CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 octobre 2024

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ITALY (Application no. 71250/16)   JUDGMENT   Art 7 • Heavier penalty • Domestic courts’ refusal of applicant’s request for a reduction of his sentence from life imprisonment to thirty years’ imprisonment after he chose to be tried under summary procedure • Assessment not in abstracto but based on specific case circumstances • Applicant not entitled to a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment as summary procedure requested long after statutory framework amended in more severe terms, with that term being substituted by life imprisonment without daytime isolation • Procedural choices of a defendant and subsequent terms of any agreement between a defendant and the State pivotal as regards applicable penalty • Length of reduced sentence to be imposed in the event of a conviction to be clearly identified by the law in force at the time of   the agreement   • Identification of most lenient law among all the laws in force during the period between commission of the offence and the delivery of the final judgment strictly linked to domestic court’s agreement to the applicant’s request for a summary trial • Offences committed punishable with life imprisonment with daytime isolation but applicant, after trial under summary procedure, sentenced to life imprisonment without daytime isolation, a more lenient penalty Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Request for summary procedure constituting an unequivocal waiver of certain procedural safeguards in exchange for certain advantages, including life imprisonment without daytime isolation • No legitimate expectation on the basis of the legal framework at the material time of incurring another sentence • Imposition of penalty foreseeable   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 17 October 2024   FINAL   17/03/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Cesarano v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Alena Poláčková,   Péter Paczolay,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato,   Alain Chablais , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   71250/16) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Mr   Ferdinando Cesarano (“the applicant”), on 24 November 2016; the decision to give notice of the application to the Italian Government (“the Government”); the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 24 September 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the domestic courts’ refusal of the applicant’s request for a reduction of his sentence from life imprisonment to thirty years’ imprisonment stemming, in his view, from his choice to be tried under the summary procedure. In contrast to the case of Scoppola v. Italy (no.   2) ([GC], no.   10249/03, 17 September 2009), the applicant was admitted to that procedure at a time when the law he identified as the lex mitior (Law no.   479 of 1999) was no longer in force. The application raises issues under Article   7 and Article   6 §   1 of the Convention. 2.     The question before the Court is whether, in the light of the principles set out in Scoppola (cited above), the time frame to be taken into account for the identification of the most lenient law runs in abstracto from the commission of the offence until the final conviction or whether, when it comes to simplified procedures – which depend on a request by the accused person – the time frame begins from the moment at which such a request is formulated. THE FACTS 3.     The applicant was born in 1954 and is serving a life sentence in L’Aquila. He was represented by Mr M. Vetrano, a lawyer practising in Naples. 4.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr L. D’Ascia. 5.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.         The applicant’s FIRST committal for trial 6 .     In 1995 the applicant was committed for trial with other co-defendants on charges of mass murder ( strage ) and murder, crimes committed in 1983, which, at that time, were cumulatively punishable by a life sentence with daytime isolation. At the time of the applicant’s trial, defendants liable to a sentence of life imprisonment could not be tried under the summary procedure, a simplified process which entailed a reduction of sentence in the event of a conviction. 7.     Law no. 479 of 16 December 1999 entered into force on 2   January 2000 and reintroduced, for defendants liable to a sentence of life imprisonment, the option of being tried under the summary procedure (for a chronology of the relevant domestic provisions, see paragraphs 29-33 below). As amended by that Law, Article 442 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) provided that, where the crime committed by the defendant was punishable by life imprisonment, the appropriate sentence, following conviction under the summary procedure, would be thirty years’ imprisonment (see paragraph   30 below). 8 .     Pursuant to section 4- ter of Decree-Law no. 82 of 7 April 2000, as amended and converted into Law no. 144 of 5 June 2000 (which entered into force on 8 June 2000), defendants liable to a sentence of life imprisonment were allowed to ask to be tried under the summary procedure at their next hearing, provided that evidentiary hearings were still ongoing in their case, either at first instance or on appeal. 9 .     At the time that provision was enacted, the proceedings in the applicant’s case were pending at first instance and evidentiary hearings were ongoing. Hence, at that time, the applicant had the possibility of asking to be tried under the summary procedure and possibly being granted a reduction of his punishment from a life sentence to thirty years’ imprisonment. However, he did not do so. It appears from the case file that some of his co-defendants asked for and were granted trial under the summary procedure. 