CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 15 mai 2025

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margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 } .sA5C65A44 { font-family:Arial; color:#212529; background-color:#ffffff } FIRST SECTION CASE OF VERSACI v. ITALY (Application no. 3795/22)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Private life • Refusal by the head of police to grant the applicant a “public security licence”, to carry out bookmaking activities on behalf of a foreign company, for not fulfilling the domestic law “good character” requirement • Domestic authorities’ decision not based on conduct directly attributable to the applicant but to individuals with whom he had social or family connections • Underlying reasons for the disputed measure linked to the applicant’s private life • Art   8 applicable under its reasons-based approach • Vague and indefinite concept of “good character” sufficiently foreseeable in view of the clarifications provided in the guidance on administrative practice and in the domestic case-law • Sufficient judicial review in place to guarantee against arbitrary interference with fundamental rights by the head of police who had broad discretion in granting security licences • Disputed measure “in accordance with the law” • Wide margin of appreciation afforded to the domestic authorities in view of the specific regional context and the need to avoid the risk of crimes being committed within the gambling enterprise • Relevant and sufficient reasons given by the head of police • Absence of any flagrant non-observance or arbitrariness in the judicial review of those reasons • Impugned measure “necessary in a democratic society”   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 15 May 2025   FINAL   15/09/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Versaci v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ivana Jelić , President ,   Alena Poláčková,   Péter Paczolay,   Gilberto Felici,   Erik Wennerström,   Raffaele Sabato,   Alain Chablais , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   3795/22) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Mr   Emanuele Sebastiano Bruno Versaci (“the applicant”), on 22   December   2021; the decision to give notice to the Italian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning Article 6 § 1 and Article   8 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 15 October 2024 and 18   March   2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the latter date: INTRODUCTION 1 .     The case concerns the refusal by the head of the police authority ( questore ) of the applicant’s application for a “public security licence” ( licenza di pubblica sicurezza ) to carry out bookmaking activities on behalf of a foreign company because he did not fulfil the “good character” ( buona   condotta ) requirement in Article   11(2) of Royal Decree no. 773 of 18   June   1931 (Consolidated Act on Public Security, Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza ; hereinafter: “TULPS”). It raises the question of whether the legal basis for that refusal met the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention as to the quality of the law and whether, in the specific circumstances of the case, the refusal was based on relevant and sufficient reasons and was subjected to a sufficient judicial review. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant, who was born in 1985 and lives in San Luca, was represented by Ms A. Mascia, a lawyer practising in Verona. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr L. D’Ascia, Avvocato dello Stato . 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. background to the case 5 .     On 6 October 2014 the applicant set up a business taking bets in Italy on behalf of an Austrian bookmaking company. 6 .     On 23 December 2014 section 1(643) of Law no. 190 of 23   December   2014 (“Law no.   190/2014”) entered into force. It provided that persons carrying out bookmaking activities on behalf of foreign companies without the necessary authorisation from the Agency for Customs and Monopolies could regularise their legal situation using the procedure set out in that provision (see paragraph 23 below). THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7.     On 8 January 2015 the Austrian company (see paragraph 5 above) made a regularisation application on behalf of the applicant (see paragraph   6 above). 8 .     For the purposes of that application, the applicant applied to the head of the Reggio Calabria police authority ( questore ) for a declaration under section   1(643) of Law no. 190/2014, which states that in order to lawfully carry out bookmaking activities in Italy on behalf of a foreign company one must obtain a public security licence as provided for by Article 88 TULPS (see paragraph 21 below). 9.     The Reggio Calabria police headquarters ( Questura ) opened a preliminary investigation in order to assess whether the applicant had complied with the requirements of the law. On 5   May   2015 the Questura asked the applicant for further documentation so they could issue the licence. The applicant produced that documentation on 4   August   2015. 10 .     