CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 février 2025

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text-align:center } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s2F3EB0E4 { border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sE1A7A04C { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#424242 } .s598389F9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt } .sBAADFE8C { border:0.75pt solid #838383; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } FIFTH SECTION CASE OF DENYSYUK AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE (Applications nos. 22790/19 and 3 others – see appended list)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Correspondence • Covert audio and video monitoring of the first applicant and interception of the second and third applicants’ telephone communications in the context of police operations carried out during criminal proceedings against them • Applicants’ denied access to judicial decisions authorising impugned measures • Court lacking access to those decisions and thus unable to conclude they were authorised as a result of proper and detailed judicial scrutiny • Lack of sufficient safeguards to ensure implementation of covert investigative measures • Applicants’ communications with their lawyers not sufficiently protected by specific and detailed rules and procedures defining their identification and handling in the event of accidental interception • No independent oversight authority with sufficient competence to protect the applicants from abuse or mistakes by the law-enforcement officers • Lack of an effective domestic procedure for the determination of the core of their Art   8 complaints in good time • Interference not in “accordance with the law” Art 8 • Private life • Correspondence • Structural deficiencies in the domestic legal framework protecting the confidentiality of lawyers’ telephone communications with clients subject to telephone tapping • Art   34 • Victim • Fourth applicant, a lawyer, standing regardless of whether any of his actual telephone communications with his clients were intercepted Art 38 • Non-compliance with State obligation to furnish all necessary facilities   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 13 February 2025   FINAL   13/05/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mattias Guyomar , President ,   María Elósegui,   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,   Gilberto Felici,   Andreas Zünd,   Diana Sârcu,   Mykola Gnatovskyy , judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   22790/19, 23896/20, 25803/20, and 31352/20) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Ukrainian nationals, whose personal details are set out in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table; the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government represented, most recently, by their Agent, Ms   M.   Sokorenko (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article   8 (all applications) and Article   13 of the Convention (applications nos.   23896/20, 25803/20 and 31352/20) and to declare inadmissible the remainder of applications nos.   22790/19 and 23896/20; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 21 January 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applications concern the alleged incompatibility of covert investigative measures ( негласні слідчі (розшукові) дії ) with the applicants’ rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, having regard, in particular, to the alleged lack of adequate safeguards in the applicable law and the practical means of implementing it in their respective cases. They also concern the availability of domestic remedies, within the meaning of Article   13 of the Convention, for the applicants’ complaints raised under Article 8 (applications nos.   23896/20, 25803/20 and 31352/20). THE FACTS Application no.   22790/19 (Mr   Denysyuk) 2.     The first applicant, Mr   Stanislav Fedorovych Denysyuk, was born in 1958 and lives in Kharkiv. 3.     On 24 May 2017 A.M., a prosecutor from the Prosecutor General’s Office, issued the applicant with a written notification of suspicion ( повідомлення про підозру ), accusing him of participating in a large-scale corruption scheme and abusing his authority as the former head of a regional tax authority. 4.     On the same date the applicant was arrested and subsequently remanded in custody until 22 May 2018. 5.     On 14 March 2018 O.Y., another prosecutor from the Prosecutor General’s Office, informed the applicant that the pre-trial investigation in his case and that of twenty-five other defendants had been completed and that he could familiarise himself with the prosecution’s case file. 6 .     On 8 October 2018 the applicant received a letter from O.Y. dated 28   September 2018, which stated as follows: “In accordance with the requirements of Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, you are notified that in the course of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case ... in which you are a defendant, your constitutional rights were temporarily restricted by means of a covert surveillance measure provided for in Article   270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No information that could be used as evidence was obtained during the execution of that measure.” 7.     On 4 and 10 December 2018 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, requested O.Y. to clarify what covert measure had been applied to him, what information had been collected, when the measure had been discontinued and whether it had involved the interception of his communications with his legal counsel. 8.     By letters dated 6 and 11 December 2018 O.Y. notified the applicant that he had been subject to local audio and video monitoring, and that the material obtained in the course of that monitoring had been destroyed as it had had no evidential value. He further stated that Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure required law-enforcement authorities to notify individuals that they had been subject to covert surveillance within twelve months of the discontinuation of the measure in question. According to the applicant, he never received the originals of these letters and copies were only handed to him in spring 2019, after he had complained in court about the prosecuting authority’s failure to deal with his request for information. 9.     On 14 March 2019 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, further requested the Kyiv Court of Appeal to provide him with information concerning the scope, duration and other details of the judicial authorisation for the covert measure concerning him. 10.     On 18 March 2019 the President of the Kyiv Court of Appeal informed the applicant that the court was unable to provide the information requested since its record-keeping system did not register personal identifying details of individuals for whom authorisation for a covert surveillance measure had been sought, as the very act of seeking such authorisation was classified information. 11.     On 8 August 2019 the State Bureau of Investigation launched a criminal investigation into the applicant’s complaint that the covert measure applied to him had been unlawful. The applicant argued, in particular, that he had reason to believe that the audio and video monitoring had taken place while he had been in custody. During that period, he had mostly been visited by lawyers and doctors, with whom communications were privileged and could not be monitored. 12.     On 29 May 2020 the State Bureau of Investigation discontinued the criminal proceedings. Referring to the testimony of O.Y., who had submitted that the applicant’s monitoring had been carried out in accordance with the law, the investigator concluded that it did not appear that a criminal offence had been committed. 13.     According to the latest information from the parties, the criminal case against the applicant was ongoing before the Dniprovskyi District Court of Kyiv. Application no.   23896/20 (Mr   beylin) 14.     The second applicant, Mr   Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych Beylin, was born in 1977 and lives in Kyiv. 15 .     On 6 January 2017 the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (“NABU") instituted criminal proceedings against several officials for their purported involvement in a large-scale corruption scheme concerning the procurement of goods for the State railway company. 16.     On 2 October 2019 M.S., a NABU detective, issued the applicant with a notification of suspicion, accusing him of aiding and abetting the scheme by abusing his official authority as an adviser to the head of the President’s administration. 17.     On 20 November 2019 the pre-trial investigation in the case was completed and the prosecution’s case file was disclosed to the defence. According to the applicant, the file included, in particular, transcripts of telephone conversations made from the tapped telephone lines of his co ‑ defendants, accompanied by copies of seventeen phone tapping requests filed by detectives with judges and the relevant judicial authorisations. The applicant submitted that all these requests and authorisations had contained brief and formulaic language without any assessment of the individual circumstances of each case. No documents relating to the covert measures in relation to him personally had been included in the file. 18.     On 21 December 2019 M.S. informed the applicant that he had been subject to unspecified covert surveillance measures in the course of the pre ‑ trial investigation. He further informed him that the material obtained in the context of those measures had not been used as evidence in the case against him. The relevant notice read as follows: “Pursuant to Articles ... 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... you are being notified that in the course of the pre-trial investigation ... covert investigative (operative) measures were applied, as a result of which your ... constitutional rights were temporarily restricted. Material obtained in the course of [those] covert investigative (operative) measures has not been used as evidence.” 19.     On 26 December 2019 the applicant, represented by lawyers, filed a number of requests with various authorities seeking the disclosure of information concerning the type, scope, duration and other details of the aforementioned covert surveillance measures, including whether or not they had involved the interception of his communications with his lawyers. He stated that the prosecution’s case file disclosed to him contained no relevant material. 20 .     On various dates in December 2019 and January 2020 the NABU officials, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (“SAPO”) authorities, and the President of the Kyiv Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s requests, informing him that all the material collected in the course of the disputed measures had been destroyed as having no evidential value and referring to the classified nature of the documents and information requested. 21.     On 24 January 2020 the Ombudsman (Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights) refused to investigate the matter on the applicant’s behalf on the basis that all the relevant procedures were governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22.     On 10 July 2020, in the course of the preparatory hearing held by the Higher Anti-Corruption Court in preparation for the applicant’s trial, the applicant complained that the NABU detectives and the SAPO prosecutor had acted unlawfully by refusing to provide him with documents relating to the covert surveillance measures applied to him and by prematurely destroying the material obtained in the course of those measures. He also alleged that the measures in question could have included the interception of his communications with his lawyers and requested that the interception of these communications be declared unlawful. The applicant’s complaints were added by the court to his criminal file to be examined at the evidence stage. 23 .     As of April 2023, the trial was ongoing. 24.     In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government informed the Court that, according to the information they had received from NABU, the covert surveillance measure applied to the applicant had been phone tapping. This measure had been authorised by an investigating judge in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25 .     The Government further informed the Court that they were unable to comply with its request to provide copies of the relevant judicial authorisations or any other relevant material from the applicant’s domestic case file. In particular, all relevant information that could have remained in the possession of the Kyiv Court of Appeal and SAPO had already been destroyed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable law and regulations. Also, the material obtained in the course of the covert surveillance in the applicant’s case, which had not been used as evidence, had been destroyed. Other relevant documents, such as detectives’ phone tapping requests to the investigating judges and the relevant judicial decisions, contained information that had not been declassified. Therefore, under section 32 of the State Secrets Act copies of these documents could not be provided. Application no.   25803/20 (mr   berezkin) 26.     The third applicant, Mr   Maksym Stanislavovych Berezkin, was born in 1980 and lives in Kropyvnytskyy. 27.     Between 2003 and 2015 the applicant, a businessman, was the beneficial owner of companies affiliated with the private business group K., in which he also held various high-ranking positions. 28 .     On 16 May 2016 SAPO initiated criminal proceedings concerning a large-scale scheme involving the diversion of State funds and money laundering, involving a number of public employees and executives of K. 29 .     On 23 October 2018 Y.T., a NABU detective, issued the applicant with a notification of suspicion, accusing him of aiding and abetting the scheme by participating in a conspiracy and abusing his posts. 30.     On the same date the applicant’s flat was searched and his mobile phone was seized. 31.     On 16 December 2019 the applicant was informed that the pre-trial investigation in the case had been completed and that he could familiarise himself with the prosecution’s case file. 32.     On the same date the applicant was notified that his telephone communications had been intercepted in the course of the investigation, pursuant to authorisations issued by the investigating judges of the Kyiv Court of Appeal (on 24   January   2017 and 21   September   2018) and the Lviv Court of Appeal (on 9 August 2017). Each authorisation had covered a two ‑ month period. The material obtained in the course of the interception had not been included in the prosecution’s case file as it had had no evidential value, and it had therefore been destroyed. 33.     On 24 December 2019 the applicant, represented by lawyers, filed a number of requests with various authorities seeking the disclosure of the documents and further information concerning the interception, including assurances that his communications with his lawyers had been protected. He stated that the prosecution’s case file disclosed to him contained no relevant material. 34 .     On various dates in December 2019 and January 2020 the NABU officials, the SAPO authorities, and the Presidents of the Kyiv and Lviv Courts of Appeal rejected the applicant’s requests, informing him that all the material collected in the course of the disputed interception had been destroyed as having no evidential value and referring to the classified nature of the documents and information requested. 35.     According to the applicant, in the course of his examination of the prosecution’s case file, he came across thirteen declassified interception authorisations concerning his co-defendants, which resulted in the collection of the material used as evidence. A number of these authorisations were made by handwriting the personal details of the subjects of interception on pre ‑ filled printed forms. According to a graphology expert’s assessment ordered by the applicant’s lawyer, the handwriting on those forms belonged to Y.T., the detective in charge of the case. 36.     On 20 January 2022, after the case had been remitted to the Higher Anti-Corruption Court for examination, the applicant complained to that court that the NABU detectives and SAPO prosecutor had acted unlawfully by refusing to provide him with the documents relating to the interception of his telecommunications and by prematurely destroying the material obtained in the context of that measure. He also alleged that the measure in question might have included the interception of his conversations with his lawyers and requested that the interception of these communications be declared unlawful. 37 .     On 9 May 2023 the Higher Anti-Corruption Court rejected the applicant’s complaints in the course of a preparatory hearing. The court stated, in particular, as follows: “Since it was impossible [for the applicant] to inspect the documents on the basis of which the aforementioned covert surveillance measure had been carried out, [this matter] could have been significant if the relevant material had been used ... as evidence. However, for the purposes of the preparatory [court hearing], the grounds for authorising investigative measures whose results will not be used as evidence are irrelevant and do not fall within the scope of the issues which the court must decide before the start of the trial.” 38 .     The court further held that the immediate destruction of material irrelevant to the criminal proceedings had been lawful and had served as a safeguard against misuse of the applicant’s private information. Since he himself was the source of the communications in question, the material obtained in the course of their interception could not have contained any information unknown to him. Should he wish to use it for his defence, he remained free to use other means, such as calling his interlocutors as witnesses. The destruction of all the intercepted material served, in particular, as a safeguard for the privacy of his communications with his lawyers. The court further noted as follows: “... according to the information from the detective ... the material obtained in the context of the covert investigative measure will not be used by the prosecution as evidence. Therefore, the question of how it was obtained, including any possible breach of the guarantees of advocate’s activity and legal professional privilege, does not lend itself to be assessed either during the preparatory hearing or the subsequent trial. If, in the course of the trial, the court establishes that the information used by the prosecution as evidence was directly or indirectly obtained as a result of interference with the communications between the defendants and their counsel, the court will evaluate that evidence in accordance with the admissibility criteria.” 39.     According to latest information from the parties, the trial is ongoing. 40 .     In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government informed the Court that, for the same reasons as in the second applicant’s case (see paragraph   25 above), they were unable to comply with its request to provide judicial authorisations for the interception of the applicant’s telecommunications or any other relevant documents. Application no.   31352/20 (mr kulchytskyy) 41.     The fourth applicant, Mr   Nazar Stepanovych Kulchytskyy, was born in 1981. He is a lawyer practising in Kyiv. 42.     On various dates the second and third applicants and S.T. (the third applicant’s co-defendant) engaged the fourth applicant as their defence counsel in the criminal cases against them. 43.     On 16 December 2019 the fourth applicant learned that the third applicant and S.T. had been subjects to telephone tapping within the framework of the criminal proceedings against them and that the relevant material obtained had been destroyed. 44.     On 21 December 2019 the fourth applicant learned that the second applicant had been subject to an unspecified covert investigative measure within the framework of the criminal proceedings against him. 45.     According to the fourth applicant, in the course of the pre-trial investigation of his clients’ cases, he discussed and advised them on legal matters on numerous occasions over the telecommunications network. As those clients were subject to phone tapping, his communications with them could have been intercepted by the investigating authorities and their content could have been known to them, in breach of lawyer-client privilege. In winter and spring 2020 the fourth applicant lodged numerous information requests with the law-enforcement and judicial authorities seeking to find out whether any of his conversations with the aforementioned clients could have been intercepted and whether their content could have become known to the investigation (see, in particular, paragraphs   19 and 33 above). The authorities refused to disclose any relevant information. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE relevant domestic law Code of Criminal Procedure (2012) 46 .     The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (№   4651 ‑ VI of 13   April   2012), as in force at the material time, read as follows: Article 246. Grounds for conducting covert investigative (operative) measures “1.     Covert investigative (operative) measures are a type of investigative (operative) measure, the fact and methods of which shall not be disclosed, except as provided for in this Code. 2.     Covert investigative (operative) measures are conducted in cases where it is impossible to obtain information about a criminal offence and the person who committed it. The covert investigative (operative) measures outlined in Articles ... 263 ...   [and] 270 ... of this Code shall only be conducted in criminal proceedings concerning serious or particularly serious offences. 3.     .... The investigator shall notify the prosecutor of ... the results obtained. ... . ... .” Article 248. Examination of requests for authorisation to conduct a covert investigative (operative) measure “... 3.     The investigating judge shall issue a ruling authorising a covert investigative (operative) measure if the prosecutor or investigator proves that there are sufficient grounds to believe that: (1)   a criminal offence of the relevant degree of seriousness has been committed; (2)   evidence may be obtained during the covert investigative (operative) measure that, alone or in combination with other evidence, may be essential for clarifying the circumstances of a criminal offence or identifying the perpetrators of a criminal offence. ... .” Article 249. Period of validity of the investigating judge’s decision to authorise a covert investigative (operative) measure “1.     The period of validity of the investigating judge’s decision to authorise a covert investigative (operative) measure may not exceed two months. 2.     If the investigator or prosecutor believes that the covert investigative (operative) measure should be continued, the investigator, with the prosecutor’s consent, or the prosecutor shall have the right to apply to the investigating judge for authorisation in accordance with the requirements of Article 248 of this Code. 3.     In addition to the information specified in Article 248 of this Code, the investigator or prosecutor shall provide additional information justifying the continuation of the covert investigative (operative) measure. 4.     The total period during which a covert investigative (operative) measure authorised by an investigating judge may be conducted in one set of criminal proceedings may not exceed the maximum pre-trial investigation period provided for in Article   219 of this Code .... 5.     The prosecutor shall discontinue the further covert investigative (operative) measure if no longer necessary.” Article 252. Recording the implementation and results of covert investigative (operative) measures “   ... 3.     A report ( протокол ) on a covert investigative measure, with annexes, shall be submitted to the prosecutor no later than twenty-four hours after [the measure’s] termination. ...” Article 253. Notification of persons subject to covert investigative (operative) measures “1.     Persons whose constitutional rights have been temporarily restricted during covert investigative (operative) measures, as well as the suspect and his or her defence counsel, shall be notified in writing of the restriction by the prosecutor or, on his or her behalf, by the investigator. 2.     The specific time of the notification shall be determined taking into account the presence or absence of threats to the achievement of the objectives of the pre-trial investigation, public safety, or the life or health of persons involved in covert investigative (operative) measures. Notification of the fact and results of covert investigative (operative) measures shall be made within twelve months from the date of their discontinuation, but no later than the filing of an indictment with the court.” Article 255. Measures to protect information not used in criminal proceedings “1.     Information, items, and documents obtained as a result of covert investigative (operative) measures that the prosecutor does not consider necessary for further pre-trial investigation shall be immediately destroyed on the basis of his or her decision ... 2.     It is prohibited to use the material referred to in the first paragraph of this Article for purposes not related to criminal proceedings, or to familiarise participants in criminal proceedings or other persons with them. ... 4.     The destruction of information, items and documents shall be carried out under the supervision of the prosecutor. ...” Article 258. General provisions on interference with private communications “1.     No one may be subjected to interference with private communications without the authorisation of the investigating judge. 2.     The prosecutor [or] investigator with the prosecutor’s consent shall apply to the investigating judge for permission to interfere with private communications in accordance with the procedure specified in Articles 246, 248, 249 of this Code, if any investigative (operative) measures include such interference. ... 5.     Interference with private communications between a defence counsel, [or] a clergyman and a suspect, accused, convicted or acquitted person is prohibited.” Article 263. Interception of information from [electronic] telecommunications networks “1.     Interception of information from [electronic] telecommunications networks ... is a type of interference with private communications carried out without the knowledge of persons using telecommunications to transmit information, on the basis of a decision of an investigating judge, if during its implementation it is possible to establish circumstances relevant to criminal proceedings. 2.     In this case, the investigating judge’s authorisation to intercept private communications shall also specify the identifying features that will enable the precise identification of the subscriber to be placed under surveillance, as well as the [electronic] telecommunications network and the terminal equipment on which the interception of private communications may be carried out ...” Article 270. Local audio and video monitoring “1.     Local audio and video monitoring may be carried out during the pre-trial investigation of a serious or particularly serious offence and consists in the covert recording of information through audio and video means inside publicly accessible places without the knowledge of the owner, possessor or persons present at the place, if there is information that the conversations and behaviour of persons in that place, as well as other events taking place there, may contain information relevant to criminal proceedings. 2.     Local audio and video monitoring, in accordance with the first paragraph of this Article, shall be carried out on the basis of a decision of an investigating judge in accordance with the procedure provided for in Articles 246, 248, 249 of this Code. ” Article 303. Decisions, actions or omissions of the investigator or prosecutor that may be challenged during the pre-trial investigation and the right to complain “... 2.     Complaints against other decisions, actions or omissions of the investigator or prosecutor shall not be examined during the pre-trial investigation, but may be subject to examination during the preparatory court hearing in accordance with the provisions of Articles 314 to 316 of this Code.” Article 309. Decisions of the investigating judge that may be challenged during the pre-trial investigation “... 3.     Complaints concerning other rulings of the investigating judge are not amenable to appeal and objections to them may be filed during the preparatory court hearing.” Article 315. Resolution of issues relating to the preparation for trial “... 2.     In order to prepare for the trial, the court shall: (1)   fix the date and place of the trial; (2)   determine whether the trial shall be held in public hearing or in camera; (3)   determine the list of persons participating in the hearings; (4)   examine requests from participants in the proceedings with regard to: calling certain persons to appear in court for examination; requesting the production of certain items or documents; [and] conducting the hearings in camera.” (5)   take such other steps as may be necessary to prepare for the trial.” The State Secrets Act 47 .     The relevant provisions of the State Secrets Act (Law of Ukraine “On State Secrets” no.   № 3855-XII of 21   January   1994), as in force at the material time, read as follows: Section 1.   Definition of terms “In this Act, the terms shall be used in the following sense: State secret (hereinafter also referred to as ‘classified (secret) information’) - a type of classified information that includes information in the field of defence, economy, science and technology, foreign relations, State security [or] law enforcement, the disclosure of which may harm the national security of Ukraine and which is classified as a State secret in accordance with the procedure specified in this Act and is subject to State protection; ...” Section 32.     Restrictions on the disclosure of State secrets to a foreign State or to an international organisation “Classified information, prior to its declassification ... and material objects containing such information, which has not been declassified, may be disclosed to a foreign State or an international organisation only on the basis of international agreements ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or by a written, reasoned order of the President of Ukraine, regard being had to the need to ensure the national security of Ukraine on the basis of proposals of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.” Bar and Advocacy Act 48 .     The relevant provisions of the Bar and Advocacy Act (Law of Ukraine “On the Bar and Advocates’ Activity” no.   5076-VI of 5   July   2012) as in force at the material time, read as follows: Section 22. Legal privilege “1.     Legal privilege shall cover any information that has become known to the advocate, ... about the client, as well as the issues on which the client ... sought the advocate’s advice, ... the content of the advocate’s advice, consultations or explanations, documents drawn up by the advocate, information stored on electronic media, and other documents and information received by the advocate in the course of his or her legal practice.” Section 23. Safeguards for advocates’ activity “1.     The professional rights, honour and dignity of an advocate shall be guaranteed and protected by the Constitution of Ukraine, this Act and other laws, in particular: (1)   any interference with and obstruction of the performance of an advocate’s activity shall be prohibited; ... (9)   interference with an advocate’s private communications with a client shall be prohibited ...” Other relevant laws and regulations 49 .     References to the relevant provisions (Article   1176) of the Civil Code and the Compensation Act (Law of Ukraine “On the procedure for compensation for damage caused to citizens by the unlawful acts of bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation authorities, prosecutor’s offices and courts” no.   266/94-ВР of 1 December 1994) can be found, inter alia , in the Court’s judgment in Nechay   v. Ukraine (no.   15360/10, §§   36-37, 1   July   2021). 50.     The Instruction on Covert Measures (Instruction on the implementation of covert investigative (operative) measures and the use of their results in criminal proceedings) was adopted jointly by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice on 16 November 2012 (Order no.   114/1042/1199/936/1687/5). The Instruction includes procedures for the collection, recording, storage, classification, declassification and destruction of data by means of covert investigative (operative) measures. 51 .     