CEDHCASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG23
CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 juillet 2024
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0725JUD004222118
- Date
- 25 juillet 2024
- Publication
- 25 juillet 2024
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
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source officielleNo violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections - {general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Stand for election)
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LATVIA (No. 2) (Application no. 42221/18)   JUDGMENT Art 3 P1 • Stand for election • Removal of applicant’s name from list of candidates for parliamentary elections on grounds of her past active participation in the Communist Party of Latvia and her current political activities • Case a continuation of Ždanoka v.   Latvia [GC] and principles set out therein as to lawfulness and legitimate aim applied • Impugned restriction sufficiently foreseeable and thus lawful • Legitimate aims of protection of the State’s independence, democratic order and national security • Significant change to the general context since Ždanoka v.   Latvia [GC] with Latvia (and Europe in general) no longer enjoying the “greater stability” referred to by the Grand Chamber in that case • Following Ždanoka v.   Latvia [GC] the respondent State increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order calling for even wider margin of appreciation in protecting those values • Legislature’s limited action in respect of periodic reassessment of impugned restriction not unjustified in specific and sensitive context • Constitutional Court’s fresh interpretation of impugned restriction, in view of developments, narrowing down legal basis to persons who endangered and continue to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law, within its interpretative authority and not arbitrary or unreasonable • Reasons given by the Central Electoral Commission held to be sufficient given specific case-circumstances and applicant’s public profile and support of Russian Federation’s actions in the Crimean Peninsula • Domestic proceedings afforded sufficient procedural safeguards against arbitrariness • Applicant able to stand and was elected in European Parliament Elections • Wide margin of appreciation not overstepped   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 25 July 2024   FINAL   25/10/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2), The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mattias Guyomar , President ,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Mārtiņš Mits,   María Elósegui,   Kateřina Šimáčková,   Mykola Gnatovskyy,   Stéphane Pisani , judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   42221/18) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Ms Tatjana Ždanoka (“the applicant”), on 1 March 2019; the decision to give notice to the Latvian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 2 July 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the removal of the applicant’s name from a list of candidates for parliamentary elections on the grounds of her past active participation in the Communist Party of Latvia and her current political activities, deemed to represent a threat for the independence of Latvia and risk undermining the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. The applicant complains primarily under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Riga. She was a member of the European Parliament until July 2024 (see paragraph 11 below). She was represented before the Court by Mr W.S.B. Bowring, a lawyer practising in London. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. THE GRAND CHAMBER JUGDMENT of 2006 and the facts prECEDING it 5.     In 1971 the applicant joined the Communist Party of Latvia (“the CPL”), which was the regional branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (“the CPSU”). In March 1990 she was elected to the Supreme Council of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Latvian SSR”). In April 1990 she became a member of the Central Committee for Supervision and Audit of the CPL, a position that she maintained until the dissolution of the CPL in September 1991. 6.     On 13 January 1991, following military operations launched on the previous day by the Soviet army against the neighbouring country of Lithuania, an unsuccessful coup d’état took place in Latvia. The plenum of the CPL Central Committee called for the resignation of the Latvian government, the dissolution of the Supreme Council and the assumption of full powers by the Latvian Public Rescue Committee ( Vislatvijas Sabiedriskās glābšanas komiteja ), set up on the same date by several organisations, including the CPL. On 15 January 1991 this committee announced that the Supreme Council and the government were stripped of their respective powers and declared that it was assuming full powers. After causing the loss of five civilian lives and injuries to thirty-four persons during armed clashes in Riga, this attempted coup failed. 7.     On 21 August 1991, after another unsuccessful coup d’état in Moscow (also supported by the Central Committee of the CPL), the Supreme Council proclaimed an immediate and absolute restoration of the country’s independence lost in 1940. The CPL was declared unconstitutional two days later and officially dissolved the following month. 8 .     In 1998 and 2002 the applicant was prevented from standing in parliamentary elections on the basis of section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act of 1995, which prevents persons having “actively participated” in the CPSU (the CPL) after 13 January 1991 from standing as candidates or being elected to the national Parliament ( Saeima ). The applicant’s “active participation” in the CPL following the aforementioned date was established by the Civil Division of the Supreme Courtin a final judgment of 15   December 1999. 9 .     