On 12 January 2016 the questore notified the applicant of the intention to refuse his application. He argued, in particular, that the applicant was not “of good character”, as required by Article 11(2) TULPS (see paragraphs   1 above and 21 below) for the following reasons: (i)   a close relative of the applicant was involved in judicial proceedings concerning drug trafficking and had been subjected to a police caution issued by the questore and to the preventive measure of special police supervision; (ii)   the applicant had frequently been found by the police in the company of persons with criminal and police records for the offences of handling stolen goods, assisting an offender, kidnapping, criminal conspiracy, illegal possession of guns, aggravated theft, criminal conspiracy to traffic illegal drugs, blackmail, affray, assault and battery, manslaughter and drug trafficking. The questore considered these matters had a negative impact on the assessment of the applicant’s “good character”, as required by Article   11(2) TULPS, as they showed that he did not have the high moral standards required by law for the public security licence he had applied for. In   particular, he could not be sure the applicant would not use the bookmaking activities as a vehicle to launder money deriving from unlawful activities or that there would not be criminal infiltration into the applicant’s own activities. 11 .     On 14 January 2016 the applicant challenged the intention to refuse his application. He claimed, inter alia , that where a person was refused a public security licence because they were found to be not “of good character”, the character assessment had to be based on the conduct of the individual concerned and that, in this regard, it was not sufficient that the individual concerned had family members or associates with criminal records. 12 .     On 3 February 2016 the questore refused the applicant’s licence application and ordered him to cease his activities. The questore gave the following reasons: “IT WAS OBSERVED that during the inquiry carried out by this office the applicant had been found by the police on many occasions to be in the company of people with serious criminal and police records; ... HAVING REGARD to the requirement under Article 11 of the TULPS that, among other things, an applicant for any police licence must establish that he or she is of good character, a concept which includes being assessed as being beyond reproach or at least a positive assessment of the applicant’s overall lifestyle and conduct; IT IS CONSIDERED that, for the purpose of assessing whether a person meets the good character requirement, this administration has an obligation to take into account an applicant’s family environment and his or her personal relationships; IT IS CONSIDERED that the results of the inquiries undertaken support the assessment that those matters might affect the exercise of the activity in question; ... IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED that, for the above reasons, the conditions for refusing the applicant’s application are met ...” THE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES 13 .     On 25 February 2016 the applicant appealed against the refusal to the Reggio Calabria Section of the Calabria Regional Administrative Court ( Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale , “TAR”) and asked for the refusal to be provisionally suspended. He argued first of all that that the decision criteria established by case-law had not been followed, since having family members with criminal records was not a sufficient basis to find a risk that a public security licence would be abused, unless it had been specifically found that that situation led to a risk of the abuse of the public security licence. The applicant submitted that, given that he had no criminal or police record himself, the refusal of his application had not been based on relevant or sufficient reasons and that no proper reasons for refusal had been given. In particular, the questore had not given sufficient reasons for finding that the applicant’s brother’s criminal and police record entailed a risk that he would interfere in the bookmaking activities for which the applicant was seeking a public security licence. The applicant further complained that the refusal had been based on “the results of the inquiries undertaken” without indicating in any way what those inquiries consisted of and what the consequences were that had been drawn from them. The applicant also argued that the questore had not carried out an assessment of his character and antecedents but had limited his assessment to conduct which was not attributable to the applicant himself. Lastly, the applicant complained of an alleged breach of his right to a fair hearing because, in his view, the reasons given for the refusal of his application (see paragraph 12 above) had been different from those indicated in the questore ’s preliminary notice of the intention to refuse his licence application (see paragraph 10 above). 14.     In his application for the provisional suspension of the refusal, which had been lodged on the same date as the appeal, the applicant observed that the bookmaking activities in question constituted the principal means by which he supported his family and that if he were unable to carry on those activities, he would be caused serious and irreparable prejudice. 15.     On 24 March 2016 the TAR dismissed the applicant’s application for a suspension of the refusal of his licence application. The decision was confirmed on 7 July 2016 by the Consiglio di Stato , which found that it was not possible to dispel the doubts raised by the applicant’s connections with individuals with serious criminal and police records. These doubts had been confirmed by the police authority and had been the basis for refusing the applicant’s application for a public security licence. 16 .     On 31 December 2017 the applicant received from the Questura a copy of a report by the Carabinieri of 2 October 2015, which had been used in the administrative procedure to assess whether he was “of good character”. The report concluded that, notwithstanding some problematic association with individuals with criminal and police records, the applicant did not appear to be “unsuitable or a habitual offender” ( non risulta essere soggetto controindicato o che possa abitualmente delinquere ). 17 .     