CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 10 septembre 2024

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display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sD00444C6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s2F3EB0E4 { border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sE1A7A04C { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#424242 } .sBAADFE8C { border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF DIANOVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Applications nos. 21286/15 and 4 others – see appended list)   JUDGMENT Art 11 • Freedom of assembly • Termination by police officers of five-day hunger strike of one of the applicants in a public space and ensuing administrative conviction for participation in unauthorised “public event” • Ambiguity in public events’ legal classification and categorical and formalistic application of legal framework on “static demonstrations” • Absence of relevant and sufficient reasons • Conviction based on purely formal grounds • Fine imposed of a criminal nature requiring particular justification • Interference not shown to pursue a pressing social need and not “necessary in a democratic society” Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Administrative conviction of the remaining four applicants for participation in unauthorised “public event” for gathering with another two persons in a park’s secluded area to make a political satirical film • Legal ground of interference did not meet “quality of law” requirements • Broad definition of “meeting” in relevant domestic law allowing expansive interpretation by domestic authorities • Application of concept of “mass gathering” to a group of six individuals without considering specific context and nature of applicants’ activity • Art 5 § 1 • Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Administrative arrest and detention at the police station in breach of right to liberty and unfair administrative offence proceedings on account of absence of a prosecuting party   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 10 September 2024   FINAL   10/12/2024   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Dianova and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Pere Pastor Vilanova , President ,   Jolien Schukking,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,   Diana Kovatcheva , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   21286/15, 13140/16, 13162/16, 20802/16 and   24703/16) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by five Russian nationals (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table; the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 5, 6, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the decision to grant priority to the application no. 21286/15 under Rule   41 of the Rules of Court; the parties’ observations; the comments submitted by the Institute for Law and Public Policy in application no. 21286/15, which were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section; the decision of the President of the Section to appoint one of the sitting judges of the Court to act as an   ad hoc   judge, applying by analogy Rule   29 §   2 of the Rules of Court (see   Kutayev v. Russia , no.   17912/15, §§ 5-8, 24   January 2023); Having deliberated in private on 9 July 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns two instances in which acts of political and artistic expression were interrupted and sanctioned under the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). THE FACTS 2.     The applicants’ personal details and the names of their representatives appear in the appended table. 3.     The Government were initially represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by Mr M. Vinogradov, his successor in that office. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Application No . 21286/15 Hunger strike in protest against ill-treatment of prisoners 5.     At the material time Ms Dianova, a pensioner, was a member of the Public Monitoring Commission of the Sverdlovsk Region (“the Sverdlovsk ONK”), which was carrying out regular inspections of detention facilities. 6 .     On 2 August 2014 a detainee was beaten in special ‑ regime correctional colony IK-63 in Ivdel in the Sverdlovsk Region. He was admitted to a hospital due to the severity of his injuries. 7.     On 5 August 2014 the applicant and other members of the Sverdlovsk ONK attempted to visit IK-63 but were denied entry. 8 .     On 6 August 2014 the applicant and Ms Z., a fellow member of the Sverdlovsk ONK, decided to hold a hunger strike to draw attention to the detainee’s ill ‑ treatment. They wrote a letter to the Sverdlovsk Regional Department of the Federal Penitentiary Service (“the Sverdlovsk FSIN”) stating their decision and requesting, inter alia , an independent inquiry into the allegations of ill-treatment and dismissal of the director of IK-63. 9 .     On the same date, Ms Dianova and Ms Z. placed two foldable camp beds near the local stadium located across the street from the building of the Sverdlovsk FSIN and displayed a banner that read “Hunger strike of the members of the Sverdlovsk ONK”. Over the following days, the two women remained in the street, drinking only water. When members of the media or passers-by engaged with them, Ms Dianova and Ms   Z. explained that their hunger strike aimed to demand the dismissal of the director of IK-63 and to protest against the denial of access to that penal facility for the Sverdlovsk ONK members on 5   August 2014. 10 .     