CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 12 décembre 2024

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text-align:justify } .s7B8C052 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:21.85pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s43F57E2F { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:21.85pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } FIRST SECTION CASE OF ADAMČO v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2) (Applications nos. 55792/20, 35253/21 and 41955/22)   JUDGMENT   Art 3 (substantive) • Degrading treatment • Absence of convincing security needs for systematically subjecting a prisoner to thorough strip searches (TSS) for an extensive period of time and despite a complex set of other security arrangements • No attention paid to the applicant’s behaviour throughout the service of his prison sentence • Relevant legal provisions prescribing a TSS in certain types of situations applied without any discretion to consider the particular circumstances • Likely aggravation of any possible feeling of the applicant of being the victim of arbitrary measures by the rejection of any remedy he used without individual consideration of his substantive arguments • Combination of effects resulting in excessive humiliation Art 8 • Private life and correspondence • Inspection of the applicant’s documents, including to some extent their content, on the occasion of consultations with his lawyers in prison • No reasonable cause shown to exist suggesting the documents contained an unlawful element or any other abuse in the privileged channel of communication with his lawyers • Absence of appropriate safeguards • Interference not shown to pursue any “pressing social need” and thus not “necessary in a democratic society”   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 12 December 2024   FINAL   12/03/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Adamčo v. Slovakia (no. 2), The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Alena Poláčková,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Georgios A. Serghides,   Raffaele Sabato,   Alain Chablais,   Artūrs Kučs , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos. 55792/20, 35253/21 and 41955/22) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Branislav Adamčo (“the applicant”), on 15 December 2020, 1 July 2021 and 24 August 2022, respectively; the decisions to give notice to the Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention in connection with the strip searches of the applicant, the examination of the contents of his personal documents and his being restrained during a break in a court hearing, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 19 November 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1 .     The case mainly concerns a specific form of body search carried out on the applicant as a person serving a prison sentence at the “maximum guarding level” ( maximálny stupeň stráženia ). Known as a “thorough strip search” ( dôkladná osobná prehliadka – “TSS” or, in the plural, “TSSs”), this generally consists of the subject of the search stripping naked, performing a squat, and being “visually searched” and it is carried out, inter alia , in connection with receiving “open visits” (including from his or her lawyers), taking part in investigative measures outside of the prison and being transferred to court hearings and between prisons. 2 .     In addition, the case also concerns certain individual incidents when the applicant’s personal documents were inspected on the occasion of his conferring with his lawyers, and an one-off incident when, during a break in a court hearing, the applicant was refused to have one of his hands released from a special restraining device in order for him to be able to use the toilet. This device consists of handcuffs and leg-cuffs, which are connected by a chain that is attached to a belt (an “SRD”). 3.     The case raises issues under Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention. THE FACTS 4.     The applicant, born in 1978, is detained in Leopoldov and was represented by Mr M. Kuzma, a lawyer practising in Košice. 5.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová. 6.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. THE APPLICANT’S DETENTION AND SEARCHES 7.     In connection with his prosecutions and convictions for violent offences related to organised crime (see, for example, Adamčo v. Slovakia , no.   45084/14, 12 November 2019, and Potoczká and Adamčo v. Slovakia , no.   7286/16, 12 January 2023), the applicant has been continuously deprived of his liberty since 24 August 2006; he is presently serving a sentence of twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The principal part of his detention took place in Leopoldov Prison, but he was also incarcerated in other detention facilities. 8 .     In serving his sentence, the applicant has been obliged to submit to those restrictions on his human rights and fundamental freedoms that are inherent in that sentence (section 4(1) of the Execution of Prison Sentences Act (Law no. 475/2005 Coll., as amended – “the EPSA”). This entailed having to submit to a search of his person and of his personal belongings (section 39(h) of the EPSA Act) under the terms specified in section 13b of the Prison and Court Guard Service Act (Law no. 4/2001 Coll., as amended – “the PCGSA”). 