CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 11 mars 2025

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She was represented before the Court by Mr K.A. Anfinsen, a lawyer practising in Kolbjørnsvik. 2.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms H.L. Busch, of the Attorney General’s Office (Civil Matters), assisted by Mr B. Snipsøyr, an advocate at the same office. The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 4.     X was born in the region of Darfur in Sudan in 1989. The applicant was born in Sudan in 1997. 5 .     X arrived in Norway as an asylum-seeker in 2009. He was granted temporary residence in 2010 and became a Norwegian citizen in 2016. During a visit to Sudan and a longer stay there in 2017 he met the applicant and they married in 2018. 6 .     In March 2019 the applicant applied for a residence permit for Norway on the basis that she was married to X. She stated in her application, which she submitted to the Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, that she had no education. According to the information she provided, she had first met X in August 2017 in the Mayo area of Khartoum. Before they married in 2018, the only time the two of them had spent together had been during that same month, when she was 20 and X was 28. 7.     On 22 March 2019 the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration ( Utlendingsdirektoratet ) dismissed the application on the grounds that there was a minimum age requirement of twenty-four years for the permit because the marriage had not taken place prior to X’s entry to Norway or while both parties held a residence permit for Norway. This requirement was set out in section 41a of the Immigration Act (see paragraph 27 below) and had not been fulfilled. The Directorate did not find any basis for exempting her from the age requirement, as it did not find it obvious that the marriage had been voluntary, which was the condition for exemption. 8 .     On 2 April 2019 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Immigration Appeals Board ( Utlendingsnemnda ) against the Directorate’s decision. She provided more details about her relationship with X. She stated that while X had been visiting Sudan in 2017, he had rented a room in her brother’s house, which was where they had first met. They were not related and X had asked her brother for permission to marry her. After X’s visit, the two of them had communicated by messaging each other and after a while they had agreed that they would get married. The applicant did not provide any further details or documentation about the proposal. She stated that she had agreed to marry X without any form of coercion or pressure. 9 .     On 14 October 2019 the Immigration Appeals Board upheld the Directorate’s decision. The Board pointed out that the applicant and X came from an area where there were forced marriages and that they were therefore at risk of being subjected to forced marriage. It referred to country information from the US Department of State and the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre ( Landinfo ) and concluded that it was not obvious that the marriage had been voluntary, and therefore the twenty-four-year age requirement applied and the applicant could not be granted a residence permit. 10 .     On 25 October 2019 the applicant applied to the Oslo City Court ( tingrett ) for a review of that decision. She submitted that the Board’s decision should be revoked because it was “obvious” that her marriage had been voluntary. She further complained that the proceedings had not been conducted correctly, and the decision had violated Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. She also provided some more information on the facts of the case, including that X had been in Sudan in 2017 to visit his parents. She reiterated that X had asked her brother for permission to marry her. According to the applicant, her brother was the eldest child of the family and the right person to decide that question, since her mother had died and her father had remarried. 11 .     On 16 and 17 April 2020 the Oslo City Court conducted an oral hearing in the case. Both the applicant and X attended and gave evidence. An adviser from the Country of Origin Information Centre gave expert evidence about marriage traditions and the prevalence of forced marriages in Sudan. 12 .     On 27 May 2020 the Oslo City Court gave its judgment. It made a broad assessment of whether it had been obvious that the marriage of the applicant and X had been voluntary and concluded that this was not the case. It noted that the applicant and X were at a general risk of being subject to forced marriage. It made, among other things, the following observations: “Sudan is beyond doubt a country where forced marriage occurs. The court refers to the testimony of the regional adviser at Landinfo [G.J.S.]