CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 20 juin 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBD1BE8CC { width:33.89pt; display:inline-block } .s9A597DC0 { width:115.42pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 36126/19 Medea PATASHURI against Georgia   The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 20 June 2024 as a Committee composed of:   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström , President ,   Lado Chanturia,   Mykola Gnatovskyy , judges , and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   36126/19) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 3 July 2019 by a Georgian national, Ms Medea Patashuri (“the applicant”), who was born in 1971 and lives in New York in the United States of America, and who was represented by Ms B. Pataraia and Mr N. Gamkhitashvili, lawyers practising in Tbilisi, Georgia; the decision to give notice of the application to the Georgian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the respondent State’s alleged failure to protect the applicant from domestic violence allegedly perpetrated by her former husband. The applicant complained under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention. 2 .     On 4 March 2014 the applicant complained to the police that her former husband had physically assaulted her. A criminal investigation was launched on the same day. A medical examination of the applicant confirmed the existence of physical injuries, which were assessed as being of a minor nature (hematoma). The applicant was granted victim status in proceedings in which her former husband was accused of domestic violence and a restraining order was issued, prohibiting the applicant’s former husband from physically approaching her. 3.     On 15 April 2014, given the minor nature of the injuries, a plea bargain was concluded with the applicant’s former husband. Prior to the conclusion of the bargain, the prosecuting authority had consulted with the applicant in accordance with the relevant legislation, and she had agreed to the proposed course of action. The perpetrator was convicted of the offences, having pleaded guilty, and was punished with a fine of 3,000 Georgian laris (GEL) (approximately 1,000 euros (EUR)). 4.     On 3 September 2014 another criminal investigation was instituted based on a new domestic violence complaint filed by the applicant with the police that same day, against her former husband. A medical examination commissioned by the investigator confirmed that the applicant had received a blow to her face (she had a bruise on her left cheek). New domestic violence charges were brought against the former husband, who was also formally warned under a further restraining order not to approach the applicant. The applicant’s former husband again pleaded guilty, and the prosecuting authority, after having obtained the applicant’s consent, again concluded a plea bargain. This resulted in the perpetrator’s second criminal conviction and his punishment with another fine. 5 .     On 13 January 2016 the applicant again complained to the police, alleging that her former husband had run into her with his car a few days earlier, fracturing her foot and rupturing a tendon in her knee. A criminal investigation was launched on the same day. A medical examination of the applicant was commissioned and other forensic examinations (see paragraph 7 below) were conducted shortly after the incident. The applicant was subsequently granted victim status, and the prosecuting authority, after having finalised the investigation, brought proceedings against the applicant’s former husband and sent the case for trial, seeking a prison sentence. 6.     On an unspecified date in 2016 the applicant left Georgia for the United States of America, where she has been residing since. 7 .     By a judgment of 29 December 2017, the Mtskheta District Court, after having conducted a trial during which a number of witnesses were heard and all other evidence was considered, acquitted the accused. The acquittal was based on the fact that, contrary to the applicant’s allegations, the medical examination of the applicant had revealed no signs of a recent fracture or of torn tendons on her feet or knees. That conclusion was confirmed in oral evidence by the medical expert heard during the trial, and by the fact that no traces of the alleged contact between the applicant and her husband’s vehicle were found by the investigators either on the bodywork or wheels of the car or on the clothes and shoes that the applicant had been wearing on the day of the alleged incident. On the other hand, a number of witnesses heard by the trial court stated that it was the applicant who had hit the windscreen of her former husband’s car with a bottle, after an argument with him, whilst an examination conducted by the investigators further confirmed that there had been some impact on the windscreen of the car. In the light of that evidence, the District Court concluded that the applicant’s allegations concerning the circumstances surrounding the alleged attack on her with the vehicle were highly contradictory, confused and unsubstantiated, and that the criminal charges against the applicant’s former husband should therefore be dropped as ill-founded. 8.     The prosecution authority lodged an appeal against the judgment of 29   December 2017, but the Tbilisi Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the acquittal on, respectively, 23 May 2018 and 3 January 2019. 9.     