9 .     With effect from 15 March 2018, the PCGSA was amended (by Law no. 50/2018 Coll.) so as to define a TSS as constituting a specific form of search of a person. 10 .     The explanatory report ( dôvodová správa ) regarding the relevant part of the amendment specified that the law in force until then had not clearly defined a uniform manner in which the TSS was to be carried out, and under what conditions; moreover, the report stated that the amendment was to contribute to the safeguarding of the rights of detained persons. Further details as to when and how a TSS is to be carried out are provided in Order of the Minister of Justice no. 2/2014 on the ensuring of protection by the Prison and Court Guard Service (“the 2014 Order”), as in force since 1   January 2017. 11 .     Among other instances, a TSS was carried out on the applicant (i)   twice on 5 February 2018, and several TSSs were carried out on him (ii)   between 22 January and 7 February 2019 and (iii) between 14 and 20   March 2019 and (iv) on 22 July 2021, as specified in more detail below. 12 .     In the absence of specific records regarding of the total number of TSSs carried out on the applicant throughout his detention, the parties provided the following data as to the numbers of the situations that had arisen in the applicant’s case in which a TSS had been prescribed by law (see paragraph 1 above). 13 .     According to the Government, since 2008 the applicant had received forty-three open visits (the records concerning visits received in the preceding period being inconclusive). The applicant did not dispute that number, and pointed out that a TSS had been carried out prior to and after each of those visits. The Government also submitted that records concerning the applicant’s participation in investigative measures were incomplete. According to the information received from the prisons involved, he had taken part in such measures on 1,077 occasions, while other records indicated that his presence at such measures had been requested 1,152 times. However, pointing to the statements given by the authorities of the prisons in question and the applicant’s own submissions, the Government argued that a TSS had not necessarily been carried out on each of these occasions. The applicant for his part argued that the number of investigative measures in which he had taken part had been greater but that, in absolute figures, the difference was not decisive. The parties were in agreement in that the applicant had been transferred between prisons 198 times, the applicant adding that a TSS would be carried out both prior to and after each of such transfers. The applicant submitted that, moreover, he had also been escorted to court hearings on 180 occasions; he added that, by law, a TSS had had to be carried out before each such escort. 14 .     In more general terms, the applicant pointed out that, in addition to the above-mentioned instances, “regular” TSSs had been carried out (see paragraph 41 below) and that, if those “regular” TSSs were included, he had undoubtedly been submitted to a TSS more than two thousand times. In that regard, the Government objected that such “regular” TSSs were outside the scope of the present case. 15 .     The searches referred to under items (ii) and (iii) (see paragraph 11 above) were prompted by the applicant’s meeting his lawyers; on those occasions, documents containing his notes for and notes from his lawyers were also inspected. REMEDIES USED IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANT’S SEARCHES 16 .     The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the above-noted specific instances of a TSS in complaints lodged by him with the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) on 12 February 2018 (concerning the incident referred to under item (i) above), 11 February 2019 (concerning the incidents between January and February 2019 referred to under items (ii) and (iii) above) and 26   July 2021 (concerning the incident referred to under item (iv) above). After those complaints were dismissed, he pursued his case by means of lodging repeated complaints under section 36(1) of the Public Prosecution Service Act (Law no. 153/2001 Coll., as amended) and repeated complaints under section 36(2) of that Act. 17 .     The applicant’s arguments may be summarised as follows. He had been subjected to a TSS on countless occasions over a period of twelve years and nothing illicit had ever been found on him. On the occasion of his transfer between two prisons on 5 February 2018, he had at all times been blindfolded and restrained by handcuffs and leg-cuffs, and had had to wear soundproof earmuffs, in addition to which he had been under visual surveillance by several guards. TSSs undertaken both prior to and after the transfer had, in the circumstances, neither served any legitimate aim nor been necessary. Moreover, the legal definition of a TSS in section 41 of the 2014 Order was flawed in that it made no reference to the person being searched having to perform a squat. With regard to his having been subjected to a TSS both prior to and after receiving