10 .     On 24 November 2000 Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 entered into force. Section 7(1) of the Decree-Law provided that “life imprisonment”, as referred to in Law no. 479 of 1999, should be taken to mean “life imprisonment without daytime isolation”. In other words, only those liable to a sentence of life imprisonment without daytime isolation could be eligible for a reduction to thirty years’ imprisonment, while those liable to a sentence of life imprisonment with daytime isolation, such as the applicant, would only be eligible, in the event of trial under the summary procedure, for a reduction to life imprisonment without daytime isolation.       The Naples Assize Court’s first instance judgment 11.     On 25 October 2007 the applicant was convicted by the Naples Assize Court, following a trial under the ordinary procedure. The penalty imposed on the applicant at that stage of the proceedings is not clear from the case file. 12.     On 17   September 2009, while the proceedings in the applicant’s case were pending on appeal, the Court, in its judgment in Scoppola (cited above), concluded that Italy had failed to discharge its obligation to grant the applicant in that case – who had asked to be tried under the summary procedure while Law no. 479 of 1999 had been in force, but had been sentenced to life imprisonment – the benefit of a reduction of his sentence to thirty years’ imprisonment as prescribed by that Law, in violation of Article   7 of the Convention. The Court also concluded that Article   6 §   1 of the Convention had been breached as a result of the frustration of the applicant’s legitimate expectation that thirty years’ imprisonment was the maximum sentence to which he was liable.     quashing of the judgment and remittal of the case 13 .     On 19 February 2010 the Naples Assize Court of Appeal quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the case to the Rome public prosecutor, who was deemed to have jurisdiction to deal with the case. 14 .     On 15 May 2012 the applicant was again committed for trial on the same charges as in 1995. At a preliminary hearing held on 2   October   2012, he asked to be tried under the summary procedure. 15.     With a view to incorporating the Grand Chamber’s findings in Scoppola (cited above) into the domestic system, the Constitutional Court, by judgment no. 210 of 3 July 2013, ruled that section 7(1) of Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000 was unconstitutional (for more details, see paragraphs 35 et seq. below). 16.     However, that conclusion did not affect the validity of the provision in the applicant’s case. Indeed, the replacement of thirty years’ imprisonment with a life sentence without daytime isolation remained valid for cases in which the summary procedure had been initiated as from 24   November 2000, that is, the date on which Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 had come into effect.    The Rome preliminary hearings judge’s first ‑ instance judgment 17 .     On 26 September 2013, following a trial under the summary procedure, the Rome preliminary hearings judge ( giudice dell’udienza preliminare ) found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment without daytime isolation, under section 7 of Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000. As to the penalty imposed on the applicant, the judge took into account certain aggravating circumstances (including the number of individuals involved in the commission of the offences, the abject reasons for committing them and the presence of premeditation), the extremely serious nature of the acts attributable to the applicant and the fact that he had previously participated in other egregious offences, including more than forty murders, extortions, mafia-type crimes and weapon-related offences. 18.     Concerning the applicant’s request for a reduction of his sentence to thirty years’ imprisonment in the light of Scoppola (cited above), the preliminary hearings judge set out in detail the principles expressed by the Plenary Court of Cassation in Giannone (see paragraphs 43 et seq. below) and observed that the applicant’s situation was not comparable to that of the applicant in Scoppola (cited above) because he had neither requested nor been granted trial under the summary procedure while Law no. 479 of 1999 had been in force. Therefore, the judge dismissed the applicant’s request. 19.     Lastly, with regard to the applicant’s request that a question as to the constitutionality of section 7 of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 be raised, the judge noted that, by its judgment no. 210 of 2013 (see paragraph 35 below), the Constitutional Court had declared section 7(1) of Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000 unconstitutional, stating that that provision was prejudicial to those in situations identical to that of the applicant in Scoppola (cited above). However, the provision in question was not applicable to the applicant in the present case, who, unlike Mr Scoppola, had not been granted trial under the summary procedure while Law no 479 of 1999 had been in force. 20.     The judgment was deposited with the registry on 6   December   2013.      The Rome assize court of appeal’s judgment 21.     The applicant lodged an appeal. As to the penalty imposed on him, he again relied on the principles set out in Scoppola (cited above) and sought a reduction of his sentence to thirty years’ imprisonment, which, he argued, was the most favourable penalty provided for among all the laws in force during the period between the commission of the offences and the delivery of the final judgment. 22.     