. He explained that, normally, marriage is a family matter. It is a question of an alliance between families. In some families, it is the woman herself who has made it clear who she wants to marry, and [the husband] is then presented to the family members, who must accept him. In other families, it is the family that proposes potential marriage candidates, and to varying degrees listens to the woman’s wishes. In all cases, the woman must have permission, that is, formal acceptance, from her guardian. The guardian can be for example her father or brother, or whoever is considered the male head of the family. The adviser also referred to a report from the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo) ‘Theme note Sudan: Chastity, freedom of movement and violence against women’, which states, among other things, the following: ‘The ideal of a woman in Sudan dictates that girls and unmarried women should be pliant and obedient to older family members, especially men, and most of all to their father or husband. Being in open opposition to one’s father or parents or husband implies that the girl or woman has not internalised important norms, and is interpreted to mean that her guardians and relatives have done a poor job with her upbringing. Girls and women who are seen as stubborn, disobedient and headstrong will be expected by many to behave in a way that could jeopardise their family’s reputation.’” 13.     The City Court further stated that the significance of the requirement to consult the applicant’s brother before the marriage could be concluded was somewhat unclear. It also observed that there had been little contact between the couple before their marriage: X had been in Sudan for only a month and a half before the wedding took place and the extent of any electronic contact between them remained uncertain. Furthermore, the City Court noted that the applicant had only been twenty years old when she met X, and that she had neither education nor employment, which suggested a limited degree of independence from her family. 14 .     Moreover, the City Court found the statements made by the applicant and X inconsistent, and that in some circumstances their answers had been evasive and vague. It stated: “This applies, among other things, to how the parties met. [X] claimed that [the applicant] was staying with her brother when he arrived and that he was renting a room from him. [The applicant] claimed that she only visited her brother when [X] lived there. [The applicant] also claimed that she lived with her sister. According to the regional adviser [G.J.S], this is not very likely, since two unmarried women would not live alone together in Sudan. As for the contact between the parties when [X] was in Sudan, [X] claimed that they mostly met only in her brother’s apartment, and maybe once at a store. [The applicant], on the other hand, claimed that they met repeatedly, both indoors and outside. Regional adviser [G.J.S] explained that unmarried men and women would not be alone together. It would immediately bring dishonour upon the family if this were to happen. Furthermore, the explanations as to why [X] was in Khartoum differ slightly. [X] seemed to claim that he had no relatives in Khartoum, only a sister who lived just outside it. It later became clear that his brother lived there now and then. The subpoena states that [X] went to Khartoum to visit his parents. [The applicant] claimed that [X] has both a sister and a brother in Khartoum, but that does not seem to be correct.” 15.     On the basis of the above, the City Court did not find it obvious that the marriage had been voluntary and concluded that the Board’s decision to refuse the applicant a residence permit was valid. 16.     The City Court did not consider whether the applicant was within the jurisdiction of Norway within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, but found that there had been no violations of the applicant’s rights under the Convention. In that connection the following considerations were noted: “Based on the information contained in the evidence presented in court, there do not seem to be any insurmountable obstacles to family life in another country, such as Sudan. This is supported by the testimony of the regional adviser [G.J.S] of Landinfo, and the fact that [X] has been to Sudan several times over long periods without any problem. If the court has understood correctly, there were only certain areas in which he could not reside.” 17.     On 19 June 2020 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Oslo City Court’s judgment with the Borgarting High Court ( lagmannsrett – “the High Court”). She maintained that it was obvious that her marriage had been voluntary and that the decision to reject her application for a residence permit was invalid because it had violated her rights under the Convention. 18 .     While the case was pending on appeal before the High Court, the applicant turned twenty-four years old and therefore applied again for residence in Norway based on her marriage with X, since by then she had met the age requirement. A residence permit based on marriage to a Norwegian citizen was granted to her on 19 May 2021. 19 .     On 17 and 18 August 2021 the High Court heard the applicant’s appeal. The applicant, having moved to Norway by then, was present. Since she had been granted residence, her original claim for the revocation of the Board’s decision of 14   October 2019 (see paragraphs 9-10 above) was struck out since she no longer had any interest in the outcome of a review of the validity of the decision not to give her a right of residence. It was suggested that the applicant could replace her original claim with an application for a declaratory judgment stating that the previous rejection had violated her rights under the Convention. The applicant lodged such an application. 