On the evening of 11 August 2014, in view of the rain, Ms   Dianova and Ms Z. set up a tent to shield the camp beds located near the stadium fence on a pedestrian walkway. At that moment, Ms M., another member of the Sverdlovsk ONK, joined the hunger strike. The camp beds and the tent did not impede pedestrian traffic, as the pathway was sufficiently wide. Administrative-offence proceedings against Ms Dianova 11.     On the evening of 11 August 2014 police officers approached the three women and drew up administrative-offence records for Ms Dianova and Ms   Z. No such record was drawn up in respect of Ms M. 12.     The administrative-offence record for Ms Dianova, issued on 12   August 2014, read as follows: “At 11.30 p.m. on 11 August 2014, at [an address in Yekaterinburg], near the Central Stadium, Ms Dianova O.I, acting in breach of section 6   § 3 (1) of [the Public Events Act], failed to comply with lawful demands by police officers ... to cease participation in a public event, [specifically] a group static demonstration conducted after 10 p.m., for which no prior notification had been submitted.” 13.     On 27 August 2014 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg (“the Verkh-Isetskiy Court”) held a hearing in the administrative offence case against Ms   Dianova, in her presence and with her legal counsel present. The applicant argued that her hunger strike did not constitute a “static demonstration” within the meaning of the Public Events Act, and therefore was not subject to the notification procedure. Furthermore, the administrative-offence case file did not contain any evidence of Ms   Dianova’s alleged refusal to comply with the police’s lawful demands. 14.     At the hearing, Ms   Dianova was informed for the first time that on 7   August 2014 the head of the Sverdlovsk FSIN had sent a letter to the head of a police unit in Yekaterinburg. The letter suggested to verify whether an administrative offence file under Article   20.2   §   2 of the CAO for breach of the established procedure for the organisation or conduct of public events should be opened against Ms Z. and Ms Dianova. It referred to the letter from Ms Dianova and Ms Z. (see paragraph 8 above), unspecified news articles and a DVD disk containing unspecified information. 15 .     On the same date the Verkh-Isetskiy Court found Ms Dianova guilty of breaching the rules of participation in public events under Article   20.2   §   5 of the CAO. The court rejected the applicant’s arguments that the hunger strike did not qualify as a “static demonstration”, finding that “the police officers had accurately determined that the public event conducted on 11   August 2014 by Ms Dianova and others, who voiced their opinions while staying in one place and without using sound-amplifying devices, near the target [organisation] and using a placard, constituted such an event”. The police orders to stop the event were therefore justified, as the mandatory prior notification procedure had not been complied with. 16.     The Verkh-Isetskiy Court fined Ms Dianova 10,000 Russian roubles   (RUB), roughly the equivalent to her monthly old-age pension, her sole source of income at the time. 17 .     On 22 October 2014 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 27 August 2014 on appeal. The appeal judgment, insofar as relevant, read as follows: “Considering that the intent of conducting a static demonstration, within the meaning of the [Public Events Act], is to draw public attention to a target object or issue, the efforts of Ms Dianova O.I. to highlight the plight of individuals detained in [IK ‑ 63], were rightly determined by the [first-instance] judge as constituting a static demonstration. ... According to the police officers’ reports , at 11.30 p.m. on 11   August 2014 they demanded that Ms Dianova O.I. cease her participation in a public event, [specifically] a static demonstration, and informed her that [the public event] had not been approved pursuant to the requirements of the law and had been conducted at night, which was in breach of the law ..., but Ms Dianova O.I. did not comply with these demands. ... The penalty applied to Ms Dianova O.I. fell within the minimum range prescribed by Article 20.2   §   5 of [the CAO], and therefore cannot be considered excessively harsh.” Information concerning Ms Z. 18.     On 29 August 2014 the Verkh-Isetskiy Court found Ms Z. guilty of an administrative offence under Article 20.2   §   5 of the CAO and imposed a fine of RUB 10,000. On 13 November 2014 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court upheld that conviction on appeal. Applications n os . 13140/16, 13162/16, 20802/16 and 24703/16 Filmmaking on 19 July 2015 and the applicants’ apprehension 19 .     According to the applicants, on the evening of 19 July 2015 they, along with two other individuals, gathered in the Vorobyovy Gory public park in Moscow with the intent of creating a satirical film. One of the actors was disguised to satirically portray Vladimir Putin, while other participants pledged their love for him while carrying posters with absurd slogans and covering each other with melted chocolate. To avoid disturbances, the filmmakers chose a secluded area of the park. At around 9 p.m. a group of uniformed and plain ‑ clothed police officers approached them. The participants scattered, but were apprehended one by one and forced into a police van. The applicants allege that they were taken to the police station at 9.30 p.m., and released at approximately 12.15 a.m. on 20 July 2015. 20 .     