CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 10 juin 2025

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display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } SECOND SECTION CASE OF B.T. AND B.K.CS. v. HUNGARY (Application no. 4581/16)   JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Placement of a Roma child in temporary State care immediately following his birth • Domestic authorities’ failure to carry out a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the child and those of his biological parents • Domestic authorities’ failure to conduct in-depth and careful assessment of the situation, including short-term and long-term aspects affecting the child • Decisions based on the mother’s previous conduct during her pregnancy and towards her other children • Serious shortcomings in the decision-making process depriving the mother of adequate involvement concerning the care of her child • Disproportionate interference with the right of the mother and her child to respect for their family life   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 10 June 2025   FINAL   10/09/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of B.T. and B.K.Cs. v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Saadet Yüksel,   Péter Paczolay,   Anja Seibert-Fohr,   Davor Derenčinović,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   4581/16) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Hungarian nationals, Ms   B.T. and Mr B.K.Cs. (“the applicants”), on 21 December 2015; the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”) in respect of the first and second applicant and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 13 May 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns the placement of the second applicant, a child of Roma origin, in temporary State care immediately following his birth. The applicants complain of a violation of Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2.     The first applicant, B.T., was born in 1976. The second applicant, her son B.K.Cs., was born on 3 May 2014. They live in Kesznyéten. The applicants were represented by the European Roma Rights Centre, a non ‑ governmental organisation based in Brussels. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, from the Ministry of Justice. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.     The first applicant is of Roma origin and the second applicant is considered by his parents to be Roma. The first applicant had five children born between 1997 and 2010. They were placed under child protection on 28   September 2010 because the older children had not attended school and the two youngest children had not received necessary medical care. They were temporarily placed in various childcare institutions and with foster families on 21 June 2011. On 20 December 2011 the children were placed in temporary foster care ( átmeneti nevelésbe vétel ). THE SECOND APPLICANT’S PLACEMENT IN TEMPORARY CARE 6 .     On 13 December 2013, when the first applicant was four months pregnant with her sixth child, B.K.Cs., the local health visitor ( védőnő ) wrote to the Kesznyéten Child Welfare Service ( gyermekjóléti szolgálat ) and the Tiszaújváros Guardianship Authority about her, explaining that she had an “unplanned” pregnancy with her sixth child. The report mentioned that the first applicant was living alone, receiving social benefits and participating in the public work programme only because it was obligatory. She had endangered the unborn baby’s and her own health by smoking and not attending regular medical check-ups. Furthermore, all her older children had been placed in foster care and she had not changed her attitude or living conditions since then. The report recommended that she should not be allowed to take the baby home from the hospital after delivery. Neither B.T. nor her partner, M.Cs., the father of the second applicant, were informed about this report. 7 .     On 16 December 2013 the Tiszaújváros Guardianship Authority reviewed the placement of B.T.’s four minor children in temporary foster care. It took note of the positive changes in the first applicant’s living conditions and the fact that the parents had decent accommodation; the father, M.Cs., was in work; and the mother received financial support from the municipality. It returned B.T.’s daughter to her from temporary foster care, but upheld the temporary foster care of her sons, essentially because she was expecting another child. B.T. made a request for the termination of the temporary foster care of her sons. This request was dismissed on 7   March 2014 on the grounds that the child protection authority suggested that the placement should be maintained, given B.T.’s pregnancy. 8 .     On 11 February 2014, during the sixth month of the first applicant’s pregnancy, the local health visitor wrote to the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Hospital recommending that the baby should not be released from hospital with his mother following delivery. The reason for this recommendation was that, so far as the health visitor knew, all the first applicant’s children were in care and B.T. was a heavy smoker. The parents were not informed of this recommendation. 9 .     On 3 May 2014 the first applicant gave birth to the second applicant. According to the first applicant, she was discharged from the hospital on 6   May 2014 but was not allowed to take her baby, the second applicant, with her. The first applicant submitted that she had not been informed of the reasons for this measure and that she was never shown any decision allowing her child to be taken away from her. According to the Government, the applicant was discharged from hospital on 7 May 2014. 10 .     