CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 9 juillet 2024

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border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .sBA0054F1 { width:22.06%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s6E53EE73 { width:7.44%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s5B1F4FB1 { width:26.52%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s48B06E0A { width:26.16%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sA8931871 { width:17.8%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sB055D536 { width:22.06%; border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } THIRD SECTION CASE OF SAVINOVSKIKH AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Application no. 16206/19)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Family life • Termination of custody and foster care agreement of transgender person in respect of two minors on account of his diagnosis of “transsexualism” and change of gender identity • Domestic authorities’ failure to conduct in-depth examination of entire family situation • Predominant reliance on legal impossibility of same-sex couples’ being accepted as foster parents as well as traditions and mentality of Russian society, without consideration of investigating authorities’ conclusion • Absence of individualised expert examination or supporting scientific study on impact of change of gender identity on children’s psychological health and development • Lack of balanced and reasonable assessment of competing interests • Art 34 • Locus standi • Applicant had standing to act on the children’s behalf as when the application was lodged the social services safeguarding their interests under domestic law were at the origin of the arbitrary interference   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 9 July 2024   FINAL   09/10/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Jolien Schukking,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Andreas Zünd , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   16206/19) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Yulia Savinovskikh (“the applicant”), on his own behalf and on behalf of D.D. and K.K., Russian nationals born in 2012, on 14   March 2019; the decision to give notice of the application to the Russian Government (“the Government”); the decision not to disclose D.D.’s and K.K.’s names; the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant; the comments submitted by Transgender Europe (TGEU) jointly with the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) and the Russian Transgender Legal Defense Project (TLDP); the Russian LGBTQ+ non-governmental organisation Coming Out; and a group of global national human rights organisations (from Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, South Africa and the United States) led by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, which had all been granted leave by the President of the Section to intervene in the written procedure; the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the elected judges of the Court to sit as an   ad hoc   judge, applying by analogy Rule   29   §   2 of the Rules of Court (see   Kutayev v. Russia , no.   17912/15, §§   5-8, 24   January 2023); Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the termination of the custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person in respect of two minors on the ground of his being diagnosed with “transsexualism” and going through change of gender identity. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant is a Russian national, born in 1977, who resided at the material time in Yekaterinburg, Russia. He was represented by Ms   N.   Dobreva, a lawyer practising in Sofia, Bulgaria. 3.     The Government were initially represented by Mr   M.   Galperin and Mr   A.   Fedorov,   former Representatives of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by their successor in that office, Mr   M.   Vinogradov. 4.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5 .     The applicant is a transgender man. He was assigned female at birth and his gender was registered as female. He has three biological children. He currently identifies as male. 6.     D.D and K.K. were born in 2012. Their biological parents were deprived of parental rights. They were placed in the public care facilities and then taken into the applicant’s guardianship under a foster care agreement. Events preceding the separation of the applicant from D.D. AND K.K. 7 .     On 5 June 2014 the municipal social services in the Kirovskiy District of Yekaterinburg issued an order by which D.D. was placed into the applicant’s custody. D.D.’s biological parents had been deprived of parental rights and he had lived in a public care facility since birth. He had been diagnosed as HIV-positive and suffered from developmental delays and a form of cerebral and muscular dysfunction. 8.     On 19 June 2014 the applicant signed an agreement with the municipal social services under which D.D. was placed in his care and the applicant gained custody of him. 9 .     On 29 January 2016 the municipal social services in the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District of Yekaterinburg issued an order by which K.K. was placed into the applicant’s custody. The latter’s biological parents had been deprived of parental rights and he had lived in a public care facility since birth. He had been born prematurely and was subsequently diagnosed with cerebral palsy, delayed speech development and intellectual disability. One year after his birth he was assigned disability status. 