CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 février 2025

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ROMANIA (Application no. 45430/19)     JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Positive obligations • Private life • Dismissal of defamation action brought by police officers against a private individual for a post uploaded on Facebook, along with their photograph taken on a public street while performing the duties and the name of one of them • Art   8 applicable as requisite level of seriousness attained • Domestic courts’ balancing exercise between competing rights at stake in conformity with criteria laid down in Court’s case-law   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 25 February 2025   FINAL   25/05/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Toth and Crișan v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Lado Chanturia , President ,   Faris Vehabović,   Tim Eicke,   Ana Maria Guerra Martins,   Anne Louise Bormann,   Sebastian Răduleţu,   András Jakab , judges , and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   45430/19) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Romanian nationals, Mr   Zoltán-Ovidiu Toth and Mr   Alin Crișan (“the applicants”), on 8   August 2019; the decision to give notice to the Romanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint under Article   8 of the Convention concerning the alleged violation of the applicants’ right to respect for their private life and reputation and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 4 February 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The applicants complained of a violation of their right to respect for their private life and reputation because the domestic courts had allegedly failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake following an allegedly defamatory post uploaded by a private individual on Facebook. They relied on Article   8 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     Mr   Zoltán-Ovidiu Toth (“the first applicant”) and Mr   Alin Crișan (“the   second applicant”) were born in 1982 and 1974, respectively, and live in Oradea. They were represented before the Court by Mr   C.D. Rusu, a lawyer practising in Oradea. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms   O.F. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.     The applicants are police officers working for the Oradea local police force ( Poliţia Locală Oradea ). The online post concerning the applicants and the proceedings against them 6 .     On 8   April 2016 the applicants fined C.T. and her mother for a minor offence in connection with the disposal of household waste and with the conduct that those two private individuals had displayed towards them. As indicated in the judgment of Oradea District Court (“the District Court”) (see   paragraph 15 below) C.T. had challenged the fine and the national courts had established that (i)   she had deposited the household waste in an unauthorised location, but she had not insulted the applicants and (ii)   the   applicants had behaved inappropriately towards C.T. In reaching these conclusions, the competent courts had relied on testimonial evidence and a forensic expert report submitted by C.T., which indicated that on the date of the incident she had sustained bodily injuries which had not required a medical treatment. According to evidence in the case-file, the national courts had reduced the fine imposed on C.T. 7 .     On the same date (8 April 2016) C.T. used her personal Facebook account to post a text accompanied by the applicants’ photograph to the public Facebook group “Oradea is us” ( Oradea suntem noi ). The post read as follows: “Today the local police [ poliţia comunitară ] have screwed up [ au facut-o de oaie ] once again. I went downstairs [holding my] child in [my] arms to take him to the car and after [five] minutes my mother also innocently came downstairs with the [household] waste. She was unaware that each [owner’s] association has its own bins. I explained [this] to her and I told her to leave the bag [with the household waste] next to the bin where [she] was standing, intending to take it to our courtyard myself, obviously, after placing [my] child in the car. It was logical that I was not going to leave it in the middle of the road!!!!!! In the meantime, the local police showed up [and] they jumped on us as [if they were] on fire [ arși ]. I explained to them what the problem was, but, eager [to start] a scandal, they did not [want to] understand!!!! ‘Mister [ Domnule ], wait [for five] minutes while I put [my] child [in the car], then I’ll come [back] to put the [household] waste where it should [go]!’ NO, they wanted [me to provide them with] my [ID immediately], to drop everything and to stand to attention!! They did not even identify themselves until the moment that I said I was calling 112 [emergency services]. We were terribly scared! They verbally assaulted and pushed us. [They] did not let my mother drive away in [her] car ... it was terrifying! How [can anyone] behave like that with [two] women and a child? Do they really have so little dignity and respect towards people????!!!!!!!!” 8 .     In the photograph, the applicants were depicted standing next to one another dressed in their police uniforms, with the first applicant holding a pen, a notebook and a mobile phone in his hand. Some cars, buildings and an unidentified person could be seen in the background. 9 .     C.T.’s post received ninety-two comments and was “liked” by around 160   people. According to the applicants, it was also shared seventy-three times. In their view, that meant that the post was viewed more than 100,000   times, given that each user had more than 200   “friends” and that the online group in question had more than 24,000   members. 