CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 2 juillet 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s2044A09A { margin-left:6.51pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .s3A692EA6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sAE6FB95D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:32.01pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sF54F3725 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sDBC81028 { width:4.83pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s65DDED6B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s7AE800C3 { width:4.28pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s5E503E34 { width:34.45pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sD8AE9261 { width:36.9pt; display:inline-block } .s1B8ACA20 { width:148.1pt; display:inline-block } .sB8467130 { width:24.88pt; display:inline-block } .s766CA6F { width:155.43pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 26781/20 Girolamo Massimo PALMERI against Italy   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 2   July   2024 as a Chamber composed of:   Alena Poláčková , President ,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Péter Paczolay,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 June 2020, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The application was lodged by Mr Girolamo Massimo Palmeri (“the   applicant”), an Italian national who was born in 1971 and lives in Milan. He was represented before the Court by Mr R. Mariconti, a lawyer practising in Milan. 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. The circumstances of the case 3.     On 21 July 2015 the Milan police headquarters ( questura ) received a telephone call from an anonymous informer who alleged that the applicant and his son were drug dealers and were hiding illegal drugs in their flat. 4 .     The police undertook proprio motu an urgent search of the applicant’s flat under Article   103 § 3 of Presidential Decree no. 309 of 9   October   1990 ( Testo unico delle leggi in materia di disciplina degli stupefacenti – “Decree no.   109/1990”; see paragraph 20 below). They seized a considerable quantity of hashish and items which could be used for packaging it, namely a precision balance, scissors and plastic sheets, which allegedly demonstrated that they had been selling the drug. 5 .     The applicant and his son were therefore charged with the criminal offence of drug dealing. The applicant asked to be tried in accordance with the summary procedure ( giudizio abbreviato ). His request was upheld. The criminal proceedings against the applicant 6 .     In the first-instance proceedings, held in accordance with the summary procedure before the Milan preliminary hearing judge ( giudice per l’udienza preliminare – “the GUP”), the applicant argued that the illegal drugs and the other seized items could not be admitted as evidence against him as they had been obtained by means of a search undertaken in breach of domestic law. In   his view, Article 333 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”; see paragraph 13 below), as interpreted in the domestic case-law, clearly specified that anonymous sources of information could not be used as evidence or as a ground for ordering house searches in the absence of other elements justifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed. 7 .     On 7 November 2017 the GUP dismissed the applicant’s arguments and convicted him of drug dealing. She observed that although anonymous sources of information could not be used in themselves to justify a search, they could legitimately be used to start an investigation, in the context of which a house search could be ordered. 8 .     On 20 March 2018 the applicant appealed against the judgment to the Milan Court of Appeal. He argued, inter alia , that the house search had been undertaken in breach of domestic law (see paragraph 6 above) and of Articles   6   §   1   and   8 of the Convention, as interpreted by the Court, and repeated his contention that the seized items could not be admitted as evidence against him. 9 .     On 29 October 2018 the Court of Appeal, reiterating the reasoning of the first-instance judgment, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 10 .     On 5 April 2019 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation, reiterating the same complaints. 11 .     On 24 January 2020, by judgment no. 2849, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It considered that the issue of using anonymous sources of information to authorise searches was irrelevant. It observed that the search undertaken by the police in the applicant’s case had been regulated by Article   103 § 3 of Decree no.   309/1990 (see paragraph 20 below) and not, as the applicant had argued, by Article 354 § 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 18 below). The Court of Cassation therefore found that, in the light of its well-established case-law (see paragraph 24 below), the search at issue did not require the previous existence of a suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed and the formal opening of a criminal investigation ( notitia criminis ); by contrast, in the light of its preventive function, it merely required the existence of a reasonable ground for believing that illegal drugs had been present in the flat. 12 .     