According to the Government, officers from a Moscow police station were informed by passers-by that a group of people were chanting slogans and holding posters with obscene words near the observation deck in Vorobyovy Gory park. The applicants were taken to a police station in the Ramenki District of Moscow, where they were held from 9.20   p.m. on 19   July until 12.10 a.m. on 20 July 2015, i.e. for two hours and fifty minutes. 21.     The police officers submitted reports to the head of the district department of the interior in respect of Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov and Ms   Zenyakina. The reports lacked a specific title and did not cite any legal provisions, they also differed slightly in their wording. The reports for Ms   Sheveleva and Mr Mikhaylov stated that they had been “arrested and escorted [to the police station] for breaching the established order of organising or holding meetings, assemblies, marches and picketing in accordance with the [Public Events Act]”. The report for Ms Zenyakina stated that she had been “escorted to the [police] station for breaching the established order of organising or holding assemblies, meetings, and picketing pursuant to [the Public Events Act]”. No report was prepared for Mr   Roslovtsev. 22 .     On 19 July 2015 identical administrative arrest records were drawn up in respect of Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov and Ms Zenyakina for allegedly committing an offence under Article 20.2 of the CAO. Ms Sheveleva contested the record, stating that they had been engaged in filmmaking, not in a meeting or any other political action as alleged. Mr Mikhaylov confirmed that he was unaware of any prohibited public events. Ms Zenyakina did not provide any comments on the administrative arrest record. 23.     The administrative-offence records for Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov, Ms Zenyakina and Mr Roslovtsev were prepared on the same day. The records contained the following identical passage: “At about 9.05 p.m. on 19 July 2015 [the applicant] was at the address ... in a group of six people, using a placard with inscriptions in Russian stained with brown substance, obviously attracting public attention, that is, [he or she] was a participant in a mass [public] event constituting a meeting, without the municipal authorities’ prior approval («согласование») of the place and time to hold such an event, thus breaching [the Public Events Act], and committing [an offence] under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO.” 24 .     In the administrative-offence record Ms Sheveleva stated her strong disagreement with the charges, emphasizing that the incident was a film shoot, not a political event or meeting. Mr Mikhaylov stated that he did not agree with the record and considered his arrest to be unlawful. Ms Zenyakina also expressed her disagreement with the administrative-offence record. Administrative-offence proceedings against Ms Sheveleva, Mr   Mikhaylov, Mr Roslovtsev and Ms   Zenyakina First-instance trial 25.     When the administrative-offence records were transferred to the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (“the Nikulinskiy Court”), Ms   Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov, Ms Zenyakina and Mr Roslovtsev submitted in writing that they had not participated in any “public event” and that they had been making a film, exercising their right to free artistic expression. 26 .     According to the Government, the four applicants were informed of the first-instance hearing date and time by telegram, and they did not request an adjournment. However, Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov and Ms Zenyakina, represented by Mr O. Beznisko, stated that they had not received any notifications. On 23 July 2015 Mr Roslovtsev, represented by Mr   N.   Zboroshenko, informed the Nikulinskiy Court of his lawyer’s prior commitments on 24 July 2015 and requested to postpone the hearing. This request was not addressed. 27.     On 24 July 2015 the Nikulinskiy Court proceeded with the administrative-offence cases against Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov, Mr   Roslovtsev and Ms Zenyakina in their absence and without their representatives. The court declined to summon the arresting police officers or the applicants’ witnesses. 28.     On the same day the Nikulinskiy Court issued nearly identical two ‑ page judgments for each applicant, differing mainly in the rejection of Ms. Sheveleva’s and Mr. Mikhaylov’s arguments that the filming was not a “public event.” The court found all applicants guilty under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO and fined each RUB 10,000. 29.     The Nikulinskiy Court reasoned, in particular, as follows: “[The applicant] breached the established order of holding a public event by participating in an unauthorised [meeting]... At about 9.05 p.m. on 19 July 2015 [the applicant], while at 30, Kosygin Street, Moscow, at the Vorobyovy Gory observation deck, as part of a group of six people using placards with inscriptions in Russian covered in brown substance, participated in a meeting without the municipal authorities’ prior approval of the place and time to hold such an event, thus violating [the Public Events Act], while ignoring police demands to cease the unlawful actions. ... A meeting is defined as a mass gathering of citizens in a certain place for public expression on socio-political issues. ... The aforementioned event had not received a prior approval from the [municipal authorities]. In such circumstances the court considers that [the applicant]’s actions fall under Article   20.2   § 5 of the [CAO] because [the applicant] breached the established order of holding a [public event].” Appeals 30.     