CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 24 septembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .s8B15FBF9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:8.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sAE6FB95D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:32.01pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 } .s65DDED6B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sDBC81028 { width:4.83pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s7AE800C3 { width:4.28pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .sB8467130 { width:24.88pt; display:inline-block } .s766CA6F { width:155.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 25311/17 IMMOREKS MAKEDONIJA DOO SKOPJE against North Macedonia   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 24   September 2024 as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Jovan Ilievski,   Pauliine Koskelo,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Frédéric Krenc,   Davor Derenčinović,   Gediminas Sagatys , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 March 2017, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant company, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant company, Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje, is a limited liability company incorporated in the respondent State (“the applicant company”). It was represented before the Court by Mr Z. Hadji-Zafirov, a lawyer practising in Skopje. 2.     The Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova. The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4.     The applicant company was set up in September 2004 and works primarily in building construction. 5 .     In October 2004 the applicant company entered into a contract with another company, E., under which E. was to perform construction work for the applicant company in the building of a hotel. The contract stipulated, inter alia , that E. was to keep construction records for the work performed. 6 .     In 2005 the Internal Revenue Office, regional directorate – Skopje ( Управа за јавни приходи, Регионална дирекција Скопје – “ the IRO”) conducted a VAT-related tax audit of the applicant company. On 25 July and 15 September 2005 it drew up tax assessments concerning the periods from 1 January 2004 to 30 June 2005, and from 1 to 31 July 2005, respectively. It established that E. had not kept proper records concerning the materials or equipment used in relation to the construction of the hotel and had not provided the IRO with any construction records to show that the declared construction work had actually been performed. Furthermore, E. had subsequently refused a tax audit. On the basis of the above-mentioned tax assessments, on 29 August 2005 the IRO issued a decision ordering the applicant company to pay additional VAT in the amount of 49,011,945 denars ((MKD) – approximately 796,000 euros (EUR)). On 1 June 2006 the Supreme Court (which then had jurisdiction ratione materiae ) confirmed that decision with final effect. 7.     On 4 January 2008 the IRO decided to conduct a VAT-related tax audit of the applicant company for the period between 1 January 2005 and 31   December 2007. The audit took place over several days between February and September 2009, and focused on the period from 1 August 2005 until 31   December 2007, given that the previous tax audit (see paragraph 6 above) had covered the period until 31 July 2005. 8 .     On 16 October 2008 the IRO compiled a tax assessment on the basis of the audit. It found that the applicant company was not entitled to the VAT deductions it had previously declared in relation to transactions with several suppliers (E., K., U.M., G.K., G. and P.R.), for the following reasons. - On 7 July 2008 E. had refused a tax audit of its transactions with the applicant company. The IRO further referred to its findings made in the previous audit. - The invoice issued by K. for the purchase of windows did not indicate the place of issue, the applicant company’s address, the date of the purchase or the date and manner of delivery of the windows, and did not include K.’s stamp. - There were discrepancies between the applicant company’s VAT accounting records and those of the suppliers U.M. and G.K. Moreover, those companies did not have sufficient employees and/or equipment to have carried out the reported services. The invoices issued by them did not indicate their VAT number, their own or the applicant company’s addresses, or the quantity or description of services provided to the applicant company. - There were irregularities in G.’s tax declarations. - The invoices issued by P.R. did not indicate the dates when the alleged services had been performed or the applicant company’s VAT number. 9.     Relying on its tax assessment, on 16 October 2008 the IRO issued a decision ordering the applicant company to pay additional VAT in the amount of MKD 18,222,206 (equivalent to approximately EUR 296,730). On 21   December 2009 the Minister of Finance (“the Minister”) confirmed that decision. 10.     On 28 October 2010 the Administrative Court allowed an administrative-dispute claim by the applicant company, finding that the relevant facts, in particular concerning the transactions between the applicant company and the suppliers E. and G., had not been correctly established. The Minister overruled the tax decision of 16 October 2008 and remitted the case to the IRO. 11 .     