The Court of Cassation further observed that, even if the search had been found unlawful – which it did not consider to be the case – that would not have prevented the illegal drugs and the other seized items from being admitted as evidence. Indeed, according to its well-established case-law (see   paragraphs 25-26 below), the lawfulness of the seizure of items whose existence and possession was illegal in itself, such as illegal drugs, was not affected by the unlawfulness of the means by which such items might have been obtained, such as house searches. In particular, the court held as follows: “the case-law had already distinguished between the effects of an unlawful search, a hypothesis which is not at issue in the present case, since the measure is a legitimate investigative activity undertaken under Article 103 of Decree no. 309/1990, and the effects of the seizure of evidence which follows the search; the power to seize the said evidence is not affected by the manner in which the seized items have been obtained; such power is conditioned exclusively by the existence of express prohibitions on the use of a certain type of evidence; those prohibitions cannot be identified in the present case and are not enshrined in Article 333 § 3 of the CCP, which merely prohibits the use of anonymous sources of evidence and does not concern the power to seize items the production and possession of which constitute, under certain conditions, a criminal offence.” RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Relevant domestic provisions Code of Criminal Procedure 13 .     Article 333 § 3 of the CCP provides that no use may be made of anonymous criminal complaints. 14 .     The relevant provision concerning the seizure for evidential purposes ( sequestro probatorio ) of items used for committing a criminal offence ( corpus delicti ) or pertaining to a criminal offence reads as follows: Article 253: Object and formalities of the seizure “1.     The judicial authority shall, by a reasoned decision, order the seizure of the corpus delicti and of items pertaining to the offence that are necessary for the establishment of the facts. 2.     The corpus delicti shall consist of any items on which or by means of which the offence was committed, as well as any items that constitute its product, profit or price. 3.     The seizure shall be carried out personally by the judicial authority or by a criminal police officer delegated by the same order. 4.     A copy of the seizure order shall be delivered to the person concerned, if present.” 15.     Where a seizure is ordered under the provision cited above, the individual concerned may apply for a review under Article 257 of the CCP, which reads as follows: Article 257: Review of the seizure order “1.     The defendant, the individual from whom items were seized and the individual who would be entitled to have them returned may lodge an application for review under Article   324. 2.     The application for review shall not suspend the enforceability of the seizure order.” 16.     Article 263 of the CCP regulates proceedings for requesting the return of seized items. 17.     Article 352 of the CCP allows searches to be undertaken proprio motu by the police in cases where individuals are found in flagrante delicto or in cases involving the commission of the criminal offence of escaping from arrest or detention. 18 .     Article 354 § 2 of the CCP allows the police, in urgent cases when it is not possible to wait for authorisation by the public prosecutor, to immediately undertake investigative measures, such as inspections, searches and seizures, which must then be approved by the public prosecutor. Presidential Decree no. 309 of 9   October   1990 (Consolidated Act on the regulation of illegal drugs) 19 .     Pursuant to Article 87 of Decree no. 309/1990, once an order to seize illegal drugs is final, the drugs must be confiscated and, if they are not needed as evidence, destroyed. 20 .     Article 103 §§ 3 and 4 of Decree no. 309/1990 regulates searches undertaken by the police in the context of operations aimed at the prevention and suppression of unlawful trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances. Those paragraphs read as follows: Article 103: Checks and inspections “3.     Criminal police officers, when there are reasons of particular necessity and urgency that do not allow them to request authorisation by telephone from the appropriate judge, may also carry out searches, giving notice, without delay and in any event within forty-eight hours, to the public prosecutor, who, if the conditions are met, shall approve them within forty-eight hours of being notified. 4.     Officers and agents of the criminal police who have carried out checks, inspections and searches under paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be obliged to immediately issue the person concerned with a copy of the report on the results of the measure taken.” The “Cartabia” reform 21 .     