10 .     Some of the people who commented on the post and engaged in the ensuing discussion about the event reported by C.T. referred to the applicants and to local police officers in general in a disrespectful manner, using expressions such as “scumbags”, “impostors”, “idiots”, “stupid”, “hillbillies”, “di.ks amounting to nothing”, “uneducated”, “crazy” and “worthless simpletons”. One of the people said that he wished that he could meet “specimens” like the applicants “to wipe the arrogance off their faces ( să le scot figurile din cap )” and that, if the “scumbags” had been beaten up, they would have called the emergency services. One person stated that the second applicant appeared in several YouTube videos committing abuses. Three other people said that they had been fined by the applicants, that they had witnessed the second applicant acting overzealously and been given a hard time by him even though he had been off duty at the time, or that they had seen him harass a less-abled woman. One person said that she knew the applicants personally and was surprised by the information in C.T.’s post. 11 .     In one of her replies to the comments (see paragraphs   9-10 above), C.T. disclosed the second applicant’s full name after she was asked about his identity. In another reply to a third-party comment effectively condoning the applicants’ alleged reactions to C.T.’s behaviour, she denied that her intention had been to defame the applicants. 12 .     On 19   August 2016 and on an unspecified date, respectively, the relevant authorities discontinued the disciplinary and criminal proceedings brought either by C.T. or by her mother against the applicants in connection with the events of 8   April 2016 (see paragraphs   6-7 above), apparently for lack of sufficient evidence (see paragraph   17 below). Action in tort brought by the applicants First-instance proceedings The applicants’ claim 13 .     On 14   February 2017 the applicants brought an action in tort against C.T., claiming 50,000   Romanian lei (RON) (11,111   euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and asking the court to order her to publish an apology in local newspapers and on the page of the Facebook group “Oradea is us”. They complained that C.T.’s post had defamed them and had affected their reputation and image because it had spread information which distorted reality, disseminated their photograph and the second applicant’s full name publicly to a wide audience without their consent and instigated and generated offensive third-party comments and threats. 14 .     C.T.’s allegations that they had verbally and physically assaulted her and her mother were untrue. In fact, it had been C.T. who had been aggressive towards them and it had been her mother who had insulted them and had almost injured them as she drove away in her car. Moreover, C.T. had denied that she had been physically assaulted and had refused to lodge a complaint against the applicants when she had been questioned in that connection by other police officers who had been dispatched to the scene after C.T.’s telephone call to the emergency services (see paragraph 7 above). Furthermore, because of C.T.’s actions, the applicants’ family and friends had questioned their professional conduct and behaviour towards women, and random individuals had stopped them on the street and questioned them about the alleged abuses committed by them. Their employer had also opened disciplinary proceedings against them. The first-instance judgment 15 .     On 26   June 2017 the District Court dismissed the action in tort. It held that the applicants had standing to bring the proceedings against C.T. because she had posted their photograph and identified the second applicant by his full name. Nevertheless, it found that the conclusions of the national courts described in paragraph 6 above had a res judicata effect. 16 .     Moreover, even though the post had generated some trivial third-party comments about the applicants, it had not harmed their image. In fact, when some of the third parties had started using potentially offensive expressions, C.T. had clearly stated that she had intended only to report on the event in dispute and not to offend anyone. Second-instance proceedings The applicants’appeal 17 .     The applicants appealed against the judgment and contested the District Court’s assessment of the case. They argued that their image had been harmed by the post and not by what had happened at the scene of the events of 8   April 2016. Accordingly, the findings of the courts during the proceedings brought by C.T. against the fine imposed on her had been irrelevant to the action in tort which they had brought against her. Moreover, the applicants reiterated the arguments they had raised before the District Court (see paragraphs   13-14 above) and pointed to the fact that the courts had upheld the fine imposed on C.T. (see paragraph 6 in fine above)   and the fact that the disciplinary and criminal proceedings opened against them in respect of the alleged events reported by C.T. (see paragraph 12 above) had been closed by the relevant authorities on the grounds that the evidence against the applicants had been contradictory. They lastly argued that C.T. could have foreseen the results of her actions and that, in accordance with the case-law of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, any statement posted on Facebook could have legal consequences. The second-instance judgment 18 .     