On 30 August 2000 the Constitutional Court ( Satversmes tiesa ) found the statutory restriction set out in section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act constitutional. However, it noted, firstly, that the expression “actively participated” had to be construed strictly, as only applying to those who had actually attempted to re-establish the former Soviet regime and not to any person having had formal membership in the CPSU (the CPL) after 13   January 1991. Secondly, the Constitutional Court indicated that such limitations on passive electoral rights could only be temporary, and that Parliament should set a time-limit on them by periodically examining their necessity in the light of the political situation in the country. 10 .     On 16 March 2006 the Court in its Grand Chamber formation concluded that, in the particular historical and political context of Latvia, the impugned statutory restriction as applied to the applicant was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate and that the applicant’s rights guaranteed under Article   3 of Protocol No. 1 had not been violated (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no.   58278/00, ECHR 2006-IV). It added, however: “135.   It is to be noted that the Constitutional Court observed in its decision of 30   August 2000 that the Latvian parliament should establish a time-limit on the restriction. In the light of this warning, even if today Latvia cannot be considered to have overstepped its wide margin of appreciation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, it is nevertheless the case that the Latvian parliament must keep the statutory restriction under constant review, with a view to bringing it to an early end. Such a conclusion seems all the more justified in view of the greater stability which Latvia now enjoys, inter alia , by reason of its full European integration ... Hence, the failure by the Latvian legislature to take active steps in this connection may result in a different finding by the Court ...” 11 .     Since the European Parliament Elections Act of 2004 contains no provision similar to section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the applicant was able to stand as a candidate and was elected to the European Parliament in 2004. She was re-elected in all the subsequent elections and held the position of member of the European Parliament until July 2024. THE FACTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE GRAND CHAMBER JUGDMENT of 2006 Judicial and parliamentary review of the impugned restriction 12 .     By a judgment of 15 June 2006 the Constitutional Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statutory restriction contained in section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act, while also finding that a similar restriction with respect to former KGB agents was disproportionate in relation to the individual who had brought the constitutional complaint in question (for more details, see Ādamsons v. Latvia , no.   3669/03, §§ 77-82, 24 June 2008). 13 .     At the plenary meetings of 26 April 2007, 29 January 2009 and 25   February 2010, the Latvian Parliament discussed and rejected proposals to repeal section 5(6), submitted by members of the opposition. In particular, at the plenary meeting of 29 January 2009 several members of Parliament referred to the internal situation in Latvia and to the geopolitical situation in Europe, which had deteriorated since the Russian military invasion of Georgia in 2008. Likewise, during the debates of 25 February 2010, several parliamentarians noted that, given the internal situation in Latvia and the regional issues faced by Europe, the time for abolishing the impugned restriction had not yet come. There were no further attempts to abolish it after 2010. The Constitutional Court’s review Application to the Constitutional Court 14.     In 2017 the applicant asked the Central Electoral Commission ( Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija ) whether she could now stand as a candidate for parliamentary and municipal elections. By an information letter ( uzziņa ) of 4   August 2017 the Commission responded that the statutory restriction still applied to her, and thus prevented her from standing for election. 15.     The applicant lodged an application with the Constitutional Court, seeking a reassessment of the compatibility of section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act with the Latvian Constitution ( Satversme ), namely, with its Article 1 (the general principle of a democratic State), Article   9 (the right to stand for election to Parliament) and Article 91 (equality before the law and non-discrimination). She argued, among other points, that, contrary to the indications given by the Constitutional Court and by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, the Latvian legislature had not engaged in a regular reassessment of the necessity of the impugned restriction. She also claimed that any legitimate aim pursued by the respective norm could be reached by more lenient means, such as by informing prospective voters of a candidate’s past participation in the organisations in question, through publication in the Official Gazette. The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 29 June 2018 16 .     By a judgment of 29 June 2018, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provision. It considered that, given the time that had elapsed since its judgments of 2000 and 2006 (see paragraphs 9 and 12 above) and the changed circumstances over that period, the matter could no longer be considered as resolved and that it warranted a fresh adjudication in the light of present-day conditions. The relevant parts of the Constitutional Court’s judgment read as follows: “13.2.     