Under sections 5.9. and 5.10 of the Instruction, upon completion of covert measures, the prosecutor in charge of the case decides whether to declassify the relevant material “taking into account the circumstances of the criminal proceedings and the need to use [that] material ... as evidence ...”. This decision is formalised by a resolution, which must be approved by the chief prosecutor of the relevant office. 52.     Under sections 6.1. and 6.4.1, if the prosecutor in charge of the case decides that certain material is not necessary for the pre-trial investigation, it must be immediately destroyed on the basis of his or her written resolution, which must contain a full list of the material to be destroyed. 53 .     Under sections 6.6. and 6.8., the destruction is carried out by a designated commission in the presence of the prosecutor who ordered it, and the commission must draw up an “act” containing details of the destruction. 54.     The Instruction does not contain any provisions detailing procedures for identifying and handling accidentally intercepted privileged communications, such as exchanges between lawyers and their clients. Relevant International, EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW material 55.     The relevant international, European and comparative law material can be found in the Court’s judgment in the case of Pietrzak and Bychawska ‑ Siniarska and Others v. Poland (nos.   72038/17 and 25237/18, §§   87-91 and 93-123, 28   May   2024). THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 56.     Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE   8 OF THE CONVENTION in respect of the FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD APPLICANTS 57.     The first, second and third applicants complained that the covert investigative measures of which they had been notified on 8   October   2018, 21   December 2019 and 16   December   2019 respectively had breached their rights guaranteed by Article   8 of the Convention, having regard, in particular, to the alleged lack of adequate safeguards in the applicable law and the practical means of implementing it in their respective cases. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility The Government 58.     The Government argued that the three aforementioned applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them, or, in the alternative, that their applications were manifestly ill-founded because they had not made use of the effective avenues of redress provided by the domestic legal system. 59 .     In this regard, the Government acknowledged that the applicable law did not provide for a possibility of appealing against judicial rulings authorising covert measures. They argued, however, that there were other suitable remedies. In particular, once the applicants’ respective cases had been referred for trial, they had had the right, under Article   309   §   3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to file objections concerning the lawfulness of the decisions taken by the investigating judges. Under Article 303   §   2 of that Code they could also lodge complaints concerning the actions, omissions or decisions of the law-enforcement officials (see paragraph   46 above). The courts would have been obliged to take those objections and complaints into account when examining the applicants’ respective cases. If the applicants had succeeded in obtaining a decision in their favour, they would have been able to claim damages on the basis of either Article   1176 of the Civil Code or the Compensation Act (see paragraph 49 above). 60 .     The Government further pointed out that in the cases of Meimanis v.   Latvia (no.   70597/11, §   78, 21   July   2015) and Kibermanis v. Latvia ((dec.) no.   42065/06, §   49, 3   November   2015) the Court had already found that a two-tier redress mechanism enabling individuals to complain about covert police operations in the course of criminal or other proceedings and, if successful, to resort to a civil-law remedy for compensation, was effective in principle. They also submitted that findings as to the potential effectiveness of a similar two-tier mechanism had been made by the Court in Ukrainian cases, in particular   Orlovskiy v. Ukrain e (no.   12222/09, §§   14   and 58, 2   April 2015) and Tikhonov v. Ukraine (no.   17969/09, §§   22 and 39, 10   December 2015). In both cases the domestic courts, in the course of the applicants’ trials, had made separate rulings ( окрема ухвала ) acknowledging irregularities in the applicants’ arrest and detention. Since the applicants had not followed up by filing compensation complaints, the Court had found that they had not exhausted domestic remedies for their complaints under Article   5   §   1 of the Convention. 61.     The Government acknowledged that the two latter cases had been examined at domestic level under the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure. However, they argued that unspecified provisions of the current 2012 Code, which was applicable in the present case, provided a comparable solution. 62 .     To illustrate the effectiveness of the existing remedies, the Government referred to a Supreme Court ruling (case no.   61-6654ск21) issued on 8   December   2021. In that ruling, the court dismissed an appeal on points of law filed by the Ternopil police against a judgment awarding non-pecuniary damages to the head of a private company who had been subject to covert interception of information from telecommunication channels in connection with a criminal investigation into an alleged breach of intellectual property rights by his company. The proceedings in that case had been discontinued for lack of