The applicant also raised again a question as to the constitutionality of section 7 of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000. He argued that the question brought before the Constitutional Court which had given rise to its judgment no.   210 of 2013 (that is, Ercolano – see paragraphs 35 et seq. below) concerned a different situation from his own as, contrary to the situation in that case, the proceedings on the merits were still pending in his case. 23 .     On 4 November 2014 the Rome Assize Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and refused his request for a reduction of sentence. Endorsing the reasoning of the preliminary hearings judge, the Assize Court of Appeal reiterated that the applicant’s situation differed from that of the applicant in Scoppola (cited above). Referring in its turn to the Court of Cassation’s judgment in Giannone (see paragraphs 43 et seq. below), the Assize Court of Appeal considered that, in the applicant’s case, the identification of the applicable sentence was strictly linked to the time at which he had had access to the summary procedure. 24.     In sum, it was the date of the request to be admitted to the summary procedure that determined the sanction applicable in relation to the offence committed. 25.     The Assize Court of Appeal thus concluded that, in accordance with the well ‑ established domestic case-law (see paragraphs 41-42 below), the principles set out in Scoppola (cited above) could not be applied to his case. 26.     With regard to the applicant’s question of constitutionality, the Assize Court of Appeal considered that the fact that, in the case of Ercolano , the defendant’s sentence had been final had had no impact on the Constitutional Court’s conclusions. Indeed, the substantial nature of the reduction of the sentence had been strictly linked to the type of procedure conducted in the specific case. The Assize Court of Appeal considered that the so called “authentic interpretation law” (that is, section 7 of Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000) had already been deemed inadequate ( insostenibile ) by the European Court of Human Rights (in Scoppola , cited above) and by the Constitutional Court (in its judgment no.   210 of 2013), in so far as it deprived the potential beneficiary of a legitimate expectation where access to the summary procedure had already taken place. That idea remained valid irrespective of whether the criminal proceedings were final (as in the case of Ercolano ) or pending (as in the applicant’s case).    The CourT of cassation’s judgment 27 .     By judgment no. 26519 of 7 January 2016, deposited with the registry on 24 June 2016, the Court of Cassation declared an appeal by the applicant on points of law inadmissible. Relying on its case-law (namely judgment no.   34233 of 19 April 2012, known as “ Giannone ”; see paragraph 43 below) and endorsing the lower courts’ reasoning, the Court of Cassation reiterated that in the applicant’s case no issue arose as to the more lenient subsequent law to be applied in his case, bearing in mind that at the time when he had been granted trial under the summary procedure, Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000 had been in force. In that respect, the circumstance emphasised by the applicant that the proceedings in his case were still pending was irrelevant. Therefore, the applicant was not entitled to a reduction of sentence as he had not requested access to the summary procedure under the provisions of Law no.   479 of 1999. 28.     Confirming the lower courts’ reasoning, the Court of Cassation also refused a request by the applicant to have the case examined by the Constitutional Court. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE         domestic legal framework    The summary procedure 29 .     The summary procedure is governed by Articles 438 and 441 to 443 of the CCP. It is based on the assumption that a case can be decided as the file stands ( allo stato degli atti ) at the preliminary hearing. A request to be tried under the summary procedure may be made orally or in writing at any time before the parties have made their submissions at the preliminary hearing. If the summary procedure is followed, the hearing takes place in private and is given over to the parties’ oral submissions; in principle, they must base their arguments on the documents included in the prosecution’s file, even though, exceptionally, oral evidence may be allowed. If the judge finds the defendant guilty, the sentence imposed is reduced by one-third (Article   442 §   2).    Amendment of Article 442 of the CCP by Law no. 479 of 16   December 1999 30 .     By Law no. 479 of 16 December 1999, which came into force on 2   January 2000, Parliament reintroduced the possibility, which had previously been denied (see paragraph 34 below), of allowing a defendant liable to a sentence of life imprisonment to opt for the summary procedure. Section   30 provides: Section 30 “The following changes shall be made to Article 442 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: ... (b) in paragraph 2, after the first sentence, the following [second and last sentence] shall be added: ‘Life imprisonment shall be replaced by thirty years’ imprisonment’”.    Decree-Law no. 341 of 24 November 2000 31.     Decree-Law no. 341 of 24 November 2000, which came into force on the same day and was converted into Law no. 4 of 19 January 2001, purported to give an “authentic interpretation” of the second sentence of paragraph   2 of Article   442 of the CCP and added a third sentence. 32 .     Under the chapter entitled “Authentic interpretation of Article   442, paragraph   2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure and provisions regarding the summary procedure in trials for offences punishable by life imprisonment”, section   7 of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 provided: Section 7 “1.     