By section 1(24) of Law no. 134 of 27 September 2021 the Italian Parliament delegated powers to the government to amend the relevant provisions of the CCP to introduce the possibility of a judicial review of search orders issued in criminal proceedings. The provision clarified that the amendments had to be formulated in such a way as to guarantee the right of the individual being investigated and other interested individuals to lodge objections with the judge for preliminary investigations ( giudice per le indagini preliminari – GIP) against a search order, specifically in cases where the search was not followed by a seizure. The accompanying explanatory report expressly stated that the legislative reform was aimed at implementing the Court’s judgment in the case of Brazzi v. Italy (no.   57278/11, 27   September 2018). 22 .     The delegation of those powers was implemented by the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 10 October 2022, Article 12 of which inserted a new provision in the CCP, which reads as follows: Article 252- bis : Objection to a search order issued by the public prosecutor “1.     Unless the search order issued by the public prosecutor is followed by a seizure, the person being investigated and the person in respect of whom a search has been ordered or carried out may lodge an objection against that search, on which the judge shall rule in accordance with Article   127. 2.     The objection shall be lodged within ten days from the date of the execution of the order or from the date on which the person concerned became aware that the search had been carried out, failing which it shall be invalid. 3.     The judge shall uphold the objection if he or she finds that the search was ordered outside the cases provided for by law.” 23 .     Article 17 of the Legislative Decree amended Article 352 of the CCP (see paragraph 17 above) by introducing a new sentence in its fourth paragraph, requiring that searches carried out by the police proprio motu be subsequently approved, in a reasoned decision, by the public prosecutor, and introducing a new paragraph 4- bis , which reads as follows: “Unless the search is followed by a seizure, the person being investigated and the person in respect of whom the search has been ordered or carried out may, within ten days from the date on which they had knowledge of the decision on its approval, lodge an objection, on which the judge shall rule in accordance with Article 127. The   provision of Article 252- bis § 3 shall apply.” Relevant domestic case-law The nature of searches pursuant to Article 103 § 3 of Decree no.   309/1990 24 .     The case-law of the Court of Cassation has clarified that searches undertaken by the police under Article 103 § 3 of Decree no. 309/1990 (see   paragraph 20 above) are different from urgent searches undertaken by the police under Article   354   §   2 of the CCP (see paragraph 18 above). In the light of their preventive function, the former can be undertaken when there is a suspicion or reasonable grounds for believing that illegal drugs are present at a given location. Unlike searches under the latter provision, they do not require the existence of a previous notitia criminis , that is to say the prior formal opening of an investigation based on the suspicion that a specific criminal offence has been committed (see, among other authorities, Court of Cassation, judgments no.   9884 of 15   November   2013, no.   19365 of 17   February 2016, and no. 3196 of 13   November   2019). Admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained through unlawful searches (a)    Court of Cassation 25 .     In judgment no. 5021 of 27 March 1996, the Joint Chambers of the Court of Cassation clarified that the lawfulness of the seizure of items used for committing a criminal offence ( corpus delicti ) or pertaining to a criminal offence, under to Article 253 § 1 of the CCP (see paragraph 14 above), and of items whose existence and possession was unlawful in itself, was not affected by the unlawfulness of the means resorted to in order to obtain and seize such items. Therefore, the seized items could be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings irrespective of whether they had been obtained, for example, through an unlawful search. 26 .     In its subsequent case-law the Court of Cassation dealt with the specific issue of searches and seizures in the context of anti-drug operations pursuant to Article 103 § 3 of Decree no. 309/1990. It stated that the validity of the seizure of illegal drugs and other items gathered during a search did not depend on the validity of the search, even if the search itself had been unlawful. Accordingly, the seized items could be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings irrespective of the lawfulness of the search (see Court of Cassation, judgments no. 150 of 5   January   2006, no.   26668 of 30   June   2009, no. 17478 of 5 May 2011, no. 3196 of 13   November   2019, and no. 3196 of 27   January   2020). (b)    Constitutional Court 27 .     In ruling on the compatibility with the Constitution of the possibility of admitting as evidence items seized through unlawful searches, the Italian Constitutional Court has considered that the Court of Cassation’s case-law cited above was so well established as to be considered “the law in force” in Italy ( diritto vivente ) on the matter. The Constitutional Court has on several occasions dismissed objections of unconstitutionality which had been brought before it in that respect and thereby accepted the possibility of admitting as evidence items that had been seized through an unlawful search (see Constitutional Court, judgments no. 219 of 22   May   2019, no.   252 of 21   October 2020, and no. 247 of 9   December   2022). 