete plan for any investigative actions to be taken in relation to the individual case of the applicant. An   abstract reference by the prosecution service to a future need to take further evidence was insufficient to justify the continued detention of the applicant. 29 .     The prosecution appealed, arguing that the risk of influencing witnesses concerned not only any further witnesses that might need to be heard but also those that had already been interviewed but would need to be interviewed again. 30 .     On 24 August 2020 the Fifth Appellate Section of the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 5   August 2020 and dismissed the applicant’s request for release. The decision noted that the President of that Section had obtained ex proprio motu the seized document from the applicant’s apartment (see paragraph 13 above) and that it in fact constituted a detailed blueprint of the defence of judge D with regard to her involvement in the promissory-note case. The applicant’s possession of that document and her contact with B and another judge prior to the hearing by the Judicial Council had been concrete circumstances justifying a concern that the applicant might attempt to   interfere with the course of justice. Nevertheless, the risk of collusion stemmed above all from the character of the prosecuted actions, which amounted to systemic corruption, and from the suspects’ personality traits and relationships. It was possible that still more persons with relevant knowledge about the case would need to be heard as witnesses, and the crucial part of evidence-taking and assessment took place at trial and not at the pre-trial stage. The gravity of the charges was extremely high, in particular since the alleged corruption was suspected of having been organised by C, who was an   official of the Ministry of Justice and had herself previously been a judge. Instead of being a symbol of justice, honesty, and lawfulness, she had betrayed her mission. That applied also to the applicant, in that she had too previously been in charge of judicial conduct as a Director General of a   Section at the Ministry of Justice. In view of all the circumstances, including the need to   reassure the public that the judiciary was able to deal with attempts to trade in influence, it was inappropriate to replace the detention with any alternative measures. As regards the alleged delays in the investigation, the court noted that it was first of all within the discretion of the investigating authorities to organise an investigation in line with its strategic objectives and that the court was only authorised to interfere with that discretion if inactivity in the investigation reached a certain threshold. The prosecution had barely given any reasoning in its interlocutory appeal against the decision of 5 August 2020 and its overall approach gave rise to doubts as to whether or not it genuinely intended to pursue the prosecution. Maintaining that course might impact the courts’ future decisions as regards the justification of continued detention. 31 .     The applicant then turned to the Constitutional Court, arguing mainly that the Supreme Court had decided the case on other grounds than those advanced by the prosecution and had thereby breached the principle of equality of arms. Moreover, the Supreme Court had failed to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on those new grounds, in violation of the adversarial principle. 32 .     On 1 December 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. There was no rule limiting an appellate court’s assessment of a detention case to the grounds raised in the interlocutory appeal. Even though the adversarial principle was applicable, its application was not subject to absolute rules and it had to be adapted to the stage of the proceedings. The central consideration was rather that the decision on the interlocutory appeal should only rest on elements which were known to the detainee and on which that detainee had had an opportunity to comment. Both of those conditions had been met in the case at hand. RELEASE AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 33.     The prosecution had meanwhile applied for judicial authorisation of an   extension to the applicant’s detention beyond the statutory seven-month limit (ending 11 October 2020). 34 .     The application was dismissed at first instance by the SCC on 21   September 2020 and, on an interlocutory appeal by the prosecution, the applicant was released from detention by a decision of the First Appellate Section of the Supreme Court of 8 October 2020. 35 .     It was noted that the evidentiary situation had remained essentially the same since the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 August 2020 (see paragraph   30 above). 36 .     The applicant had convincingly explained that the seized document was in fact Judge D’s notes for her hearing before the Judicial Council (see paragraph 9 above), which she had accidently left behind and which the applicant had found and taken to give back to her but which she had then forgotten about. She added that even though the prosecuting authorities had known about the seized document and had had it available to them since January 2020, they had paid no attention to it since then. Similarly, in the light of the applicant’s explanations, it was confirmed that in her interactions with the other judges prior to that hearing she had merely shared her position and that of C but had sought in no way to influence theirs. There were no significant differences between the submissions of the applicant and Judge D which would cause them to try to come to some agreement. They both told the same story, both admitting to having consulted on general matters and both denying that the applicant had had any improper involvement in the promissory-note case. 37 .     