visits from his lawyers and having his legal documents inspected on fourteen such occasions between January and March 2019, the applicant argued that a consultation with a lawyer was not to be treated as an ordinary visit for the purposes of the provisions on TSS (section 41(1)(j) of the 2014 Order and section 24 of the EPSA), since contact with lawyers was subject to special rules under section 38 of the EPSA. Moreover, as regards inspections of his documents, the applicant also relied on the Court’s judgment in the case of Laurent v. France (no. 28798/13, 24 May 2018). In connection with the TSSs to which he had been subjected both before and after attending a court hearing on 22 July 2021, the applicant argued that preventive and restrictive measures had been applied to him routinely, and without any individualised consideration of any security risks. This had been unjustified, and contrary to the observations and recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (“the CPT”) in its report on its visit to Slovakia in 2018. The disproportionality of being subjected to a TSS both before and after the court hearing was exacerbated by the fact that throughout the entire time between the two searches, he had been constantly under the visual surveillance of five guards. 18 .     The reasoning of the PPS for dismissing the applicant’s complaints and repeated complaints may be summarised as follows. Submitting the applicant to a TSS on 5 February 2018 had had its basis in section 41(1)(c) of the 2014 Order, and it made no difference that a TSS had been carried out twice. Having to perform a single squat in the circumstances had not constituted harassment and had simply constituted a means of achieving the purpose of the search, which had been purely preventive and security-related and had taken into account the individual circumstances of the person searched. With regard to the searches of the applicant’s person and the inspections of his documents between 22 January and 8 February 2019 and between 14   and 20 March 2019, the PPS referred to the powers of the prison administration under section 13b(1), (2) and (6) of the PCGSA (see paragraphs 36-38 below) and section 41(1) and (2) of the 2014 Order (see paragraphs 39 and 40 below). As to the justification for the TSSs conducted in connection with an inmate’s contact with his or her lawyer, it was unimportant whether the contact was seen as a “visit”; the relevant criterion was whether that contact had been direct or indirect. As to the searches of the applicant on 22 July 2021, the PPS referred to section 41(c) and (f) of the 2014 Order, which provided that a prisoner should be subjected to a TSS prior to a transfer between prison facilities and in response to any concern that the prisoner was carrying illicit objects. In that regard, the PPS opined that such a concern “needed no support in any circumstance” and referred to the position taken by the prison administration that “during the court hearing [the applicant] had been placed near a civilian person”, with a reference being made to “[the applicant’s] person in correlation with the sentence [imposed on him]”. In sum, in the application of the pertaining rules, no shortcomings had been established. 19 .     The applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaints, in which he reiterated his arguments, were declared inadmissible by decisions of 23   February 2021, case no. IV. US 79/21 (concerning item (i) above), 7 July 2020, case no. II. US 312/2020 (concerning items (ii) and (iii) above), and 22   June 2022, case no. IV. US 343/22 (concerning item (iv) above). 20 .     The Constitutional Court’s reasoning may be summarised as follows. Under the principle of subsidiarity, the Constitutional Court had no direct jurisdiction in respect of any actions or omissions on the part of a prison administration and the district and regional levels of the PPS. Accordingly, its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing how the highest level of the PPS (the Office of the Prosecutor General) had dealt with the applicant’s complaints concerning the prison administration and the lower levels of the PPS. In that regard, the Office of the Prosecutor General had properly exercised its duties, and its conclusions had not been arbitrary or extremely illogical and had not missed the essence of the case. The fact that no illicit objects had ever been found on the applicant was of no consequence, since any past behaviour provided no guarantee as regards future behaviour. The complaints were accordingly manifestly ill ‑ founded. USE OF AN SRD ON THE APPLICANT ON 22 JULY 2021 AND REMEDIES APPLIED IN THAT RESPECT 21 .     As alluded to above, on 22 July 2021 the applicant was escorted from Košice Prison to the Košice District Court in order to attend a hearing. For the purposes of the transfer, he was restrained by an SRD (see paragraph 2 above) and at all times guarded by five guards. 22.     It is undisputed that, at the opening of the hearing, the presiding judge asked the applicant’s escort whether there were any security-related grounds preventing that his hands be released. As there were none, his hands were freed until a break in the hearing, when they were secured again, and the applicant was shown to a waiting room for detained persons ( eskortná miestnosť ) that was furnished with metal bars. 23.     