28.     In judgment no. 252 of 21 October 2020, however, the Constitutional Court declared Article 103 § 3 of Decree no. 309/1990 unconstitutional, but exclusively in so far as it did not specify that urgent personal and house searches authorised by the competent public prosecutor by telephone had to be subsequently approved by the same public prosecutor. Other remedies 29 .     As recently reiterated by the Court of Cassation, the seizure of evidence under Article 253 of the CCP (see paragraph 14 above) is subject to two different remedies, which have different aims and purposes. Applications for review under Article 257 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 above) are aimed at challenging the factual and legal grounds on which the seizure was based; by contrast, applications for the return of seized items under Article   263 of the CCP (see paragraph 16 above) merely concern the issue of whether, in the light of the passage of time or of other new elements, the seizure at issue is no longer justified and must therefore be lifted. Accordingly, applications for the return of seized items cannot be lodged in order to complain of the invalidity and unlawfulness of a search in itself (see Court of Cassation, judgment no. 15697 of 27   April   2021). (a)    Application for review of seizure orders 30 .     According to the domestic case-law, house searches in themselves (both those authorised by the public prosecutor and those undertaken autonomously by the police and subsequently approved by the public prosecutor) cannot be challenged before the judicial authorities. Applications for review can therefore be lodged only against seizure orders, and, in any event, the validity of the seizure is not affected by any invalidity of the search (see Court of Cassation, judgment no. 33892 of 13   September   2021, summarising the relevant case-law; see also, for example, Court of Cassation, judgments no. 30130 of 24 June 2015, no. 51997 of 31 October 2017, and no.   15537 of 12 November 2020). (b)    Application for the return of seized items 31 .     The Joint Chambers of the Court of Cassation have clarified that the return of seized items whose confiscation is mandatory under Article   240   §   2 of the CCP or under other provisions because their production, existence or possession is unlawful is always forbidden, even in cases in which the seizure order is declared invalid or revoked. Accordingly, it is not possible to request the return of such items (see Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, judgment no. 40847 of 4 October 2019, with further references). COMPLAINT 32.     The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the house search undertaken by the police in his flat had not been “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of the second paragraph of that provision. He argued that there had been no suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence and that there had been no relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the measure since, under domestic law, anonymous sources of information could not be resorted to as a ground for ordering house searches. He further argued that the measure should have been subjected to ex ante scrutiny. THE LAW 33.     The application concerns the question whether the house search undertaken by the police in the applicant’s flat, in the course of which the authorities seized a considerable amount of hashish which was subsequently used as evidence in the criminal proceedings brought against him for drug dealing, was “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article   8   §   2 of the Convention. 34.     The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints concerned a house search which took place on 21 July 2015. However, the application was lodged on 18 June 2020, within six months from the Court of Cassation’s judgment no. 2849 of 24 January 2020 (see paragraph 11 above). That   judgment concluded the criminal proceedings in which the seized items, which had been obtained through the contested search, were admitted as evidence, and confirmed the applicant’s conviction for drug dealing. 35 .     In this context, the Court emphasises that the requirements contained in Article 35 §   1 of the Convention concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month period are closely interrelated ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v.   Portugal [GC], no.   56080/13, § 130, 19   December   2017). It   must assess whether the present application complied with the six-month rule which the Court must apply of its own motion ( see Merabishvili v.   Georgia [GC], no.   72508/13, § 247, 28   November   2017; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes , cited above, §§ 128-39; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §   138, 20 March 2018; and Kupinskyy v.   Ukraine , no. 5084/18, § 57, 10   November 2022), as required by Article   35   § 1 of the Convention. This provision, as in force when the facts of the present case took place [1] , reads as follows: “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.” 