Even though the suspicion against the applicant as regards the merits of the charges against her persisted, there was nothing to show that she had in fact colluded with anyone. 38 .     Moreover, the applicant was suspected of having had only the lowest form of involvement in the corruption under investigation and had been charged with a single offence, all the key evidence for which had already been taken. There could therefore no longer be any reason for her to seek to   interfere with the course of justice. 39 .     In addition, it was noted that no further investigative actions were planned in relation to the charges against the applicant and that there was no apparent reason why the investigating authorities had breached the procedural rights of the accused by not allowing them access to B’s depositions prior to his being charged. 40.     In sum, the reasons for the applicant’s detention had ceased to exist. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41 .     Under Article 71 § 1 (b), a person against whom charges have been brought ( obvinený ) may be remanded in detention pending trial only if there are facts that have previously been established suggesting that the prosecuted action or omission constitutes a criminal offence, that that offence has been committed by that person, and that that person’s conduct or other specified circumstances give rise to a justified concern that that person would seek to   influence witnesses, experts or the person’s co-accused or would otherwise hamper the investigation. 42 .     Article 72 § 3 provides, inter alia , that at the pre-trial stage detention is decided on by a pre-trial judge on an application by the prosecution, that the judge’s ruling as to the grounds for detention is not limited by the prosecution’s application, and that interlocutory appeals against the judge’s decision are to be determined by a higher court. 43.     A person who is in possession of an object of importance in criminal proceedings must surrender it on request, which must be accompanied by a   warning as to the consequences of a failure to comply, including the possibility that the object will be removed (Article 89 § 1, as in force at the relevant time). 44.     A house search is governed by Articles 99 et seq. It may be carried out if, inter alia , there is a justifiable suspicion that an object important for the proceedings is to be found there (Article 99 § 1). At the pre-trial stage, the warrant for the search is to be issued by a pre-trial judge, on application by the prosecution (Article 100 § 1). The warrant may be executed only if a   prior request for the voluntary surrender of the object fails (Article 104 § 1). 45 .     The scope of the appellate review in response to an   interlocutory appeal is defined in Article 192 § 1 so that the appellate court should review both the first-instance rulings being challenged and the course of the proceedings leading up to them. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL 46 .     The Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999 entered into force with respect to Slovakia on 1 July 2022 (Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 375/2002 Coll.) and, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States signatory hereto, ... Emphasising that corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society; ... Article 11 – Bribery of judges and officials of international courts Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct [of Active bribery of domestic public officials and Passive bribery of domestic public officials] involving any holders of judicial office or officials of any international court whose jurisdiction is accepted by the Party. ...” THE LAW         JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 47 .     Application no. 615/21 consisted of complaints under Article 5 of the Convention in respect of the applicant’s remand in detention. 48.     Application no. 9427/21 comprised a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the search of the applicant’s home. 49 .     Application no. 36765/21 contained complaints under Article 5 of the Convention in relation to the proceedings on the applicant’s request for release. 50.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment (Rule   42 § 1 of the Rules of Court). ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 (c) AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION 51.     The applicant complained that her detention had been unjustified and arbitrary and had violated her rights under Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (c)     the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ... 3.     Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph   1   (c) of this Article ... shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.” Admissibility 52.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ arguments 53.     The applicant contended that for her detention to be lawful there needed to be specific facts pertaining to her individually which gave rise to a   reasonable suspicion that she had committed an offence and that there was a   risk that she would interfere with the course of justice. The decision to   remand her in detention and the decision on her interlocutory appeal against detention had been phrased in abstract terms and had identified no such facts. In so far as these decisions had suggested that she had been close to B, that had not been true. Even if it had been, that could not have justified detaining her to prevent their colluding since B herself had been detained. Moreover, by the time she was remanded in detention, all the other suspects who had been arrested had already given evidence, both to the investigators and to the court. As regards D’s suggestion that the applicant had been assigned to the commercial-law bench of her court in order to be able to cover up A.’s unlawful activities, the authorities had failed to consider the statement in D’s deposition to the effect that no cases having to do with A had been assigned to the applicant. No charges had been brought against the applicant and no   inquiry had been pursued in in that connection. Nevertheless, even if there had been some suspicion of a criminal offence on that account, it would have been a different matter from that in relation which she had been remanded (the promissory-note case). 