20.     On 14 September 2021 the High Court gave its judgment.   As part of its examination of the merits of the claim that the applicant’s Convention rights had been violated, it raised the issue of whether she had been protected by the Convention at the time of the relevant facts since when she had originally been refused residence permit for Norway she had been a foreigner residing abroad. 21 .     The High Court stated in that context that Article 1 of the Convention obliged the Contracting Parties to secure the rights defined in the Convention to everyone within their jurisdiction and that jurisdiction was normally limited to each State’s own territory. With reference to legal doctrine, it observed that there existed exceptional cases where a State would be responsible under the Convention for actions that had taken place or had effects outside its territory. Referring to Abdul Wahab Khan v.   the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 11987/11, 28 January 2014, the High Court stated that involvement in proceedings within a State was not in and of itself an exceptional circumstance that would automatically mean that the person involved was within the jurisdiction of that State. At the same time, in that decision the Court had held that the State’s positive obligations under Article   8 had some application to individuals located outside a State’s territory in cases concerning family reunification with a person who already resided in the State (ibid., § 27). 22.     The High Court went on to consider M.N. and Others v.   Belgium ((dec.) [GC], no. 3599/18, § 109, 5 May 2020) and the cases referred to therein ( Nessa and Others v. Finland (dec.), no. 31862/02, 6 May 2003; Orlandi and Others v. Italy , no. 26431/12, 14 December 2017; and Schembri v.   Malta (dec.), no. 66297/13, 19 September 2017). It noted, nonetheless, that jurisdiction had in fact not been an issue in any of them. 23.     On a further review of the Court’s case-law, the High Court stated that it found the question of whether the applicant had been protected by the Convention a difficult one. While the Court’s case-law showed that it was not sufficient for a person to be party to proceedings within a State in order to be within that State’s jurisdiction, the applicant had married a Norwegian citizen resident in Norway, which clearly indicated that she was within Norwegian jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention in so far as Articles 8 and 14 were concerned. At the same time, there was a distinction between family reunification and the establishment of family life, and the applicant and X had not had any pre-existing family life as had been the case in M.N. and Others v. Belgium (cited above, § 109). The applicant had no connection to Norway when her request for a residence permit was denied. She had been residing in her native Sudan, where she had met and married X, and they had not established cohabitation when she applied for, and was refused, a permit to reside in Norway. On the basis of the country adviser’s statement about the conditions in Sudan and the fact that X had spent time in Sudan on several occasions, the High Court also concluded that there were no insurmountable obstacles to the applicant and X establishing a family life in Sudan. 24.     On the basis of an overall assessment, the High Court concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances in the case before it that would extend Norway’s jurisdiction beyond its territory for the purposes of the Convention. The applicant had therefore not been protected by the Convention and on that basis the High Court found in favour of the State. 25.     On 24 September 2021 the applicant lodged an appeal against the High Court’s judgment with the Supreme Court. 26.     On 2 December 2021 the Supreme Court’s Appeals Committee ( Høyesteretts ankeutvalg ), in a summary decision, refused the applicant leave to appeal against the High Court’s judgment. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK Relevant domestic legislation and practice 27 .     Section 41a of the Law relating to the admission of foreign nationals into the realm and their stay here of 15 May 2008 ( utlendingsloven – “the Immigration Act”) reads as follows: Section 41a Twenty-four-year age requirement for family establishment “It is a condition for a residence permit under sections 40 (spouses) and 41 (cohabitants) that both parties are aged twenty-four or over, unless (a)     the marriage was entered into or cohabitation was established before the date of the sponsor’s entry into Norway, or (b)     the parties have entered into marriage or lived in an established cohabitation in Norway while both have held a residence permit or Norwegian or Nordic citizenship. Exceptions to this requirement may be made if it is obvious that the marriage or cohabitation is voluntary.” 28 .     On 6 December 2022 the Supreme Court of Norway gave a judgment in case HR-2022-2329-A, in which an application for a residence permit had been rejected because the applicant did not fulfil the requirement to be at least twenty-four years old in order to apply for a residence permit for family establishment under section 41a of the Immigration Act. The applicant in that case complained that the Immigration Appeals Board’s rejection of her residence permit application had breached her right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and that the rejection had also breached the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14. 