36.       In that regard, the Court would reiterate that the six-month time-limit imposed by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires applicants to lodge their applications within six months of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. This provision allows only remedies which are normal and effective to be taken into account, as an applicant cannot extend the strict time-limit imposed under the Convention by seeking to make inappropriate or misconceived applications to bodies or institutions which have no power or competence to offer effective redress for the complaint in issue under the Convention (see Kurşun v. Turkey , no.   22677/10, §   75, 30   October 2018, and Lopes de Sousa Fernandes , cited above, §   132, with the case-law cited therein). 37 .     It follows that if an applicant has recourse to a remedy which is doomed to fail from the outset, the decision on that appeal cannot be taken into account for the calculation of the six-month period (see, among other authorities, Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 65, 11   December   2018, and Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 49270/11, §   131, 9   June   2022). 38 .     In the light of the above, where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date on which an applicant becomes aware of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see, among other authorities, Mocanu and Others v. Romania   [GC], nos.   10865/09 and 2 others, § 259, ECHR 2014 (extracts); Novotný v.   the Czech Republic , no.   16314/13, § 34, 7 June 2018; and Belugin v.   Russia , no.   2991/06, § 60, 26   November 2019). 39.     In this connection, the Court reiterates that the determination of whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must use and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the six-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant’s complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes , cited above, § 134; Ražnatović v.   Montenegro , no. 14742/18, § 27, 2 September 2021; and Mukhametov and Others v. Russia , nos. 53404/18 and 3 others, § 27, 14 December 2021). It   further emphasises that to be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, § 74, 25   March   2014, and G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, §   182, 28   June   2018). 40.     The Court has also clarified that where an arguable breach of one or more of the rights under the Convention is in issue, there should be a mechanism available to the victim for establishing any liability of State officials or bodies for that breach. Furthermore, in appropriate cases, compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage flowing from the breach should in principle be available as part of the range of redress (see,   mutatis mutandis , T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.   28945/95, §   107, ECHR 2001‑V (extracts); Roth v.   Germany , nos.   6780/18 and 30776/18, § 92, 22 October 2020; and Sy v.   Italy , no.   11791/20, §   142, 24   January 2022). 41 .     In the light of the principles reiterated above, the Court considers that in the present case it is necessary to assess whether the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant provided him with an effective remedy for the purpose of complaining, under Article 8 of the Convention, of the unlawfulness of the contested house search, and can therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the six-month rule (see paragraphs 42-53 below). 42 .     As regards measures affecting rights guaranteed by Article 8 ordered in the context of criminal proceedings, the effectiveness of the domestic remedies will depend largely on the particular features of the respondent State’s legal system and on the circumstances of the specific case (see   Gernelle et sa société d’exploitation de l’hebdomadaire Le Point v.   France (dec.), no.   18536/18, § 43, 9 April 2024). It results from the assessment of the relevant case-law of the Court that, in order to be effective for the purpose of the non-exhaustion rule, a remedy must first and foremost allow an assessment of the legality and necessity of the contested measure (see, among others, Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria , no. 34529/10, §§   210‑211, ECHR   2013 (extracts)). Moreover, in case of a finding of an irregularity, the remedy must offer appropriate redress (see, among others, Budak v.   Turkey , no.   69762/12, § 46, 16 February 2021). 43.     A complaint lodged with the criminal courts hearing the proceedings in which the measure was ordered may be regarded as effective if those courts are competent to review the legality and necessity of the interference complained of (see Panarisi, v. Italy , no. 46794/99, §§ 76-77, 10   April   2007, Dragojević v. Croatia , no. 68955/11, § 72, 15 January 2015, Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia , no. 34148/07, §§ 40-44, 31 March 2016, and Radzhab Magomedov v. Russia , no. 20933/08, §§ 77-79, 20   December   2016; see also Ben Faiza v. France , no. 31446/12, § 47, 8 February 2018, Xavier Da Silveira v. France , no. 43757/05, § 46, 21 January 2010, and Gernelle et sa société d’exploitation de l’hebdomadaire Le Point , cited above, § 44). 