In Article 442, paragraph 2, [second and] last sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the words ‘life imprisonment’ should be taken to mean life imprisonment without daytime isolation. 2.     In Article 442, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following sentence shall be added in fine : ‘Life imprisonment with daytime isolation, in the event of cumulative offences or a continuous offence, shall be replaced by life imprisonment.’” 33.     The relevant parts of the provisions of the CCP governing the summary procedure, as amended by Law no. 479 of 16 December 1999 and by Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000, read as follows: Article 438 “1.     The defendant may request that the case be decided at the preliminary hearing on the basis of the case file as it stands ... 2.     The request may be made, orally or in writing, until such time as the final submissions have been made under Articles 421 and 422. 3.     The wishes of the defendant shall be expressed in person or through the intermediary of a specially instructed representative ( per mezzo di procuratore speciale ). The signature on the instruction shall be authenticated by means of the formalities detailed in Article 583 § 3 [by a notary, another authorised person or counsel for the defence]. 4.     The judge shall give a decision on the request in the order adopting the summary procedure. 5.     The defendant ... may make his or her request subject to the admission of new evidence necessary for the court to reach a decision. The judge shall adopt the summary procedure if the admission of such evidence is necessary for a decision to be reached and is compatible with the aim of economy inherent in the procedure, taking into account the documents already before the court which can be used. In such cases the prosecution may request the admission of rebutting evidence. ... ...” Article 441 “1.     The summary procedure shall follow the provisions laid down concerning preliminary hearings, in so far as they can be applied, with the exception of Articles   422 and 423 [provisions governing the power of the judge to order of his or her own motion the production of crucial evidence and the possibility for the prosecution to amend the charge]. ... 3.     The summary proceedings shall be conducted in private. The judge shall order the proceedings to be conducted at a public hearing if all the defendants so request. ... 5.     Where the judge considers that the case cannot be determined as it stands, he or she shall acquire ( assume ) of his or her own motion the evidence necessary for a decision to be reached. In such cases, Article 423 shall apply. 6.     For the purposes of the production of the evidence [referred to] in paragraph 5 of the present Article and in Article 438 § 5, the arrangements adopted shall be those set forth in Article 422 §§ 2, 3 and 4 [these paragraphs permit the parties to put questions to the witnesses and expert witnesses through the intermediary of the judge and give the defendant the right to ask to be questioned].” Article 442 “1.     Once the arguments have been heard, the judge shall take a decision under the terms of Articles 529 et seq. [these provisions concern discharge, acquittal and conviction]. 1 bis .     The judge’s deliberations shall be based on the documents contained in the file [referred to] in Article 416 § 2 [the file held by the public prosecutor’s office on the steps taken in the preliminary investigation], the documents [indicated] in Article   419 §   3 [relating to the steps in the investigation taken after the defendant was committed for trial] and the evidence adduced at the hearing. 2.     If the defendant is convicted, the sentence imposed by the judge in the light of all the circumstances shall be reduced by one-third. Life imprisonment shall be replaced by thirty years’ imprisonment. Life imprisonment with daytime isolation ... shall be replaced by life imprisonment. 3.     The judgment shall be served on the defendant if he or she was not present. ...” Article 443 “1.     The defendant and the prosecution may not appeal against an acquittal if the purpose of the appeal is to secure a different form [of acquittal]. ... 3.     The prosecution may not lodge an appeal against a conviction unless the judgment alters the legal characterisation of the offence ( il titolo del reato ). 4.     The appeal proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article   599.”       Domestic case-law    Constitutional Court’s case-law      Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 176 of 23 April 1991 34 .     By judgment no. 176 of 23 April 1991, the Constitutional Court struck down the provisions of the CCP under which the summary procedure had been made available to persons accused of crimes punishable by life imprisonment. It found, in particular, that those provisions had gone beyond the powers that Parliament had delegated to the government with a view to the adoption of the new CCP.      Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 210 of 3 July 2013 35 .     Upon referral by the plenary Court of Cassation in case no. 34472 of 10   September 2012 (known as “ Ercolano ”), the Constitutional Court considered the question of the compatibility of section 7 of Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000 (see paragraph 32 above) with the Italian Constitution and the Convention, as interpreted in Scoppola (cited above), with regard in particular to the retrospective effect of that provision in cases where defendants had requested trial under the summary proceedure while Law no.   479 of 1999 had been in force but had been sentenced at a later stage, namely from the afternoon of 24 November 2000, when Decree-Law no.   341 of 2000 had entered into force, and had thus incurred the heavier penalty laid down by that decree. 