During the break, the applicant requested that one of his hands be released in order that he could use the toilet for urinating. As this request was refused, he did not use the toilet. 24 .     At the conclusion of the break, the applicant was again brought to the courtroom for the continuation of the hearing and his hands were again released, in application of the same procedure as that described above. 25 .     In his complaint to the PPS of 26 July 2021 and in his subsequent repeated complaints (see paragraph 16 above), the applicant also argued that his not having his hand released and accordingly not being able to use the toilet, as specified above, could not have had any acceptable justification, as there had never been anything illicit found on him; moreover, throughout the day he had at all times been under the surveillance of his guards, and the incident had taken place in the fully secured space of the courthouse. The impugned treatment had been degrading and had impaired his ability to concentrate during the subsequent court proceedings. It had been absurd for his hands to remain released during the hearing but not during the break. Except for referring him to the applicable legal provisions, the PPS had in fact given no grounds for dismissing his complaints. 26 .     In dismissing his complaints and repeated complaints, the PPS referred to the applicable legal provisions – in particular section 31(1)(c) of the PCGSA and section 52(2), (3), (4) and (6) of the 2014 Order – and found that no shortcomings had been established in the application thereof. In a letter of 6 October 2021, the Košice Regional Office of the PPS added that the PPS was not the author of the given rules, and its task was to implement them, but “certainly not to provide any explanatory argumentation”. 27 .     In his complaint to the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 19 above), the applicant reiterated his arguments. In dismissing his complaint, the Constitutional Court referred to the reasoning given by the PPS and observed that the use of restraining measures on the applicant had been justified on several of the relevant statutory grounds – particularly in view of the gravity of his offences and his physical capacity. OTHER FACTS RELIED ON BY THE PARTIES 28 .     Together with his observations, the applicant submitted a copy of an instruction issued in 2012 by the governor of Košice Prison regarding measures to be taken with regard to the applicant’s detention in that prison pursuant to which, inter alia , “special attention [was to be paid] to the monitoring of his correspondence, with a focus on prohibited information and also when carrying out any [other] business.” 29 .     In their observations, the Government pointed out that, while serving his sentence, in 2009, 2012 and 2013 the applicant had committed three disciplinary offences. In response, the applicant explained that the sanctions imposed for these offences had been expunged ( zahladnie disciplinárneho trestu ) and that, by law, they were thus to be seen as having never been imposed. 30 .     The Government also referred to an overview of various incidents noted by the prison administration as having taken place between 2017 and 2023 in the prisons in Slovakia concerning illicit objects and substances that had been found on or used by inmates. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE JURISDICTION OF THE ORDINARY COURTS IN CONTENTIOUS MATTERS, ACTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTION 31.     The relevant legal provisions are laid out in Maslák v. Slovakia (no.   2) (no. 38321/17, §§ 78, 79, 81 and 82, 31 March 2022). PRACTICE OF THE ORDINARY COURTS AS REGARDS ACTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INTEGRITY REFERRED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT 32 .     Without providing the texts thereof, the Government referred to decisions issued by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 23 August and 27   September 2018 and 12 June 2019 regarding appeals lodged in respect of unrelated cases nos. 14Co 132/18, 16Co 38/18 and 13Co 270/18. In the Government’s submission, by those decisions the Regional Court had quashed first-instance decisions discontinuing proceedings in respect of actions seeking the protection of personal integrity and had held that it was the task of the first-instance court to re-examine them. In so far as can be established, the actions in question had been brought by inmates or former inmates against the prisons (and their governors) where they were serving or had served sentences; they had brought those actions in connection with matters such as their alleged entitlement to use a notebook computer, to make telephone calls and to receive visits. In the Government’s submission, the Regional Court had held that, in so far as the plaintiffs had argued that actions or omissions on the part of the defendants had given rise to private claims linked to the protection of the plaintiffs’ personal integrity, it behoved the courts to examine whether such claims had been made out. 33.     