The Constitutional Court has already recognised that the aim of the impugned provision is to protect the democratic State order, national security and the territorial unity of Latvia. The impugned provision targets persons who have actively attempted to undermine the democratic State order and, in so doing, have rejected Article 1 of the Constitution....The European Court of Human Rights has also found that the purpose of the impugned provision was to protect the integrity of the democratic process rather than to punish those who had been active in the organisations referred to in the provision. The legislature was clearly motivated by prevention rather than by punishment (see the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights of 16 March 2006 in the case of Ždanoka v. Latvia , ... § 122). Hence, in adopting the impugned provision, the legislature’s intent was to deprive a given individual of the right to be a candidate in elections and to be elected to Parliament not only because he or she had been active in the organisations referred to in the impugned provision after 13 January 1991, but also because, by being active in the said organisations, the individual concerned had endangered the restored independence and democratic order of the Latvian State. The Constitutional Court is required to establish the content of the impugned provision at the present time, in 2018, that is, it must be examined in this specific moment in time. The Court must therefore examine whether the content inserted in the impugned provision at the moment of its enactment is still valid, or whether the content of the impugned provision ought to be drawn out by analysing the way in which the conditions to be taken into account in interpreting this legal norm have changed over time ... The content of a legal norm is not frozen, since every society continues to develop and its legal system also evolves accordingly. It follows that the processes that occurred following the enactment of a provision also determine its content. In consequence, the Constitutional Court will interpret the impugned provision by taking into consideration its objective aim now, in 2018, having regard to the current development of Latvia as a democratic State governed by the rule of law. 13.3.     In examining the development of the Latvian legal system, the Constitutional Court takes into account the fact that various restrictions regarding participation in State activities apply to persons who, after 13 January 1991, were active in the organisations referred to in the impugned provision, are also included in other laws ... ... The Constitutional Court notes that, in the case of Latvia, both the ‘aspect of the general context of the instant case, ... that of the re-establishing of a democratic order after an undemocratic (totalitarian) regime [and the aspect] of the re-establishing of an illegally occupied State’ should be taken into account (see the dissenting opinion of Judge E. Levits in ... Ždanoka v. Latvia [Chamber] judgment [of the European Court of Human Rights] of 17 June 2004 ...). The occupation, which lasted for fifty years, had far-reaching consequences in Latvian society which continue to influence democracy even now. A significant part of society is still open to totalitarian ideas and has a positive assessment of the period of occupation by the USSR ... The process of examining the consequences of the totalitarian regime’s policies and the occupation has not yet been completed in Latvian society. This process, as shown by similar experience in other countries, is a lengthy one ... The Constitutional Court concludes that the impugned provision is one of the tools available to a self-defending democracy that a democratic State governed by the rule of law in order to protect its constitutional bodies and State security institutions from persons who, by their actions, endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law ... [T]his applies, in particular, to a transitional period, when, with the aim of ensuring the sustainability of democracy in the country, the State might need to take special measures to defend itself ... Thus, and especially in a State where democratic traditions have not yet become fully consolidated, it might be necessary to prevent actions being taken by an individual who, after 13 January 1991, was active in the organisations referred to in the impugned provision, if such actions are directed against the national independence of Latvia and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law, even if such actions do not reach the threshold of danger that could be defined [as] crimes against the State, as set out in the criminal law. A democratic State governed by the rule of law has the right to demand from persons taking public offices loyalty to the State and, in particular, to the constitutional principles on which it is based (see the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 18 November 2014 in the case of Spūlis and Vaškevičs v. Latvia , applications nos. 2631/10 and 12253/10, § 42). Thus, all aspects of the aim of the impugned provision must be examined, that is, of its objective meaning, which also comprises protection of the national independence of Latvia and the principles underpinning Latvia as a democratic State governed by the rule of law ... against persons who [might] endanger them if working in constitutional bodies and security institutions. The concept of ‘active participation’ included in the impugned provision denotes actions that are contrary to the aim of this provision. 13.4.     In view of the above, the impugned provision must be interpreted to mean that it prohibits from standing for parliamentary elections a person who, by actively participating in the CPSU (the CPL), the Internationalist Front of Workers of the Latvian SSR, the United Council of Labour Collectives, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans or the Latvian Public Rescue Committee, or in the regional committees thereof ,after 13 January 1991, has by his or her actions endangered and still continues to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. An action directed against the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law may consist, inter alia – but not exclusively – in denying the [existence of] the independent State, actions directed against its democratic order, [or] supporting international crimes. ... 