On 9 December 2019 the applicant filed further pleadings with the TAR. As regards the police having found him in the company of people with serious criminal and police records on many occasions, the following observations were made: “the authority should have provided specific reasons why the applicant could no longer be considered a suitable person to hold a public security licence; it should also have stated the specific ways in which it foresaw that the licence might be abused, on the basis of an assessment of probable dangerousness based on logical inferences supported by some elements of fact, rather than just considering it sufficient that the applicant supposedly kept bad company. Moreover, his keeping bad company is not otherwise clarified (location, time-frame, etc.) nor are details of it specified (it concerns individuals who are presumed to live in the same place as the applicant, which is not a metropolis, but notably San Luca, which is a small town where public and private places to meet are not numerous).” In respect of that “bad company” further observations were made as follows: “However, [keeping that bad company] is surely incapable of compromising [the applicant’s] suitability to hold a public security licence given that the nature of the company and the infrequency of the meetings, the fact of the meetings having been a long time ago, and other reasons, does not allow a reasonable inference that that company was capable of actually affecting the suitability of the individual concerned; such a detrimental decision needs to be based on a proper assessment of the overall behaviour of the individual concerned ...” The applicant therefore considered that the refusal issued by the questore lacked reasoning: “The refusal does not include any contextualisation [of the applicant’s conduct], nor any assessment based on elements of the applicant’s conduct (of which there is absolutely no criticism); notwithstanding the applicant’s requests for clarification of this aspect of the decision, no clarification has been provided by the Questura .” In conclusion, the applicant considered that the questore had not undertaken a proper assessment which could reasonably have led him to conclude that he lacked the required “good character”: “... the required suitability to obtain a public security licence must be inferred from conduct attributable to the applicant (and not others) which is also different from conduct amounting to criminal offences, but which is relevant in respect of the activity which the individual aims to carry out ...” 18 .     By judgment no. 139 of 2 March 2020, the TAR dismissed the applicant’s claims. It found that the police authority had a broad discretion under Article 11(2) of the TULPS in assessing whether applicants were able to fulfil the requirement of “good character” where they had done things which did not constitute criminal offences but made it inappropriate to grant or renew a public security licence. In the TAR’s view, the issuing of the licence was not dependent on an assessment that the person concerned was not a danger to society. However, the police authority had to say why they considered the individual concerned was not “of good character”. In the specific circumstances of the case, the police authority had correctly taken into account the applicant’s relationships with individuals with criminal and police records, the fact that his brother was under special police supervision and that his mother had personal connections with a family which was under investigation by the police. In the TAR’s view those circumstances were sufficient to find that the applicant did not satisfy the “good character” requirement. The TAR also found there had been no breach of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing, as he had been able to present his case after the questore had told him of the intention to refuse his application for the licence (see   paragraphs 10-11 above). In particular, as regards the “good character” requirement, the TAR held as follows: “In the case at issue, the proceedings instituted on the basis of the applicant’s application led to the discovery of matters which reasonably led the questore of Reggio Calabria to refuse the public security licence. Although the applicant established that his brother has no criminal convictions [...] he was not able to dispel the doubts raised by his keeping ‘bad company’ with persons with serious criminal records, which have been checked by the police authority and on which the refusal is based. This court shares the concerns which led the third section of the Consiglio di Stato to dismiss the applicant’s application for suspension of the refusal ... The importance attributed by the applicant to the report by the Carabinieri of 2 October 2015, from which he made arguments in his favour, cannot be upheld: the report, on the one hand, gives details of the family relationships and the company the applicant keeps and, on the other hand, limits itself to a statement – which appears contradictory – that the applicant does not appear to be ‘unsuitable’ or a ‘habitual offender’; it is clear that, in order to obtain a public security licence ... in a sensitive local context such as the city of San Luca, the authority in exercising its discretion when making an assessment cannot and must not limit itself to observing that the person concerned does not habitually commit criminal offences, but must require much more, notably the full suitability of the person concerned which must be inferred from the absence of family, personal, and local connections which might lead to speculation about the non-transparent use of sensitive bookmaking activities ... The circumstances stressed by the Questura about the criminal records of the person concerned and his keeping bad company, the concerns about his brother and his wider family (the applicant’s mother has family connections with the [G.a.S.] family, which has come to the attention of the police authority) are sufficient to justify the conclusion that the applicant lacks the required ‘good character’ ... In other words, there is a cumulation of circumstances which paint a picture from which the Questura has legitimately inferred that the applicant does not meet the ‘good character’ requirement. 