On 12   January 2018 the Bihor County Court (“the County Court”) dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the District Court’s judgment. It held that the applicants should have been mindful of the context and place in which they were operating when they had fined C.T., and of the type of relationship that had existed between them and her at that time. 19 .     Also, the post had not initiated a defamatory campaign against them. It had merely reported C.T.’s perception of the event in which she had been directly involved. Last-instance proceedings The applicants’ appeal on points of law 20.     The applicants appealed on points of law against the judgment and largely reiterated the arguments raised before the County Court (see   paragraph   17 above). 21.     Moreover, they contended that none of the information posted on Facebook had been censored, even though C.T. could have deleted any insults or inappropriate images. She was not a journalist and neither she nor the courts could rely in her defence on the rules applicable to journalistic freedom of expression. She was a private individual and therefore was under an obligation to adjust her public speech accordingly. Her actions had exceeded the limits of her right to freedom of expression and had been a way of exercising revenge on the police. The last-instance judgment 22 .     By a final judgment of 28   February 2019, the Oradea Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law and upheld the County Court’s judgment. Referring to principles deriving from the Court’s case-law on freedom of expression and to the provisions of the Convention and the Civil Code concerning the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life, reputation and image, the Court of Appeal held that the principles developed in the Court’s case-law in respect of journalistic or political speech were also applicable to the present case. 23 .     It also held that the post had been a way for C.T. to publicly manifest her right to freedom of expression with the intent to bring her message to the attention of a large number of users of the Facebook group. However, her post had not exceeded the limits of the aforementioned right afforded to her. It had been prompted by, and was an expression of, her momentary dissatisfaction at the applicants’ conduct while they had been exercising their professional duties and it expressed her opinion about the manner in which they had accomplished those duties. It was also supported by a sufficient factual basis. 24 .     C.T.’s right to use the social media network in question as a means of communication could not be contested. Similarly, she could not be held responsible for the potential consequences of the comments made by third parties following her post, because every individual was responsible only for his or her own statements   – given that civil liability was personal   – and the conditions for third-party liability had not been met in her case. Moreover, the information disseminated by her post had been accurate and had been reviewed with res judicata effect (see paragraphs 6 and 15 above). 25 .     The Court of Appeal held that the post did not include offensive content and that all the indecent expressions used in the comments had been posted by third parties. C.T. could not have banned third parties from writing defamatory comments on the social media website in question or deleted those comments, and the closure of the proceedings brought by her against the applicants (see paragraph   12 above) could not engage her civil liability. Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism were wider in the applicants’ case than in cases concerning ordinary citizens because the applicants were employees of a public service and the proper functioning of the State itself was at stake. The fact that C.T. had also disseminated the applicants’ photograph and the second applicant’s name could not have affected them in any way, given that they were public persons and the photograph in question did not portray them in an undignified or indecent manner. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 26.     The relevant provisions of the Civil Code regarding liability in tort and for personal actions, read as follows: Article   1349 “(1)     Every person has a duty to respect the rules of conduct that the law or local custom imposes and not to interfere, through [his or her] actions or inaction, with the rights or legitimate interests of other people. (2)     Any person who has legal capacity and who violates this obligation shall be liable for all damage caused and must provide reparation in full. ...” Article   1357 “(1)     A person who causes damage to another by an unlawful act committed with intent shall provide reparation. (2)     A person who causes damage shall be liable for any harm caused.” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 27.     The applicants complained that when dismissing the proceedings they had brought against C.T. on account of her post and its content, the information disclosed and the public reaction it had generated, the domestic courts had failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake and to adequately protect their right to respect for their private life and reputation. They relied on Article   8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility Applicability of Article   8 of the Convention (a)    The parties’ submissions 28.     The Government argued that the applicants could not complain of a violation of their right to respect for their private life, since they had been acting in their professional capacity when C.T. had taken their photograph. 29.     