44.     By contrast, this is not the case when a complaint lodged with the criminal courts only concerns the question of the fairness of the admission of a piece of evidence, without allowing those courts to assess the substance of the complaint grounded on the Convention ( Khan v. the   United   Kingdom , no.   35394/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-V, Goranova‑Karaeneva v.   Bulgaria , no.   12739/05, § 59, 8 March 2011, Akhlyustin v. Russia , no. 21200/05, §   24, 7 November   2017, Zubkov and Others v. Russia , nos.   29431/05 and 2 others, § 88, 7   November   2017, Hambardzumyan v. Armenia , no.   43478/11, §   43, 5   December 2019, and Gernelle et sa société d’exploitation de l’hebdomadaire Le Point , cited above, § 44). In particular, in some cases the Court has held that although the courts could, in the criminal proceedings, consider questions of the fairness of admitting the evidence in the criminal proceedings, it was not open to them to deal with the substance of the Convention complaint under Article   8 that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was not “in accordance with the law” or not “necessary in a democratic society”; still less was it open to them to grant appropriate relief in connection with the complaint (see Goranova-Karaeneva , cited above, § 59, Dragojević v. Croatia , no.   68955/11, §   99, 15   January   2015, with further references, Zubkov and   Others v.   Russia , nos.   29431/05 and 2 others, §   88, 7   November   2017, and Hambardzumyan v.   Armenia , no. 43478/11, §   43, 5   December 2019). In similar cases, the Court observed that any opportunity for an applicant to challenge a search warrant or any aspect of its implementation in the criminal proceedings against him would have concerned the protection of his right to a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charge against him, but would have had no direct connection with his rights protected independently under Article   8 of the Convention (see Plechlo v. Slovakia , no.   18593/19, §   46, 26   October   2023, and Potoczká and Adamčo v. Slovakia , no.   7286/16, §   61, 12   January   2023). 45.     Moreover, as to the redress which is appropriate and sufficient in order to remedy a breach of a Convention right at national level, the Court has generally considered this to be dependent on all the circumstances of the case, having regard, in particular, to the nature of the Convention violation at stake (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no.   22978/05, §   116, ECHR 2010, and Gernelle et sa société d’exploitation de l’hebdomadaire Le Point , cited above, §   45). Several forms of redress have thus been considered adequate by the Court. In some cases it has held that the exclusion from the criminal proceedings of pieces of evidence unlawfully obtained could constitute an adequate form of redress (see Ben Faiza , cited above, §§   47 and 73); in other situations, the possibility for the persons concerned to obtain, following a finding of irregularity, financial compensation by the criminal court (see   Kibermanis v. Latvia (dec.), no. 42065/06, § 49, 3   November   2015, and Bălteanu v. Romania , no. 142/04, § 32, 16 July 2013) or by another judicial authority (see Parlamış v. Turkey (dec.), no. 74288/01, 13   November   2007, Svetina v. Slovenia , no.   38059/13, § 60, 22   May   2018, and Budak , cited above, § 44) has been held to be sufficient. In some other cases in which the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the incompatibility with that provision of domestic laws examined in the abstract, in the absence of any concrete measure imposed on the applicant, the Court considered that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any damage caused to the applicant (see, for example, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary , no.   37138/14, § 98, 12 January 2016, and Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no.   47143/06, § 312, ECHR 2015). In particular circumstances, it considered that express acknowledgement of the violation of Article 8 and the award of symbolic compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant could constitute sufficient redress (see   Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2) , no. 66580/12, §§ 169-174, 2 October 2018). 46.     As regards the Italian context, the Court notes that in the case of Brazzi it left open the issue of whether criminal proceedings in Italy would constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of the violation of Article 8 alleged by the applicant, since the contested search had not been followed by a seizure and there had been no criminal proceedings (see Brazzi , cited above, §   46). The Court also notes that, following its judgment in the case of Brazzi (cited above), the provisions of the CCP have been amended (see paragraph   21 above) in order to introduce a remedy against searches authorised by the public prosecutor (see paragraph 22 above) or undertaken proprio motu by the police (see paragraph 23 above). However, that remedy only concerns searches which have not been followed by a seizure and was introduced several years after the violation alleged in the present case took place. 47 .     