29.     The Supreme Court explained in detail the reason for the age requirement for a residence permit for family establishment in the domestic legislation, the Norwegian authorities’ efforts to combat forced marriage and the international obligations incumbent on Norway in this respect, as well as the relevant jurisprudence of the Court. It concluded that the refusal of the residence permit in that case had been valid. It emphasised that the decision reasonably balanced the interests of the individual and those of society, and therefore did not violate Article 8 of the Convention. The age requirement and the exception in section 41a of the Immigration Act pursued the legitimate purpose of combating forced marriage and were rooted in clear international obligations, and the rejection of the applicant’s application for a residence permit had been for reasons of fact and had not been disproportionate or discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention. 30 .     Regarding the practice of the rule, the Supreme Court noted: “Administrative decisions from UNE [the Immigration Appeals Board] have been submitted which in my opinion support the view that the rule is generally practised in accordance with these assumptions. The decisions show that individual assessments are based on the specific circumstances in each case. There are examples of exceptions for spouses with a background from a region where forced marriage is a problem, even though the marriage does not conflict with traditional norms. An overview of the number of rejections and approvals under the exception rule during the period 2017–2022, broken down according to the applicant’s home country, supports this. For example, a total of forty-eight cases from Kosovo have been rejected, while exceptions were granted in nine cases during the same period. However, for some countries, such as Afghanistan, no exceptions were granted during the period.” 31 .     The applicant submitted two tables of statistics in support of her claim. They showed the number of rejections and approvals of residence permits by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) between 2017 and 2022. The first table showed the number of rejections on sections 40 (residence permit for spouses), 41 (residence permit for cohabitants), and 48 (residence permit to enter into a marriage) of the Immigration Act grounds by country of origin, where the reason for rejection was that the applicant was not eligible for exemption from the requirement to be at least twenty-four years old:     2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 (YTD) Total Afghanistan 30 30 13 2 2 2 79 Kosovo   3 33 12     48 Pakistan 19 16 1 3 3   42 Iraq 8 18 3 2   2 33 Somalia 3 7 6 3   2 21 Turkey 8 7 3 1   2 21 Eritrea 4 5 4 2 2 2 19 Syria 4 3 2 2 1 3 15 Stateless 4 5 4       13 Sri Lanka 3 4 3 2     12 Morocco 1 9 1 1     12 Russia 3 1     2 3 9 Iran 2 2 4       8 India 4 2         6 Ethiopia 2 1 1 1 1   6 Sudan 2 2 2       6 Other countries 7 12 14 4 2 5 44 Total 104 127 94 35 13 21 394   The second table showed the number of approvals in the same period and in relation to the same provisions the number of cases in which the applicant had been given an exemption from the requirement to be at least twenty-four years old:     2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 (YTD) Total Philippines 4 15 4 5 4 3 35 Thailand 8 11 7 4 2 3 35 USA 4 10 7 4 3 6 34 Brazil 1 11 8 4 4 2 30 Ukraine 4 2 4 6 2 3 21 Russia 1   5 2 5 1 14 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 4 3 2   1 11 Vietnam 2 1 5   1 1 10 North Macedonia   3 1 3 2 1 10 Kosovo 1 5 1 2     9 Colombia 1 1 3 2   1 8 Morocco 1 2 1 2 1   7 Serbia 2 1   1 1 1 6 Canada   2     2 1 5 Albania   1 2 2     5 Indonesia   2 2 1     5 Turkey 4       1   5 Other countries 8 25 13 7 8 10 71 Total 42 96 66 47 36 34 321   European and international legal framework European Union 32.     Article 4 paragraph 5 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22   September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ 2003 L   251, reads as follows: “In order to ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages Member States may require the sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age, and at maximum 21 years, before the spouse is able to join him/her.” United Nations 33 .     The relevant part of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948) reads as follows: Article 16 (2) “Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.” 34 .     The relevant parts of the United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (adopted on 7 November 1962 by General Assembly resolution 1763 A (XVII)) read as follows: Preamble “The Contracting States...should take all appropriate measures with a view to abolishing such customs, ancient laws and practices by ensuring, inter alia , complete freedom in the choice of a spouse...” Article 1   (1) “No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties”. 35.     The relevant part of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966 by General Assembly resolution 22001 (XXI)) reads as follows: Article 23 (3) “No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.” 36.     The relevant part of the United Nations Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted on 18   December 1979 by United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/180) reads as follows: Article 16 “1. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: ... b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent....” 37 .     The report “Global Estimates of Modern Slavery – Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, September 2022” ISBN (PDF)978-92-2-037483-2 by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Walk Free and the Organisation for Migration (IOM), gives up-to-date information on the prevalence of forced marriage worldwide. It claims that an estimated 22 million people are currently living in forced marriages and that the problem is increasing. In most cases, the force is exercised by family members, primarily parents, but also other relatives. The phenomenon is introduced as follows in the report: “Forced marriage is a complex and highly gendered practice. Although men and boys are also forced to marry, it predominantly affects women and girls. Forced marriages occur in every region of the world and cut across ethnic, cultural, and religious lines. The many drivers of forced marriage are closely linked to longstanding patriarchal attitudes and practices and are highly context specific.” According to the report, migration is one of several circumstances in which forced marriage commonly takes place. Although many people voluntarily migrate for marriage, the report also states that migration may create situations of vulnerability for certain groups. People may be intentionally deceived and trafficked into forced marriage or, once having migrated or while still on the journey, end up in situations where they cannot escape and are coerced into forced marriage. Girls and young women who are forced into marriages may also migrate to escape their husbands or parents. Council of Europe 38.     The relevant provision of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on 7 April 2011 (“the Istanbul Convention”), which entered into force in respect of Norway on 1   November 2017, reads as follows: Article 37 – Forced marriage “1 Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional conduct of forcing an adult or a child to enter into a marriage is criminalised. ....” 39 .     In its Resolution 1468 (2005) of 5 October 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe said: “1.   The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about the serious and recurrent violations of human rights and the rights of the child which are constituted by forced marriages and child marriages. 2.   The Assembly observes that the problem arises chiefly in migrant communities and primarily affects young women and girls. 3.   It is outraged by the fact that, under the cloak of respect for the culture and traditions of migrant communities, there are authorities which tolerate forced marriages and child marriages although they violate the fundamental rights of each and every victim. 4.   The Assembly defines forced marriage as the union of two persons at least one of whom has not given their full and free consent to the marriage. 5.   Since it infringes the fundamental human rights of the individual, forced marriage can in no way be justified. 6.   The Assembly stresses the relevance of United Nations General Assembly   Resolution 843 ( IX) of 17 December 1954 declaring certain customs, ancient laws and practices relating to marriage and the family to be inconsistent with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” COMPLAINTS 40.     The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the refusal to grant her a residence permit in Norway. She also complained, under Article 14 read with Article 8 of the Convention, that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race and national and social origins in the enjoyment of her rights under Article 8 of the Convention. THE LAW The Government’s preliminary objection 41.     The Government objected to the application on the ground that the applicant had not been within Norway’s jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention when the alleged violations had taken place. They submitted that she had been a Sudanese national residing in her native Sudan, and therefore not within Norway’s territorial jurisdiction. They further submitted that even if it were the case that family life could occasionally extend jurisdiction under the Convention in respect of an individual, it could not do so in the present case since the applicant had at no time had a pre ‑ existing family life in Norway that that State had ever been under an obligation to protect. The Government contended that the application therefore had to be declared inadmissible for being incompatible ratione   personae with the provisions of the Convention, as set out in Article   35 §   3   (a), and rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4. 42.     The applicant submitted in response that in cases relating to family reunification, under domestic law it was the foreign national and not the sponsor that had to apply to the domestic authorities. A person applying for a residence permit was not allowed to enter Norway before the permit had been granted. It was therefore also the foreign national that had to contest the decision domestically. The sponsor, in this case X, could, according to the applicant, have been joined as a party to the domestic proceedings, but this would also potentially have made X liable for legal costs in the event of unsuccessful proceedings. 43.     The applicant emphasised that she was legally married to X, a Norwegian citizen, and had by law been obliged to put herself under Norwegian jurisdiction when she had applied for a residence permit from abroad. She also pointed out that another case had recently been heard by the Supreme Court in which the appellant had entered Norway unlawfully and applied for family reunification in-country. The Government had not claimed that the Convention did not apply in that case, in contrast to her case, in which she had abided by the law and remained abroad until she was allowed to enter. 44 .     The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government’s jurisdiction argument since the present application is in any event inadmissible for the reasons below (compare I.A.A. and Others v.   the United Kingdom   (dec.), no.   25960/13, §§   26-27, 8   March 2016). Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention 45.     The applicant complained that the rejection of her application for a residence permit violated her right to respect for her family life as guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The parties’ arguments (a)    The Government 46.     The Government stressed that the right of States to admit and exclude aliens from their territory was one of the fundamental components of State sovereignty. The Court has consistently held that different principles apply to cases concerning the withdrawal of the residence right of a “settled migrant” and those of a foreign national seeking admission to a host country. In the case of foreign nationals seeking admission, the Court has examined whether a State has a positive obligation under Article 8 to grant a residence permit (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738/10, §§ 104-05, 3   October 2014 and the references therein). 47.     The Government explained that section 41a of the Immigration Act was based on thorough attempts by the legislature over several years to balance so far as possible the different interests of family reunification and protection against forced marriage. The legislature also considered views from several different parties and adjusted the content of their proposals based on those views. It also considered whether the provision might breach individuals’ Convention rights and found – after an extensive review – that it would not. 48.     The Government pointed out that the Supreme Court had recently made an extensive assessment of the disputed provision and its relationship to Convention rights in its judgment of 6 December 2022 (see paragraphs 28 ‑ 30 above). The merits of the present case had also been thoroughly considered by both the immigration authorities and the District Court, and both the applicant and her husband had given extensive oral statements in the consultation process. The nature of the case also pointed to a broad margin of appreciation being appropriate. 49.     According to the Government, the aim of the age requirement in section 41a of the Immigration Act was to combat forced marriages, and thus to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Forced marriages were a major problem worldwide and Norway was committed through a number of international instruments to implement measures combating them. There was international consensus that an age requirement was an effective measure to combat forced marriage. 50.     The Government further submitted that several aspects of section 41a of the Immigration Act were less strict than the age requirement in Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ 2003 L   251 and the domestic law in certain European Union countries, such as Denmark. Firstly, the provision in the Immigration Act only applied to residence permits for family establishment, not family reunification. Secondly, the provision in the Immigration Act contained an exception for marriages that were obviously voluntary. The Government further observed that the age requirement was only one of many measures implemented in Norway. The authorities had chosen to establish a high level of protection against forced marriage and had implemented several different measures to that effect. 51.     In sum, the Government submitted that the potential effects of forced marriage were so harmful that general measures to prevent such marriages justified any temporary delays in enabling the establishment of family life that might result from the age requirement. 52.     