The applicants disagreed and argued that the material and information posted by C.T. without their consent to a wide audience, along with the subsequent offensive comments, had affected their reputation and public image as ordinary individuals. Their status as public servants and the fact that they had been acting in their professional capacity was irrelevant in this context. (b)    The Court’s assessment 30.     The Court reiterates that the notion of private life is a broad concept, not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name, photograph, or physical and moral integrity. This concept also includes the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention. The guarantee afforded by Article   8 of the Convention in this regard is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his or her relations with other human beings. There is thus a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life. In certain circumstances, even where a person is known to the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect for his or her private life. Publication of a photograph may thus interfere with a person’s private life even where that person is a public figure (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v.   France [GC], no.   40454/07, §§   83-85, ECHR   2015 (extracts), with further references). 31.     It has been accepted by the Court that Article   8 encompasses a person’s right to protection of his or her reputation as part of the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG v.   Germany [GC], no.   39954/08, §   83, 7   February 2012, and Țiriac v.   Romania , no.   51107/16, §   60, 30   November 2021). Also, individual members of a public body who could be “easily identifiable” in view of the limited number of its members and the nature of the allegations made against them may be entitled to bring defamation proceedings in their own name (see OOO Memo v.   Russia , no.   2840/10, §   47, 15   March 2022). 32.     In order for Article   8 to come into play, however, the attack on a person’s honour and reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and must have been carried out in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG , cited   above, §   83). This requirement covers social reputation in general as well as professional reputation in particular (see Denisov v.   Ukraine [GC], no.   76639/11, §   112, 25   September 2018, and Țiriac , cited above, §   60). 33.     The Court notes that the courts acknowledged that the provisions of domestic law and the Convention and the principles developed in the Court’s case-law – including in the context of political or journalistic speech – concerning the right to respect for private life and reputation were applicable to the applicants’ case and that the applicants had standing to complain of a violation of their right to respect for their private life and reputation and to bring defamation proceedings against C.T. (see paragraphs 15-16, 18-19, and   22-25 above). 34.     The Court finds no reason to hold otherwise. Given the nature of the accusations brought against the applicants and the particular importance attached to the publication of a person’s photograph and, in certain circumstances, of his or her name (see paragraphs 55 and 79 below) under the Court’s case-law, it considers that C.T.’s acts and their consequences described in paragraph 57 below attained the requisite level of seriousness for Article   8 of the Convention to come into play. It follows that this provision applies to the present case. Other grounds of inadmissibility 35.     The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicants 36 .     The applicants argued that the mere fact that the national authorities had put in place a legal framework capable of providing adequate protection against alleged violations of their right to respect for their private life and reputation had been insufficient to ensure compliance with the State’s obligation to protect them against such violations. 37 .     The national courts had failed in their duty to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake and to adequately protect their above-mentioned rights. This was all the more so given that as public servants they were banned from entering conversations on social media platforms and countering misinformation. The only way they could remedy the damage done to them was by bringing court proceedings. 38.     The information disseminated by C.T. was untruthful and had been disseminated to a very wide audience on Facebook which, according to the national courts’ practice, was a public space. Even though C.T. could foresee the results of her actions, she had chosen to pursue them. Therefore, C.T. had not acted in good faith and had not simply informed the local community about an event in which she had been involved. 39 .     The Government’s arguments described in paragraphs   45-46 below were irrelevant. Asking for the removal of the post and of the third-party comments at issue would have served no purpose given that the damage to the applicants’ reputation had already been done and that they were free to choose the redress which they considered best suited to the protection of their rights. The information in question had received maximum attention immediately after it was posted and its visibility, impact and consequences had only decreased over time. Even though they had indeed not suffered any specific professional consequences, their image had been affected given the questions they had received from strangers, friends and acquaintances about their conduct and the proceedings opened by their employer (see   paragraph   14 in fine above). 