19.     ... A specific restriction is clearly entailed by the impugned provision; it prohibits a person who, by actively participating in the organisations referred to in the impugned provision, has by his or her actions endangered, and still continues to endanger, the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law, from standing as a candidate for parliamentary elections, since the aim of the impugned provision has not substantially changed over time. The original intent of the legislature in enacting the impugned provision, namely, the protection of a constitutional body (the legislature) from persons who, by their actions, have endangered and still continue to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law, continues to be the objective aim of this norm as the legal system currently stands. The content of the restriction is comprehensible, and the consequences of its application are foreseeable. Consequently, the impugned provision has been worded with sufficient clarity and the consequences of its application are predictable. It follows that the restriction of fundamental rights included in the impugned provision has been established by law. ... 23.     ... The Constitutional Court considers [as follows]: although Latvia is a Member State of the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and of other organisations, this circumstance does not per se exclude possible threats to the Latvian State. [According to an expert opinion heard by the Court], Latvia’s integration in the European Union could be regarded as important indirect evidence of the stability of Latvia’s democracy; however, it is far from being direct evidence of it. Likewise, the time elapsed since the restoration of Latvia’s independence is not the sole or the most significant factor in ensuring the stability of a democratic regime ... The Security Police note that the level of democratisation of Latvian State has increased over time; however, Latvia’s membership of certain international organisations or the length of this membership cannot be regarded as a sufficient yardstick of stability ... Analysing the political situation in the country, and throughout Europe as a whole, the Constitution Protection Bureau and the Security Police point to the possible threats that could be incurred by the Latvian State, its democratic order and security if the restriction established in the impugned provision were to be revoked ... Moreover, as noted above, democracy is far from being perceived as an undisputable reality in Latvian society. The impugned provision is one of the tools that currently ensure the protection of Latvia’s national independence and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. In protecting its democratic order, the State has the right to assess independently the degree to which it is endangered and to decide whether to retain the restriction in the future. If the legislature, exercising its discretion, has decided that the restriction included in the impugned provision continues to be necessary, then a regulation which would allow the individual concerned to stand in parliamentary elections, subject only to a requirement that he or she provide [public] information about previous participation in one of the organisations referred to in the impugned provision, cannot be deemed to be a more lenient measure. In view of the above, it must be concluded that the measure suggested by the applicant would not ensure protection of a democratic State order to the same degree as that is ensured by the restriction imposed in the impugned provision. Thus, the legitimate aim cannot be reached by other measures with the same quality ... 24.1.     ... The Constitutional Court notes that the legislature last examined the substance of the restriction included in the impugned provision in 2010. The Constitutional Court finds [as follows]: although neither the Convention nor the Constitution lays down the frequency of the legislature’s regular review of a particular restriction on an individual’s right to stand for election, the fact that Parliament has not reviewed this restriction since 2010 should be assessed negatively. However, within the system of Latvia’s constitutional bodies the Constitutional Court also has jurisdiction to verify whether there is a reasonable justification for keeping the restriction ... , that is, whether or not this restriction has been set arbitrarily. The Constitutional Court must therefore ascertain whether there are circumstances which currently justify maintaining this restriction. 24.2.     In assessing whether there is a reasonable justification for retaining the restriction on fundamental rights included in the impugned provision after 2010, both the democratic development of the State and the external threats to national security must be taken into account. One of the factors which justified the retention of this restriction until 2010 was Russia’s aggression against Georgia... As noted by the Security Police and the Constitution Protection Bureau, following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine the political situation in the region deteriorated, and this factor has a direct impact on national security.... The Annual Report of the Constitution Protection Bureau for 2016 notes: ‘ The most significant threats to security are created by Russia: its aggression in Ukraine; the demonstration of military power and acts of provocation in the direct vicinity of NATO’s external borders; elements of an information war and hybrid warfare directed against the neighbouring States ’ ... The conclusion that the most fundamental threat to Latvia’s national security arises from Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is also made in the 2017 Annual Report of the Constitution Protection Bureau ... As regards internal threats, the Security Police emphasises that it has repeatedly noted in its annual reports that persons who were previously active in the organisations referred to in the impugned provision are [still] expressing opinions contrary to national security and the national interest and are engaging in actions against them ... The Constitutional Court notes that in the context of the democratic development of the Latvian State these external and internal threats are a significant factor which justifies maintaining the restriction. 24.3.     The impugned provision is not directed against pluralism of ideas in Latvia or the political views of a particular individual, but rather against persons who, by their actions, endangered and continue to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law (see, for example, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 June 2015 in the case of Petropavlovskis v. Latvia , application no. 44230/06, §§   69-70). It must also be noted that the impugned provision does not prohibit the person [concerned] from being actively engaged in political parties and associations. Moreover, the restriction on a person’s rights included in the impugned provision is not arbitrary and is sufficiently individualised. As previously stated, the impugned provision [only concerns those who], by their actions, have endangered and still continue to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. Pursuant to sections 13(2)(6) and 13(3)(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the Central Electoral Commission is to strike any person to whom the impugned provision applies out of the submitted list of candidates. In accordance with section 13-1 (1) of the same Act, a decision of the Central Electoral Commission to strike a candidate out of a registered list of candidates can be appealed against within three working days following [its] adoption. Section 54 of the [same] Act provides that the appeal is to be lodged with the Regional Administrative Court, which will examine the case in the first instance and deliver a ruling within seven days following the receipt of [the decision]. Thus, the Parliamentary Elections Act comprises a mechanism which allows for an individual assessment of each case and verification whether the prohibition on standing for parliamentary election is applicable to the [specific] person. The Constitutional Court has already recognised that the Central Electoral Commission, rather than being a mere technical bureau or an intermediary institution, is the highest governing body, which must strictly ensure that all laws applicable to parliamentary elections are correctly applied and enforced ... When screening the proposed candidate, the Central Electoral Commission must ascertain not only whether a person’s active involvement in the organisations referred to in the impugned provision has been established by a court judgment but also whether that person, by his or her actions, still continues to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. In order to verify this, in accordance with section 11 of the Central Electoral Commission Act, the Central Electoral Commission has the right to request information from State and local government officials or to summon them to its meetings. 24.4.     The Constitutional Court concludes that, in a State where, in view of its democratic development and the general situation in Europe, the democratic order, that is, the integrity of its constitutional bodies; requires protection, the public benefit from the restriction included in the impugned provision outweighs the adverse consequences that are caused to a person who, by his or her actions, endangers the independence of the State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law ... It should be noted that if it is established at any time that the political situation in the country has changed or that the foreign-policy threats have diminished, the legislature is under an obligation to review the restriction in the impugned provision and to decide on amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act. Thus, the [impugned] restriction complies with the principle of proportionality and, consequently, the impugned provision, provided that it is properly interpreted, is compatible with Articles 1 and 9 of the Constitution. 25.     The appellant also alleges that, in establishing the rules by which a person’s right to stand for parliamentary elections are to be exercised, the legislature did not comply with the principle of equality. ... Since the persons [concerned] are not in similar and mutually comparable circumstances, the impugned provision is compatible with ... Article 91 of the Constitution.” 17 .     One of the seven members of the Constitutional Court expressed a dissenting opinion. In his view, the way in which the majority had interpreted section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act and other relevant provisions of domestic law had exceeded the objective aim and contents of those provisions as intended by the legislature. By introducing an additional condition of “still continu[ing] to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law”, the majority’s judgment had endowed the Central Electoral Commission with a substantially new task: assessing the merits of an individual candidate’s case – that is, whether he or she still posed a threat for independence and democracy – which had not originally been intended. The Commission was supposed to take decisions only on the basis of data established by a court judgment or provided by other State institutions as specified by law, without itself having any margin of appreciation. By granting it such a margin and such new powers, the majority had failed to have regard to the principle of legal certainty and had weakened the existing system, which protected candidates from arbitrariness. Moreover, after its scope had been narrowed down by the Constitutional Court, the impugned provision now applied to only one or two persons; this made it into an ad hominem law, incompatible with the principle of equality. Finally, the dissenting judge considered that the restriction in question, linked to an individual’s political activities in 1991, was in any event disproportionate and unjustified twenty-seven years after the events. The applicant’s disqualification from standing for election Proceedings before the Central Electoral Commission 18.     