CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 3 juin 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s9F46BEC9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .sB00DFE03 { width:22.87pt; display:inline-block } .sCEDB100B { width:137.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }     THIRD SECTION DECISION Application no. 232/16 Panagiotis KANELLOPOULOS against Greece   The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 3   June   2025 as a Committee composed of:   Peeter Roosma , President ,   Ioannis Ktistakis,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   232/16) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 December 2015 by a Greek national, Mr Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (“the applicant”), who was born in 1955, lives in Patra and was represented by Mr V. Chirdaris, a lawyer practising in Athens; the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention to the Greek Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs G. Papadaki, Senior Legal Advisor of the Legal Council of the State, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the alleged unfairness of criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of his alleged inability to directly examine certain witnesses whose testimony had been crucial for proving his innocence. 2 .     The applicant was the Director of the Tax Office of Patras. In   October   2007 the applicant and M.D., who was an employee of the same office, asked the Chairman and Managing Director of a company (A.B.) to give them 2,000 euros (EUR) as a gift to speed up the procedure for auditing the company’s tax data. 3 .     An administrative examination was conducted to establish whether the applicant and his colleague were bribed. Pursuant to the said examination, pre-trial statements under oath were taken from various witnesses, among which were M.S., a colleague of the applicant, and D.V., the accountant of A.B.’s company. M.S.’s statement was taken on 13 September 2009. D.V.’s statement was taken on 20 September 2009. M.S. stated that she had known the applicant and M.D. as they worked together. Sometime in 2008 A.B. had visited the tax office and had a conversation with the applicant in her presence. During that conversation A.B. did not deny that he had offered to the applicant to go on a trip with his family and the applicant had refused A.B.’s offer. A.B. had also replied in the negative when asked by the applicant if he had ever asked him for money or lied. According to M.S., the applicant had asked A.B. why he had been trying to make the applicant look like a thief. The applicant had also asked A.B. why he had not contacted him personally to inform him of anything, to which A.B. had replied that he had made a mistake. D.V. mainly stated that he had no information concerning the behaviour of the employees of the Tax Office, nor was he informed by the said employees of any discrepancy in the company’s accounts. 4 .     Subsequently, the applicant and M.D. were tried before the Patras Misdemeanours Court for the offence of joint passive bribery (‘ παθητικής δωροδοκίας από κοινού’ ). The applicant was represented by two lawyers and his co-defendant by one lawyer. The court heard two witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and three defence witnesses. Both parties had the opportunity to examine the said witnesses. D.V. and M.S. were not called as witnesses by either the prosecution or the defence. Various documents were also admitted as evidence before the court. 5.     On 31 May 2013 the first instance court found the applicant and his co-defendant guilty and sentenced them to one year imprisonment suspended for three years for the offence of joint passive bribery (‘ παθητική δωροδοκία από κοινού’ ) (decision no. 1856/2013). 6.     The applicant appealed to the Three-member Appeal Court of Patras (‘Court of Appeal’). He was represented by two lawyers. 7 .     Pending the proceedings, on 8 September 2014 the applicant applied to the Prosecutor of the Patras Court of Appeal and requested, for the first time, that the statements of D.V. and M.S. (see paragraph 3 above), among other documents, be added to the file so that they could be taken into account by the court in order for it to get a complete picture of the case (‘ ...προκειμένου να αποκομίσει το Δικαστήριο ... την πλήρη εικόνα της υπόθεσης .’). 8 .     The Court of Appeal first heard five witnesses for the prosecution. Subsequently, it read out some documents, including the documents that the applicant had requested to add to the file (see paragraph 7 above). These included the pretrial statements of D.V. and M.S. It then heard three witnesses for the defence. Next, it called the defendants to an apology. At the end of their apology the court asked the parties whether they wished to obtain any additional examinations or clarifications, to which they replied in the negative and the president of the court declared the evidentiary proceedings closed. The court then allowed the parties to plead their case and subsequently retreated for deliberations. 9.     On 19 September 2014 the Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision (judgment no. 966-967/2014). The judgment contained an analysis of the available documents and referred to the testimony of two prosecution witnesses (one of whom, A.B., see paragraphs 2 and 3 above), on which it strongly relied in finding the applicant guilty. The court did not make specific reference to the testimony of D.V. and M.S. 10 .     