In the present case, the applicant applied for a residence permit on the basis of her marriage to a Norwegian citizen. The exception to the age requirement in section 41a and her Convention rights were carefully considered by both the immigration authorities and the District Court. The authorities made a broad assessment of all the facts of the case when considering whether it was “obvious” that the marriage had been voluntary so as to bring the applicant within the exception. Factors such as the applicant’s age; the fact that she and X were generally at risk of being subjected to forced marriage given their background; how they had met and spent time together before the marriage; their explanations concerning their relationship; their age and the age difference between them; and their education and employment were considered. As the parties had not established a family life in Norway prior to their marriage, the denial of the applicant’s application for residence did not interrupt their established family life. (b)    The applicant 53.     The applicant argued that the age restriction on the right to a residence permit to establish a family was not appropriate to achieve the only stated purpose of section 41a of the Immigration Act, namely the prevention of forced marriage. The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had commissioned a report on how to prevent forced marriage, which did not suggest that an age requirement was likely to be an effective measure. The restriction in question in the present case was therefore not sufficiently necessary in a democratic society to limit the statutory right to establish a family. 54.     The applicant further claimed that the standard of proof under domestic law that a marriage was not a forced marriage was extremely high, and no real consideration had been given to her application for a residence permit other than looking at her age and most importantly her country of origin. No interviews were conducted with her or X before or after she turned twenty-four. 55.     Although the restriction in question was temporary, as most applicants were ultimately granted residence when they reached the age of twenty-four, it nonetheless constituted a disproportionate intervention in their private lives because she and her husband had had to wait approximately two years before they could take up their family life in Norway. 56.     The applicant further argued that in the consultations leading to the drafting of the Immigration Act it had been assumed that the rule in section 41a would primarily affect people of certain nationalities, ethnicities, or religions. She provided statistics from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration on how many residence permits were rejected on the basis on section 41a of the Immigration Act (see paragraph 31 above), which in her view showed that applications from certain countries – such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan – had a 100% rejection rate. The applicant claimed that this indicated that section 41a was a tool for restricting immigration from certain countries and not primarily aimed at combating forced marriages. 57.     The applicant maintained that there had been no assessment of how effective the disputed rule was. When a twenty-one-year age requirement was proposed in the Official Norwegian Reports (NOU) in 2008, that had been based on Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ 2003 L   251. It was explicitly stated that it had been considered sensible to harmonise Norwegian law with EU law. The Government then decided that the twenty-four-year age requirement which applied in Denmark would be too strict, especially as it would affect all applicants for a residence permit. In this connection the applicant referred to the reports on Denmark by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, which had voiced concerns on the rules on family reunification and the age requirement in that country. 58.     The applicant further submitted that as a refugee, X should be awarded generally favourable treatment in family reunification matters. The applicant suggested that this point was also relevant to the Government’s suggestion that X could easily cohabit with his wife in Sudan until she reached twenty ‑ four years of age. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 59.     The Court reiterates at the outset that a State is entitled, as a matter of international law and subject to its treaty obligations, to control the entry of aliens into its territory and their residence there. The Convention does not guarantee the right of a foreign national to enter or to reside in a particular country (see Jeunesse , cited above §   100). 60.     Moreover, where immigration is concerned, Article 8 does not impose a general obligation on a State to respect a married couple’s choice of country for their matrimonial residence or to authorise family reunification on its territory. Nevertheless, in a case which concerns family life as well as immigration, the extent of a State’s obligations to admit relatives of persons residing in that State to its territory will vary according to the particular circumstances of the persons involved and the general interest, and is subject to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests involved. Factors to be taken into account in this context are the extent to which family life would be disrupted, the extent of the family ties in the Contracting State, whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of the foreign national concerned and whether there are further issues of immigration control (see Jeunesse , cited above, §   107, and M.A. v. Denmark [GC], no. 6697/18, § 132, 9   July 2021). 