19 .     On 9 October 2020 the applicant lodged an appeal against the TAR’s decision with the Consiglio di Stato . Firstly, the applicant argued that the decision of the TAR should be reviewed because it had been taken on the basis of circumstances which had not been referred to in the questore ’s disputed refusal of the applicant’s application, notably the facts that the applicant’s brother was under special police supervision and that his mother had personal connections with a family which was under investigation by the police. Secondly, the applicant argued that there had been no explanation in the disputed decision of how the fact that the applicant had been found in the company of persons with criminal and police records on many occasions justified the finding that he was not “of good character”. In particular, the applicant observed that the vast majority of the reports of his keeping bad company had been made many years before the disputed decision, notably before 2002 and 2007. The applicant had been found in that company several times between 2008 and 2013, but he observed that those occasions were isolated meetings with various individuals who did not have serious criminal records or concerned facts which had taken place after the police had recorded their observations on the applicant. Moreover, the applicant submitted that some of those meetings had taken place for business reasons. In the applicant’s view, the TAR had failed to demonstrate how having isolated meetings with individuals, which were not described in detail as to their contents or circumstances, could be considered “associating” with those people and creating a risk of abuse of a public security licence. The applicant further argued that the circumstances on which the first-instance decision had been based were not sufficient to justify the refusal of a public security licence. Firstly, the applicant had never been prosecuted for any criminal offence. Secondly, the applicant’s brother had been acquitted of the charges of drug trafficking and, in any case, the applicant had no close relationship with his brother. Thirdly, the applicant’s mother had no criminal or police record and the circumstances referred to by the TAR were too generic and vague to conclude that the applicant lacked the required “good character”. 20 .     By judgment no. 4820 of 24 June 2021, the Consiglio di Stato dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the refusal of the licence. It clarified that the police authority had a broad discretion in making an assessment of character and that its judgment could not be questioned by the judicial authorities unless it was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. In the specific circumstances of the case, the assessment was not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. In particular, the questore had considered the applicant’s previous association with persons with serious criminal and police records. The fact that the applicant’s brother had been acquitted of drug trafficking was not sufficient to exclude the impact of that association on the assessment; moreover, the assessment had also been based on other information gathered by the police authorities which sufficiently confirmed that adverse assessment. In particular, the Consiglio di Stato held as follows: “6.     In the present case, this [ Consiglio di Stato ] considers that the assessment of the questore of Reggio Calabria is not arbitrary or unreasonable. ... 6.3.     As regards the applicant’s keeping of bad company, the administration stressed that only some of the encounters referred to were meetings with convicted individuals in vehicles owned by the company of which the applicant was an employee. Others were meetings at times and in circumstances and locations which were not related to the applicant’s professional activities ... The report of the questore , which is based on information gathered during the inquiry, shows an overall picture of the applicant keeping bad company which does not allow for a characterisation of the decision to refuse him a public security licence, because there was a risk that authorising him to operate in the gambling sector could facilitate the laundering of money of unlawful provenance including by persons close to the applicant, as manifestly unreasonable or seriously discriminatory. 6.4.     The first-instance court observed that a public security authority is indeed entitled to refuse a police licence to a person who does not appear to be of good character or who is considered unsuitable to hold a licence because of a possibility that he or she might abuse a licence if one were issued to him or her. 6.5.     In this respect, the reference made in the disputed decision to the ‘involvement in judicial proceedings’ of the applicant’s brother cannot be considered wrong, given that, as it is well-known, for the purpose of the assessment required by Article 11(2) of the TULPS also criminal proceedings which were concluded with an acquittal can be taken into account. ... 7.     In conclusion, this court observes that the decision on appeal correctly points out that the applicant’s brother had not been convicted, but the appellate court does not argue with the claim that the applicant had numerous associates with serious criminal and police records, which the police authority referred to and used as the basis for the refusal of the applicant’s licence application. The applicant’s brother is himself involved in judicial proceedings concerning drug offences and is already subject to an oral caution from the questore and to the preventive measure of special police supervision. Moreover, the numerous criminal offences committed by people close to the applicant are relevant, as they constitute general and consistent circumstances capable of justifying the contested refusal, the express reasons for which arose from the conduct of the applicant (and not from that of his relatives and work colleagues) and which, when seen in the context of the specific risks undeniably connected with the activities of arranging, collecting and managing sports betting which has cash winnings that are paid electronically, a channel which can be used – and which has not infrequently been used – for the purpose of ‘laundering’ ‘dirty’ money obtained from illegal activities managed by organised crime.” Moreover, the Consiglio di Stato noted that the applicant’s mother had connections with a family which was under police investigation. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW Royal Decree no. 773 of 18 June 1931 ( Testo Unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza , TULPS) 21 .     Public security licences are regulated by the TULPS, the relevant provisions of which read as follows: Article 11 “Subject to any special conditions laid down by the law in individual cases, police licences shall be refused to: (1)     persons who have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than three years for an intentional offence and have not obtained a rehabilitation ( riabilitazione ); (2) persons who are subject to an oral caution or personal security measure or who have been declared habitual, professional or notorious criminals. Police licences can be denied ... to a person who cannot show that he or she is of good character ( buona condotta ). ...” Article 88 “A licence to carry on bookmaking may only be granted to entities licensed or authorised by Ministries or other entities which have been granted by law the power to organise and manage betting and to entities authorised by licence holders under the same concession or licence.” Law no. 732 of 24 October 1984 (Repeal of the good character requirement for employment as a civil servant) 22 .     The only provision of Law no. 732 of 24 October 1984 reads as follows: “No ‘good character’ assessment can be requested or made for the purposes of employment as a civil servant. Article 2(1)(3) of the Consolidated Act on the statute of civil servants of the State and any other provision which is incompatible with the present law are accordingly repealed.” Law no. 190 of 23 December 2014 23 .     Law no. 190 of 23 December 2014 set out a procedure for regularising the unauthorised taking of bets at the time of its entry into force. In particular, section   1(643) reads as follows: “Pending the reorganisation of public gambling following the implementation of Article 14 of Law no. 23 of 11 March 2014 and in order to ensure the protection of public order and security and of vulnerable social groups and minors, as from 1   January   2015 with regard to those entities active as at 30 October 2014 and offering bets with cash winnings in Italy, whether on their own account or on behalf of third parties including foreign third parties, which are not connected to the national totaliser of the Customs and Monopolies Agency, in view of the fact that in such cases the player is the offeror and that the gambling contract is therefore made in Italy and consequently regulated by Italian domestic legislation, those entities may have their position regularised by applying by 31 January 2016 and subject to the following conditions: (a)     No later than 31 January 2016, the entities shall forward to the Customs and Monopolies Agency ... a declaration of commitment to tax regularisation ... together with an application for a public security licence pursuant to Article 88 of the [TULPS], and subsequent amendments ...” RELEVANT ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 24 .     Circular no. 1763 of 30   October   1996 of the Ministry of the Interior on requirements of excellent character and good character (“the Circular”) was intended to clarify the meaning of “good character” for the purpose of issuing public security licences, in the light of judgments no.   440 of 2   December   1993 (see paragraphs 35-41 below) and no. 311 of 25   July   1996 (see paragraphs 47-53 below) of the Constitutional Court. 25 .     The Ministry stated that the police authority had the burden of proving that an applicant did not meet the “good character” requirement, and that their assessment had to be undertaken on the basis of clear and certain criteria so as to guarantee full transparency. Those criteria had to be on the one hand compatible with the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution and on the other hand capable of being the basis for a proper assessment by the public authorities. The assessment had to be undertaken in the light of the interests protected by the relevant public security licence and reasons should be given so that the individual concerned is able to understand the decision. 26.     The Ministry stipulated that the assessment of “good character” must not take into account any element of personal or baseless beliefs about the individual or conduct of a political nature, except where it involved criminal offences. 27 .     The assessment was to be made objectively, excluding aspects relating to the individual’s private life. It could take into account “only specific and objectively verifiable facts arising from the individual’s personal life, including his or her family situation” ( solo fatti specifici ed obiettivamente verificabili che si sono manifestati nell’ambito della vita associata anche familiare ). Those facts had to be capable of raising doubts as regards the suitability of the individual concerned to the activities for which police authorisation was requested ( idonei a rilevare il grado di affidabilità ai fini dell’espletamento di un’attività soggetta ad autorizzazione di polizia ). 28 .     