On 6 May 2014 the Child Welfare Service wrote to the Tiszaújváros District Guardianship Authority reiterating that, on the basis of the health visitor’s assessment, the baby should not be sent home with his mother, who was in a “crisis” because of her irresponsible behaviour. On the same day, a hospital nurse transferred a “recommendation” to the Guardianship Authority informing them that B.K.Cs. could not be sent home with his parents as all the other children in the family were in temporary foster care and the mother had not cooperated with the local health visitor. The nurse asked the Guardianship Authority to issue a decision to place the second applicant in temporary State care. 11 .     On 7 May 2014 the Tiszaújváros District Guardianship Authority decided to suspend the parental rights of both the first applicant and the child’s father, M.Cs., and placed the child in the temporary care ( ideiglenes hatályú elhelyezés ) of a foster mother, B.H. The Authority stated that the first applicant had an irresponsible lifestyle and that three of her children had been committed to State care because of her living conditions. Furthermore, the baby’s physical, mental and emotional development would be seriously endangered in his family environment. 12.     Having received the decision on 12 May 2014, the first applicant appealed. She maintained that the statements about her irresponsible lifestyle and her living conditions were based on a situation that dated back to 2011. She referred to a decision of the Guardianship Authority of 16 December 2013 which noted positive changes in both respects (see paragraph 7 above). She submitted that the Guardianship Authority was aware that she was providing a financially and emotionally stable and loving family environment to her children. She also claimed that a disproportionate number of Roma children were taken into temporary foster care in Kesznyéten. 13 .     On 24 June 2014 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Guardianship Authority, acting as an appeal body, upheld the first-instance decision. It noted that the mother had not given up smoking during her pregnancy and had not attended the medical checkups suggested by the health visitor. It also stated that the parents had not ensured that their other children attended school and kindergarten regularly and received adequate medical care. Furthermore, the first applicant had neglected the educational development of the children. They had been unprepared for school and had often worn dirty clothes. They had developed pulmonary diseases because of the mother’s smoking and had been seen wandering around unattended in the neighbourhood. Counselling by the child protection authorities had been unsuccessful, so the children had first been placed under temporary child protection and then taken into foster care. The authority dismissed the argument that the child’s father had a high and regular income, stating that he did not live in the same household as the first applicant. Neither did the authority find it relevant that the first applicant participated in the public work programme, since this was a precondition for qualifying for social benefits. 14.     On 5 August 2014 the first applicant’s lawyer sought judicial review of the decision of the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Guardianship Authority by the Miskolc Administrative and Labour Court, arguing that the administrative decisions breached the mother’s and the child’s rights to respect for their private and family life. He submitted that there had been no evidence that the first applicant had endangered B.K.Cs. There had been no substantive grounds for removing him from the family and that removal had been disproportionate. The legal representative also claimed that the removal had been discriminatory as Roma children were taken into State care in a disproportionate number. On 9 September 2014 the first applicant also asked the court to suspend the enforcement of the decision taking her child into temporary care. 15.     On 9 October 2014 the Administrative and Labour Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. Relying on the previous reports about the first applicant’s attitude towards her other children, her living conditions, and the fact that the father’s regular workplace was in Budapest, about 180 kilometres away, and he therefore seemingly did not participate in the upbringing of the children, the court found that the first applicant had been correctly prevented from taking B.K.Cs. home and that it had been appropriate to take him into temporary care. 16.     The first applicant’s lawyer lodged a petition for review with the Kúria. He argued that a child could only be removed from his or her family if the family environment constituted a risk to his or her physical, intellectual, emotional or moral development, which was not the case. B.K.Cs. had been removed from his family solely because of the family’s lack of appropriate accommodation and financial means. He asserted in this respect that the decisions had failed to take into account the positive developments in the family’s circumstances since 2011, when the other five children had been taken into foster care. He reiterated that the measure was in breach of the principle of equal treatment, as such measures targeted Roma children. 17 .     In its judgment of 13 May 2015, the Kúria dismissed the first applicant’s petition and upheld the lower court’s judgment. It held that there had been positive developments in the family’s situation, notably, their living conditions had improved; and the first applicant had regular contact with her other children. However, since these developments had taken place after the first-instance administrative decision, they could not be taken into account when assessing the lawfulness of that decision. Moreover, according to the Kúria, even if the administrative authority had taken the positive developments into account, it had been right to conclude that they were insufficient to justify the baby’s return to his family or to end his placement in temporary care. The judgment was served on the first applicant on 22   June 2015. 