36.     The Constitutional Court’s judgment proceeded from the assumption of the referring court that the constitutionality question at stake concerned cases identical to that in Scoppola (cited above), that is, cases where the request to be tried under the summary proceedure had been formulated while Law no.   479 of 1999 had been in force. 37.     The relevant parts of that judgment read as follows: “9.     On the merits... ... The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 17 September 2009 in Scoppola v. Italy found that Article 442 § 2 of the CCP amounted to ‘a provision of substantive criminal law concerning the length of the sentence to be imposed in the event of conviction following trial under the summary procedure’ and that, notwithstanding its designation, section 7(1) of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 was not in fact an interpretative provision because ‘Article 442 § 2 of the CCP did not contain any particular ambiguity; it clearly stated that life imprisonment was to be replaced by thirty years’ imprisonment, and made no distinction between life imprisonment with and life imprisonment without daytime isolation’. The Scoppola judgment goes on to add that ‘the Government have not produced any examples of judicial decisions which could be alleged to have been based on conflicting interpretations of Article 442’. The above assessments are also indisputable under national law. ... By its retroactive effect, section 7(1) of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 resulted in life sentences being handed down to defendants to whom the previous version of Article   442 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had applied, under which they should have been sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. In the Scoppola judgment of 17 September 2009, the European Court of Human Rights, departing from its previous settled case-law, held that ‘Article 7 §   1 of the Convention guarantees not only the principle of non-retrospectiveness of more stringent criminal laws but also, and implicitly, the principle of retrospectiveness of the more lenient criminal law’, which was embodied ‘in the rule that where there are differences between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and subsequent criminal laws enacted before a final judgment is rendered, the courts must apply the law whose provisions are most favourable to the defendant’. Within the context of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention, this principle is analogous to that contained in Article 2 § 4 of the Criminal Code, which has been elevated by the Strasbourg Court to the status of a Convention principle. The Court therefore found that section 30 of Law no. 479 of 1999 was a subsequent criminal-law provision prescribing a more lenient penalty and that Article 7 of the Convention therefore required the applicant to be granted the benefit thereof.” 38 .     On those grounds the Constitutional Court found that the question concerning the constitutionality of section 7 of Decree-Law no. 341 of   2000 raised in relation to Article 7 of the Convention was well founded and ruled that section 7(1) of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 was unconstitutional in that its designation as a law of “authentic interpretation” (see paragraph 32 above) had unduly determined its retrospective application to ongoing proceedings. 39 .     At the same time, the Constitutional Court specified that section   7(2) of the Decree-Law, amending Article 442 § 2 of the CCP, was limited to laying down the new rules concerning the summary procedure for crimes punishable by a life sentence, to be applied “in a fully operational manner” ( a regime ) and thus in cases ( fattispecie ) following its entry into force. Consequently, the option of a trial under the summary procedure for defendants liable to life imprisonment (with or without daytime isolation) remained open, but with a different sentencing framework. 40.     Lastly, the Constitutional Court clarified that a review of the enforcement order was the appropriate procedure for obtaining a reduction of sentence in cases where the defendant’s conviction had become final. This concerned, in particular, cases identical to Scoppola (ibid.), namely those in which an applicant had been tried under the summary procedure following a request submitted while Law no. 479 of 1999 had been in force.    Court of Cassation’s case-law      The Court of Cassation’s judgments after Scoppola 41 .     Following the Court’s judgment in Scoppola (cited above), many convicted people serving life sentences sought a review of their enforcement orders, requesting that their penalties be reduced to thirty years’ imprisonment. The domestic courts acting as enforcement judges dismissed those applications; the defendants then appealed on points of law. 42.     The Court of Cassation repeatedly stated that only defendants who had opted for trial under the summary procedure between 2 January 2000 and 24   November 2000 – that is to say, between the entry into force of Law no.   479 of 16 December 1999 and the entry into force of Decree-Law no.   341 of 24   November 2000 – were entitled to a reduction of sentence (see, inter alia , judgments no. 8689 of 2   December 2011, no. 25227 of 10   January   2012, no.   5134 of 11 February 2012, and no. 48329 of 13 November 2012).      The plenary Court of Cassation’s judgment no. 34233 of 19   April 2012 (known as “ Giannone ” ) 43 .     