The Circular included a non-exhaustive list of circumstances capable of demonstrating a lack of “good character”. 29.     The authorities could only consider conduct which would go to show whether the individual was a suitable person to carry out the activities for which a public security licence had been requested. 30.     The Circular indicated certain circumstances which, inter alia , could lead to the conclusion that an individual lacked the requisite “good character”. It included, for example, repeat and habitual offenders, individuals against whom there was evidence of the commission of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment of at least three years, and individuals subject to preventive measures. 31.     It further clarified that the domestic authorities had to take into account facts capable of demonstrating a risk that the public security licence requested would be abused. 32 .     The Ministry indicated that the police authority had to carry out an assessment of any associates of the individuals who had criminal or police records if they might raise the possibility of abuse of the public security licence. 33 .     The Ministry further said that specific attention should be given to family relationships, where relatives of the individual might become involved in the use of the public security licence. 34 .     The Ministry recommended that sufficient reasons should be given for the refusal of applications for public security licences so that the individuals concerned could exercise their rights to have the decisions reconsidered. RELEVANT DOMESTIC CASE-LAW Constitutional Court Judgment no. 440 of 2 December 1993 35 .     In its judgment no. 440 of 2   December   1993, the Constitutional Court declared Article 11(2) of the TULPS to be unconstitutional in so far as, for the purposes of the issue of public security licenses, it placed the burden of proving “good character” on the individual concerned. 36 .     As regards the concept of “good character”, the Constitutional Court observed that it enabled the making of an “indicative value judgment” ( valore   sintomatico ) on a “subjective lifestyle” ( modo di essere soggettivo ). Its aim was not to punish past conduct but to prevent possible future conduct related to the activities for which a public security licence had been requested. 37.     As regards foreseeability, the Constitutional Court recognised that the assessment of “good character” conferred a broad discretion on the public administration ( ampia discrezionalità ), and held as follows: “the requirement of ‘ good character ’ ... constitutes the basis for various assessments of reliability to be made by the administrative authority and, as such, cannot be considered in itself to be contrary to those principles of reasonableness to which every legal system must adhere. However, in order not to conflict with the non-negotiable requirement of certainty and to avoid the risk of arbitrariness, the broad discretion inherent in this general clause requires a precise definition of the specific conditions which the assessment must satisfy for the type of licence or authorisation applied for.” 38 .     As observed by the Constitutional Court, the lack of foreseeability of the concept of “good character” had led to its being dropped as a requirement for some legal purposes such as eligibility for employment in the civil service (see paragraph 22 above). In particular, the legislator considered that the concept conferred too broad a discretion on the administrative authority and that it was based on vague and indeterminate criteria. 39 .     The Constitutional Court held that the legislative provisions about the “good character” requirement had to be strictly interpreted in the light of the relevant constitutional values, and that they had not been declared unconstitutional principally because the exercise of such a broad administrative discretion was subject to judicial scrutiny by the administrative courts. 40 .     It further observed that the criteria with which the concept of “good character” had been clarified were capable of leading to “zones of complete uncertainty” ( zone di assoluta incertezza ) for the public administration when it had to decide whether the requirement had been satisfied. In the court’s view, such uncertainty was even more serious where the legislative provision was not limited to a requirement of “good character” but also imposed the burden of proving it on the individual concerned. The Constitutional Court considered that it was unreasonable to impose the burden of proving his or her own “good character” on an individual. 41 .     As regards the scope of the judicial review exercised by the administrative courts over the administrative decisions in this sphere, the Constitutional Court observed that the individual could challenge administrative decisions which were based on incorrect facts or on assessments where discretionary powers had demonstrably been exercised in an illogical or irrational way. However, the Constitutional Court found that this review did not appear “comprehensive” ( non appare esauriente ). In particular, it observed that an individual could not bring new evidence before the administrative courts in order to challenge an assessment made by an administrative authority ( resta inibita l’allegazione di un fatto dimostrativo capace di neutralizzare il giudizio formulato dalla pubblica autorità ) and could not challenge the assumptions or judgment of the administrative authority ( non essendo comunque possibile all’interessato contestare in via giurisdizionale nè i presupposti nè le valutazioni compiute dall’autorità amministrativa ). 42.     