In the present case, the contested search was followed by the seizure of illegal drugs and other items (see paragraph 4 above), which were used as decisive evidence to convict the applicant of drug dealing. 48 .     In the criminal proceedings the applicant argued that the seized items could not be admitted as evidence because they had been obtained through a search which, in his view, had been unlawful (see paragraphs 6, 8   and   10 above). However, the applicant’s argument was rejected at all three levels of the domestic proceedings, namely by the Milan GUP (see paragraph 7   above), the Milan Court of Appeal (see paragraph 9 above) and the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 11 above). That court observed, in particular, that even assuming that the search had been found to be unlawful, which it did not consider to be the case, its well-established domestic case-law made clear that the seized items (in this case, the hashish) could be admitted as evidence, as their possession had been unlawful in itself and had been used for committing the crime at issue in the proceedings (see paragraph 12   above). 49.     The Court notes that the approach followed in the applicant’s case was clearly in line with the well-established case-law of the Court of Cassation. That court clarified that, in general, the lawfulness of the seizure of the corpus delicti and of items pertaining to the offence, as defined in Article 253 § 1 of the CCP, was not affected by any unlawfulness of the search through which they had been obtained (see paragraph 25 above). The same principle was applied with specific regard to the measure at issue in the present case, namely searches carried out, pursuant to Article   103 § 3 of Decree no.   309/1990, in the context of operations aimed at the prevention and suppression of unlawful trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances (see paragraph 26 above); the Court of Cassation found, in particular, that seized illegal drugs, whose existence and possession was unlawful in itself, could be used as evidence irrespective of any unlawfulness of the search. 50.     The Court also notes that the Italian Constitutional Court considered that that approach was sufficiently well established in the domestic case ‑ law of the Court of Cassation to be considered “the law in force” in Italy on the issue ( diritto vivente – see paragraph 27 above). 51 .     The Court therefore considers that, in the light of the domestic law and case-law, the criminal courts, in the specific circumstances of the case and due to the nature of the seized items (see paragraphs 25-26 above), could not have provided redress for the applicant’s complaint about the unlawfulness of the house search by excluding the illegal drugs and other items seized from being admitted as evidence. That said, the Court reiterates that neither the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 nor the right to an effective domestic remedy guaranteed by Article 13 confer as such a right to obtain the exclusion of evidence obtained through an unlawful search in breach of Article 8 (see Kalnėnienė v. Belgium , no.   40233/07, §   61,   31   January   2017). 52 .     Lastly, the Court notes that in the Italian legal system the criminal courts have no power to award financial compensation in the event of an unlawful or unjustified investigative measure (contrast Bălteanu v. Romania , no 142/04, § 32, 16 July 2013, and Kibermanis v. Latvia , no. 42065/06, §   48, 3 November 2015). Nor could an individual, even assuming that he or she could have obtained a declaration of unlawfulness of the measure by the criminal courts, have subsequently lodged a civil action for financial compensation (contrast Svetina , cited above, § 60). 53 .     The Court therefore finds that criminal proceedings were not an effective remedy in respect of the complaint that the house search violated Article 8 raised in the present application and cannot therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the six-month rule. In particular, even assuming that the applicant could have obtained by the criminal courts a declaration that the search was unlawful, he could not have obtained any form of appropriate redress, either in the form of the exclusion from the criminal proceedings of the evidence seized during the search or by obtaining an award of any financial compensation by the same criminal courts or in subsequently instituted civil proceedings. 54 .     In the light of the above, the Court considers that the present application has been lodged out of time. 55.     It follows that the application must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   1 and   4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, by a majority, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 25 July 2024.     Ilse Freiwirth   Alena Poláčková   Section Registrar   President [1] Protocol No. 15 to the Convention has shortened to four months from the final domestic decision the time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. However, in the present case the six-month period still applies, given that the final domestic decisions were taken prior to 1 February 2022, date of entry into force of the new rule (pursuant to Article 8 § 3 of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention).