CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 25 mars 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s434D37A9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB6A7F5BF { width:17.54pt; display:inline-block } .sB179EDE2 { width:121.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 29790/20 Saulius VELEČKA and Marina BUI-VELEČKIENĖ against Lithuania   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 25   March   2025 as a Committee composed of:   Davor Derenčinović , President ,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   29790/20) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17   June 2020 by two Lithuanian nationals, Mr Saulius Velečka (“the first applicant”) and Ms Marina Bui-Velečkienė (“the second applicant”), who were born in 1971 and 1988 respectively, reside in Vilnius and were represented by Mr   O.   Drobitko, a lawyer practising in Klaipėda; the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article   8 of the Convention concerning family visits in prison to the Lithuanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms   K.   Bubnytė-Širmenė, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the applicants’ complaints under Article   8 of the Convention that they were not allowed to have visits with physical contact, in particular conjugal visits, while the first applicant was in pre-trial detention. The applicants also complained that, as a result of the first   applicant’s detention, he had been restricted in his communication with his children. 2 .     At the time of the events in question, the first applicant had been serving a fourteen-year prison sentence at the Marijampolė Correctional Facility. 3 .     In   May 2019 he became a suspect in a new pre-trial investigation concerning two episodes of deprivation of liberty to extort property committed in 2018, while leading an organised group. 4 .     On 30   May 2019 the first applicant was placed in pre-trial detention at the Vilnius Correctional Facility on the ground that he might interfere with the pre-trial investigation if he remained at the Marijampolė Correctional Facility, where another suspect, M.Ž., had started serving a sentence. 5 .     As grounds for pre-trial detention, the courts referred to the first   applicant’s five prior convictions and to the lengthy sentence – three to ten years’ imprisonment – associated with the new serious crimes of which he was suspected (see paragraph   3 above): it was suspected that he had led a criminal organisation from prison, and that the above-mentioned crimes had been perpetrated according to a plan, the development and execution of which had been facilitated by conspiratorial methods involving the use of coded means of communication within the prison. The first applicant had not been deterred by his previous fourteen-year sentence (see paragraph 2 above). It was therefore reasonable to believe that he could obstruct the pre-trial investigation by exerting influence on witnesses and/or suspects or by destroying evidence, or that he could commit new crimes. 6 .     On 30   May 2019 the prosecutor also prohibited the first applicant from making telephone calls to anyone except his lawyer; he was also forbidden to meet with anyone except his lawyer without express permission. At that stage of the investigation any impediment could severely limit the possibility of objectively investigating the crimes of which the first applicant had been suspected. 7.     The first applicant’s pre-trial detention was subsequently prolonged regularly by court orders and lasted until 30   November 2020, when, as submitted by the Government, no restrictions on his communication with his family members applied any longer. 8 .     On 4   July 2019 the prosecutor granted the first applicant’s request that he be allowed to receive short visits, with physical contact, from his children (born in 1991, 2001 and 2017) and his mother. 9 .     On 14   August 2019, referring to Article   23 §   1 of the Law on Execution of Pre-trial Detention (hereinafter – the LEPD; the relevant provisions of that Law are set out in Deltuva v. Lithuania , no. 38144/20, §§ 19-25, 21 March 2023), the prosecutor reiterated the prohibition on the first applicant making telephone calls to his relatives and his spouse, stating that not all the procedural actions involved in the investigation had been completed. The first   applicant was suspected of being a leading member of a well-organised criminal group which had previously communicated using various codes and untraceable mobile phones. He had previously breached the ban on having a mobile phone in prison and had illicitly called the second applicant. Allowing the first applicant to make telephone calls would entail a risk that he might transmit coded information to other persons. 10 .     For essentially the same reasons, the prosecutor decided that the first   applicant could receive short visits from the second applicant only in the presence of a prison officer, that is, without physical contact (Article   22 §§   1, 2 and 4 of the LEPD). The first applicant was allowed to receive an unlimited number of visits with physical contact (Article 22 §§ 1, 2 and 5 of the LEPD) from his children and mother. A number of such contact visits was regularly granted throughout the first applicant’s detention (see paragraph   13 below), the prosecutor and the courts having referred to the best interests of the children. 11.     Several appeals by the first applicant, wherein he questioned in what manner conjugal visits from the second applicant could obstruct the pre-trial investigation, were dismissed by the senior prosecutor and the courts on the following grounds: the fact that the first applicant had been placed in pre-trial detention precisely so that he could not obstruct the pre-trial investigation (see paragraph   4 above), his prior convictions and the nature of the allegations against him (see paragraph 9 above). A balance between the first   applicant’s rights under Article   8 of the Convention and the need to achieve the goals of the pre-trial investigation had been struck: the first   applicant had been allowed to receive multiple visits from his children, his mother and the second applicant. 12 .     Further requests by both applicants for the removal of restrictions on short visits with physical contact and conjugal visits were refused, the prosecutors and the courts (last court decision of 13   January 2020) reiterating that the first applicant had communicated with the second applicant and other individuals illegally from prison (see paragraph   9 above), and also noting that the children’s interests had been taken into account. The first applicant had been granted opportunities (unlimited from 29   November 2019) to see his spouse via short visits without physical contact; he was only refused conjugal visits. 