CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 22 avril 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s34DFC730 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sECF8538A { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sD11CFAB7 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15.01pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB00DFE03 { width:22.87pt; display:inline-block } .s301E5582 { width:146.43pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     THIRD SECTION CASE OF SADIGOV v. AZERBAIJAN (Application no. 48665/13)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 22 April 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Sadigov v. Azerbaijan, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Darian Pavli , President ,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   48665/13) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 15 July 2013 by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Ildirim Shamil oglu Sadigov ( İldırım Şamil oğlu Sadıqov - “the applicant”), who was born in 1949, lives in Tartar and was represented by Mr V. Guliyev, a lawyer based in Azerbaijan; the decision to give notice of the application to the Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 18 March 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the applicant’s complaint about the allegedly unlawful demolition of his property. 2.     It appears from the case file that the demolished building had been constructed in 1955 and was used as State-owned canteen before N.A., the applicant’s mother, who was a manager of that canteen at the material time, purchased it in 2004 under preferential privatisation conditions; a technical passport was issued in respect of the property in the same year. According to the privatisation documents, the total surface area of the building was 120   square metres, and N.A. paid 3,300,000 old Azerbaijani manats (600 new Azerbaijani manats (AZN)). After N.A.’s death in 2005, the applicant inherited the building. 3 .     On 15 November 2007 the Barda District Territorial Department of the State Agency on Registration of Immovable Property Rights (“the BDTD”) issued a title deed confirming the applicant’s ownership of the building in question. According to the title deed and the “technical passport”, issued with it, the surface area of the building was in fact 210.1 square metres, and the depreciation rate was 30%. It appears from the case file that the building in question housed a State-run college until January 2008, when the college was moved to a new location. 4 .     On 3 March 2008 the Tartar District Executive Authority (“the TDEA”) issued a written order for the demolition of the applicant’s building. The order stated that the building, which had been built several decades previously and was located within the grounds of a public park, had been unused for several years; it had deteriorated, meaning that it could not be used, and its architectural appearance did not meet modern standards. The TDEA therefore ordered that the building be demolished in the public interest, without payment of compensation to the owner. However, it appears from the case file that the applicant was offered five plots of land in the vicinity of the contested building, as compensation in kind in exchange for the demolition of his building, but that he declined those offers. 5.     On 13 March 2008 the building was demolished, pursuant to a written order from the TDEA. 6 .     Following the demolition,   the applicant brought proceedings against the TDEA before the Tartar District Court, asking it to award him AZN   117,000 in respect of pecuniary damage (for the building), AZN   60,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and AZN 25,000 for his medical expenses (the case file does not contain a copy of the claim). He argued, inter alia , that although the building had been unusable at the time of privatisation, he had subsequently had full renovation work carried out on it. On 11 August 2008 the Tartar District Court awarded the applicant AZN 660 in respect of pecuniary damage. 7.     Following an appeal by the applicant,   the Ganja Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and decided that the claim ought to be examined in commercial proceedings. 8.     On 2   December 2008 the Ganja Local Economic Court ordered an expert examination to determine the market value of the demolished property based on the “technical passports” of the building, issued in 2004 and 2007 (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above). 9 .     Noting that all technical parameters in both technical passports were essentially identical, the expert concluded that the price per square metre of the demolished building was AZN 520, and thus estimated the market price of the demolished building at AZN 109,200 (approximately 104,600   euros (EUR) at the relevant time). It appears from the evaluation report that in reaching that conclusion the expert took into account, among other things, the average price per square metre of similar buildings in the area in question. 10 .     On 28 January 2010 the Ganja Local Economic Court found that the demolition of the applicant’s building by the TDEA had been unlawful and awarded the applicant AZN 660 in respect of pecuniary damage and AZN   200 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court held that the expert evaluation of the demolished building had not reflected the reality, since the building, constructed in 1955 and not subject to renovation work, was dilapidated and unfit for use. It dismissed the documents submitted by the applicant describing repair works, as these had not been signed or approved by an authorised body or a specialist. The court held that the sum of AZN 660, as paid by the applicant’s mother at the time of privatisation, would constitute adequate compensation for the building in question, having regard also to the five different plots of land proposed to the applicant in exchange for the demolished building, an offer which remained valid. 11 .     A further appeal by the applicant was dismissed   by the Ganja Court of Appeal. 12.     The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, complaining that the lower courts’ judgments had been unfair, particularly with regard to the amount of compensation. 13.     On 14 October 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court’s judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. In particular, the Supreme Court stressed that it was unacceptable to determine the market value of the building in question on the basis of privatisation documents. The Supreme Court also noted that the lower courts had not conducted a comparative analysis of the data contained in the expert report and in the extract from the real estate register. 14.     On 20 May 2011 the Ganja Court of Appeal awarded the applicant AZN 109,200 in respect of pecuniary damage, relying on the expert examination commissioned by the first-instance court (see paragraph   9 above). 15.     Following a cassation appeal lodged by the TDEA and the Ministry of Finance, on 27 September 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court’s judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It noted that in determining the market price, depreciation allowances had not been taken into account in the expert opinion as the building in question was old and had been in use for a long time. 16 .     