By judgment no. 34233, deposited with the registry on 7   September 2012, the plenary Court of Cassation held that the principles set out in Scoppola (cited above) should be read together with the procedural rules governing the summary procedure. That being so, the date of the submission of the request for trial under the summary procedure was considered to be the decisive element, together with the tempus commissi delicti (that is, the time of the commission of the offence), to establish which law was applicable when determining the relevant sentence. 44 .     According to the Court of Cassation, the issue of the succession of criminal laws examined in Scoppola (cited above) arose exclusively in cases where the defendant had asked to be tried under the summary procedure under the lex mitior – that is, between 2 January 2000 and 24 November 2000 – thus becoming entitled to the more lenient penalty of thirty years’ imprisonment. 45.     More specifically, the Court of Cassation stated that, in the light of Article   7 of the Convention as interpreted in Scoppola (cited above), the principle of the retrospectiveness of the lex mitior guaranteed that the length of the proceedings did not disadvantage the defendant, who might have incurred a heavier penalty than the one imposable if the proceedings had ended earlier. It then considered that the more favourable applicable law had to be identified within a different period from the reference period in trials conducted under the ordinary procedure. Indeed, while in the latter case the reference period ran from the date of the commission of the offence to the date of the final conviction, in trials conducted under the summary procedure the more lenient applicable law had to be identified within the period running from the request for a trial under the summary procedure until the date of the final conviction. It was the Court of Cassation’s view that where, following a defendant’s decision to be tried under the summary procedure, the applicable sentence had been reconsidered and reduced, the time of the commission of the offence could not be taken into account alone as the identification of applicable sentence was strictly linked to the time at which the defendant accessed the summary procedure. 46.     In sum, “it was the date of the request to follow the summary procedure that determined the sanction applicable in relation to the offence committed”. 47.     The court concluded that where a defendant, as in the case at issue, had opted for trial under the summary procedure after the entry into force of section   7 of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000 (which provided that the penalty of thirty years’ imprisonment was to be substituted by life imprisonment without daytime isolation), no breach of the principle of retrospectiveness of the more lenient criminal law occurred and no legitimate expectation of the defendant was frustrated, since during the reference period (from the request for the case to be examined under the summary procedure until the date of the final conviction) the legal system had not provided for the possibility of being sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment.      The plenary Court of Cassation’s judgment no. 18821 of 7   May   2014 (known as “ Ercolano ”) 48 .     Following the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 210 of 2013 (see paragraph 35 above) and in accordance with its previous Giannone judgment (see paragraph 43 above), by judgment no. 18821 of 7 May 2014, the plenary Court of Cassation ruled that enforcement judges had an obligation to reduce life sentences imposed on those who had opted for the summary procedure between 2 January and 24 November 2000, regardless of whether an application had been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. 49 .     The reasoning of the judgment, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “5. ...A request for trial under the summary procedure lodged during the validity of the so-called ‘intermediate law’, namely section 30(1)(b) of Law no. 479 of 1999, relating to crimes punishable by life imprisonment, requires, in the event of conviction, that the more lenient penalty be imposed, despite the fact that, by the end of the trial, the relevant legal framework has been – medio tempore – amended in more severe terms. ... 5.1 In conclusion, with regard to the succession of criminal laws, the principle at hand operated ... between 2 January and 23 November 2000: specifically, during this time frame the defendant must have submitted a request for trial under the summary procedure, a procedural event that gives rise to the more lenient penalty in force at that time, triggering its retrospective application with regard to the date on which the crime was committed and its continued validity even after the entry into force of a subsequent heavier penalty ...” 50 .     Following the Giannone and Ercolano judgments, the Court of Cassation has been consistent in refusing to apply the principles set out in Scoppola (cited above) to persons sentenced to life imprisonment as a result of proceedings which were not identical to those in that case, in that the defendants had not asked to be tried under the summary procedure under Law no.   479 of 1999 or had done so, but had later withdrawn their request (see, inter alia , Court of Cassation, no. 15748 of 21 January 2014, no.   34158 of 1   August 2014, no. 7162 of 21 December 2015, and no.   11916 of 21   November 2018).     COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIALS 51 .     