In conclusion, the Constitutional Court held as follows: “... while the refusal [to grant a public security licence] must state reasons, and the individual concerned can challenge in a court any decision which was based on incorrect facts or on assessments arising from the demonstrably illogical or irrational exercise of discretionary powers, this does not appear to provide a full safeguard where the individual concerned – because of the generic nature and variable content of the notion [of ‘good character’] – is prevented from raising facts in order to challenge the assessment made by the administrative authority. ... But what the legislation in question lacks is precisely the practical feasibility of such review, since the individual concerned is not allowed to challenge before a court either the assumptions made or the assessments carried out by the administrative authority. This also has a consequential impact for the principle of impartiality because the checks carried out by the administration are not always anchored to precise interpretative criteria and there is therefore a risk that – as the referring judge feared – they will be based on the personal opinions of the decision-takers. The second paragraph of Article 11 of the Royal Decree no. 773 of 18 June 1931, where it provides that security licences can be denied to those who cannot show good character, must therefore be declared unconstitutional because it does not comply with Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution ...” Judgment no. 108 of 31 March 1994 43.     In its judgment no. 108 of 31 March 1994, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a legislative provision that excluded individuals from seeking employment in the police force unless the Ministry of the Interior, whose assessment could not be challenged in court, held that they came from a “family of undisputed moral esteem” ( famiglia di estimazione morale indiscussa ). 44 .     The Constitutional Court observed that the legislative provision entailed an arbitrary presumption that the conduct of family members should be automatically attributed to the individual concerned. It therefore constituted an unreasonable limit to eligibility for employment in the police force, in breach of the principle of equality. 45 .     The Constitutional Court held that it was not unreasonable to assess the morality of an individual on the basis of his or her conduct in the context of social and family life. However, it was arbitrary to presume that behaviour attributable to a family as a whole or to specific members of the family could automatically be attributed to another individual. 46.     The Constitutional Court further held that it was unreasonable for the decision to be taken on the basis of information gathered by the administrative and police authorities and an unchallengeable assessment by Ministry officials. In its view, the decision had to be an impartial assessment based on specific and objectively verifiable facts ( valutazioni imparziali aventi ad oggetto fatti specifici ed oggettivamente verificabili ), which had to be reflected in the reasoning of the decision in order to allow it to be judicially reviewed. If these conditions were not satisfied, there would be a breach of the constitutional requirement for administrative authorities to make assessments which were neither excessively broad nor indeterminate. Judgment no. 311 of 25 July 1996 47 .     In its judgment no. 311 of 25 July 1996, the Constitutional Court declared a legislative provision which required an applicant for the position of security guard to be a “person of excellent political and moral conduct” ( persona di ottima condotta politica e morale ) to be unconstitutional. 48 .     The Constitutional Court recognised that concepts such as “good character” and being a “person of excellent political and moral conduct” had created uncertainty and problems of interpretation, given the ill-defined character of the requirement ( carattere indefinito del requisito ) and the consequent broad discretion ( larghezza di margine di apprezzamento discrezionale ) conferred on the administrative authorities concerned. 49.     Although the “good character” requirement for the purposes of eligibility for employment in the civil service (see paragraphs 22 and 38 above) had been withdrawn in order to overcome the problems of interpretation raised by such a concept, the Constitutional Court held that that legislative provision had not had the effect of withdrawing the same requirement for obtaining a public security licence. 50.     However, in the Constitutional Court’s view, the use of similar concepts in legislation required a better clarification of their content where it concerned what could be legitimately considered in an administrative assessment. 51.     The Constitutional Court held that, for the purposes of eligibility for public functions or obtaining public security licences, it was acceptable to impose conditions requiring the suitability of the individual concerned ( requisiti ... di affidabilità ) to the relevant function or activities to be shown. The satisfaction of those conditions could be inferred from conduct of the individual concerned which, although it might not constitute a criminal offence, was relevant to the function or activities for which the licence had been sought. Whether those conditions were satisfied had to be impartially and reasonably assessed by the administrative authorities and had to be subject to judicial review. 52.     The Constitutional Court further held that, in order for the process to be constitutionally legitimate, the scope of the conduct to be taken into account had to be set out. It was necessary, firstly, that the conduct should be attributable to the individual concerned. Secondly, it was necessary to exclude behaviour of an ideological, political or religious character. Thirdly,   it was not possible to consider conduct which merely concerned the individual’s private life and had no effect on the activities concerned. Lastly,   conduct that, given the passage of time or because of its isolated nature, could not be reasonably considered to a