In response, the applicant clarified the further development and outcome of the proceedings in respect of the said actions as follows: Upon the delivery of the above-mentioned decision of 23 August 2018, the respective action had been discontinued with final effect, as the plaintiff had failed to pay the court fees. After the decision of 27 September 2018, the given action had been dismissed as unfounded (by a final decision given by the Regional Court on 27 October 2021). Referring to a Constitutional Court’s ruling of 3 May 2017 in an unrelated case no. I. US 226/17, the Regional Court noted, inter alia , that special legislation governing prison-related matters provided for the possibility to pursue a remedy in respect of such matters before the PPS. Following the above-mentioned decision of 12 June 2019, the action in question had been dismissed by the Banská Bystrica District Court with final effect. The court’s decision had referred to established judicial practice according to which an interference with personal integrity stemming from the ordinary exercise of official powers in criminal or other similar official proceedings could not be considered to be unjustified. If a decision constituting an interference with personal integrity was quashed, compensation claims resulting from that decision were to be pursued under the State Liability Act. STATUTORY RULES CONCERNING SEARCHES AND THE USE OF RESTRAINING DEVICES IN PRISONS 34 .     During the execution of a prison sentence, inmates are obliged to submit to restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms, the exercise of which either would be contrary to the purpose of the sentence, or may not be exercised while the sentence is being executed (section 4(1) of the EPSA). 35 .     Under section 39(b) and (h) of the EPSA, a convicted inmate is obliged to follow instructions and orders given by officers and employees of the Prison and Court Guard Service (“the PCGS”) and to submit to a search of his or her person and a search of his or her personal belongings. 36 .     The PSGSA entered into force on 1 February 2001. Its section 13b(1) and (2) (see paragraph 8 above) gives officers of the PCGS the power to carry out a search of the person and personal belongings of inmates, such a search being considered to be a preventive security-related measure serving, inter   alia , to prevent inmates from producing and holding illicit objects and substances. Subsection 3 provides that such a search must not pursue objectives other than the purpose of the sentence or detention and of protecting persons, premises of the PCGS or good order on such premises. 37 .     A search of the person of an inmate is to be carried out by a guard of the same sex; hygiene rules must be respected and the human dignity of the searched person must not be degraded (section 13b(4)). 38 .     With effect from 15 March 2018 a new provision (subsection 6) was added to section 13b of the PCGSA, setting out that a TSS consists of the inmate in question having to strip down to his or her underwear and an officer of the PCGS carrying out a search of, inter alia , the buccal cavity, armpits, palms and soles. Once the inmate has stripped naked, the officer is to carry out a visual check of his or her body. 39 .     Under the 2014 Order (see paragraph 10 above), as applicable from 1   January 2017, a TSS is to be carried out, inter alia: before and after the direct escorting of the inmate in question (section 41(1)(c)); before and after the inmate is escorted for the purposes of proceedings before a court or the PPS (section 41(1)(e)); when there is a concern that the inmate may be holding illicit objects (section 41(1)(f)); and prior to and after open visits (section 41(1)(j)). 40 .     Section 41(2) of the Order, as in force since 1 January 2017, provides TSS procedures that are similar to those set out in the PCGSA (see paragraph   38 above). In addition, it provides that a TSS is to be carried out in a designated area and normally performed on one person at a time. A visual check shall be undertaken to establish any injuries or concealed items. 41.     In addition to the searches referred to above, the 2014 Order also prescribes a regular TSS six times per calendar year (sections 36(1) and   37(4)). 42 .     Under section 25(3)(a) of the EPSA, an inmate’s correspondence with his or her defence counsel is exempted from inspection. 43 .     Under section 31(1) (b)-(f) of the PCGSA, the following coercive measures may be applied to prevent or pre-empt inmates engaging in unlawful actions: escort shackles ( predvádzacie retiazky ), binding shackles ( spútavacie retiazky ), handcuffs ( putá ), binding belts ( spútavací opasok ) and binding straps ( spútavacie popruhy ). In the context of escorting an inmate, these measures may even be applied pre-emptively; their use must be approved by a decision by the prison governor (section 31(2)). Under section   52(2) of the 2014 Order, when taking such a decision, regard is to be had to: the gravity of the offences committed by the inmate; his or her physical fitness, level of dangerousness, behaviour and state of health; and any intelligence held by the prison’s Service for Prevention and Security. CPT REPORT ON ITS VISIT TO SLOVAKIA FROM 19 UNTIL 28   MARCH 2018 (SENT TO THE SLOVAK AUTHORITIES ON 19   DECEMBER 2018) CPT/INF (2019) 20 44 .     