With a view to participating in the parliamentary elections of 6   October 2018, the political party “Latvian Union of Russians” (“ Latvijas Krievu savienība ”) submitted lists of candidates for each of the five plurinominal constituencies of Latvia. The applicant’s name appeared on the list as candidate number one for the constituency of Vidzeme. The Central Electoral Commission registered the lists by a decision of 8 August 2018. On the same day, it requested opinions from the Constitution Protection Bureau and the Security Police as to whether the applicant’s current activities were endangering Latvia’s independence and democratic order. It appears that at least some of the data provided by the Security Police were classified and were not disclosed to either the applicant or her legal representative. 19 .     On 21 August 2018 the Central Electoral Commission held a hearing at which the applicant was present. Having heard information received from the intelligence services to the effect that the applicant’s activities endangered Latvia’s independence and democratic order, the Commission invited the applicant to express her opinion, which she declined to do. By a decision taken on the same day at the close of the hearing, the Commission struck the applicant’s name out of the list of candidates. Relying on section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act as interpreted by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 29 June 2018 (see paragraph 16 above), the Commission found it undisputed that the applicant had “actively participated” in the CPL after 13 January 1991 and that the first of the two criteria implicit in the provision in question was therefore fulfilled. As to the second criterion, the Commission stated the following: “In order to establish whether the candidates included in the submitted lists fulfil the requirements of section 4 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the Central Electoral Commission sent the list of candidates to the competent institutions mentioned in section 13(2) of the same Act. Relying on [the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 29 June 2018] and in accordance with section 11 of the Central Electoral Commission Act, the Central Electoral Commission sent a request to the Constitution Protection Bureau [ Satversmes aizsardzības birojs ] and the Security Police [ Drošības policija ] for information as to whether Tatjana Ždanoka, by her actions, endangers the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. By a letter sent in reply on 14 August 2018, the Constitution Protection Bureau indicated that, according to its assessment, the actions of Tatjana Ždanoka constitute a threat for the democratic State order and national security. By a letter sent in reply on 15 August 2018, the Security Police indicated that, according to the information at [its] disposal, over the long term and even today, Tatjana Ždanoka has created a threat for the interests of national security and the democratic State order. ... 6.     With regard to the second condition – that the person, by his or her actions, still continues to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law – the Central Electoral Commission notes the following. ... 8.     ... [I]n assessing the activities of T. Ždanoka, one must conclude that her actions at moments that were crucial for society and the State allow us to reach a clear and unequivocal conclusion. Thus, the support publicly expressed by Tatjana Ždanoka for the annexation of Crimea (Ukraine), as well as her participation as an observer in elections in annexed Crimea, threaten the long-term sustainability of democracy, State independence and other principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2014), p. 15). Such a public expression of support is both openly contrary [ klaji pretēja ] to Latvia’s international interests and threatens Latvia’s national security; this creates reasonable grounds for doubting [this] person’s intentions, as well as [her] ability to promote the long-term sustainability of Latvia as a democratic Western State, [the country’s] successful development, and the implementation of values typical of Europe. 9.     Tatjana Ždanoka is an activist for the so-called ‘compatriot policy’ [ tautiešu politika ] being conducted by Russia. By means of this policy, Russia is trying to attract Latvia, as well as other neighbouring countries, into the sphere of its political and economic influence, in order to ensure that they operate in a manner that corresponds to Russia’s interests. The importance of the ‘compatriot policy’ grows every year, creating increased threats for the security of the constitutional order of the State of Latvia (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2014), p. 10). Activists for Russia’s ‘compatriot policy’ in Latvia have tried to obtain greater support among the ethnic minorities of Latvia by manipulating the topics of education and non-citizens in the context of the military conflict in Ukraine (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2014), p. 10). Consequently, as a result of the ‘compatriot policy’ carried out by Russia, the Latvian people are being split, population groups are being artificially polarised, mutual ethnic tensions within Latvian society are being exacerbated, and the existing order is being destabilised. 10.     