Between February and June 2011 the IRO performed another tax audit, and on 13 June 2011 it issued a new tax assessment. Again, it found that E. had refused a tax audit for the period between 1 January 2005 and 31   December 2007 and that the previous tax audits (see paragraph 6 above) showed that it had not kept proper records of the services provided, the materials used, the salaries paid or the requisite equipment for the declared construction work. The IRO corrected its assessment of 16 October 2008 in respect of the supplier G. and found that the applicant company could deduct the input VAT arising from the corresponding transactions. In respect of the other suppliers, it maintained its previous findings (see paragraph 8 above). 12 .     On 14 November 2011 the IRO issued a decision ordering the applicant company to pay additional VAT in the amount of MKD 16,898,094 (approximately EUR 274,400). On 3 April 2012 the Minister upheld that decision. 13.     On 14 January 2014 the Administrative Court set aside the decision of 3 April 2012 and remitted the case to the Minister. It found that the five ‑ year (relative) statutory limitation period concerning the 2005 tax debt had expired. On 16 May 2014 the Minister remitted the case to the IRO. 14.     On 7 July 2014 the IRO issued a new decision, ordering the applicant company to pay additional VAT in the same amount as indicated in its decision of 14 November 2011 (see paragraph 12 above). On 18   December   2014 the Minister dismissed the applicant company’s appeal, stating among other that the IRO’s decision had been based on the tax assessment of 13   June   2011 (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant company lodged an administrative-dispute claim against that decision. 15 .     On 27 August 2015 the Administrative Court dismissed the administrative-dispute claim, finding that the Minister had been correct to accept the facts of the case as established by the IRO. It further held as follows: “[O]n the basis of the documents in the case file and the established facts, the court concludes that the [applicant company] did not keep proper and correct records concerning the grounds for tax calculation, in particular of the input turnover ( влезниот промет ) and the previous deductible tax, so the declared VAT amount for the audited period did not correspond to the real input turnover, [that is,] the recorded input turnover was higher than the real [amount], which resulted in irregularities in the exercise of the right to deduct the input VAT ...” The court further found that the statutory limitation period in respect of the tax debt had not elapsed, as it had been interrupted by the previous tax decisions. 16.     On 28 October 2015 the applicant company appealed against the Administrative Court’s judgment. It argued, inter alia , that the absolute ten ‑ year statutory limitation period in respect of the 2005 tax debt had expired. 17 .     On 6 July 2016 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal and upheld the Administrative Court’s judgment. It further endorsed the IRO’s findings in the tax assessment of 13 June 2011 (see paragraph 11 above). It refused to address the complaint that the statutory limitation period in respect of the 2005 tax debt had expired, as that complaint had not been raised in the administrative-dispute claim but only in the appeal against the Administrative Court’s judgment. Other relevant information 18 .     The Government provided a copy of a civil claim for unlawful enrichment ( неосновано збогатување ) lodged on 30 December 2009 by the applicant company against E., in which the applicant company had argued that following the tax assessments of 25 July and 15 September 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), it had been unable to obtain a VAT deduction in the amount of MKD 49,011,945 (approximately EUR 796,000). 19 .     On 21 February 2011 the Tetovo Court of First Instance considered the claim withdrawn, as neither the applicant company’s nor E.’s representatives had appeared at a hearing. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Valued Added Tax Act ( Зaкон за данок на додадена вредност , Official Gazette no. 44/99, with further amendments, “The VAT Act”) 20 .     Section 33 of the VAT Act provides for a taxpayer’s right to deduct, inter alia , the VAT previously paid to other taxpayers in the supply chain. 21 .     Under section 34(1), the right to deduct VAT is obtained if the taxpayer uses the acquired goods or services for its own economic activity, on the basis of an invoice or a customs declaration issued in compliance with section 53 (see paragraph 23 below), if that invoice or customs declaration is entered in the taxpayer’s records. Under section 34(2), the right to deduct VAT is obtained on fulfilment of all the conditions set out in sections 33 and 34(1) of the VAT Act. 22.     Under section 42, the competent tax authority assesses the VAT to be paid where a taxpayer has not submitted a VAT declaration within the prescribed deadline, has miscalculated the VAT or has declared an amount which does not correspond to its actual transactions, or if a tax audit has established that the taxpayer’s records are incomplete or incorrect. 23 .     Under section 53(10), an invoice must include the following: the place and date of issue and a serial number; the names, addresses and VAT numbers of both the buyer and the seller of the goods or services; the date of the transaction; the quantity and description of the goods or services; the price without VAT, the applicable VAT rate, the amount of VAT and the final price with VAT; and the signature and stamp of the taxpayer which has issued the invoice (the seller). The Obligations Act ( Закон за облигационите односи , Official Gazette no. 18/01, with further amendments) 24.     The Obligations Act provides, inter alia , for the right to compensation in the event of damage (section 141), unlawful enrichment (section 199) and payment on behalf of another person (section 207). Relevant practice of the administrative courts 25 .     In a judgment ( У-5. Бр. 757/2011 ) of 1 March 2013, which according to the Government is final, the Administrative Court dismissed a company’s challenge against a VAT-related decision, finding that the conditions of sections 33 and 34 of the VAT Act had not been cumulatively fulfilled and that some of the suppliers’ invoices had not included certain elements prescribed in section 53 of the VAT Act. In another final judgment ( УЖ – 3. бр. 297/2015 ) of 17 August 2015, the Higher Administrative Court dismissed another company’s challenge against a VAT decision in a case in which the IRO had found that invoices issued by the company’s suppliers had been flawed. The court held that the applicant company’s suppliers had to calculate, pay and properly record VAT in their own records. COMPLAINTS 26.     The applicant company complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the domestic authorities had arbitrarily established its tax obligation in respect of its VAT deduction entitlement and refused to consider parts of its tax debt time-barred. It further complained under Article   13 of the Convention that it had had no access to an effective procedure to challenge the domestic authorities’ decisions. THE LAW Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention 27.     The applicant company complained that in the proceedings ending with the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment of 6 July 2016, the domestic authorities had arbitrarily refused to allow the VAT deduction. In addition, the Higher Administrative Court had not addressed on the merits its argument that the statutory limitation period had expired in respect of the 2005 tax debt. The applicant company relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” The parties’ submissions 28.     The Government submitted that the applicant company’s complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention and the Protocols thereto, as the company had had no “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, nor had it had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to deduct the input VAT which it had paid to its suppliers. The relevant statutory conditions (sections 33 and 34 of the VAT Act) should have been cumulatively fulfilled and those conditions required the relevant suppliers’ invoices to comply with section 53 of the VAT Act and be registered in the taxpayer’s records. In addition, as was apparent from the administrative courts’ case-law (see paragraph 25 above), the entitlement to deduct the input VAT could in certain circumstances depend on whether a taxpayer’s suppliers had failed to comply with their own tax obligations, particularly if the taxpayer should have been aware of that failure. In the instant case, the invoices issued by the applicant company’s suppliers had been flawed, and there had been other irregularities, of which the applicant company was, or should have been, aware. 29.     The Government further submitted that the applicant company had not exhausted the relevant domestic remedies as it had not pursued the civil proceedings that it had brought against E. for unlawful enrichment (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above) for the period up until July 2005. Furthermore, it had not initiated any civil proceedings against E. for the period after July 2005, nor had it initiated any proceedings against its other suppliers or the IRO, under any of the grounds provided in the Obligations Act (see paragraph 24 above), for any period. 30.     The applicant company submitted that it had paid in full the invoices issued by its suppliers and had expected that, under the VAT Act, it would obtain a deduction of the corresponding VAT. Until then it had not experienced any problems in deducting input VAT. The IRO had not established any irregularities in the applicant company’s own operation. It had availed itself of the remedy which it had considered to be the most effective, that is, the tax and administrative-dispute proceedings. The Court’s assessment 31.     The Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the applicant company’s complaints under this head are in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. 32 .     The general principles concerning the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 have been summarised in, for example, Ooo Khabarovskaya Toplivnaya Kompaniya v. Russia ((dec.), no. 10114/06, §§ 57-59 and 61, 19   September 2017).   Furthermore, the Court has already examined the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the context of VAT deduction (see “Bulves”   AD v.   