10.     On 1 February 2016 the foster care agreement of 19 June 2014 was supplemented with an additional agreement in respect of K.K.’s placement in the applicant’s care. 11.     At the time of the above-mentioned proceedings the applicant’s gender was recorded as “female”, he was married to Mr. E.S. and they lived with their two biological children born in 2012 and 2013. The applicant also has an adult daughter from a previous marriage. 12.     On 3 July 2017 the medical commission of the Sverdlovsk Regional Clinical Psychiatric Hospital diagnosed the applicant with “transsexualism” and established the absence of any psychiatric contraindications for him to undergo surgical, cosmetic and hormonal correction of gender (female to male). The medical commission found that since childhood the applicant identified himself as male, wanted to receive surgical and hormonal treatment so as to change his body in accordance with the chosen male gender, as well as to obtain legal recognition of his new gender identity. 13.     On 21 July 2017 the applicant underwent a double mastectomy and all of his breast tissue was surgically removed. Around the same time the applicant created an account on a social network presenting himself as male. Termination of the applicant’s CUSTODY and HIS separation from D.D. AND K.K. 14.     On 24 August 2017 the municipal social services of the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District of Yekaterinburg became aware of the applicant’s surgery and discovered that he had posted pictures of himself on his page on the social network in which he presented himself as male. 15.     On   27 August 2017 a social services official visited the applicant’s apartment where he resided with D.D. and K.K. During this visit the applicant told the official that he had been diagnosed with “transsexualism” and that he was going through a change of gender identity. He further stated that he was planning to move to another country with the children, where he had already lodged an asylum application. During that visit the official also found that the sanitary conditions in the apartment were unsatisfactory and decided that D.D. and K.K. should be temporarily placed into a public care facility. 16 .     On 28 August 2017 the social services of the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District of Yekaterinburg issued two orders in respect of D.D. and K.K. by which the applicant’s custody of them was terminated with reference to the conflict between the interests of the children and the applicant. 17 .     According to the applicant, on 30 August 2017 he was served with the above-mentioned orders and was asked to sign a friendly settlement agreement in order to terminate the foster care agreement of 19 June 2014. The applicant refused to do so and on the same day D.D. and K.K were taken from the applicant’s family and placed in the Social Rehabilitation Centre for Minors of the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District of Yekaterinburg. The applicant has not seen the children since then. 18 .     On 5 September 2017 the social services attempted to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant, claiming that he had not duly performed his duties as a guardian of D.D. and K.K. The investigating authorities conducted an inquiry and found the living conditions in the applicant’s apartment to be satisfactory and that the applicant and his spouse had performed their parental duties in accordance with the law. On 20   October 2017 the investigating authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings. Judicial proceedings for the termination of the foster care agreement 19 .     On 4 September 2017 the social services lodged a complaint with the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg (“the District Court”), requesting to terminate the foster care agreement of 19 June 2014, as supplemented on 1   February 2016. In their submissions they stated: “The main reason for termination of the foster care agreement is [the applicant’s] transsexualism, since the children were initially placed in a traditional family.” 20.     The applicant lodged a counter ‑ claim requesting the courts to find the orders of 28 August 2017 unlawful and to restore his custody of D.D. and K.K. He submitted that he had never intended to undergo change of gender identity and that his account on the social network had been of a purely artistic nature. He stated that he had been diagnosed with “transsexualism” but claimed that that was only a part of his personality, since he still performed the role of a “mother” and that was how the children perceived him. Regarding the double mastectomy, the applicant claimed that it had not been part of a gender transition, but merely a surgery performed for personal reasons. He stated that he had been under no obligation to inform the social services of the surgery. 21 .     On 5 February 2018 the District Court held a hearing during which it examined the applicant’s medical records and the record of the visit of the social services official to the applicant’s apartment on 27 August 2017 and heard the parties and witnesses. 22 .     On the same day the District Court ordered that the foster care agreement be terminated and it dismissed the applicant’s counter-claim. The court established that his diagnosis of “transsexualism” had been proved by the medical records and that he had actually intended to go through change of gender identity, with the double mastectomy being part of it. It further held that even though “transsexualism” was a “psychiatric disorder”, it was not in itself an obstacle for gaining custody and taking children into foster care. However, in the circumstances of the case, the applicant’s diagnosis of “transsexualism” had been a sufficient reason to deprive him of custody. The text of the judgment reads, in the relevant part, as follows: “In accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, in Russia only a man and a woman can be married. Registration of same ‑ sex marriages is prohibited. [The applicant’s] identification as male, considering her being married to a man, her intent to adopt a social role typical for persons of male gender, is in substance contrary to the principles of family law of our country, traditions and mentality of our society.” 23 .     The court also noted that according to the record drawn up on the official’s visit to the applicant’s apartment on 27 August 2017, the sanitary conditions in the apartment were unsatisfactory. The witnesses, who worked in the public care facility where K.K. was placed on 30   August 2017, submitted that upon K.K.’s arrival it was noted that the latter had major gaps in his intellectual development. According to their testimony the foster family had not ensured the necessary educational activities. Although D.D. and K.K. were affectionate toward the applicant and the members of his family, this circumstance alone could not serve as a basis for satisfying the applicant’s claims in view of the substantial conflict between the interests of the applicant and those of the children. 24 .     The District Court found that the applicant had breached the provisions of the foster care agreement by failing to inform the social services of “significant circumstances”, such as his diagnosis, the surgery and the creation of his social network page where he presented himself as male. The court considered these circumstances significant since they “affected the physical, spiritual and moral development of the children”. 25 .     The applicant lodged an appeal with the Sverdlovsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). During the appeal hearing, he continued to deny his intention to go through the change of gender identity and added as evidence an expert panel report of 24   January 2018. That report concluded that the applicant should be diagnosed with “gender identity disorder, unspecified” under ICM-10 F.64.9. In view of the applicant’s social adaptability, acceptance of a female social role, heterosexual relations, stable partnership, marriage and childbirth, there had been no sufficient indicators for the diagnosis of “transsexualism” (ICM-10 F.64.0). Furthermore, the report indicated that the applicant did not have any other disorder which might be dangerous for the children’s life, health and development. 26 .     On 15 May 2018 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed. The Regional Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusions and reiterated that the decision to terminate the foster care agreement was based on (i)     poor sanitary conditions in the apartment, (ii)     apparent lack of necessary attention to K.K.’s intellectual development and (iii)     the applicant’s failure to inform the social services of “significant circumstances”. The circumstances in question were found to be “significant”, because they “characterised [the applicant’s] personality, which could not but affect the mental, spiritual and moral development of the fostered children”. The court pointed out that the decision to terminate the foster care agreement had been driven not by the applicant’s diagnosis of “transsexualism”, but by the breach of the foster care agreement and the legal impossibility of same-sex couples being foster parents. 27.     Subsequent cassation appeals lodged by the applicant were dismissed on 5   September 2018 by the Regional Court and on 31 October 2018   by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Futher developments 28.     After the applicant’s appeal was dismissed, he fled to another country together with his husband and two biological children. 29.     On 22 October 2018 he lodged an application for refugee status in respect of his fear of prosecution in Russia and separation from his biological children on account of his change of gender. 30.     On 14 April 2021 his asylum application was granted. 31.     Meanwhile, according to the Government, on 18   March 2019 and 21   February 2020, respectively, D.D. and K.K. were placed in the foster family of Mr A.G. and Ms N.G., who thus gained custody of the children. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK relevant domestic law Family Code of the Russian Federation (as in force at the material time) 32.     The mutual and voluntary consent of a man and a woman who have attained marriageable age is required for the registration of a marriage (Article 12 § 1). 33.     Children left without parental care are placed (under adoption, custody, guardianship or foster care) in families where they are to be raised. In the absence of such possibility they are temporarily placed in organisations for orphans and children left without parental care. Until a child without parental care is placed in a family or organisation specified above, the duties of their guardian are temporarily assigned to the custody and guardianship authorities (Article 123). 34.     Custody and guardianship are established for children left without parental care for the purpose of their maintenance, upbringing and education, as well as for the protection of their interests. Custody is established for children under the age of 14; guardianship is established for children from 14 to 18 years of age (Article   145   §   1). 35 .     Only adults with legal capacity may be appointed as guardians (trustees) of children. Persons who are in a union formed between persons of the same sex, that union being recognised as a marriage and registered in accordance with the legislation of the State in which such marriage is permitted, as well as persons who are citizens of that foreign state and are not married, cannot be appointed as guardians (Article 146 § 1). 36.     Persons suffering from diseases, the list of which is determined by the government of the Russian Federation and includes mental and behavioural disorders, cannot be appointed as guardians (trustees) (Article 146 § 3). [1] 37 .     Guardians (trustees) exercise the rights and fulfil the duties of a guardian (trustee) in respect of a child under their guardianship and are responsible for any non-fulfilment or improper fulfilment of the duties assigned to them in accordance with the procedure and conditions provided for by federal law and the custody and guardianship agreement (договор об осуществлении опеки и попечительства) (Article 153 § 2). Federal Law “On Guardianship” 38.     Federal Law no.   48-FZ “On   Guardianship” of 24 April 2008 ( Федеральный закон от 24 апреля 2008 №   48-ФЗ «Об опеке и попечительстве» ) provides that the rights and obligations of a guardian (trustee) for the representation and protection of the rights and lawful interests of the child arise from the moment of the adoption of the act on the appointment of a guardian (trustee). The placement of a child under custody and guardianship is allowed under the custody and guardianship agreement between the custody and guardianship authority and a guardian on the basis of the act of the custody and guardianship authority appointing a guardian who performs his or her duties in exchange for a fee. The right of a guardian (trustee) to remuneration arises from the moment of the signing of the agreement (section   14(1)-(3)). 39.     Guardians are legal representatives of the children placed in their care and are entitled to act on their behalf for the protection of their rights and lawful interests without any formal authorisation (section 15(2)). 40 .     The custody and guardianship authority may relieve a guardian (trustee) from performing his or her duties, including temporarily, in the event of conflicts between the interests of the child and the interests of the guardian (trustee) (section 29(4)). 41.     The custody and guardianship authority is entitled to remove a guardian (trustee) from the performance of his or her duties in the event of improper performance of the duties assigned to him or her, violation of the rights and legitimate interests of the ward, including when exercising guardianship for personal gain, or leaving the child without supervision and necessary assistance (section 29(5)). 42 .     The rights and obligations of the guardian (trustee) will be terminated from the date the custody and guardianship authority adopts an act releasing the guardian (trustee) from the performance of the duties assigned to him or her or on the removal of the guardian from the performance of such duties. This act may be challenged in court (section   29(6) and (7)). 43.     The termination of guardianship leads to the termination of the custody and guardianship agreement (section 30(3)). Civil Code of the Russian Federation 44 .     At the request of one of the parties, the contract may be changed or terminated by a court decision in the event of a significant violation of the contract by the other party. A violation of the contract by one of the parties is considered significant if it entails damage to the other party to the extent that that party is considerably deprived of what it had the right to count on when concluding the contract (Article 450 § 2). Relevant international material 45 .     For some of the relevant international material, see A.M. and Others v. Russia , no. 47220/19, §§   33, 35, 37-40, 6 July 2021. UN Human Rights Council 46 .     In its Resolutions 17/19 (2011), 27/32 (2014) and 32/2 (2016), the UN Human Rights Council (“the HRC”) has “strongly deplor[ed] acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against individuals because of their ... gender identity”. The HRC has welcomed “positive developments at the international, regional and national levels in the fight against violence and discrimination based on ... gender identity”. Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity 47.     In 2016, the HRC appointed an Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (“the UN SOGI expert”). 48.     In his biannual reports (2018) to the HRC and the UN General Assembly, the UN SOGI expert has emphasised that “[w]ithin international human rights law, there is a well-established framework prescribing respect for gender identity” and observing that the “United Nations treaty bodies have affirmed in their doctrine that ... gender identity, including gender expression, are prohibited grounds for discrimination”. He has called upon States to “adopt anti-discrimination legislation that includes ... gender identity”. To address discriminatory acts against transgender populations, the UN SOGI expert recommend that States “prevent, investigate and punish ... discrimination based on gender identity perpetrated by both State and non ‑ State actors” and that they “eliminate the social stigma associated with gender diversity ...”. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 49.     The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (“the High Commissioner”) has strongly affirmed that transgender people are covered by existing guarantees against discrimination. In her report to the HRC (2011), the High Commissioner stated that “[a]ll people, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons, are entitled to enjoy the protections provided for by international human rights law ...”. She has called upon States to ensure that “anti-discrimination legislation includes ... gender identity among prohibited grounds”, observing that “States’ responsibility to protect individuals from discrimination extends to the family sphere” and that “States should also provide legal recognition and protection to same-sex couples and protect the rights of their children, without discrimination”. Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 50 .     In the Issue Paper (2009) entitled “Human rights and gender identity”, the Commissioner for Human Rights called upon member States to “implement international human rights standards without discrimination and prohibit explicitly discrimination on the ground of gender identity”. In his subsequent report (2011) entitled “Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe”, the Commissioner recommended that States “enact comprehensive national legislation on non ‑ discrimination and include ... gender identity among the prohibited grounds ...”. He advocated screening “national legislation to detect and correct possible inconsistencies with non-discrimination legislation in force to prevent discrimination on grounds of ... gender identity”. In the sphere of private and family life, the Commissioner encouraged member States to “recognise the parental rights of same-sex parents, individually or jointly, including their rights of guardianship and custody without discrimination on grounds of ... gender identity”. THE LAW JURISDICTION 51.     The applicant complained that his rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention had been violated. The Court decides that it has jurisdiction to examine the present application in so far as the facts giving rise to the alleged violation of the Convention occurred prior to 16   September 2022 – the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a party to the Convention (see   Fedotova and Others v. Russia   [GC], nos.   40792/10   and 2   others, §§   68 ‑ 73, 17 January 2023, and Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2134/23 and 6 others, § 46, 6 June 2023). ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 52.     The applicant complained, on behalf of himself, D.D. and K.K., that the removal of D.D. and K.K. from his custody had not been necessary in a democratic society and, therefore, violated their right to respect for their family life. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility 53.     The Government argued that the applicant had no standing to bring the application on behalf of D.D. and K.K., as his custody of the children had been legally terminated on 28   August 2017 and he had had no contact with them since then. As of 18   March 2019 and 21   February 2020 respectively, D.D. and K.K. were accommodated in the foster home of Mr   A.G. and Ms   N.G., who have been exercising their rights and duties in representing D.D. and K.K. and protecting their rights and lawful interests. 54.     The applicant argued that, at the time of the lodging of the present application before the Court, the functions of D.D.’s and K.K.’s guardian had been exercised by the Yekaterinburg Social Welfare Office. However, the Yekaterinburg Social Welfare Office (custody and guardianship authority) had been accused before the Court of failing in its responsibility to protect D.D.’s and K.K.’s best interests by arbitrarily removing them from the applicant’s custody. Further, no information had been provided as to whether the new guardians, Ms A.G. and Mr N.G., had been informed of the proceedings before the Court brought on behalf of their foster children and whether they had been asked if they wished to maintain these complaints on behalf of D.D. and K.K. Lastly, the applicant submitted that the question of locus standi had been closely intertwined with the questions which the Court was called upon to examine under Article   8 of the Convention and that the Government’s objection should be dismissed. 55.     The Court reiterates that the position of children under Article 34 of the Convention calls for careful consideration, as children must generally rely on other individuals to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (see   Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], no.   37283/13, §   156, 10 September 2019). It is necessary to avoid a restrictive and purely technical approach in this area; in particular, consideration must be given to the links between the child in question and his or her “representatives”, to the subject-matter and the purpose of the application and to the possibility of a conflict of interests (see   Giusto and Others v.   Italy   (dec.), no.   38972/06, ECHR 2007-V, and   Moretti and Benedetti v.   Italy , no.   16318/07, §   32, 27 April 2010). 56 .     In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the matter of the applicant’s standing to bring the present complaint before the Court on behalf of D.D. and K.K. is closely linked to the merits of the complaint. It therefore joins the Government’s preliminary objection in this regard to the merits. 57.     In other respects, the Court notes that the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention is not inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article   35 §   3   (a) of the Convention or on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits Submissions by the parties (a)    The applicant 58 .     The applicant submitted that the interference had not pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The “traditional family”, defined by the Russian government as a union between a man, a woman and their children, was not as such a protected aim and the termination of the foster care agreement had not served to advance this declared aim. The protection of moral values or the institutions of family and marriage does not justify interference with the individual rights of LGBT persons, namely under Article 8 of the Convention. 59 .     The applicant disagreed with the Government’s submission that the “traditional value” to procreate was worth protecting at all costs. He believed that non-traditional family forms could likewise advance true family values. 60.     The applicant applied for the position of foster parent individually, not jointly with his husband, and he had had a personal contract with the custody and guardianship authority. Russian law allowed single parents, including single fathers, to take care of foster children. It had been the custody and guardianship authority’s duty to guide and help him in the course of the implementation of the foster care contract, giving him indications and advice as to the best manner to fulfil his function, including after the change of his gender identity. 61.     The domestic authorities had applied the Family Code, ignoring the individual circumstances and what had been at stake for D.D. and K.K.: the risk of living in a hospital, without parental care. 62.     For the reasons above, the applicant considered that his separation from D.D. and K.K. had not pursued a legitimate aim under the Convention and had not been necessary in a democratic society applying modern medical standards and modern understanding of transgender persons’ identities. (b)    The Government 63 .     The Government submitted that the decisions of the domestic authorities had been well-founded because the applicant’s self-identification as male had contradicted the provisions of Russian law barring same-sex unions and patients with mental disorders becoming foster parents. The applicant had been chosen as a foster parent because he had provided a traditional family environment for raising the children, therefore the disruption of this environment (the disrupting of the different-sex union, diagnosis of transsexualism, mastectomy and blogging using male identity) had justified the premature termination of the foster care contract. The measure in question had pursued a legitimate aim of, inter alia , eliminating a demographic threat to the propagation of the Russian population and the protection of the interests of the children. The Government further submitted that the Russian Federation had not been the only member State of the Council of Europe where same-sex marriages were prohibited and where a ban on the adoption of children or establishment of custody or guardianship over them had been denied to couples of the same sex. They cited the relevant provisions of Romanian and Armenian law. (c)    Third-party interveners (i)       TGEU, ILGA-Europe and TLDP 64 .     The third-party interveners submitted, citing multiple studies, that scientific research had conclusively disproved fears that children in transgender families were more likely to adopt atypical gender behaviour or gender identity or show any impact on their developmental milestones. Studies had proved that protective processes such as family continuity and communication could help children to avoid the feeling of “loss” after their parent’s transitioning. At the same time, other variables, such as the age of the children (younger children being arguably more accepting), the relationship between the parents and social stigma, could make the adaptation process more difficult. The third parties suggested that decisions on child custody or the parental rights of a transgender parent should be based on an individualised analysis, rather than on negative perceptions and “myths” about transgender parents. (ii)     Coming Out 65.     The third party submitted that family relations arising between a guardian and a fostered child were covered by the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention and that any interference into relations of that kind should be done only when necessary in a democratic society. In the balancing of a guardian’s and a fostered child’s interests particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child, transgender status of a guardian alone not being sufficient to justify the removal of a fostered child from the former’s care. 66.     Relying on modern studies of relations between parents and children in families which included transgender people, the third party went on to say that it was important for the children to preserve connection with a person they knew and loved; change of sex or gender did not hinder the children from recognising that parent as the same attentive, caring and loving person as he or she had been before the surgery. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 67.     The relevant general principles concerning interference with the right to respect for family life have been summarised by the Court in   Strand Lobben and Others , cited above, §§   202-11, and   Petrov and X v.   Russia   (no.   23608/16,   §§ 98-102, 23   October 2018). (b)    Application of the above principles in the present case 68 .     The Court notes at the outset that the parties did not dispute the existence of family ties between the applicant, D.D. and K.K. between 5   June 2014 and 29 January 2016 respectively, when the applicant was appointed their guardian, and 28   August 2017 when his guardianship over them was terminated (see paragraphs 7, 9 and 16 above). Indeed, the Court has found in previous cases that the relationship between a foster family and a fostered child who had lived together for many months had amounted to family life within the meaning of Article 8   §   1 of the Convention, despite the lack of a biological relationship between them. It took into account the fact that a close emotional bond had developed between the foster family and the child, similar to the one between parents and children, and that the foster family had behaved in every respect like the child’s parents (see   V.D. and Others v.   Russia , no.   72931/10, §§   90-93, 9   April 2019; Moretti and Benedetti , cited above, §§   49 ‑ 50; and   Kopf and Liberda v.   Austria , no.   1598/06, §   37, 17   January 2012). 69.     It is not in dispute that the termination of the applicant’s custody of D.D. and K.K. on 28   August 2017 resulted in the severance of that relationship and thus constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Such interference constitutes a violation of that provision unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues one of the legitimate aims under Article   8   §   2 and can be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. 70.     The Court accepts the Government’s argument that the impugned measure had a basis in national law, namely the Family Code, the Civil Code and the Federal Law “On Guardianship” (see paragraphs 35-37 and 40-44 above). It further notes that the Government advanced two aims behind the measure in question – avoiding the demographic threat to the population and the protection of the interests of the children (see paragraph 63 above). While the Court does not accept as legitimate the first aim in the absence of a clear link between the termination of the applicant’s custody and the alleged demographic threat, it is prepared to assume that the measure in question was intended to protect the interests of the children D.D. and K.K (compare A.M. and Others v. Russia , cited above, §   51). It will proceed on this assumption to determine whether the interference at issue was necessary in a democratic society. 71 .     The Court observes that in the present case the domestic authorities terminated the applicant’s custody in respect of D.D. and K.K. essentially on account of his diagnosis of “transsexualism”, his change of gender identity and the resulting disruption of the traditional family, defined in domestic law as a union of a man and a woman, where the children had been initially placed, which allegedly affected their physical, spiritual and moral development (see paragraphs 19, 22, 24 and 71 above). Although the Regional Court in its decision of 15 May 2018 stated that the termination of the foster care agreement had not been driven by the applicant’s diagnosis of “transsexualism”, but by his failure to inform the social services about it, the fact remains that the applicant’s change of gender identity, consistently at the centre of the deliberations, was viewed by the appellate court as reflecting on his personality, which “could not but affect the mental, spiritual and moral development of the fostered children” and thus in contradiction to the interests of the children (see paragraph 26 above). The domestic courts, furthermore, briefly relied on allegedly unsatisfactory sanitary conditions in the applicant’s apartment and the alleged failure to provide K.K. with the necessary educational activities. 72.     It is not the Court’s task to take the place of the domestic authorities in examining whether the applicant, in carrying out his functions as D.D.’s and K.K.’s guardian, represented any risk to their psychological health and development and whether his guardianship should have been terminated. However, the Court must satisfy itself that the domestic courts, when taking such a decision, conducted an in ‑ depth examination of the entire family situation and a whole series of other relevant factors and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what the best solution would be for the child (see A.M. and Others v. Russia , cited above, §   53, with further references). 73 .     The Court observes that the decision ending the applicant’s custody concerned children, aged four and five years at the material time, who had serious medical diagnoses, were abandoned at birth and, prior to their placement in the applicant’s family at the ages of one and three years respectively, had stayed in the State-run institutions. It further observes that the decision in question was not supported by any individualised expert examination of the applicant and the children or any scientific study regarding the impact of a change of gender identity on the children’s psychological health and development. The reasoning of the domestic courts in this respect relied primarily on the legal impossibility of same-sex couples’ being accepted as foster parents, as well as the traditions and mentality of the Russian society. Furthermore, no consideration was given to the conclusion of the investigating authorities, including in relation to the allegedly unsatisfactory sanitary conditions in the applicant’s apartment, to the effect that the applicant and his spouse had performed their parental duties in accordance with the law (see paragraph 18 above) and to the expert report of 24   January 2018, provided by the applicant, to the effect that the latter “did not have any disorder which could be dangerou