18.     The first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Kúria’ s judgment asking the Constitutional Court to review the lawfulness of the judgment. She maintained that the measure had been disproportionate as removing the child from his family was possible only if there was a serious danger to his development. In her submission, the only reason for removing her son from the family environment had been the family’s poor financial circumstances. On this basis, she argued that the measure was in breach of her right to family life and constituted degrading treatment. She also complained about the perceived unfairness of the administrative proceedings. She pointed out that Roma children were more likely to be taken into state care because of the biased attitude of the authorities. She argued that the removal of her son also constituted discriminatory treatment. 19 .     The complaint was dismissed on 26 January 2016. The Constitutional Court found that the restriction of the first applicant’s parental rights had been necessary to safeguard the second applicant’s right to care and protection. Given that the courts had applied constitutional principles when assessing the case, the measure had been proportionate and decided on in the best interests of the child. As regards the complaints concerning the alleged degrading and discriminatory nature of the measure, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s submission contained no meaningful reasoning. THE SECOND APPLICANT’S PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE 20.     On 6 January 2015 the Tiszaújváros District Guardianship Authority reviewed the second applicant’s placement in temporary care and decided to transfer him to long-term foster care ( nevelésbe vétel ). On 13 March 2015 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Guardianship Authority revoked this decision and remitted the case for re-examination with the instruction to gather information about the parents’ living conditions and their attitude towards the child during their visits. 21 .     In the resumed proceedings the Tiszaújváros District Guardianship Authority upheld the second applicant’s placement in foster care of B.H. and suspended the parents’ exercise of their parental rights. The first applicant and M.Cs. were allowed to have contact with their son once a month for an hour. The Guardianship Authority relied on the report issued by the child protection services on 7 August 2014. This assessed the positive developments in the first applicant’s circumstances as insufficient to support a conclusion that her attitude to the upbringing of her children would change and stated that until the parents could provide evidence of positive change, the child could not be taken home. 22.     That decision was upheld on appeal on 7 September 2015 by the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Guardianship Authority, which found that the positive developments in the parents’ living conditions and their regular contact with their older children did not constitute a sufficient basis to conclude that the parents would care adequately for the children. The Borsod ‑ Abaúj-Zemplén County Guardianship Authority found it relevant that the first applicant’s other children had been taken into foster care primarily because they had not been attending school, and also because the parents had not provided adequate living, health and sanitary conditions. The authority would not return the children unless the parents provided evidence that their stance towards the schooling of their children had changed. 23.     The first applicant sought judicial review. On 3 May 2016 the Miskolc Administrative and Labour Court set aside the previous administrative decisions and remitted the case to the Tiszaújváros District Guardianship Authority. It held that the administrative authorities had failed to adequately establish all the circumstances of the case. 24.     In August 2015 the second applicant was allowed to spend two weeks with his parents and siblings. 25.     On 25 March 2016 the Tiszaújváros District Guardianship Authority terminated the second applicant’s placement in foster care with B.H. and decided to return him to his parents. The Guardianship Authority found that the living conditions of the parents were adequate, that the parents were cooperating with the child protection services and that they maintained regular contact with their children in foster care and had a regular income. The second applicant returned to his parents on 1 April 2016. OTHER PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE APPLICANTS 26 .     On 13 June 2016 the applicants, M.Cs., and two other plaintiffs (a couple whose child had also been taken into State care) filed a civil action for damages in the Miskolc Regional Court against the Kesznyéten Municipal Administration, the Kesznyéten Public Notary, the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Governmental Office and the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Hospital. They claimed that the Municipal Administration had breached their right to respect for family life in that the health visitor had not given them the necessary support during the mothers’ pregnancies but had instead made recommendations for the removal of their children. They also claimed that they had been discriminated against, referring to derogatory statements made by the health visitor about the mothers’ ethnic origins. Furthermore, the Municipal Administration had not provided the basic social services required to deal with the families’ vulnerable situation and the Governmental Office had given its decisions on placing the children in foster care only after a delay, having based them on the degrading comments of the health visitors, in violation of the plaintiffs’ right to respect for their family life and to equal treatment. Finally, the County Hospital had separated the children from their mothers without an official decision. The plaintiffs emphasised that their claim did not concern the lawfulness of the children’s placement in State care as this question had been subject to separate proceedings. 