The relevant part of the report provides: “51.     ... Further, the Committee recommends that appropriate steps be taken to: ... -   abolish the practice of using devices on prisoners to block their vision and hearing while they are being transported from one location to another; -   abolish the resort to multiple strip-searches of prisoners being transported from the prison. Reference is also made in this respect to the recommendation in paragraph 92. ... 92.     Strip-searching of prisoners was still a frequent occurrence in all the prisons visited. For instance, at Banská Bystrica Prison, inmates were routinely obliged to strip naked and perform a squat before and after every contact visit and whenever leaving/returning to the prison (e.g. to appear before a court). The CPT must recall that a strip-search is a very invasive – and potentially degrading – measure. Therefore, resort to strip-searches should be based on an individual risk assessment. In order to minimise embarrassment, prisoners who are searched should not normally be required to remove all their clothes at the same time, e.g. a person should be allowed to remove clothing above the waist and to get dressed before removing further clothing. The Committee reiterates its recommendation that the Slovak authorities ensure that these precepts are effectively implemented in all Slovak prisons.” EUROPEAN PRISON RULES 45.     The recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States of the Council of Europe on the European Prison Rules (Rec (2006)2-rev, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd   meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies and revised and amended by the Committee of Ministers on 1 July 2020 at the 1380 th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Legal advice 23.1   All prisoners are entitled to legal advice, and the prison authorities shall provide them with reasonable facilities for gaining access to such advice. 23.2   Prisoners may consult on any legal matter with a legal adviser of their own choice and at their own expense. 23.3   Where there is a recognised scheme of free legal aid, the authorities shall bring it to the attention of all prisoners. 23.4   Consultations and other communications, including correspondence about legal matters between prisoners and their legal advisers, shall be confidential. 23.5   A judicial authority may, in exceptional circumstances, authorise restrictions on such confidentiality to prevent serious crime or major breaches of prison safety and security. 23.6   Prisoners shall have access to, or be allowed to keep in their possession, documents relating to their legal proceedings.” THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 46.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment (Rule   42 § 1 of the Rules of Court). THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS The parties’ submissions 47 .     The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies by asserting his claims by means of bringing an action for the protection of personal integrity, in respect of which they referred to more recent judicial practice (see paragraph 32 above). Under the same rule, they argued that it was only open to the applicant to complain before the Court of instances of a TSS which he had challenged before the domestic authorities (all having taken place in Košice Prison). In so far as he had raised in his complaint before the Constitutional Court – which had resulted in its judgment of 7 July 2020 (see paragraph 19 above) that, on occasions when he had seen two of his lawyers separately in one day, he had been subjected to a TSS four times within a short space of time – this was incompatible with the exhaustion rule, since no such argument had been raised before the prison authorities and the PPS, and the Constitutional Court was not a court that examined questions of fact. 48.     Lastly, the Government argued that any instances of a TSS that had occurred prior to those complained of before the domestic authorities (see paragraph 11 above) were, moreover, outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. 49.     The applicant replied by contending that he had exhausted the prescribed remedies and that not even the Constitutional Court had referred him to any others. In particular, with reference to the ultimate outcome (see paragraph 33 above) of the very cases referred to by the Government, an action for the protection of personal integrity did not constitute an effective remedy in the circumstances of his case. 50.     The applicant also argued that it was unrealistic to complain individually of every single instance of a TSS and that in any case – in view of the findings of the CPT in its report on the 2018 periodic visit of Slovakia – the outcome of such complaints would have been the same. The Court’s assessment Action for the protection of personal integrity, and the scope of the applicant’s constitutional complaint resulting in the decision of 7 July 2020 51 .     At the outset, the Court refers to the general principles regarding the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection)   [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014; and Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no.   21881/20, §§ 138-145, 27 November 2023). 