61.     Further elements that have been taken into account in the Court’s case law in this connection have been summarised in M.A. v. Denmark (cited above, § 134 and §§ 140-50). (b)    Application to the present case 62.     The Court notes that the applicant and X had not previously lived together at the time relevant to the domestic proceedings. Under domestic law they had therefore applied for a residence permit to allow them to establish their family in Norway and not for one for family reunification there, to which more lenient rules would apply. 63.     The Court further notes that the applicant and X contracted their marriage under Sudanese law. The validity of the marriage was never questioned by the domestic authorities in Norway. Indeed, neither the immigration authorities nor the courts have concluded that their marriage had been a forced marriage as they ultimately granted the applicant’s residence permit as soon as she fulfilled the age requirement (see paragraph 18 above). Instead, it was only found that it had not been “obvious” that the marriage was voluntary for the purposes of the exception under section 41a of the 2008 Immigration Act. This distinction is crucial, as it impacts the scope of the assessment and the standards applied in evaluating the applicant’s claim. 64.     Since the concept of “family life” must at the very least include relationships that arise from a lawful and genuine marriage (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom , 28 May 1985, § 62, Series   A no.   94), the Court proceeds on the assumption that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention. Irrespective of whether the present complaint is assessed from the aspect of the positive or the negative obligations under the said provision, the core issue to examine is whether when refusing the applicant’s first request for residence permit on the basis of section 41a of the Immigration Act, the authorities struck a fair balance between the competing interests (compare M.A. v.   Denmark , cited above, § 165, and B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , nos. 13258/18 and 3   others, §   93, 4 July 2023). On the one hand, the applicant’s wish to join her husband, a Norwegian national residing in Norway, as soon as possible. On the other hand, there is the State’s duty, including obligations flowing from international law commitments, to prevent forced marriages effectively. 65.     In its assessment, the Court will not engage in an abstract review of the domestic legislation or the statutory age requirement, but will focus on the manner in which they were applied to the circumstances of the present case. 66 .     The Court observes that section 41a of the Immigration Act allows persons wishing to come to Norway to establish a family to obtain a residence permit if they can prove that the marriage was entered into voluntarily, and provides that they will in any event obtain a residence permit when they reach the age of twenty-four. In other words, the statutory age requirement of twenty-four-years is not a blanket ban on the granting of a residence permit to younger persons but allows for an individual assessment on a case-by-case basis (contrast M.A. v. Denmark , cited above, §§ 192-93). This framework ensures flexibility in addressing individual cases while upholding the broader policy goal of preventing forced marriages. 67 .     The Court further observes that such an individual assessment took place in the applicant’s case. Although there was no initial interview, both the applicant and X were heard before the City Court. In addition, an adviser from the Country of Origin Information Centre gave expert evidence about marriage traditions and the practice of forced marriages in Sudan (see paragraph 11 above). The domestic court found the statements of the applicant and X to be inconsistent, evasive and vague and was thus not convinced that it had been “obvious” that their marriage had been voluntary (see paragraph   14 above). The Court sees no reason to depart from the specific findings of the domestic authorities as they were neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable. 68.     The Court further observes that the applicant lodged her first application for a residence permit in March 2019 and was ultimately granted a residence permit on 19 May 2021, as soon as she met the age requirement (see paragraph 18 above). Considering what was at stake, a waiting period of just over two years could not be considered excessive (compare M.T. and Others v.   Sweden , no.   22105/18, §   84, 20 October 2022). 69.     What is more, it transpires from the facts of the case that although X had initially arrived in Norway as an asylum seeker and had been granted temporary residence on that basis (see paragraph 5 above) he subsequently obtained permanent residence and later became a Norwegian citizen. He had stayed in Sudan on several occasions and for longer periods of time, which is how he met the applicant (see paragraphs 6, 8 and 16 above). The fact that X had visited Sudan multiple times lends credibility to the Government’s argument that there were no obstacles preventing X from travelling to Sudan as he had done so on several occasions. In those circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court agrees with the domest