27.     At the hearing held on 9 October 2017, the health visitor explained that her task was to signal any anomalies threatening the health of children and that severe neglect was considered a form of abuse. As to her comments on the unwanted nature of the first applicant’s pregnancy, she explained that it was not meant to be offensive but a statement of fact that might be relevant as a risk factor for the health of the foetus. She also stated that she had taken part in many sensibilisation trainings, but she had had to realise that she could not succeed in her job without the cooperation of the persons concerned. Social worker K.M. who took over the case after the second applicant’s placement in temporary care stated that the first applicant had been uncooperative and that she had been unable to establish a relationship of trust with her. She did not have any reservations about the plaintiffs on account of their Roma origin since she herself was of Roma origin and she felt it her task to motivate the people living in Kesznyéten to have a better life. 28.     The Miskolc High Court dismissed the applicants’ action on 1   April 2019. On appeal, on 23 January 2020 the Debrecen Court of Appeal partly overturned the first ‑ instance judgment and upheld the applicants’ claims against the Municipal Administration concerning the failure to provide the requisite level of child protection services and against the Governmental Office concerning the failure to review the second applicant’s placement in foster care between 2   June and 18 December 2014, which resulted in the violation of the applicants’ right to family life. At the same time, it found it established that the first applicant had been separated from her baby on the day on which the guardianship authorities ordered the temporary custody of the child, which was immediately enforceable. It awarded the applicants damages in the amount of HUF 300,000 (approximately 750 euros). 29.     The plaintiffs, the Governmental Office, and the County Hospital, sought review by the Kúria, which upheld the judgment of the Debrecen Court of Appeal on 25 May 2021. 30.     Meanwhile, on 13 September 2017 the first applicant, M.Cs. and their three minor children, including the second applicant, lodged another action for damages against the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Governmental Office for the breach of their right to respect for their family and private life, their right to fair administrative proceedings and their right not to be discriminated against. They maintained that three of their minor children had been unlawfully taken into foster care (in case of B.K.Cs. from 6   January 2015 to 1 April 2016), that there had been bias in the conduct of the administrative proceedings and that they had been discriminated against because of their Roma origin. 31.     During the proceedings, the court heard employees of the Guardianship Authority and the Child Welfare Service that had dealt with the applicants’ case. Witnesses explained how they had encouraged the first applicant to seek extended visits in addition to regular ones where changes in her attitude could be monitored and how she had been advised in matters of child-care in order to facilitate the return of her children. One of the social workers, K.M., who had personally advised the applicant, stated at the hearing of 28 June 2018 that she herself was also of Roma origin and she had never experienced prejudice against the Roma on the part of her colleagues. 32.     The Miskolc High Court dismissed the applicants’ action on 9   November 2018. On appeal, on 31 January 2019 the Debrecen Court of Appeal found that the Governmental Office had breached the applicants’ right to family life in that it had failed to review the necessity of placing the second applicant in foster care within the prescribed period and had not returned the other minor children to their parents in a timely manner despite a court order. The court ordered the respondent to pay the plaintiffs compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 200,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) and HUF   150,000 to each parent and to each child, respectively. Subsequently, on 30 September 2020 the Kúria overturned the judgment of the Debrecen Court of Appeal and quashed the provisions of the final judgment finding an infringement of the right to family life, prohibiting the defendant from further infringements and ordering it to pay damages. It also upheld the first-instance judgment in this respect. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 33 .     Act no. XXXI of 1997 on child protection and guardianship authorities (the “Child Protection Act”) provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: Section 7 “A child may only be separated from his or her parents or other relatives in the child’s best interests, in cases and in a manner specified by law. A child may not be separated from his or her family solely for financial reasons.” Temporary placement Section 72 “(1) If a child is left without supervision, or if his physical, intellectual, emotional, and moral development is seriously endangered by his or her family environment or by him- or herself, and therefore his or her immediate protection is necessary, the guardianship authority, the police, the immigration authority, the asylum authority, or the prison director (hereinafter “the referring authority”) should issue an immediately enforceable order to temporarily place the child aa)   with a parent who has been living separately from the child, or other relative or person capable and willing to provide care for the child ab) if   aa)   is not applicable 1. in case of children under twelve years old, with the closest foster parent providing temporary care for children, except for children whose health or personal status, dangerous behaviour or any other reason necessitate the child’s institutionalisation. ... (2) Serious danger necessitating a temporary removal from the care of the parents is the ill-treatment or neglect of a child that puts his or her life in immediate danger or may cause serious and irreparable harm to his or her physical, intellectual, emotional or moral development. ... (4) From the date of the care order the parents’ parental rights are suspended. ...” Section 128 “In proceedings before the guardianship authority, the parents and other legal representatives, the caregiver, the child [aged fourteen or more] of restricted legal capacity, the parent whose legal capacity is partially restricted in respect of legal declarations in guardianship proceedings, the child without legal capacity [aged under fourteen] and everyone whose obligations are affected by the proceedings and – if necessary – the child’s close relatives should be heard...” 34 .     The relevant rules concerning on temporary placement orders are in Government Decree no. 149/1997 (IX. 10.) on Guardianship Authorities, Child Protection Procedure and Guardianship Procedure, which provides as follows: Temporary placement order Section 95 “(1) A temporary placement order, as an immediate measure in the child’s interest, is justified in case of a)   serious danger to the child ...” Section 96 “The referring authority shall hear the persons listed in section 128 of the Child Protection Act, except where a serious danger directly puts the child’s life at risk. ...” RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL 35 .     The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, concluded in New York on 20 November 1989, provide as follows: Article 9 “1. States Parties shall that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence. 2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.” Article 18 “1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern. 2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.”   36.     The relevant part of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the “CRC”), Hungary, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HUN/CO/2 (2006) of 27 January 2006 reads as follows: “30. The Committee is concerned about the high rate of children placed in alternative care, often for financial reasons, many of them for a long period of time, including very young children and children with disabilities. It notes with regret that about half of these children are not in foster families but in institutions. The Committee is particularly worried about the considerable overrepresentation of Roma children among children in institutions. The Committee is also very concerned that not enough efforts are made to return children to their families as soon as possible.” 37 .     The relevant part of the Concluding observations of the CRC on the combined third, fourth and fifth periodic reports of Hungary, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HUN/CO/3-5 of 14 October 2014 reads as follows: Children deprived of a family environment “37. The Committee urges the State party to ensure that children are not separated from their parents because of poverty and lack of housing, and recommends that the State party prohibit the placement of children in care institutions due to the economic situation of families and that it use this only as a last resort in accordance with the United Nations guidelines for the alternative care of children, adopted on 20 November 2009. The Committee also recommends that the State party take all necessary measures to provide families in need with adequate social housing and CRC/C/HUN/CO/3-5 8 support measures, and increase social benefits to low-income families with children in order to prevent out-of-home placements. 38. The Committee notes the amendments to the Child Protection Act of 1 January 2014 that prohibit the placement of children below the age of 12 in care institutions, but regrets that the amendments do not cover children with disabilities, chronically ill children or multiple siblings. The Committee is also concerned that: (a) Roma children continue to be overrepresented in care institutions; ...” 38.     The relevant part of the Concluding observations of the CRC on the sixth periodic report of Hungary, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HUN/CO/6 of 3 March 2020 reads as follows: “F. Family environment and alternative care (arts. 5, 9–11, 18 (1) and (2), 20, 21, 25 and 27 (4)) Family environment 26. Recalling its previous recommendations (CRC/C/HUN/CO/3-5, para. 37), the Committee urges the State party: (a) To fully implement the prohibition of the separation of children from their families and their placement in alternative care on the basis of the economic situation of those families, through comprehensive programmes that tackle the multiple challenges that families are facing, and to ensure that separation is used only as a last resort in accordance with the Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children (General Assembly resolution 64/142, annex)...” THE LAW PRELIMINARY REMARK 39.     The Court notes at the outset that the first applicant is also complaining on behalf of her son, the second applicant. She is entitled to do so under the Court’s case-law, given that the present case concerns a conflict over a minor’s interests between the first applicant as his mother and the authorities who have a care order in respect of him. The first applicant, as the minor’s mother, also has standing to apply to the Court on her son’s behalf in order to protect his interests (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy   [GC], nos.   39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000 ‑ VIII; Roengkasettakorn Eriksson v. Sweden , no. 21574/16, § 61, 19 May 2022; and V.Y.R. and A.V.R. v.   