54.     The applicant also contended that she had had no previous criminal record. The search of her home had in essence put her in the same position as if she had been charged with a criminal offence. Following the search and before her arrest, she had had ample opportunity to tamper with evidence, which she had not done. As she had been suspended from office and her mobile phone had been seized, she had been excluded from her workplace and had lost touch with all her telephone contacts. In the applicant’s view, her detention had in fact been a response to popular demand, which she did not consider to have been legitimate. No genuine consideration had been given to finding an alternative to detaining her and her detention had been disproportionate. 55.     As regards the dismissal of her request for release by the Supreme Court in its decision of 24 August 2020 (see paragraph 30 above), the applicant pointed out that the reasons on which that decision had been based were subsequently dismissed in the decisions leading to her release (see paragraphs 34 et seq. above), once she had had an opportunity to respond to them. 56.     The Government referred to the decision to remand the applicant in detention and the decision on her interlocutory appeal against detention, as well as the decision dismissing her request for release and the associated decisions by the Constitutional Court, including its consent to the prosecution’s making an application to have the applicant remanded in detention. Taken as a whole, these decisions were consistent, well justified, and free from any arbitrariness. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 57.     The Court reiterates that under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, a person may be detained, in the context of criminal proceedings, only for the purpose of bringing him or her before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. The “reasonableness” of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based forms an essential part of the safeguard laid down in Article   5 §   1   (c). Having a   reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as reasonable will, however, depend on all the circumstances (see Selahattin Demirtaş v.   Turkey (no.   2) [GC], no.   14305/17, §   314, 22   December 2020, with further references). 58.     The Court stresses, in this connection, that in the absence of a   reasonable suspicion, the arrest or detention of an individual must never be imposed for the purpose of making him confess or testify against others or to   elicit facts or information which may serve to ground a reasonable suspicion against him (see Cebotari v.   Moldova , no.   35615/06, §   48, 13   November 2007, and İpek and Others v.   Turkey , nos.   17019/02 and 30070/02, §   29, 3   February 2009). 59.     The Court has also held that Article   5 § 1   (c) of the Convention does not presuppose that the investigating authorities have obtained sufficient evidence to bring charges at the time of arrest. The purpose of questioning during detention under Article   5 § 1   (c) is to further the criminal investigation by confirming or dispelling the concrete suspicion grounding the arrest. Thus, facts that raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to justify a conviction or even the bringing of a charge, which comes at the next stage of the process of criminal investigation (see Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, §   315, with further references). 60.     As a rule, problems with the “reasonableness of suspicion” arise at the level of the facts. The question then is whether the arrest and detention were based on sufficient objective elements to justify a “reasonable suspicion” that the facts in issue had actually occurred. In addition to its factual side, the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” within the meaning of Article   5 §   1   (c) requires that the facts relied on can be reasonably considered to fall under one of the sections of the law dealing with criminal behaviour. Thus, there could clearly not be a “reasonable suspicion” if the acts or facts held against a   detained person did not constitute a crime at the time when they occurred (ibid., §   317, with further references). 61.     The Court reiterates that when assessing the “reasonableness” of a   suspicion, it must be able to ascertain whether the essence of the safeguard afforded by Article   5 §   1   (c) has been secured. Consequently, the respondent Government have to furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence (ibid., §   319). 62.     While reasonable suspicion must exist at the time of the arrest and initial detention, it must also be shown, in cases of prolonged detention, that the suspicion persisted and remained “reasonable” throughout the detention (ibid., §   320). 63.     The Court also reiterates that the question whether a period of time spent in pre-trial detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed on the facts of each case and according to its specific features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are actual indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article   5 of the Convention (see, among other authorities,