CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 février 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .s29048B37 { margin-top:30pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s24E6874 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:center } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s780F5245 { border:0.75pt solid #000000; clear:both } .sF775B5E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; padding:1pt 4pt 14pt } .s55E5497F { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; padding-right:4pt; padding-left:4pt; padding-bottom:1pt; font-size:10pt } .s39E5096F { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389F8 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .sA43C3626 { width:28.35pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s329183A { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-size:14pt; text-transform:uppercase } .sE5EEB06B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18.45pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18.45pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s3936C9DD { width:11.78pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sBB64854C { width:8.45pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3A692EA6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s6F9C7ED9 { margin-left:18.45pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18.45pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s7D18490B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s5BDECA8 { width:5pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s99272BBB { margin-left:8.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .s54B12A03 { width:6.99pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s452883D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s2FA28896 { margin-left:8.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:normal } .sDBC81028 { width:4.83pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sD8E89A4 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold } .s7AE800C3 { width:4.28pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .sE8F2C496 { width:5.11pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s448F0C15 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sF0C78780 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; font-family:Arial } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .s5165BC52 { margin-left:17pt } .sE5BF05B1 { width:2.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA7186A9D { width:36.9pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .s7B051ABA { width:164.45pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .s1E019DFF { width:46.56pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .sA49AD2E4 { width:177.11pt; font-family:Arial; display:inline-block } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .fixListIndent { list-style-position: inside }   FIRST SECTION CASE OF P. v. POLAND (Application no. 56310/15)   JUDGMENT   Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Dismissal of a secondary school teacher for, among others, writing an Internet blog for adults featuring some sexually explicit content, considered by the authorities to be an affront to the prevailing domestic social mores • Lack of relevant and sufficient reasons • Applicant’s personal blogging activity did not threaten the protection of morals of minors in a manner justifying the sanction imposed • Interference neither corresponded to a pressing social need, nor proportionate Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 13 February 2025   FINAL   30/06/2025     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of P. v. Poland, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Alena Poláčková,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Péter Paczolay,   Gilberto Felici,   Alain Chablais , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   56310/15) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr   K.P. (“the applicant”), on 5 November 2015; the decision to give notice to the Polish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 8, 10 and 14 of the Convention concerning the applicant’s dismissal on disciplinary grounds from his workplace and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed; the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant; the comments submitted by the Polish Society of Anti-Discrimination Law, the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, and Campaign Against Homophobia, who were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section; Having deliberated in private on 14 January 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the dismissal of a secondary school teacher for, among other things, writing an internet blog for adults featuring some sexually explicit content. The case mainly raises an issue under Article 10 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Koszalin. He was represented by Ms A. Stach, a lawyer practising in Szczecin. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Sobczak, subsequently replaced by Ms A. Kozińska-Makowska, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.         BACKGROUND 5.     The applicant is a qualified teacher of Polish and English. 6 .     From 1 September 2007 to 16 December 2013 the applicant worked as a teacher and a form tutor in a secondary school in Koszalin. Secondary school students in Poland are between fifteen and eighteen years old. 7 .     Each year from 2008 to 2012 the school principal awarded the applicant a prize for the best teacher. In 2010 and 2013 the applicant also won national competitions for the best form tutor. 8.     The applicant did not receive any reprimands and no complaints were made about him. 9 .     The school principal stated in the disciplinary proceedings described below that since 2010 she had suspected that the applicant was homosexual. She stated that she had not taken issue with his sexual orientation and had considered him to be a very good teacher. 10.     As part of his job the applicant occasionally took his students on school excursions. 11 .     Pursuant to the 2001 Ordinance of the Minister of Education on the organisation of tourism by schools, a school trip may only be attended by persons who have been registered, prior to the event, with the school’s principal in the trip record (section 10 of the Ordinance). According to the well-established practice of the applicant’s school, third parties could not be invited to attend such activities. That rule was expressly stated in the file of each school trip. It was undisputed between the parties that the applicant had known about the rule. 12.     In June 2013 the applicant oversaw two school trips. During one of those trips, his same-sex partner accompanied him to a ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. He left immediately after the ceremony and was not present throughout the rest of the trip. The applicant’s partner also accompanied him on a school camping trip. The applicant explained that he had asked his partner to keep him company as he had suffered sunburn. On both occasions, the applicant introduced his partner to everyone as his cousin. The applicant’s partner was not listed as a participant in any of the trip records. The applicant stressed that, during both trips, he had done his night shifts and he had diligently watched over his students. 13.     From April or May 2012 until 1 July 2013 the applicant wrote approximately a hundred posts on a public blog on a website aimed at homosexual men, at times posting almost daily. In order to access the website a prospective user had to declare that they were an adult. The applicant wrote under a pseudonym. He wrote in the first person and, at times, referred to himself in the text by his real first name. 14.     The content of his blog posts comprised photographs and text in the style of a diary. 15.     The photographs mainly depicted men, alone or interacting with other men, dressed, half-dressed or nude, in various situations, such as holding hands, hugging while asleep, having fun on a beach or in water, doing household chores, sharing a bed, kissing in the street, mowing a lawn, urinating in a men’s toilet, repairing a car, posing for a picture, holding a phallic-shaped object, removing underwear, or having sex. Other photographs depicted the applicant – either alone or hugging or kissing another man. None of the photographs, whether of the applicant or otherwise, displayed sexual organs or actual sexual intercourse. 16.     The applicant’s writings mainly described his daily life; his dreams and feelings of love and loneliness; and his intimate thoughts or desires in respect of his partner. Several dozen passages had clear erotic connotations or explicitly depicted, named or described erotic or sexual acts between men. 17.     In several of his blog posts he expressed his frustration with his job as a junior teacher or employed swear words with respect to his superiors. He also wrote in general terms about his students. 18.     The applicant’s blog registered 39,000 visitors. 19 .     The applicant claims that he kept the blog a secret from his colleagues and students. It appears however that his blog was read and commented on by the school staff. It also appears that the students knew about his internet activity. In particular, one student left a comment, either on the blog or on the applicant’s Facebook page, saying “This guy ... is my teacher of Polish”. 20 .     During the disciplinary proceedings described below, the school principal stated that she had not received any complaints about the applicant’s blog from the students or their parents. She knew that the teachers at her school had been reading the blog, but submitted that they had been appalled not by the applicant’s sexual orientation, but rather by the defamatory comments about the school staff members that he had made separately on Facebook. During the same disciplinary proceedings, the applicant submitted that he had never heard any whisper about the blog from his students. 21.     On 1 July 2013 the school principal, who had been informed about the applicant’s blog, reprimanded him in that connection and asked him to delete it. The applicant did so on the same day.       DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT 22 .     On 4 July 2013 the school principal asked the disciplinary officer for teachers ( rzecznik dyscyplinarny ) to open disciplinary proceedings against the applicant on the grounds that he had breached his duties as prescribed in the 1982 Teacher’s Charter Act ( Karta Nauczyciela ). In particular, he was reported for allowing a third party (his partner) to attend two school trips without informing the school principal or asking for her authorisation. The applicant had thus treated both school events as private and had failed to ensure adequate care and supervision of his students. He was also reported for running an internet blog which contained text and images “full of eroticism ( erotyzm ) and profanities ( wulgaryzmy )”. No details were given about the blog’s content. The principal feared that the applicant was not fit to “shape his students’ moral attitudes”. The principal’s letter did not mention the applicant’s statements regarding his students or colleagues, or his Facebook activity. 23 .     The disciplinary officer from the Zachodniopomorski Governor’s Office brought proceedings with the Disciplinary Commission for the Teaching Profession and lodged an application to have the applicant reprimanded for introducing an unauthorised third party during two school trips and for “running a blog containing texts and images unworthy of the teaching profession”. 24 .     According to the record of the hearing held by the Disciplinary Commission on 16 December 2013, the questioning of the school principal and the applicant focused, firstly, on the applicant’s bringing a third party on the school trips, and, secondly, on the blog posts in so far as they contained “profanities” and “obscene” photographs and scenes – considered to “attest to the applicant’s morality” – and in so far as they contained offensive comments about the applicant’s students and colleagues. As to the comments about the colleagues, the school principal mainly referred to another activity of the applicant, namely his Facebook posts that contained negative comments about the school staff, who were depicted as slackers ( nieroby ), and clarified that profane language had not been used in those posts. Throughout the hearing, the members of the Disciplinary Commission explicitly stated that the profanities were distinct from the applicant’s sexual orientation, the latter not being the subject of the disciplinary proceedings. The applicant admitted to the breach of the rules regulating school trips and to the writing of his blog. He stated that his blogging activity had been a form of therapy and a foolish mistake. He reassured the Commission that the blog had been deleted and that he was not going to make similar publications again. 25 .     At the above-mentioned hearing, the disciplinary officer reiterated his request that a punishment be imposed on the applicant in the form of a reprimand with a warning (see paragraph 40 below). 26 .     After the hearing, on 16 December 2013, the Disciplinary Commission found the applicant responsible for “a breach of the dignity of the teaching profession and of the duties set out in section 6 of the Teacher’s Charter Act” (see paragraphs 39 and 40 below) in that on two school trips he had been accompanied by an unauthorised third party and that he had run a public blog with “texts and images unworthy of the teaching profession”. The Commission ordered that the applicant be dismissed from his position at the school (section   76(1)(2) of the Teacher’s Charter Act – see paragraph   40 below). 27 .     The decision’s reasoning contained, among other things, the following statements and observations. The applicant’s blog contained “texts of an erotic character and obscene photos”. A teacher who published profane comments on social media undermined the dignity of the profession. Teachers had to act with dignity at school and in their private environment. Teachers who in their spare time were active on the internet had to act in a dignified manner. Teachers, while enjoying freedom of expression, had to show restraint because of their mission as educators of a new generation and because of the responsibility for their expression, especially given that when publishing on the internet they did not enjoy the right to privacy. Content published on Facebook was widely accessible and aimed at an unrestricted public readership. According to the decision, “[b]y using profane terms, by breaching good mores ( dobre obyczaje ) through his expression, and by posting obscene photographs, a teacher breaches the dignity of the teaching profession”. In the light of the decision’s reasoning, the Commission did not make an assessment of any specific blog posts. 28 .     The applicant appealed against that decision, asking that the sanction imposed on him be changed as it was disproportionately severe. He argued, inter alia , that the Disciplinary Commission had wrongly found that he lacked morals and posed a threat to the ethical education of his students. He further stated that the Commission’s decision was grounded on the information about his “disturbed sexual orientation” (his own words). He acknowledged that writing the blog was reprehensible behaviour. He explained, however, that his conduct had not been the result of “depravity” but rather his complicated and difficult personal situation and identity issues, as well as his traumatic childhood. The applicant concluded that the disproportionate severity of the punishment which had been imposed on him indicated that the Commission’s decision had been based, possibly subconsciously, on homophobic prejudices and stereotypes. 29.     The applicant was assigned a legal-aid lawyer to represent him in the proceedings. Before the Appellate Disciplinary Commission (“the Appellate Commission”), the applicant’s lawyer argued firstly that the sanction that had been imposed on the applicant was disproportionately severe. In respect of the first ground for the applicant’s punishment, the lawyer stated that the applicant had indeed breached the regulations, but he had not neglected his duties during the school trips in question. In respect of the second ground, the lawyer argued that the problem was more complex. In particular, he alleged that the reason for the disciplinary proceedings had been the discovery of the applicant’s homosexual orientation, which was revealed in his blog. The disciplinary proceedings and their outcome had therefore been discriminatory. The applicant was an excellent teacher who had been teaching his students values such as love for their country, respect for the Constitution, freedom of conscience and respect for every human being. 30 .     On 24 September 2014 the Appellate Commission quashed the decision of 16 December 2013 and discontinued the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 31 .     In its decision the Appellate Commission took into consideration the applicant’s conduct during the proceedings, namely the fact that he had admitted all of the acts imputed to him and had expressed remorse for them, as well as the fact that he had ceased writing the blog and had deleted it on the same day on which the school principal had reprimanded him for it. The Appellate Commission also found that there had been no proof that he had in fact neglected his duties as tutor during the trips. Moreover, in the Appellate Commission’s view, the applicant had written the blog for therapeutic purposes on the recommendation of his psychiatrist to note down his feelings in order to overcome his childhood psychological trauma. In the light of the decision’s reasoning, the Appellate Commission did not make an assessment of any specific blog post. Lastly, the Appellate Commission attached importance to the lack of any evidence that the applicant’s blog had had any negative impact on the youth at the school. 32 .     The disciplinary officer from the Ministry of National Education appealed, reiterating: firstly, that the applicant had not complied with regulations aimed at ensuring the safety of students on school trips; and secondly, that he had breached the dignity of his profession by writing the blog. As to the latter, the officer stressed that, contrary to what had been argued by the applicant’s lawyer, the problem at hand was not the applicant’s sexual preferences, but only the indecent content of his public blog. The officer also noted that the applicant’s blog contained “erotic texts”, “obscene photographs”, “profanities”, “erotic and profane descriptions of intimate situations, and “obscene photographs of the teacher with his partner”. The officer also noted that the “comments full of profanities also referred to the school staff and school affairs”. The officer raised the additional point that the applicant had admitted to the conduct attributed to him and, in his appeal, had merely asked for a more lenient punishment. In the officer’s view, the applicant had thus not questioned the legitimacy of the punishment as such. The disciplinary officer concluded that “the applicant did not fulfil one of the statutory requirements for a teacher, namely compliance with basic moral principles”. In his view, the applicant had “breached that requirement by posting on his blog entries and photographs violating good mores”. In the light of those considerations, the officer argued that the sanction imposed on the applicant was appropriate. 33.     On 7 May 2015 the Szczecin Court of Appeal reversed the decision of 24   September 2014 and dismissed the applicant’s appeal, at the same time upholding the Disciplinary Commission’s decision, including the part ordering his dismissal. 34 .     The Court of Appeal held that the applicant, by bringing an unauthorised person on two school trips, had neglected his duties and compromised students’ safety, in breach of section 6(1) of the Teacher’s Charter Act. Moreover, it considered that the fact that the applicant had been “writing a blog with the content (including the photographs) that was profane, obscene and sexual” was unworthy of the teaching profession and in breach of the obligation laid down in section 6(5) of the same Act to shape students’ moral and civic attitudes. To that end, the Court of Appeal listed more than thirty dated blog entries and described them as: “obscene and pornographic photos” (“photos of men”, “photos of the applicant”, “sexual content”); descriptions of “the applicant’s sexual life”; and “comments about the students and [the applicant’s] work at the school”. It singled out the following excerpts, among others: (i) those regarding the applicant’s work: “I am now the school’s prostitute, who can be used, as I   will agree to anything anyway”; “have I mentioned that I will be used at my work? Regrettably, not sexually ... my period has started ... the period of apprenticeship”; “the first class has already got on my nerves. I will show those dicks in the English exam!”, “Is there anything that makes you prouder than having your students resemble you? I am raising a whole host of future little psychopaths who are already my equals in sarcasm”; (ii) those regarding his youth: “Those were the days of rebellion. I was thrown out of school for absences and a sexual approach to education – I fucked education, or alternatively, I had everything up in my ass”; or (iii) those regarding life in general: “It’s a holy day. And, in protest, I can die of humiliation. I want to be found dead, with my penis erect, with my pants lowered and stained with white sperm, among wheat coloured in blood-red gore ... 7 June – international day of sex ... remember to celebrate the holy day”. The Court of Appeal noted that, as submitted by the school principal at the hearing before it, the applicant’s blog contained terms such as “blow you” or “you have a big one”, which the principal considered unacceptable and demeaning. The Court of Appeal did not make any reference to the applicant’s Facebook activity. The Court of Appeal also noted that the applicant’s colleagues and the school principal had described the photographs as being “pornographic” and “obscene”, and the text as being “very immoral”, “profane” and “sexual”. In its reasoning, the court observed that, as the time had gone by, “the applicant [had] made more and more entries breaching the dignity of the profession, [by] describing or commenting on his sexual and professional life, [and] uploading photographs”. In that context, the court observed that teachers were not only there to convey knowledge, but also to influence children’s conduct or perception of the world. The Court of Appeal expressly stated that the applicant’s sexual orientation was irrelevant, in the sense that it could not constitute a valid justification for the public expression of obscenities. Responding to the Appellate Commission’s arguments, it also found it irrelevant that the applicant’s conduct had not had any negative effect on his students. To that end, the court attached importance to the public nature of the applicant’s internet blog and the fact that in it, he had exposed his profession and discredited his colleagues, his supervisors and his students. 35 .     The court’s reasoning does not elaborate on the statements concerning the applicant’s colleagues or school administration. In this context, the court did not examine the case from the perspective of defamation. 36 .     Lastly, the Court of Appeal observed that the sanction imposed on the applicant was proportionate in that, taking into consideration his remorseful attitude and his very good record as a teacher, it was sufficiently harmful to the applicant, but it did not take away his career opportunities in other schools. 37.     No further appeal was available under the applicable law. 38.     According to statistics provided by the Government, 109 sets of disciplinary proceedings were instituted in Poland between 2013 and 2021 for “inappropriate activity of teachers on the internet” (including blogging, Facebook posts, messaging students). Ninety-six of those cases had resulted in disciplinary sanctions against the teacher concerned. It is unknown how many of those cases concerned posts with sexual content. RELEVANT domestic LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 39 .     The conduct of teachers in Poland is regulated by the Teacher’s Charter Act of 26 January 1982 ( Karta Nauczyciela ), which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Taking into account the important role of education and upbringing in the Republic of Poland, and wishing to express the special social importance of the teaching profession in accordance with the needs and expectations [of society] by opening the way to further legal regulation of the national education system with this Act, it is hereby established: ...” Section 6 “A   teacher is obliged to: 1)     reliably perform tasks related to the position entrusted to him and to the basic functioning of the school: teaching, education and caring, including tasks related to ensuring the safety of students during classes organised by the school; 2)     support each student in his or her development; ... 4)     educate and raise young people in love for the Homeland, in respect for the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and in an atmosphere of freedom of conscience and respect for every person; 5)     take care to shape moral and civic attitudes in students in accordance with the idea[s] of democracy [and of] peace and friendship between people of different nations, races and worldviews. ...” Section 9 “1.     The position of teacher may be held by a person who: 1)     has a higher education with appropriate pedagogical preparation or has graduated from a teacher training institution ...; 2)     adheres to basic moral principles; ...” 40 .     The Teacher’s Charter Act further regulates the disciplinary liability of teachers. The relevant parts read as follows: Section 75 “1.     Teachers are subject to disciplinary liability for breaches of the dignity of the teaching profession or the obligations referred to in section 6. ... 2a.     ...   Where there is a suspicion that a teacher has committed an act violating the rights and well-being of a child, the school principal ... shall notify the disciplinary officer no later than within 14 days from the date of receiving information about the suspicion that such an act has been committed, unless the circumstances clearly indicate that no such act has been committed.” Section 76 “1.     The disciplinary penalties for teachers are: 1)     reprimand with warning; 2)     dismissal from position; 3)     dismissal from position with a ban on employment as a teacher for a period of 3 years from the date of punishment; 4)     expulsion from the teaching profession. ... 3.     Imposing the disciplinary penalty referred to in subsection 1 point 4 is tantamount to a prohibition on employing the punished person as a teacher. ... 5.     A copy of the final judgment imposing a disciplinary penalty together with its justification shall be included in the teacher’s personal file.” 41 .     Pursuant to section 85s of the Teacher’s Charter Act, a disciplinary sanction such as dismissal from his or her position is expunged from a teacher’s records after three years and the disciplinary decision is removed from the teacher’s professional file. THE LAW         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION read alone and in conjunction with article 14 of the convention 42 .     The applicant complained, relying on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, that his disciplinary dismissal from his position as a teacher at a secondary school had breached his right to respect for his private and family life, as well as the prohibition of discrimination. In that connection, he explicitly argued that the sanction in question had stemmed from prejudice against his sexual orientation and his relationship with a partner of the same sex. The provisions in question read as follows: Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”    Article 8 of the Convention taken alone 43.     The Court notes that neither party contested the applicability ratione materiae of Article 8 of the Convention to the facts of the case. That, however, does not release the Court from the obligation to examine proprio motu the question of its jurisdiction at every stage of the proceedings, even where no objection has been raised in that respect (see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v.   Turkey , no.   76730/12, § 53, 22 June 2021). 44.     The Court must assess whether the applicant’s dismissal from the position of a teacher at a secondary school affected his private life, thus rendering Article 8 applicable (see, mutatis mutandis , Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, § 118, 25 September 2018). 45.     The Court reiterates that the concept of “private life” is a broad term that is not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s physical and social identity. Article 8 protects in addition a right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world (see Mile Novaković v.   Croatia , no. 73544/14, § 42, 17 December 2020, with further references therein). 46.     Employment-related disputes are not per se excluded from the scope of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], no. 56030/07, §§ 110 and 113, ECHR   2014 (extracts), with further references, and Denisov , cited above, §   115). There are normally two ways in which a private-life issue would arise in such a dispute: either because of the underlying reasons for the impugned measure (in that event the Court employs the reason-based approach) or – in certain cases – because of the consequences it has for private life (in that event the Court employs the consequence-based approach – see Denisov , cited above, §   115). Where a consequence-based approach is at stake, a certain threshold of severity must be attained, and the applicant has to present evidence substantiating the consequences of the impugned measure. The Court will only accept that Article 8 is applicable where these consequences are very serious and affect his or private life to a very significant degree (ibid.,   §   116, and see Mile Novaković , cited above, § 43). In determining the seriousness of the consequences in employment-related cases, it is appropriate to assess the subjective perceptions submitted by the applicant against the background of the objective circumstances existing in the particular case. This analysis would have to cover both the material and the non-material impact of the alleged measure (see Denisov , cited above, § 117). The Court notes that the applicant, in formulating his Article 8 complaint relied solely on what amounts to the reason-based approach, never raising, even in essence, any arguments pertaining to the consequence-based approach. 47 .     Turning to the facts of the present case, and taking the reason-based approach first, the Court observes that the direct reason for the applicant’s dismissal from his post was a breach of the duties prescribed in the Teacher’s Charter Act. The breach in question was twofold. Firstly, the applicant had been accompanied by an unauthorised person on two school trips. Secondly, he had been writing a blog that was viewed as obscene (see paragraphs   22-34 above). The applicant, in his complaints, focused on the fact that the person who had accompanied him on the two trips was his same-sex partner and that the blog he had written had homosexual content. 48.     In so far as the applicant has argued that the situation had been underpinned by homophobic prejudice, the Court would make the following observations. 49.     The applicant’s dismissal from his school was not based on any official policy against homosexual people (contrast Lustig-Prean and Beckett v.   the United Kingdom , nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, 27   September 1999, and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom , nos.   33985/96 and 33986/96, ECHR   1999 ‑ VI). Moreover, it has not been argued that the Teacher’s Charter Act, which does not contain any references to sexual orientation (see paragraphs   39 and 40 above), had, as its underlying legislative intent, a restriction on imparting information about same-sex relationships to students (contrast, mutatis mutandis , Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], no. 61435/19, §§   195 ‑ 200, 23 January 2023). 50 .     As to whether the applicant’s homosexuality played a role in shaping the assessment made by the school principal and the authorities of his conduct, the Court notes that both the school principal and the authorities explicitly denied that that was the case (see paragraphs 9, 32 and 34 above, and contrast, mutatis mutandis , Macatė , cited above, §§ 189 and 194). The Court has previously found in other cases that, notwithstanding the precautions taken by the domestic authorities to justify their decision by reasons other than an applicant’s sexual orientation, the inescapable conclusion was that the applicant’s homosexuality had in fact been at the centre of deliberations and omnipresent at every stage of the judicial proceedings (see E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 88, 22 January 2008, and X v. Poland , no. 20741/10, § 79, 16 September 2021). No such inference can, however, be made in the present case, given the absence from the case material of any innuendo to that effect and the presence of explicit statements to the contrary, and given the fact that the applicant’s sexual orientation had seemingly been known to the school’s principal for a number of years (see paragraph 9 above), without any negative consequences for him (contrast A.K. v. Russia , no. 49014/16, §§ 43 and 44, 7 May 2024). If anything, it appears that the argument about the applicant’s sexual orientation was presented by him as an explanation for his behaviour and, as such, was rejected by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 34 in fine above). 51 .     In the light of these considerations, it cannot categorically be said that the real or crucial reason for the impugned measure was the applicant’s homosexual orientation (see the preceding paragraph; contrast, mutatis mutandis , Mile Novaković , cited above, §§ 48 and 49, and X v. Poland , cited above, §§ 73-93). 52.     The Court observes that the personal sphere protected by Article 8 can indeed include, irrespective of one’s sexual orientation, a person’s sexual life (see Chocholáč v. Slovakia , no. 81292/17, §§ 53-56, 7 July 2022). In the present case, however, it cannot be said that the applicant’s impugned conduct related to his sexual life as such (contrast with Chocholáč , cited above, in which an applicant prisoner, who was unable to receive intimate visits, received a disciplinary sanction for possession of pornographic material in his cell). 53.     In the light of these considerations, the Court is not satisfied that the underlying reasons for the applicant’s dismissal from work were sufficiently linked to his private life (contrast Travaš v. Croatia , no.   75581/13, §   56, 4   October 2016) to justify the applicability of Article 8 to the facts of the present case under its reason-based approach. 54.     Turning to the consequence-based approach, the Court must first reiterate the Gillberg exclusionary principle according to which, where the negative effects complained of are limited to the consequences of unlawful conduct which were foreseeable by the applicant, Article 8 cannot be relied upon to allege that such negative effects encroach upon private life (see Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], no. 41723/06, § 71, 3 April 2012, and Denisov , cited above, § 121). It has to be noted in this context that the applicant did not dispute that he had knowingly breached the rules relating to school trips when he had, on two occasions, been joined on such trips by his partner, who did not have the necessary authorisation (see paragraph 11 above). In these circumstances, a form of disciplinary sanction was a foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s conduct in his capacity as a teacher (see Gillberg , cited above, § 71, and compare Denisov , cited above, § 121; Gražulevičiūtė v.   Lithuania , no. 53176/17, § 102, 14 December 2021; and Juszczyszyn v.   Poland , no. 35599/20, § 231, 6   October 2022). In so far, however, as the sanction foreseeable for the above conduct could, under the applicable law, be of a lesser degree than dismissal (reprimand was another possibility, see paragraph 40 above), and more importantly, in so far as the applicant entirely contests the existence of misconduct with regard to the second ground for his dismissal, namely, his blog activity, the case may be distinguished from Gillberg (compare with Denisov , cited above, § 121). 55.     The Court will therefore continue its assessment of the applicability of Article 8, based on the assumption that the Gillberg exclusionary principle cannot be relied on fully in the circumstances of the present case. 56.     The Court would first reiterate that it is an intrinsic feature of the consequence-based approach under Article 8 that convincing evidence showing that the threshold of severity was attained has to be submitted by the applicant. Applicants are obliged to identify and explain the concrete repercussions on their private life and the nature and extent of their suffering, and to substantiate such allegations in a proper way (see Denisov , cited above, §   114). The Court thus notes that the applicant was dismissed from a stable job and that the disciplinary sanction taken against him was recorded in his professional file. That said, the Court would stress that he was not suspended or barred from exercising his profession, and that the record of the disciplinary sanction was automatically expunged after three years (see paragraph 41 above). While the applicant’s life was inevitably negatively affected by his losing a salary (see, mutatis mutandis ,   Pişkin v. Turkey , no.   33399/18, § 185, 15 December 2020; Xhoxhaj v. Albania , no. 15227/19, §   363, 9 February 2021; and Ţîmpău v. Romania , no. 70267/17, §   159, 5   December 2023), the Court reiterates that the financial element of the dispute does not make Article 8 of the Convention automatically applicable (see Denisov , cited above, § 122; Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , no.   36889/18, §   86, 20 October 2020; and Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria , no.   40072/13, §   137, 19 October 2021). As for the broader context of losing a job, the applicant has not submitted any evidence in support of his claim (see paragraph 64 in fine below), that it was impossible for him to resume exercising his profession, for instance, by securing employment at another school (see, mutatis mutandis , Calmanovici v. Romania , no.   42250/02, §§   137-39, 1 July 2008, and contrast, mutatis mutandis , Juszczyszyn , cited above, §§ 235-36; Pişkin , cited above, § 186; and Ţîmpău , cited above , §§   160-61). The applicant had a long record of excelling in his roles as a teacher and a form tutor (see paragraph 7 above). Moreover, it has not been argued that the grounds for his dismissal were made public or that substantial damage to his professional or social reputation were caused (compare Denisov , cited above, § 130, and contrast Gražulevičiūtė , cited above, § 109). The Court cannot therefore conclude that the impugned disciplinary sanction affected the applicant’s long-term opportunities for establishing and maintaining his professional life to the extent that is deemed necessary under the consequence-based approach (see Ballıktaş Bingöllü , cited above, §   60; and contrast, mutatis mutandis , Budimir v. Croatia , no. 44691/14, §   47, 16   December 2021; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine , nos. 27276/15 and   33692/15, § 86, 12 January 2023). 57.     Having measured the applicant’s subjective perceptions against the objective background and having assessed the material and non‑material impact of his dismissal on the basis of the evidence presented before the Court, it has to be concluded that the effects of the dismissal on the applicant’s private life did not go beyond the “threshold of seriousness” necessary for an issue to be raised under Article 8 (see, mutatis mutandis , Denisov , cited above, § 133). Consequently, Article 8 does not apply to the facts of the present case. 58.     It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 is incompatible ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.    Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 59.     In the light of the above considerations, and noting, on the one hand, that Article 14 of the Convention has no independent existence (see, among many other authorities, Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 123, 19   December 2018), and, on the other hand, that the scope of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 may be more extensive than that of Article   8 taken alone (see Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], no. 78630/12, §§ 47-48 and 62, 20   October 2020, and Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , nos. 56928/19 and   2   others, §§ 136 and 145-47, 14 September 2023), the Court finds that the situation complained of fell within the ambit of Article 8, given that the applicant’s blog activity was an expression of his intimate life. As such, Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, is thus applicable to the facts of the case at hand. 60.     The applicant alleged that he had been discriminated against on account of his sexual orientation. In view of its analysis regarding the reason ‑ based approach to the issue of the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention (see paragraphs 47-50 above), and the conclusion it has reached in this respect (see paragraph 51 above), the Court considers that it cannot be said that the real or crucial reason for the applicant’s dismissal was his sexual orientation. Consequently, there is no basis for concluding that he has been discriminated against on that ground. 61.     Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3   (a) and   4 of the Convention.       ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION read alone and in conjunction with article 14 of the convention 62.     The applicant complained, relying on Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention, that his disciplinary dismissal had also breached his right to freedom of expression and the prohibition of discrimination. To that end, he essentially argued that the authorities had been wrong to conclude that his blog was unethical, and, again, that they had discriminated against him on the grounds of his sexual orientation. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows, in so far as relevant: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...” Article 14 of the Convention is cited at paragraph 42 above.    Admissibility 63.     The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.    Merits      The parties’ submissions 64 .     The applicant argued that the disciplinary proceedings against him had been motivated by prejudice against persons of homosexual orientation. He also denied that his blog had contained pornographic content or that it had been accessed by his students. As to the severity of the sanction imposed, he argued that his dismissal from his school had prevented him, in practice, from resuming his profession as no other school establishment would want to hire him given his disciplinary record. 65 .     The Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his freedom of expression pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the morals of students and that it was proportionate. In particular, teaching was a pu