40.     Lastly, the applicants argued that when examining their case the Court had to take account at the very least of its own findings in the case of Sanchez v.   France ([GC], no.   45581/15, §§   160-62 and 183-85, 15   May 2023), whose outcome had legitimised their decision to lodge their application with the Court. (b)    The Government 41.     The Government argued that the national authorities had put in place a legal framework capable of providing adequate protection against alleged violations of the applicants’ right to respect for their private life and reputation. Moreover, the national courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake and had provided relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions. 42.     They had assessed the circumstances of the case with reference to the relevant principles and rules flowing from the Court’s case-law. They had held that the post had expressed C.T.’s opinion regarding the manner in which the applicants had performed their professional duties; had contained accurate information and used inoffensive language. They had also considered that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider in the applicants’ case than in cases concerning ordinary citizens because the applicants were public servants and their actions reflected on the proper functioning of the State. Furthermore, the courts had taken the view that the lawful conditions for C.T. to be held liable for the third parties’ comments had not been met. 43 .     The reasons given by the Court in the case of Sanchez , cited above, were inapplicable in the present case given the completely different factual circumstances. The applicants were not politicians. Nevertheless, they had not denied in their submissions before the national courts that they were public figures and could therefore be the subject of some public debate and their work could be more exposed to criticism. 44 .     Even though C.T. was not a journalist, the information contained in her post had been of public interest, had concerned an event in which she had been involved and had not been disseminated with bad intentions. The applicants had not been photographed in a secretive manner or in circumstances connected to their private life and the photograph had been used within the context of a public debate. It had been posted to an online group with a limited number of members. The members of that group had clearly engaged in debate about problems faced by the local community in Oradea, given that C.T.’s post had also generated positive comments as far as the applicants’ actions were concerned. In addition, C.T. had expressly stated in one of her replies to a third-party comment that she had not intended to defame anyone through her actions. 45 .     There was no evidence that the applicants had suffered negative consequences on account of the post. They had not been punished or dismissed and their reputation had not been tarnished. The disciplinary proceedings brought against them (see paragraph   12 above) had been discontinued by the authorities and a simple online search revealed that no news outlets with a high circulation had reported on the events connected to the present case. The applicants’ allegations that they had been questioned by their friends and acquaintances about their conduct were insufficient to prove that they had suffered concrete negative consequences because of the post. 46 .     Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicants had not asked the courts to order the removal of C.T.’s post from Facebook along with the offensive third-party comments, even though they could have done so. It   therefore appeared that the action in tort brought by them had been driven primarily by a pecuniary interest. Nevertheless, the courts’ decision to refuse to make an award of damages in their case could not in and of itself have resulted in a violation of Article   8 of the Convention. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 47.     The Court reiterates that while the essential object of Article   8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. The boundary between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article   8 does not lend itself to precise definition; the applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the relevant competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see   Von   Hannover v.   Germany (no.   2) [GC], nos.   40660/08 and 60641/08, §§   98-99, ECHR   2012, and Țiriac , cited above, §   72). 48.     Article   10 of the Convention guarantees “everyone” the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas and no distinction is made according to the nature of the aim pursued or the role played by natural or legal persons in the exercise of that freedom. It applies not only to the content of information but also to the means of dissemination, since any restriction imposed on such means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information. Likewise, Article   10 guarantees not only the right to impart information but also the right of the public to receive it (see Cengiz and   Others v.   Turkey , nos.   48226/10 and 14027/11, §   56, ECHR   2015 (extracts)). 49.     Article   10 does not, however, guarantee a wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even in respect of coverage of matters of serious public concern (see Monica Macovei v.   Romania , no.   53028/14, §   80, 28   July 2020). Any person who exercises freedom of expression (i)   undertakes “duties and responsibilities” the scope of which depends on his or her situation and the technical means used (see Gîrleanu v.   