Recommendation no. R (87) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerns the simplification of criminal justice. This recommendation, which relates to summary and simplified procedures, was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17   September 1987. The relevant parts read as follows: “Having regard to the increase in the number of criminal cases referred to the courts, and particularly those carrying minor penalties, and to the problems caused by the length of criminal proceedings; Considering that delay in dealing with crimes brings criminal law into disrepute and affects the proper administration of justice; Considering that delays in the administration of criminal justice might be remedied, not only by the allocation of specific resources and the manner in which these resources are used, but also by a clearer definition of priorities for the conduct of crime policy, with regard to both form and substance, by: ... - making use of the following measures when dealing with minor and mass offences: - so-called summary procedures, - out-of-court settlements by authorities competent in criminal matters and other intervening authorities, as a possible alternative to prosecution, - so-called simplified procedures; - the simplification of ordinary judicial procedures; ... III. Simplification of ordinary judicial procedures a. Judicial investigation prior to and at the trial court hearing ... 4. If there is a preliminary investigation, it should be carried out according to a procedure which excludes all unnecessary formalities and, in particular, avoids the need for a formal hearing of witnesses in cases where the accused does not contest the facts. ...” THE LAW Admissibility 52.     The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.       Merits    Alleged violation of Article 7 of the Convention 53.     The applicant complained that, having been sentenced to life imprisonment, he had been given a heavier sentence than the one prescribed by the law which, of all the laws in force during the period between the commission of the offence and the delivery of the final judgment, had been the most favourable to him. 54.     He argued, in particular, that during the criminal proceedings in his case, the domestic courts had “invented a new criterion”, entailing the need to have requested trial under the summary procedure within the period in which Law no. 479 of 1999 had been in force. Instead, in the applicant’s view, what counted in order to be granted the more favourable sanction was the fact that the offences for which he was being tried had taken place before the more favourable law had come into force. The applicant relied on Article   7 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2.     This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.”      The parties’ submissions    The applicant’s observations 55 .     The applicant relied on the Court’s findings in Scoppola v.   Italy (no.   2) (GC], no. 10249/03, § 113, 17 September 2009) to the effect that Article   442 § 2 of the CCP was a provision of substantive criminal law concerning the length of the sentence to be imposed in the event of conviction following trial under the summary procedure. 56 .     The applicant argued that since he had been tried under the summary procedure, he had been entitled to the more lenient penalty provided for by the law within that procedure (namely thirty years’ imprisonment under Article   442 § 2 of the CCP, as amended by Law no. 479 of 1999; see paragraph   30 above).    The Government’s observations 57 .     The Government emphasised that the applicant’s situation was different from the one examined in Scoppola (cited above). In contrast to the applicant in that case, the applicant in the present case had asked to be tried under the summary procedure at a time when the maximum penalty applicable for cumulative offences within that framework had already been amended from thirty years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment without daytime isolation. In that connection, the Government observed that, in contrast to the applicant in Scoppola (ibid.), the applicant in the present case had not been directly affected by the retrospective application of section   7 of Decree-Law no. 341 of 2000. They also pointed out that, in Scoppola (ibid.), the Court had concluded that Article 7 of the Convention had been violated in respect of those defendants, such as the applicant in that case, who had made their request for trial under the summary procedure before 24   November 2000. 58 .     As regards the principles applicable to the succession of criminal laws, they pointed out that a distinction should be drawn between two types of provisions: those directly regulating the applicable penalty for each offence and those relating to special procedures (such as the summary procedure), which could only possibly have an indirect effect on the sentence. In cases concerning the second type of provision, the defendant entered into an agreement with the State, as part of his or her defence strategy; consequently, the date on which such agreement had been reached was decisive in establishing the applicable penalty that the defendant risked incurring, in accordance with the principles established by the Court of Cassation in Giannone (see paragraph 43 above). 59.     In sum, the time frame for identifying the most favourable provision under the criminal law ran from the date of the request for trial under the summary procedure until the date of the conviction. 60.     Therefore, the Government contested that any retroactive application of the criminal law to the applicant’s detriment had taken place in his case.      The Court’s assessment    General principles 61 .     The Court reiterates that the guarantee enshrined in Article   7, which is an essential element of the rule of law, occupies a prominent place in the Convention system of protection, as is underlined by the fact that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 even in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. It should be construed and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment (see Del Río Prada v.   Spain [GC], no.   42750/09, §   77, ECHR   2013; Vasiliauskas v.   Lithuania [GC], no.   35343/05, §   153, ECHR   2015; and Ilnseher v.