13 .     The first applicant received thirty-one visits from his family between 30   May 2019 and 27   February 2020. Some twenty of those visits were from his children and mother, and some of them were visits with physical contact. He also received eighteen short visits without physical contact from the second applicant between 20   August 2019 and 27 February 2020. 14 .     On 2   March 2020 the prosecutor noted that the first applicant’s detention had lasted nine months and allowed him to have conjugal visits, essentially once a month, from the second applicant, in accordance with Article   22 §§ 4 and 6 of the LEPD. 15.     The applicants complained that restrictions on family visits, especially with physical contact, had been contrary to Article   8 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 16.     The general principles concerning family visits in prison have been summarised in the case of Khoroshenko v.   Russia ([GC], no.   41418/04, §§   123-26, ECHR   2015). It is an essential part of a prisoner’s right to respect for family life that the prison authorities enable or assist him to maintain contact with his close family. However, some measure of control of prisoners’ contacts with the outside world is called for, having regard, in particular, to the nature of the offence and the specific individual characteristics of a detainee, and notably during the investigations, where it could reasonably be considered necessary in order to achieve the legitimate aim pursued by the investigation. The application of such measures as physical separation, in particular, may be justified by the prison’s security needs or the danger that a detainee would communicate with criminal organisations through family channels. The State may not introduce restrictions in a general manner without affording any degree of flexibility for determining whether limitations in specific cases are appropriate or indeed necessary (ibid.). 17.     The Court accepts that the restriction on visiting rights during the relevant period had constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life. The interference complained of had a basis in law – namely Article   22 §   1 of the LEPD (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). The Court accepts that the measure was applied in order to guarantee the unhindered investigation, and thus the prevention, of crime, which is a legitimate aim under Article   8 of the Convention (see paragraphs   3, 4, 6, 11 and 12 above; see also Varnas v. Lithuania , no.   42615/06, §   119, 9   July 2013). 18.     As to necessity of the interference, the first applicant was transferred to a pre-trial detention centre in Vilnius in order to ensure that he would not interfere with the investigation, in which he was a suspect, and to prevent him from committing new crimes (see paragraphs   2, 4 and 5 above). It was on those grounds that the restrictions on the first applicant’s contact with the outside world were based (see paragraph 6 above), and the Court considers them to have been relevant. 19.     As for the sufficiency of the reasons and the proportionality of the restrictions, soon after the first applicant’s transfer the prosecutor granted his request for short visits with physical contact from his mother and children; the best interests of the children as a factor justifying the need for the visits was underlined both by the prosecutors and the courts (see paragraphs   8, 10 and 11 in fine above). The list of visits received by the first applicant in the remand facility shows that throughout his detention he received thirty-one visits from the above-mentioned family members, which must have reduced the sense of separation experienced by him (see paragraph   13 above; contrast Piechowicz v. Poland , no.   20071/07, §§   220 and 221, 17   April 2012). 20.     The proportionality of the restrictions on communication between the two applicants was assessed and justified by the prosecutors and the domestic courts, who emphasised the continuous need to prevent the first applicant from hampering the investigation given the nature and complexity of the alleged crimes, the first applicant’s criminal history, and the conspiratorial means by which the members of the criminal organisation communicated (see   paragraphs   4, 5, 9, 11 and 12 above). As noted by the prosecutor and the courts, the first applicant had also previously communicated illegally with the second applicant from prison by conspiratorial means (see paragraphs   9 and 12 above), which the authorities saw as a ground on which to limit the two   applicants’ unhindered communication. 21.     That notwithstanding, in order to assist the first applicant to maintain contact with the second applicant, short visits without physical contact that took place in the presence of a representative of the detention facility were regularly granted to the applicants by the prosecutor less than three months after the start of the pre-trial detention (see paragraph 10 above; contrast Kučera v. Slovakia , no.   48666/99, §   129, 17   July 2007). Later on, the prosecutor granted the applicants an unlimited number of such short visits and, under those special visiting arrangements, the first applicant received eighteen such visits by 27   February 2020 (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above; contrast Deltuva v. Lithuania , no.   38144/20, §   46, 21   March 2023). In March 2020 the prosecutor noted the fact that the first applicant’s pre-trial detention had lasted for more than nine months and he regularly granted the applicants conjugal visits in addition to an unlimited number of short visits (see paragraph   14 above; see also, mutatis mutandis , Bagiński v. Poland , no.   37444/97, §   96, 11   October 2005). Thus, the restrictions on the applicants’ visiting rights were not applied in a general manner without affording any degree of flexibility in the determination of whether they were still appropriate. The prosecutor, making use of the discretion allowed by the LEPD, reacted to the changing individual and general circumstances. 22.     The Court therefore finds that the authorities provided relevant and sufficient reasons for the restrictions imposed on the applicants’ visiting rights and struck a fair balance between the needs emanating from the legitimate aim pursued and the applicants’ right to respect for their family life. The restrictions on the applicants’ right to respect for their family life did not go beyond what was necessary in a democratic society to attain the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, the application is manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 2 May 2025.     Dorothee von Arnim   Davor Derenčinović   Deputy Registrar   President