According to the case file, the applicant has never filed a criminal complaint against the police or brought proceedings against the law ‑ enforcement authority for inaction in relation to her allegations of domestic violence. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 10.     Citing Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant called into question the acquittal of 29 December 2017 of her former husband for the alleged attack on her with his vehicle, and also more generally complained about the police’s failure to protect her from the repeated domestic violence incidents. 11.     The Court reiterates that the right to institute criminal proceedings and to secure the conviction of a third party is not a right which is included as such among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004‑I, with further references, and Liģeres v. Latvia , no. 17/02, § 57, 28 June 2011), and that there is no absolute right to obtain the prosecution or conviction of any particular person (see Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18727/06, 4 January 2007). From that perspective, and being guided by the principle of subsidiarity, the Court considers that, rather than there being a requirement for the criminal conviction of the applicant’s former husband, the crucial criterion for the assessment of the present case is the question of whether or not the authorities were properly diligent in their response to the alleged threat to the applicant from her former husband (compare Tkhelidze v. Georgia , no. 33056/17, § 52, 8 July 2021, with further references therein). 12 .     In this regard, the Court attaches significance to the fact that the domestic law-enforcement authorities instituted three sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant’s former husband, in each case as soon as the victim complained to them that she had been the victim of domestic violence; restraining orders were duly issued, and criminal charges were brought (see paragraphs 2-5 above). Two of those sets of criminal proceedings eventually resulted in plea bargains whereby the former husband received mild criminal sanctions in exchange for guilty pleas. However, as the Government have emphasised, the Court notes that the applicant consented to the criminal proceedings against her former husband being terminated in that simplified manner. 13.     As regards the third set of criminal proceedings against the applicant’s former husband, which resulted in his acquittal of the charges relating to the alleged attack with the vehicle, the Court notes that unlike in the previous two cases, the prosecution authority decided to take the matter to trial. The facts of the case were then carefully examined by the domestic courts at three levels of jurisdiction. After having heard the witnesses and studied the results of the criminal investigation, the courts found the applicant’s allegation that she had been hit with the vehicle to be wholly unsupported (see paragraph 7 above). The Court cannot take on the role of a fourth-instance domestic court and call into question those findings of fact. The mere fact that the domestic courts acquitted the applicant’s former husband on the basis of the lack of incriminating evidence against him cannot suffice for a conclusion that the domestic authorities have fallen short of the requisite special diligence when dealing with the applicant’s domestic violence complaints (compare, for instance, M.T. and S.T. v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 59968/09, §§ 81-83, 29 May 2012). 14 .     In view of all the above considerations, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint about the acquittal of her former husband on 29 December 2017 in relation to the alleged attack on her with a vehicle do not disclose any appearance of a failure on the part of the authorities to fulfil any positive obligation under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that that part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 15 .     As regards the applicant’s second and more general complaint about the police’s alleged failure to protect her from various incidents of domestic violence, in addition to its conclusions above about the adequacy of the police response to her three specific criminal complaints, the Court reiterates, in the light of the Government’s objection that the application was inadmissible for non-exhaustion, that in a number of similar cases raising the problem of violence against women in Georgia, where the crux of the complaints was similar to the applicant’s present complaint in that the inactivity and negligence of the law-enforcement authorities was one of the main reasons why the domestic abuse was allowed to escalate, the most pertinent way to seek redress for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention would be the initiation of criminal proceedings against the individual law ‑ enforcement agents involved (see A and B v. Georgia , no. 73975/16, §   43, 10 February 2022; Tkhelidze , cited above, § 60, with further references therein, and Gaidukevich v. Georgia , no. 38650/18, §§ 62 and 53, 15 June 2023). However, since the applicant has never resorted either to this criminal remedy or to a civil one directed against the police authority as a whole (contrast, as regards the question of the civil remedy, A and B , cited above, §   45), clearly the part of the application calling into question the purported police negligence must be rejected under Article   35 §§   1 and   4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 11 July 2024.     Martina Keller   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström   Deputy Registrar   President