Bulgaria , no.   3991/03, 22   January   2009; Business Support Centre v.   Bulgaria , no. 6689/03, 18   March 2010; Nazarev v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 26553/05 and 3 others, 25   January   2011;   Atev v. Bulgaria   (dec.), no.   39689/05, 18   March 2014; Euromak Metal Doo v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no.   168039/14, 14   June   2018; and Formela   v.   Poland   (dec.), no.   31651/08 , §§ 93-103, 5   February 2019). The Court has found that an applicant company had a legitimate expectation of deducting input VAT which it had paid to its suppliers, and, hence, had a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1, in so far as (i) it had complied fully and within the relevant time-limit with the VAT rules set by the State (it had paid the VAT on the supply on the basis of the VAT invoice issued by its supplier, had entered the supply in its accounting records, and had reported it in its VAT return for the relevant period), and (ii) it had had no means of enforcing compliance by its supplier and no knowledge of the latter’s failure to comply (see Formela , cited above, § 94). 33.     In the instant case, the applicant company’s complaint concerns the IRO’s refusal to deduct the declared VAT on supply (the input VAT) arising from its transactions with five suppliers: E., K., U.M., G.K. and P.R. The IRO’s refusal, later confirmed on appeal and upheld by the administrative courts at two levels of jurisdiction, was based on the following: E. had refused a tax audit and previous audits had shown that its records had not been properly kept; K., U.M., G.K. and P.R. had submitted invoices which had not complied with section 53 of the VAT Act; there had been discrepancies between the applicant company’s accounting records and those of U.M. and G.K.; and lastly, U.M. and G.K., had not had sufficient employees or equipment to perform the reported services. 34.     The Court observes that none of the reasons stated above related to any irregularities on the part of the applicant company or to any failure to comply with its VAT-related obligations. It was not established in the domestic proceedings, nor has it been argued by the Government, that the applicant company had not paid the input VAT to any of its suppliers or that it had not properly reported it in its tax declarations. Moreover, while the administrative courts concluded that the applicant company had not kept proper and correct records concerning its tax calculation (see paragraphs 15 and 17 above), they did not reconsider the facts of the case, but endorsed the findings made in the tax assessments drawn up by the IRO. The IRO established that there had been inconsistencies between the accounting records of the applicant company and the suppliers U.M. and G.K., but did not conclude that those inconsistencies had originated in the applicant company’s accounting records or that they had amounted to a failure by the applicant company to comply with its tax obligations. Furthermore, no such inconsistencies were identified in respect of the other three suppliers (E., K. and P.R.). 35.     However, the Court does not need to decide whether the applicant company fully complied with its VAT-related obligations. Even assuming that the tax authorities refused to deduct the disputed VAT for reasons relating solely to the failure of the applicant company’s suppliers to comply with the relevant tax rules, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention will not be applicable if the applicant company had knowledge of that failure and if it had the means to enforce the suppliers’ compliance (compare Formela , cited above, §§ 96-102). The Court will proceed to examine those questions. (a)    Transactions with the supplier E. 36.     The IRO refused to deduct the input VAT arising from the applicant company’s transactions with E. on the basis of a previous tax audit of the applicant company, in which it was established that E. had not kept proper records. The applicant company was clearly aware of those irregularities, because as a result of them it had been ordered to pay additional VAT by the decision of 29 August 2005, which became final on 1 June 2006. While those irregularities concerned the period up until 31 July 2005, which preceded the period covered by the applicant company’s complaint in the instant case those findings could have provided a clear indication to the applicant company of the manner in which E. had operated in relation to its VAT obligations.   Nevertheless, despite that indication, the applicant company did not undertake any measures to ensure E.’s compliance with the VAT rules for the subsequent period, to which the instant case relates. It did not argue that it had made any contact with E. to address the apparent breach of its statutory obligation to properly record the VAT obligations, or of its contractual obligation to keep adequate construction records (see paragraph 5 above). In addition, the applicant company did not lodge a compensation claim against E. until 2009, after the tax period to which the present case relates had expired, and it subsequently failed to pursue that claim, which was then considered withdrawn. The applicant company did not argue before the Court that it had had no available means to enforce E.’s compliance with its relevant obligations. 37.     