The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation. He argued, inter   alia, that his rights of defence were breached because the Court of Appeal had read out the statements of D.V. and M.S. and took them into account for his conviction without calling the said witnesses to the trial and without first examining whether there was any obstacle preventing them from attending. 11 .     On 20 July 2015 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. As regards the applicant’s claims in relation to D.V. and M.S.’s statements, the court considered that neither the applicant nor his lawyers had objected to the reading of the said statements. The court reiterated that according to the domestic case-law the reading of pre-trial or interrogation statements of absent witnesses did not render the proceedings invalid if the accused or his counsel had not objected to their reading. The court also considered that neither the applicant nor his lawyers had made use of the right to make observations in respect of the said witness statements. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 12 .     Relying on Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention the applicant contended that the Court of Appeal had read out the pretrial witness statements of D.V. and M.S. without first establishing whether their presence in court had been objectively impossible. According to the applicant, the Court of Appeal had refused to allow him to examine ‘the most important witnesses of the trial’ even though he had not waived his right to do so. The fact that he had requested the addition of the above statements to the case file did not mean that he had requested their reading, thus waiving his right to examine them at the hearing. 13 .     The Government raised several preliminary objections, notably that the applicant had lost his victim status and that he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not requested the witnesses to be summoned to court or lodged a request to the prosecutor to do so. They further submitted that the applicant was represented by two criminal lawyers and did not object to the reading of witness statements; in fact, he had requested their inclusion in the case file. He had had the opportunity to propose or summon D.V. and M.S. as defence witnesses but had failed to do so, effectively waiving his right to examine them. This waiver did not violate any public interest. The parties had not asked any further examination in response to the Court of Appeal offer, and the applicant had not commented on the read-out statements. The statements had not been relied upon in the judgment and had in any event been insufficient to challenge other evidence pointing to the applicant’s guilt. Finally, the criminal proceedings left no doubt as to their overall fairness. 14.     The Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the Government’s preliminary objections separately, as the application is in any event inadmissible on the following grounds. 15.   The relevant principles concerning the waiver of the right to examine a witness have been summarised, among other authorities, in Murtazaliyeva v.   Russia [GC], no.   36658/05, §§ 117-18, 18 December 2018. 16.     The Court notes, first, that the applicant himself requested that D.V. and M.S’s statements be included in the case file so that they be considered by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant cannot therefore claim that he had not wished the reading of the said statements by the court (see paragraph 12 above). 17.     Second, the applicant, who was represented by two criminal lawyers, – whose adequacy he does not dispute – never objected to the reading of the said statements in court. Nothing suggests that the applicant’s lawyers were not aware of the consequences of having those statements read out in court as well as the consequences of not objecting to the reading out of those statements, as per the domestic practice cited by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph   11 above). 18.     Third, leaving aside the fact that the applicant did not proactively call the said witnesses to testify as defence witnesses, specify the importance and relevance of their testimony to his defence - as he had done with other witnesses (see paragraph 4 above) - or ask the prosecutor to summon the said witnesses to trial (see paragraph 13 above), the Court notes importantly that before closing the examination of the evidence, the presiding judge inquired as to whether the parties wished to proceed with additional examinations or clarifications to which the applicant replied in the negative and did not lodge any request to hear D.V. and M.S. at the trial (see paragraph 8 above). 19.     The above considerations are sufficient to conclude that the applicant sought to have the pretrial statements read, and by not objecting to their reading or lodging a request to have witnesses examined despite being expressly asked by the presiding judge, he waived his right to examine those particular witnesses (see, mutatis mutandis, Murtazaliyeva, cited above, §   127). This waiver was attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance. 20.     Lastly, the Court notes that the case did not raise any questions of public interest preventing the specific procedural guarantees from being waived (see Hermi v. Italy [GC], no. 18114/02, § 79, ECHR 2006-XII). There is no reason to doubt that the applicant’s waiver constituted a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a right and that he could, with the assistance of his two lawyers, reasonably have foreseen the consequences of his conduct. 21.     Consequently, the Court dismisses the application as manifestly ill-founded according to Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 26 June 2025.     Olga Chernishova   Peeter Roosma   Deputy Registrar   President