Romania , no.   50376/09, §   92, 26   June 2018) and (ii)   must not overstep certain limits, particularly with regard to respect for the reputation and the rights of others (see Sanchez , cited above, §   149). The Court has therefore accepted that, in principle, any natural or legal person may be made the subject of various forms and degrees of individual or shared liability for defamatory or other types of unlawful speech in order to remedy effectively violations of personality rights (see, in the context of speech on the internet, Delfi AS v.   Estonia [GC], no.   64569/09, §   110, ECHR   2015, and Sanchez , cited above, §§   162-66, 183-85, 190, 192 ‑ 93, 201 and 204). 50.     Where the complaint raised before the Court is that rights protected under Article   8 have been breached as a consequence of the exercise by others of their right to freedom of expression, due regard should be had, when applying Article   8, to the requirements of Article   10 of the Convention (see   Țiriac , cited above, §   73, with further references), bearing in mind that as a matter of principle the rights guaranteed by Article   8 and Article   10 deserve equal respect and the outcome of an application should not, in principle, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article   8 or Article   10 of the Convention (see   Von Hannover , cited above, §   106, and   Axel Springer AG , cited above,   §   87). 51 .     Relevant criteria for balancing the right to respect for private life against the right to freedom of expression include the contribution to a debate of public interest; the degree of notoriety of the person affected; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the circumstances in which a photograph was taken; and the content, form and consequences of the publication (see   Von Hannover , cited above, §§   109 ‑ 13, and Hájovský v.   Slovakia , no.   7796/16, §   30, 1   July 2021). 52 .     In cases such as the instant case where the information was disseminated on the internet and generated third-party comments, certain other criteria may be relevant for the outcome of the balancing exercise and may therefore need to be taken into account. They include the status of the alleged perpetrator, his or her specific liability for the third parties’ comments, the steps taken by him or her in relation to those comments and the possibility of holding the authors of those comments liable instead (see   Sanchez , cited above, §§   179, 180, 190 and 202). 53.     In this connection the Court is also mindful of the fact that the internet has become one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression. It provides essential tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general interest (see   Vladimir Kharitonov v.   Russia , no.   10795/14, §   33, 23   June 2020, and Sanchez , cited above, §   158). In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general (see Times Newspapers   Ltd v.   the United Kingdom (nos.   1 and 2) , nos.   3002/03 and   23676/03, §   27, ECHR   2009). User-generated expressive activity on the internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression (see Delfi AS , cited above, §   110). 54.     The Court finds relevant, nevertheless, that the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms is certainly higher than that posed by the press, since unlawful speech, including hate speech and speech inciting violence, can be disseminated as never before, worldwide, in a matter of seconds, and sometimes remain persistently available online (see Delfi   AS , cited above, §§   110 and 133). 55 .     Moreover, although freedom of expression includes the publication of photographs, this is nonetheless an area in which the protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on particular importance, as the photographs may contain very personal or even intimate information about an individual and his or her family. In the cases in which the Court has had to balance the protection of private life against freedom of expression, it has always stressed the contribution made by photographs or articles in the press to a debate of general interest. Nevertheless, it has made a distinction between reporting facts   – even controversial ones   – capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society, and reporting details of the private life of an individual who does not exercise official functions (see Hájovský , cited above, §   31). Where the situation does not come within the sphere of any political or public debate and published photographs and accompanying commentaries relate exclusively to details of the person’s private life with the sole purpose of satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership, freedom of expression calls for a narrower interpretation (ibid.). 56 .     Lastly, the Court reiterates that in exercising its supervisory function, its task is not to take the place of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation are compatible with the provisions of the Convention relied on (see Axel Springer AG , cited above, §   86). Where the balancing exercise between the rights protected by Articles   8 and   10 of the Convention has been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (ibid., §   88, with further references). (b)    Application of those principles to the instant case 57 .     The Court notes that the applicants blamed C.T. for publicly disseminating their photograph and the second applicant’s full name to a wide audience on Facebook without their consent, while at the same time making untruthful remarks suggesting that the applicants had verbally and physically assaulted her and her mother, thus attracting offensive third-party comments (see paragraphs   13-14 above). 