During the re-examination of the case, the Ganja Court of Appeal ordered the BDTD to carry out a fresh valuation of the building; in a report of 4 May 2012, the building’s value was estimated at AZN 16,808 (approximately EUR 16,253 at the relevant time). A copy of that valuation was not submitted to the Court. On 19 June 2011 the Ganja Court of Appeal partially granted the applicant’s claim, awarding him AZN 16,808 in respect of pecuniary damage. The court found that the market value of the demolished building as established in the most recent expert evaluation report was “convincing”, in that the building was completely unusable as indicated by the applicant himself in his claim (see paragraph 6 above). 17.     On 11 February 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s judgment, reiterating the same reasoning. 18.     The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to afford him adequate redress for the unlawful demolition of his property. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of Protocol N o . 1 to the Convention 19.     The Government submitted that the finding by the domestic courts of a violation of the applicant’s property rights, together with the award of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, had constituted an appropriate and sufficient redress. The applicant could not therefore claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The applicant argued that the compensation awarded by the local courts had been several times lower than the actual damage sustained. 20.     The Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the Government’s objection is so closely connected to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that it should be joined to the merits (see, for a similar approach, Khizanishvili and Kandelaki v. Georgia , no. 25601/12, § 44, 17   December 2019). 21.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 22.     The applicable principles under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention have been summarised, among others, in Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v.   Latvia ([GC], no.   71243/01, §§   95-99 and 108-14, 25   October 2012). 23.     In the present case, the domestic courts found that the applicant’s building had been demolished unlawfully (see paragraph 10 above). They therefore acknowledged the violation of his property rights. They also awarded him compensation, the amount of which the applicant contested. The Court will consider the question at the core of the applicant’s complaint, namely whether the compensation awarded to him was adequate. While the domestic courts are normally in a better position to determine the existence and quantum of pecuniary damage (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.   36813/97, § 203, ECHR 2006‑V), the Court has jurisdiction to assess whether the compensation was appropriate and sufficient within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 24.     The State authority ordered the demolition of the applicant’s building without any compensation being paid. Moreover, the applicant was not informed about the impending demolition of his property. In such circumstances, no consideration of “public interest” applies. It was not therefore unreasonable for the applicant to have expected full compensation for the resulting damage (compare Khizanishvili and Kandelaki, cited above, § 54). 25.     Two different valuation reports were available to the domestic courts in respect of the market value of the applicant’s property. The report commissioned by the first-instance court determined the market value of the applicant’s building at AZN 109,200 (see paragraph 9 above). However, the report subsequently commissioned by the appellate court and conducted by the BDTD found the market price of the same building to be AZN 16,808 (see paragraph 16 above). It is not clear from the case file which valuation method was used, or on what basis the price of the building, which had been demolished several years previously, was determined in the latter valuation. 26.     The appellate court relied on the second report’s conclusions without providing relevant reasons as to what elements led it to adopt that stance and to discard the prior expert evaluation. In this respect, the Court observes that the appellate court merely noted that the building was completely unsuitable for use, referring also to the applicant’s statement in his claim (see paragraph   16 above). The Court observes however that the applicant had only stated that the building was not suitable for use at the time of privatisation and had asserted that full renovations had subsequently been carried out (see paragraph 6 above). Moreover, the court failed to take into account the fact that the technical passport drawn up, by the same BDTD, just a few months before the demolition of the building indicated the level of depreciation to be only 30% (see paragraph 3 above). The Court notes that it was not disputed between the parties during the domestic proceedings that the building in question had been used by a State-run college until January 2008, that is, three months prior to its demolition (see paragraph 3 above). 27.     It follows that the appellate court failed to provide adequate reasoning for the approach followed and the level of compensation awarded (compare Vistiņš and Perepjolkins , §§   111-14, and Khizanishvili and Kandelaki , § 58, both cited above). The appellate court’s judgment was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, which also failed to provide relevant reasoning in that regard. 28.     In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant has not been awarded full compensation in respect of the unlawful demolition of his property. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection concerning an absence of victim status. 29.     There has accordingly been a violation of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 30.     The applicant failed to submit any claim for just satisfaction within the time-limit fixed thereof as required under Rule   60 of the Rules of Court. The fact that he claimed just satisfaction in the application form lodged with the Court does not alter that conclusion (see Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no.   35589/08, §   61, 30   March 2017). In the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that there is no exceptional situation, within the meaning of its case-law (ibid., §§   78 ‑ 82), warranting the making of an award under Article   41 of the Convention (compare Miltayev and Meltayeva v. Russia , no.   8455/06, § 62, 15 January 2013, and Bērziņš and Others v. Latvia , no.   73105/12, § 111, 21 September 2021). FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Joins to the merits the Government’s objection as to the loss of victim status, and dismisses it; Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 April 2025, pursuant to Rule   77   §§   2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.     Olga Chernishova   Darian Pavli   Deputy Registrar   President