On 10 September 2015 the Moscow City Court summarily rejected the appeals of Ms Sheveleva and Mr Mikhaylov and upheld the judgments in their respect. On 22 October 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment in respect of Ms Zenyakina. 31.     On 16 September 2015 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment in respect of Mr Roslovtsev and ordered a retrial. The appeal court noted that the Nikulinskiy Court had ignored Mr Roslovtsev’s request to postpone the hearing of 24 July 2015 due to his lawyer’s unavailability (see paragraph 26 above). The Nikulinskiy Court set a new hearing for 28 October 2015 and rejected Mr Roslovtsev’s new request to postpone it as unsubstantiated. 32.     On 28 October 2015 the Nikulinskiy Court found Mr Roslovtsev guilty under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. He was fined RUB 10,000. On 16   December 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Domestic law 33 .     The relevant provisions of the Public Events Act (no. FZ ‑ 54 of 19   June 2004), as in force at the material time read as follows: Section 2. Basic definitions “... 1)     a public event is an open, peaceful action accessible to all, held in the form of a gathering ( собрание ), a meeting ( митинг ), a demonstration ( демонстрация ), a march ( шествие ) or a static demonstration ( пикетирование ) or in various combinations of these forms, organised at the initiative of citizens of the Russian Federation, political parties, other public associations, or religious associations, including [events] held with the use of vehicles. The aim of a public event is the free expression and formation of opinions, and to put forward demands on issues of political, economic, social and cultural life in the country, as well as issues of foreign policy; 2)     a gathering ( собрание ) is an assembly of citizens in a specially designated or arranged location for the purpose of collective discussion of socially important issues; 3)     a meeting ( митинг ) is a mass assembly of citizens at a certain location with the aim of publicly expressing an opinion on topical, mainly social or political issues; 4)     a demonstration ( демонстрация ) is an organised expression of public opinion by a group of citizens with the use, while advancing, of placards, banners and other means of visual expression; 5)     a march ( шествие ) is a procession of citizens along a predetermined route with the aim of attracting attention to certain problems; 6)     a static demonstration ( picket – пикетирование ) is a form of public expression of opinion that does not involve movement or the use of loudspeaker equipment, where one or more citizens with placards, banners and other means of visual expression station themselves near the target object of the static demonstration; 7)     a notification of a public event is a document by which the [competent authority] is informed, in accordance with the procedure established by this Act, that a public event be held, so that [the competent authority] may take measures to ensure safety and public order during the [event]...” 34.     Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO read as follows at the material time: “Breaches of the established procedure for the organisation or conduct of public gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches and pickets Breaches of the established procedure for holding a public gathering, meeting, demonstration, march or static demonstration at a public event ... shall be punishable by an administrative fine of between 10,000 and 20,000 [Russian] roubles or community work for up to forty hours.” 35 .     For a summary of the Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018, see Elvira Dmitriyeva v. Russia (nos. 60921/17 and 7202/18, §§ 32-36, 30 April 2019). 36.     For a summary of the domestic law and practice on the administrative escorting and arrest, see Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia (nos.   54381/08 and 5 others, §§   66-75, 10 April 2018). International materials 37 .     The European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, adopted on 4 June 2010 the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, which provide as follows: Section B – Explanatory Notes “... For the purposes of the Guidelines, an assembly means the intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place for a common expressive purpose... 16. An assembly, by definition, requires the presence of at least two persons.” 38.     The Venice Commission has adopted two Opinions on the Public Events Act. In its opinion CDL-AD(2012)007 of 20 March 2012, the Venice Commission stressed that restrictions on public assemblies must be necessary, proportionate and justified, and recommended amendments that would, inter alia , limit the grounds for suspending or terminating an assembly to public safety or imminent violence (see Lashmankin and Others v. Russia , nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, § 316, 7 February 2017). In its further opinion CDL ‑ AD(2013)003 of 11 March 2013 on the 2012 amendments to the Public Events Act, the Venice Commission expressed regret that its recommendations to bring this Act into line with international standards had not been taken into account by the Russian authorities. THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 39 .     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. Jurisdiction 40.     The Court observes that the facts giving rise to the alleged violations of the Convention occurred prior to 16 September 2022, the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a party to the Convention. The Court therefore decides that it has jurisdiction to examine the present applications   (see Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 40792/10 and 2   others, §§   68‑73, 17 January 2023). ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 and 11 OF THE CONVENTION 41.     The applicants complained that the actions taken by the police to put an end to the hunger strike and the filmmaking, respectively, and the subsequent administrative-offence proceedings resulting in their convictions under Article 20.2   §   5 of the CAO, have violated their rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. They relied on Articles   10 and 11 of the Convention, which read, in so far as relevant, as follows: Article 10 “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Article 11 “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ... 2.     No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ...” Admissibility 42.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicants (i)       Ms Dianova (application no. 21286/15) 43 .     Ms Dianova stated that Russian law did not contain any provisions concerning a hunger strike, with the exception of those related to detainees. Ms Dianova stated that she intended to hold a hunger strike in protest against torture in a penal facility, and Ms Z. decided to join her. Ms Dianova considered that her behaviour was akin to that of a solo demonstrator whose message only attracted some interest from passers-by. Referring to the Court’s findings in the case of Novikova and Others v. Russia (nos. 25501/07 and 4 others, §§   204 ‑ 08, 26 April 2016), which concerned the sanctioning of solo static demonstrations, the applicant highlighted that the mere presence of two or more people in the same place at the same time was not sufficient to classify the situation as a “public event” subject to the domestic requirement of prior notification. It can be reasonably assumed that Ms   Dianova did not intend to hold an “assembly” when she planned her hunger strike. Consequently, she was not obliged to adhere to the notification requirement, which does not apply to solo demonstrations. 44 .     Ms Dianova stressed that, in general, Articles 20.2 and 20.2.2 of the CAO have been applied in a manner that makes it difficult to determine which forms of expression can be classified as a public assembly within the meaning of the Public Events Act and the autonomous meaning of the Convention. This lack of clarity extends to the forms of expression that occur in public, but do not fall within the definition of a “public event” or “assembly”. The practice of domestic courts lacked criteria to distinguish a “public event” from other forms of public expression that did not require prior notification. The domestic legislation lacked guarantees against arbitrary interference by public authorities and failed to clarify the scope of the authorities’ discretion. 45.     She considered that the domestic courts had adopted a formalistic approach in treating her protest action as participation in an assembly. She concluded that the application of the Public Events Act and the CAO in her case had not been foreseeable, falling short of the “quality of law” requirement. Consequently, the interference with her rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention was not “prescribed by law”. 46.     In any case, even if her hunger strike were to be considered a “public event”, it was entirely peaceful, caused no disruption to traffic or the ordinary course of life, and concerned a matter of public interest, namely, torture in Russian penal facilities. The domestic courts focused on Ms Dianova’s failure to comply with the notification requirement and failed to consider the public interest and individual rights. The fine of RUB   10,000 was a disproportionately severe sanction in light of her low income. In conclusion, the interference was not “necessary in a democratic society”. (ii)     Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov, Mr Roslovtsev and Ms Zenyakina (applications nos. 13140/16, 13162/16, 20802/16 and 24703/16) 47.     Ms Sheveleva, Mr Mikhaylov, Mr Roslovtsev, and Ms Zenyakina argued that the interference with their rights was based on an arbitrary and unforeseeable interpretation of the Public Events Act by the police and domestic courts, which failed to meet the “quality of law” requirement. They submitted that the Government’s observations and the examples of domestic court judgments confirmed that the provisions of the Public Events Act were not “foreseeable”. The applicants highlighted the ambiguity in the classification of events as “meetings”, “demonstrations”, “gatherings”, and “static demonstrations”. They argued that the gathering of six people in a public park on a Sunday evening did not constitute a “meeting” within the meaning of the Public Events Act and that they could not have foreseen that it would be classified as such. 48 .     The applicants also disputed the Government’s statement that unidentified persons had contacted the police about their filmmaking. They contended that there was no evidence or materials in the administrative ‑ offence proceedings to support this statement. Furthermore, the Government’s allegation that their banners contained obscene words was unsubstantiated. They concluded that there was no pressing social need justifying the interference with their rights, and that the reasons given by the domestic courts were neither relevant nor sufficient. (b)    The Government (i)       Application no. 21286/15 49.     The Government submitted that the protest action of Ms Dianova and Ms Z., namely positioning themselves with a banner and a tent across from the Sverdlovsk FSIN building, constituted a “static demonstration”. Firstly, given that the primary objective of any static demonstration is “to draw public attention to a target or issue”, the domestic courts correctly determined that Ms Dianova’s and Ms Z.’s efforts to raise awareness about the conditions of detainees in IK-63 constituted a static demonstration requiring prior approval by the authorities. Secondly, it qualified as a “group demonstration” as it involved two individuals at the same location displaying a common banner. The Government noted that Ms Dianova, as a member of the Sverdlovsk ONK and human rights activist, was aware of the regulations governing public events, including the need for notification, and it was reasonable to anticipate that her hunger strike would be regarded as an “assembly”. 50 .     The Government further contended that the hunger strike occurred in a public setting, with Ms Dianova and Ms Z. actively engaging with passers ‑ by. On the evening of 11 August 2014, seven people were present at the site. Furthermore, Ms Dianova and Ms Z. had set up a tent. The Government justified the termination of the hunger strike on the grounds of a “pressing social need” due to the obstruction of pedestrian traffic and street cleaning vehicles for five days and the deterioration of Ms Z.’s health, which required calling an ambulance. Subsequently, administrative-offence proceedings were opened with the aim of preventing the commission of new offences by the offenders and by other persons. The authorities had tolerated the situation, and intervened when the women’s health became a concern. 51 .     The Government concluded that there was no violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. (ii)     Applications nos. 13140/16, 13162/16, 20802/16 and 24703/16 52 .     The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicants’ rights to freedom of expression and of assembly. They argued that the interference was lawful and “necessary in a democratic society”. 53 .     They recalled that the Public Events Act has defined five forms of events (see paragraph 33 above). A demonstration or a march required participants to be on the move, while a static demonstration involved only “visual agitation”, such as posters, banners, etc. The applicants’ gathering, which had not been approved by the municipal authorities, aimed to express dissatisfaction with the President’s policy, was classified as a “meeting” due to the political and social nature of their slogans. This was in breach of section   5   (5) of the Public Events Act. 54 .     The Public Events Act was accessible, clear and predictable, in line with the “quality of law” criteria. They provided several judgments holding individuals liable under Article 20.2 of the CAO in various contexts to support their arguments. The Government did not cite specific legitimate aim listed in the Convention, but justified the interference based on the applicants’ breach of the Public Events Act and the police’s duty to prevent offences. 55 .     The notification procedure was designed to ensure the smooth functioning of public infrastructure and transport, maintain public order and security, to prevent disorder and crime. It was deemed necessary to impose sanctions for violations of this procedure. The Government further argued that the applicants, as civic activists, should have been aware of the requirement to notify authorities about their gathering. The domestic courts have applied the Convention standards, basing their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the facts and imposing penalties that were proportionate to the aims pursued. (c)    Third-party interveners 56.     Intervening in application no. 21286/15, the Institute for Law and Public Politics (ILPP), a non-governmental organisation based in Moscow specialising in strategic litigation in public interest cases, along with academic and publishing activities in constitutional and human rights justice, has submitted the following. 57 .     Firstly, Section 2 of the Public Events Act defines a public event as an open, peaceful action such as a gathering, meeting, or static demonstration, organised to express opinions on various societal and political issues. A static demonstration is defined as a stationary public expression of opinion that may employ visual aids but does not involve loudspeakers or movement. The CAO outlines the liabilities for breaches in the organisation or conduct of such events in Articles 20.2 and 20.2.2. Article 20.2 addresses gatherings that disrupt public order but manifest in forms other than those defined as public events by the Public Events Act. The application of these articles by the courts is inconsistent. For example, cases under Article 20.2 of the CAO, such as someone taking a photo with a banner at a court’s entrance or collecting signatures against the construction of a recycling plant, have been overturned or discontinued upon appeal. Meanwhile, Article 20.2.2 of the CAO has been applied to a diverse range of public activities, including the work of street artists and proselytising, as well as participation in flash mobs. In many cases, these activities have resulted in administrative penalties on the pretext that they obstructed pedestrians or access to public facilities. The ILPP has identified a lack of clear guidelines to determine what constitutes a “public event” and what, although occurring in public, does not qualify as one. 58 .     