58.     The applicants appear to have accepted that the national authorities had put in place a legal framework capable of providing adequate protection against the alleged violation of their right to respect for their private life and reputation arising from the above-mentioned circumstances (see   paragraphs   36 and 39 above). Indeed, they were able to bring an action in tort against C.T. to claim compensation. 59.     The domestic courts examined the circumstances in which C.T.’s statements had been made and whether her liability was engaged. Nevertheless, the applicants disagreed with their decision. The Court must therefore review whether the national courts struck a fair balance between the competing rights at stake in conformity with the criteria laid down in its case ‑ law (see paragraphs   51-52 above). (i)       Contribution to a debate of general interest 60.     The Court reiterates that there is little scope under Article   10 §   2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest. The margin of appreciation of States is thus reduced where a debate on a matter of public interest is concerned (see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v.   Finland [GC], no.   931/13, §   167, 27   June 2017). 61 .     The national courts found that C.T.’s post intended to bring to the attention of the Facebook group “Oradea is us” her position about a matter which ultimately raised questions about the proper functioning of the State (see paragraphs   22-25 above), namely the allegedly abusive and violent manner in which the applicants conducted themselves as local police officers while carrying out their professional obligations (see paragraph   7 above). Given that in working as law-enforcement officials the applicants constantly engaged in public activities and were bound by a duty to serve and protect, and that their profession was ultimately one which involved public trust, the public had a right to be informed about any possible abusive conduct on their part. 62.     Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that the use of force by State agents, particularly where it relates to allegations of police brutality or misconduct, was inherently a matter of significant public interest (see Dyundin v.   Russia , no.   37406/03, §   33, 14   October 2008, and Bild GmbH &   Co. KG v.   Germany , no.   9602/18, §§   32-34, 31   October 2023). 63 .     C.T.’s post therefore concerned a matter of public concern, and the Court sees no reason to doubt that it was capable of contributing to a debate of general interest on the moral and professional integrity of local police officers and the proper functioning of certain public services. (ii)     Degree of notoriety of the person affected and his or her prior conduct 64 .     The Court reiterates that whilst a private individual unknown to the public may claim particular protection of his or her right to private life, the same is not true of political or public figures in respect of whom the limits of critical comment are wider, as they are inevitably and knowingly exposed to public scrutiny and must therefore display a greater degree of tolerance (see   Monica Macovei , cited above, §   79). 65 .     It cannot be said, however, that public servants knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and deed to the extent to which politicians do and should therefore be treated on an equal footing with the latter when it comes to criticism of their actions (see Stancu and   Others v.   Romania , no.   22953/16, §   116, 18   October 2022, and   Bild   GmbH & Co. KG , cited above, §   33). Public servants must enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks and it may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive, abusive or defamatory attacks or unfounded accusations when on duty (see Chernysheva v.   Russia (dec.), no.   77062/01, 10   June 2004, and Stancu and Others , cited above, §   115). Nonetheless, public servants acting in an official capacity are subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens (see Mamère v.   France , no.   12697/03, §   27, ECHR   2006 ‑ XIII). A certain degree of immoderation may fall within those limits (see Chkhartishvili v.   Georgia , no.   31349/20, §   56, 11   May 2023), particularly where it involves a reaction to what is perceived as unjustified or unlawful conduct on the part of public servants (see Savva Terentyev v.   Russia , no.   10692/09, §   75, 28   August 2018). 66.     The Government have pointed out, and the applicants have not argued otherwise, that they had not denied in their submissions before the national courts that they were public persons (see paragraph 43 above). Moreover, the courts (i)   held that the applicants were public persons and (ii)   acknowledged that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider in their case, essentially because they were public servants (see paragraph   25 above). 67 .     As regards the applicants’ status as public persons, the Court notes that it has found in the specific case of ordinary police officers that they could not be considered public figures in the same sense as politicians or any other persons who, through their acts or their position, have entered the public arena, as long as the officers had merely acted in their official capacity, without seeking public attention (see Bild GmbH &   Co. KG , cited above, §   32). 68.     In the applicants’ case, none of the available evidence suggests that they sought to be in the public eye or to receive public attention either before or after C.T. posted he