52.     As to the first part of the Government’s objections under that provision, the Court notes that in its judgment in the case of Maslák v.   Slovakia (no. 2) (no. 38321/17, §§ 118-26, 31 March 2022) it extensively examined and rejected the effectiveness of an action for the protection of personal integrity as a remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in similar circumstances. In view of the final outcomes (see paragraph 33 above) of the other cases referred to by the Government (see paragraph 32 above), their argument is undermined rather than strengthened. 53.     In addition, the Court reiterates that where there is a choice of remedies, the exhaustion requirement must be applied to reflect the practical realities of the applicant’s position, so as to ensure the effective protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Moreover, an applicant who has used a remedy that is apparently effective and sufficient cannot be required also to have tried others that were available but probably no more likely to be successful (see, for example, M.B. and Others v.   Slovakia , no. 45322/17, § 52, 1 April 2021). 54.     On the facts, the applicant made use of a set of remedies available to him under special legislation, up to the level of the Constitutional Court (see Maslák (no. 2) , cited above, §§ 75, 83, 90, 92 and 115). Being the supreme authority in Slovakia in charge of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms the jurisdiction of which is subject to the principle of subsidiarity (see M.B. and Others , cited above, § 54, with further references), the Constitutional Court did not criticise the applicant for not having exhausted the remedy now advocated by the Government prior to turning to the Constitutional Court. 55.     Furthermore, as to the Government’s objection concerning the applicant raising complaints before the Constitutional Court without first raising them before the prison authorities and the PPS (see paragraph 47 above), the Court notes that in its decision of 7 July 2020 (see paragraph 19 above) the applicant’s constitutional complaint was rejected as a whole without any reference to the admissibility rule of exhaustion of ordinary remedies. 56.     The Government’s objection of non-exhaustion concerning the applicant’s failure to bring an action for the protection of personal integrity and the scope of his complaints to the prison authorities and the PPS prior to his bringing such complaints to the Constitutional Court must accordingly be dismissed. Continuing situation and its implications for admissibility under Article   35 § 1 of the Convention 57.     What remains to be examined are the questions of whether the applicant was required (for the purposes of exhausting domestic remedies) to complain at the domestic level of other individual instances of a TSS being performed on his person than those of which he did complain and, if not, whether his complaint of such other individual instances of a TSS being performed on his person was lodged with the Court in time. 58.     In that regard, the Court reiterates that the concept of a “continuing situation” refers to a state of affairs in which there are continuous activities by or on the part of the State which render the applicant a victim. Complaints which have as their source specific events that occurred on identifiable dates cannot be construed as referring to a continuing situation. However, in the event of a repetition of the same events, such as an applicant’s transport between the remand prison and the courthouse, even though the applicant was transported on specific days rather than continuously, the absence of any marked variation in the conditions of transport to which he had been routinely subjected created, in the Court’s view, a “continuing situation” which brought the entire period complained of within the Court’s competence. Similarly, in a situation where the applicant’s detention in the police ward was not continuous but occurred at regular intervals when he was brought there for an   interview with the investigator or other procedural acts, the Court accepted that in the absence of any material change in the conditions of his detention, the breaking-up of his detention into several periods was not justified. In another case, the applicant’s absence from the detention facility for carrying out a certain procedural act did not prevent the Court from recognising the continuous nature of his detention in that facility ( see Fetisov and Others v.   Russia , nos. 43710/07 and 5 others, § 75, 17 January 2012, with further references). The same was true where applicants in custody were routinely confined in a metal cage in the courtroom each time they are brought from their detention facility to the courthouse for examination of their case (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 86, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), where there were particular conditions for visits in prison ( see Chaldayev v. Russia , no. 33172/16, §§ 45-57, 28 May 2019) and where life prisoners were systematically handcuffed every time they left their cells ( see Shlykov and Others v. Russia , nos. 78638/11 and 3 others, § 78, 19   January 2021). 