Furthermore, in Russian law, the concept of a hunger strike is specifically addressed within penitentiary legislation, where it is defined as a refusal to eat by a suspect, accused, or convicted person. However, recent judicial practice has extended the interpretation of hunger strikes to static demonstrations, leading to prosecutions under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO when such strikes are conducted outside of the penal context and deemed unauthorised public events. 59 .     The ILPP concluded that Russian legislative, administrative, and judicial practices do not clearly differentiate between public expressions that qualify as public events under the Public Events Act and thus fall under Article 11 of the Convention, and those that do not and fall solely under Article 10. Although Russian law recognises a distinction between types of public expression, as evidenced by Articles 20.2 and 20.2.2 of the CAO, the application of these articles is often lacking in clear reasoning, making it difficult to predict which legal provisions will be applied to similar forms of expression. Furthermore, the differentiation does not consistently consider issues of public order. Both articles mention obstacles to pedestrian and car circulation. In conclusion, the domestic application of these distinctions does not align with the criteria established by the Court in Tatár and Fáber v.   Hungary (nos. 26005/08 and 26160/08, § 40, 12   June 2012), which emphasizes that not all public expressions constitute assemblies requiring prior notification, particularly when they are unlikely to disturb public order and are primarily communicative in nature. The Court’s assessment 60.     The Court observes at the outset that each of the five applicants was sanctioned under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO for participation in an unauthorised “public event” within the meaning of the Public Events Act. Before the Court, the applicants invoked both Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. (a)    Application no. 21286/15 (i)       Scope of case 61.     The Court has emphasised that the freedom of assembly provided for in Article 11 is closely linked with the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10, as the protection of personal opinions, secured by the latter, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11. Article 10 is to be regarded as a lex generalis in relation to Article 11, which is a lex specialis . One of the distinctive criteria noted by the Court is that in the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly the participants would be seeking not only to express their opinion, but to do so together with others (see Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, § 101, 15   November 2018). 62.     To avert the risk of a restrictive interpretation, the Court has refrained from formulating the notion of an assembly, which it regards as an autonomous concept, or exhaustively listing the criteria which would define it. It has specified in relevant cases that the right to freedom of assembly covered both private meetings and meetings in public places, whether static or in the form of a procession; in addition, it can be exercised by individual participants and by the persons organising the gathering (ibid, § 98). 63 .     The Court notes that Ms Dianova engaged in a five-day hunger strike in a public space to protest against the ill-treatment of detainees. She undertook this protest alongside Ms Z., with a third participant joining on the fifth day. Ms   Dianova and Ms Z. engaged with the media and passers-by throughout their hunger strike. They communicated the reasons for their action, which was to show support for the victims and to protest against a lack of access to them (see paragraphs 9 and 43 above). Although Ms Dianova considered her hunger strike a solo demonstration, she never denied holding it alongside Ms Z. and subsequently being joined by Ms M. (see paragraphs   9-10 above). While the Court is not bound by the legal classification under Russian law of Ms   Dianova’s actions as participation in a group public event (see paragraph 15 above), it considers that in view of the nature of the applicant’s conduct, it fell within the notion of “peaceful assembly” contained in Article 11 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Navalnyy , cited above, § 111, and Obote v. Russia , no.   58954/09, § 35, 19   November 2019). 64.     The Court will therefore examine Ms Dianova’s complaint in light of general principles applicable to freedom of peaceful assembly that have been summarised in Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania ([GC], no. 37553/05, §§   142-48, ECHR 2015) and Navalnyy (cited above, §§ 98-103). Notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 must also be considered in the light of Article 10, where the aim of the exercise of freedom of assembly is the expression of personal opinions, as well as the need to secure a forum for public debate and the open expression of protest (ibid., § 102). 65.     It is not in dispute that the actions by the police officers to put an end to Ms Dianova’s hunger strike and the ensuing administrative sanctions constituted an interference with her right to freedom of peaceful assembly. It remains to be ascertained whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of Article 11, and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim or aims in question (see Kudrevičius and Others , cited above, § 102). (ii)     Whether the interference was prescribed by law 66.     The Court notes the ambiguity in the classification of various forms of public expression of opinion as public events under the Public Events Act, as submitted by Ms Dianova and the