Tatjana Ždanoka has on several occasions visited Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia; her party, the Latvian Union of Russians, has organised, in Riga, an event dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Odesa tragedy of 2014. These events were dominated by narratives on both historical and current political events that have been created by Russian ideologists and are favourable to Russia (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2015), p. 14). Tatjana Ždanoka has cooperated in creating propaganda, not only at these events, but also on various Russian television shows. She has also expressed an opinion on domestic and international events ... that is favourable to Russia’s foreign-policy interests but contrary to Latvia’s national-security interests (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2014), p. 15). In addition, Russian compatriot activists have spread false information about the activities, within the Baltic States, of military troops from the NATO allies and discredited the overall image of the Latvian State (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2016), p. 16). As a result, as the Security Police point out, the presence of Russia in Latvia was fostered. Furthermore, by declaring that the forcible assimilation of Russian-speaking residents in Latvia was being planned, Tatjana Ždanoka polarised and tried to divide Latvian society (see the Annual Report of the Security Police (2017), p. 18). 11.     Tatjana Ždanoka’s activities and the opinions expressed by her, listed in points 8, 9, and 10 of the [present] decision, as well as her other public activities and opinions, point to the fact that [she] continues to act against the interests of the Republic of Latvia, and creates a threat for the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law.” Proceedings before the Regional Administrative Court 20.     The applicant challenged the Commission’s decision by way of an appeal to the Regional Administrative Court ( Administratīvā apgabaltiesa ), the first and last instance in such cases. She complained that she had not been allowed to consult the report of the Security Police submitted to the Central Electoral Commission in her case. In her view, the Commission’s decision had been arbitrary, in that neither the legislature nor the Commission itself had established a procedure to verify whether a given candidate “still continue[d] to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law”. The decision had been based on the Security Police’s public annual reports, which did not properly distinguish between the applicant’s current actions, her activities in the distant past, and the activities of various unnamed “activists” to whom she was unconnected. In any event, the applicant argued that the activities for which she was criticised were nothing more than the exercise of political pluralism and democracy. Even if her opinions on certain issues were contrary to the official stance of the Latvian government, this fact did not in itself justify a restriction of her fundamental rights. The applicant expressly relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No.   1, as well as the corresponding provisions of the Latvian Constitution. 21 .     The Regional Administrative Court examined the applicant’s appeal as a panel of three judges at a hearing on 3 September 2018. The applicant, her legal representative and a representative of the Central Electoral Commission were present and were heard. At the beginning of the hearing, the representative of the Security Police declared that he did not object to the applicant familiarising herself with the classified information that had been sent by the Security Police to the Commission at the latter’s request. Following a request by the applicant’s representative, the court ordered a fifteen-minute break so that he could familiarise himself with the relevant documents. Part of the hearing, during which the representative of the Security Police made a statement, was held in camera ; both the applicant and her representative were present and were able to put additional questions to the speaker. The representative of the Security Police subsequently commented on the applicant’s appeal during the open part of the hearing. 22 .     By a final judgment delivered at the close of the hearing of 3   September 2018, the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Pointing out that the interpretation of a legal provision by the Constitutional Court was binding on State authorities (see paragraph 28-29 below), it held that the impugned decision of the Central Electoral Commission was compatible with the Parliamentary Elections Act as interpreted by the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 29 June 2018. As the Commission was not entitled to collect the relevant data itself, it could only rely on the information provided by the State intelligence agencies which, in the present case, had persuasively shown that the applicant’s current activities were dangerous for the democratic State order and national security. In these circumstances, the Central Electoral Commission was not required to make a separate assessment as to whether, in the specific case, the impugned restriction was provided by law, whether it pursued a legitimate aim and whether it was proportionate to that aim, as this had already been done by the Constitutional Court. Lastly, with regard to the confidential report by the Security Police, the court pointed out that the confidentiality of that document had been lifted after the Commission’s hearing, thus enabling the applicant’s representative to consult it. 23.     At the parliamentary elections of 6   October 2018,   the applicant’s party received 3.2% of the votes cast at national level. Having failed to reach the threshold of 5% set out in the law (see Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti ” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme” v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 10547/07 and 34049/07, 29   November 2007), it did not win any seats in Parliament. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK THE CONSTITUTION 24.     The relevant provisions of the Constitution ( Satversme ) of the Republic of Latvia, adopted in 1922 and amended by the Law of 15 OcCitations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG
- Formation
- 23
- Date
- 25 juillet 2024
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0725JUD004222118
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