59.     In the present case, the applicant complained before the domestic authorities of specific instances of a TSS having been carried out on him on 5 February 2018, between 22 January and 7 February 2019, between 14 and 20 March 2019, and on 22 July 2021. In that regard, he argued, inter alia , that such searches had been carried out on him countless times over a period of twelve years in the past and that preventive and restrictive measures were applied to him routinely without any individualised consideration of any security risks (see paragraphs 11, 16 and 17 above). His complaints were rejected with reference to the applicable rules and the conclusion that no shortcomings in their application had been established (see paragraph 18 above). 60 .     The rules in question, as unified with effect from 1 January 2017, define instances such as those complained of by the applicant in which a TSS is to be carried out (see paragraph 39 above). On the basis of the wording of the rules, and also in view of how they were interpreted by the authorities in the present case, it appears that they provide no specific room for discretion in their application. In the Court’s view, this has to be seen in the light of the findings of the CPT in its most recent report in respect of Slovakia to the effect that the strip-searching of prisoners was still a frequent occurrence in all the prisons visited (see paragraph 92 of the report cited in paragraph 44 above) and the fact that, although the exact number of the instances in which the applicant has been subjected to a TSS cannot be established, there is no doubt that throughout his detention he has been subjected to it frequently (see paragraphs 12 et seq. above). 61.     There has accordingly been a lasting practice of subjecting the applicant to a TSS in a manner showing no variation. 62.     In these circumstances, the Court accepts that carrying out a TSS on the applicant under the pertaining rules constituted a “continuing situation” in terms of its case-law. In view of the outcome of his complaints with regard to four specific instances of a TSS being conducted of his person, it would be excessively formalistic to demand of him that he denounce each and every further instance of a TSS for as long as this situation persists (see Shlykov and Others , cited above, § 62). 63.     In sum, the applicant was not required for the purposes of the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to complain at the domestic level of all other instances of a TSS carried out on his person, and his applications to the Court cannot be rejected as being belated under the provisions of that Article. 64.     The Government’s remaining preliminary objections must accordingly be dismissed. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 65.     The applicant complained that subjecting him routinely to a TSS and refusing to release one of his hands from the SRD on 22 July 2021 had amounted to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Admissibility Thorough strip searches 66.     The Court finds that the complaint is neither manifestly ill ‑ founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Special restraining device 67.     The applicant complained that the refusal to release one of his hands from the SRD during a break in a court hearing on 22 July 2021 in order that he could use the toilet had been arbitrary. The Government’s arguments to the contrary had been merely general and abstract. Since 2006 he had attended countless court hearings at which his hands had always been released, and this had never led to any security incidents. On other similar occasions his guards would release one of his hands and then be present when he used the toilet, which was less disturbing to him than not being able to use the toilet at all. Not having been able to do so on 22 July 2021 had tormented him and had curtailed his ability fully to concentrate in the subsequent stage of his hearing. 68.     The Government argued that the contested use of the SRD had been in accordance with the law (the PCGSA and the 2014 Order) and that it had responded to the situation of the applicant who had been serving a long prison sentence for violent offences under a maximum ‑ security regime, and who had been physically capable. Releasing his hands during court hearings had been subject to the decision of a judge, while outside of the hearings the decision had rested with PCGS. If his hands had been released for the purposes of using the toilet, officers would have had to be present during its use, and that would have constituted an even more invasive interference with the applicant’s privacy. 69.     The Court for its part notes that, rather than being concerned with the use of that SRD as such, the applicant’s complaint appears to concern the fact that, on a single occasion, he was not able to use the toilet because of it. No use of force was involved, and the applicant did not allege that he had been suffering from any health problems on the day of the incident. Moreover, there is no indication that the contested measure aimed to debase or humiliate the applicant or that it produced any severe physical or mental effects on hi