Bearing in mind that the irregularities in E.’s operation identified by the IRO immediately preceded the period subject to the instant case and were connected to E.’s relations to the applicant company (see paragraph 6 above), the Court concludes that the applicant company had knowledge of E.’s failure to comply with the VAT rules but did not attempt to ensure E.’s compliance with those rules (compare Formela , cited above, §   101). (b)    Transactions with the other suppliers 38.     The IRO established, and the administrative courts confirmed, that all the other four suppliers (K., U.M., G.K. and P.R) had submitted invoices which lacked some of the elements required by section 53 of the VAT Act, despite the fact that section 34 of that Act clearly specified that a VAT deduction could only be obtained on the basis of invoices issued in compliance with section 53. The Court considers that the applicant company could have carefully examined the invoices when they had been submitted for payment, become acquainted with the shortcomings therein and contacted the suppliers for the purpose of correcting the invoices, which would be a sign of the diligence to be ordinarily exercised between business partners (see, mutatis mutandis , Formela , cited above, § 99). In this regard, the Court has accepted, albeit when assessing the proportionality of a refusal to allow a VAT deduction, a more rigid approach on the part of the authorities towards diligent traders with the aim of securing the collection of taxes (see Atev , cited above, § 35, with further references, and Formela , cited above, §121). In the present case it has not been argued by the applicant company that it was in any way prevented from exercising such diligence. 39.     The Court further observes that aside from the flaws identified in the invoices issued by the suppliers U.M. and G.K., the IRO had identified other grounds to refuse to deduct VAT in relation to the transactions between the applicant company and those suppliers. However, neither the relevant provisions of the VAT Act (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above) nor the practice of the administrative courts referred to (see paragraph 25 above) indicate that those other shortcomings would have automatically led to a refusal to deduct the VAT relating to those transactions. The Court cannot therefore speculate as to what the outcome of the tax proceedings in respect of the transactions with those suppliers would have been had the applicant company attempted in a timely fashion to obtain invoices compliant with section 53 of the VAT Act. 40.     Lastly, the Court observes that in Euromak Metal Doo (cited above, §§ 9, 43 and 44), it found that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was applicable in a situation where the applicant company’s suppliers had not declared or paid the VAT which had clearly been declared in the invoices sent to the applicant company, and where some of the invoices did not contain the addresses of the suppliers. However, in Euromak Metal Doo , unlike in the present case, only some of the suppliers’ invoices had been flawed. Moreover, in that case, it was not established or even argued that the applicant company had known or could have known of the shortcomings identified on the part of its suppliers. The Court therefore does not consider that the finding in Euromak Metal Doo prevents it from establishing that in the present case the conditions for the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraph 32 above) were not met. (c)    Conclusion 41.     In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant company had no “legitimate expectation” of deducting the VAT in question and, consequently, what is at stake with regard to its transactions with the aforementioned suppliers cannot be seen as a “possession” within the meaning of Article   1   Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Accordingly, this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35   §   4 of the Convention. This finding prevents the Court from assessing the merits of the applicant company’s complaints under this head, including that related to the Higher Administrative Court’s refusal to address the alleged time-bar of parts of the tax debt. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION 42.     The applicant company complained that there had been a violation of Article   13 of the Convention on account of the refusal of the Higher Administrative Court to determine on the merits the applicant company’s objection that the statutory limitation period in respect of a tax debt had expired. 43.     Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 44.     The Court reiterates that, in accordance with its case-law, Article   13 applies only where an individual has an “arguable claim” of being the victim of a violation of a Convention right. Having regard to its above conclusion under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court does not find that the applicant company has an arguable claim for the purposes of Article   13, which therefore does not apply (see, among many other authorities, Radio Athina Monoprosopi Etairia Periorismenis Efthynis v.   Greece (dec.), no. 77504/13, §   65, 3 May 2022). 45.     It follows that this complaint is inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 17 October 2024.     Hasan Bakırcı   Arnfinn Bårdsen   Section Registrar   President