Bulgaria , no. 48321/20, § 60-61, 13 December 2022). SCOPE OF THE CASE The parties’ submissions 40.     The Government maintained that the case concerned three interrelated issues: the alleged inadequacy of the social services provided to the family prior to the birth of B.K.Cs., the temporary care order in respect of the second applicant, and the placement of B.K.Cs. and B.T.’s other children in foster care. The Government raised a number of objections to the admissibility of all three issues. 41.     The applicants submitted observations in reply to those of the Government. They emphasised that their complaint before the Court only concerned the separation of the applicants at the hospital and the temporary care order in respect of the second applicant. The domestic proceedings about the inadequacy of the social services and the foster care decisions concerned separate facts and fell outside the scope of the case before the Court. The Court’s assessment 42.     The Court reiterates that, for the purposes of Article 32 of the Convention, the scope of a case “referred to” it in the exercise of the right of individual application is determined by the applicant’s complaint or “claim”, which consists of two elements: factual allegations and legal arguments (see   Radomilja and Others v. Croatia   [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §§   109-10, 20 March 2018). The Court is not restricted by the legal grounds an applicant puts forward under the Convention and the Protocols thereto. In contrast, the Court cannot rule on whether facts which were not alleged by the applicants represented a violation of the Convention, although it does have jurisdiction to review circumstances complained of in the light of the entirety of the Convention or to “view the facts in a different manner” (see   Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, §§   99 ‑ 101, 1 June 2021). 43.     The Court observes that in their application form the applicants complained about the proceedings leading to the withholding of the second applicant from his parents immediately after his birth and his being taken into temporary State care. Those proceedings ended with the Constitutional Court’s decision of 26 January 2016 dismissing B.T.’s constitutional complaint (see paragraph 19 above). 44 .     In the absence of any application lodged with the Court relating to the social services provision for the applicants before the birth of B.K.Cs. or to the proceedings concerning B.K.Cs.’s placement in foster care and the decisions on the applicants’ contact rights during that placement, those issues fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction and the Court cannot deal with them. In order for the Court to examine the temporary care proceedings properly, it must, however, assess the case and the proceedings as a whole and place those proceedings in context, which inevitably means that it must, to some degree, have regard to other circumstances relating to the treatment of B.T., B.K.Cs. and the family by the authorities. 45.     In the light of the above, the Court does not find it necessary to examine either the Government’s preliminary objections in respect of the alleged inadequacy of the social services provided prior to B.K.Cs.’s birth or in respect of the taking into foster care of B.T.’s children or the parties’ submissions in respect of the compatibility of these proceedings with Article   8 of the Convention. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION REGARDING THE APPLICATION AS A WHOLE 46.     In the Government’s view, the applicants had failed to inform the Court of essential facts, namely that they had initiated civil proceedings (see chapter C. of the Facts part above). There had therefore been an abuse of the right of application, and the application should be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 3   (a)   of the   Convention. They claimed that the applicants had submitted false information in order to obtain a judgment to pursue a political agenda with the Committee of Ministers. Furthermore, a member of a civil society organisation had been present in the hospital following the birth of the second applicant who knew that the hospital had no legal basis to withhold the child from his mother but had not prevented its doing so. 47 .     The applicants maintained that they had provided all the information they had concerning their complaint, that is, about the unlawful placement of the second applicant in temporary care. They reiterated that the civil proceedings referred to by the Government were related to the lack of adequate social services in the region and the unlawful foster care order, those being issues that did not form part of their complaint. 48.     The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 3 (a) an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application if, among other reasons, it is knowingly based on untrue facts. The submission of incomplete and therefore misleading information may also amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information. The same applies if important new developments have occurred during the proceedings before the Court and where, despite being expressly required to do so by Rule   47   §   7 of the Rules of Court, the applicant has failed to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Gross v. Switzerland   [GC], no.   67810/10 , § 28, ECHR 2014, with further references). 49.     Turning to the application at hand, the Court notes that it concerns the alleged unlawful separation of the second applicant from his mother and his being taken into State care. The relevant information was included in the initial application form and as the applicants emphasised, their complaint before the Court was limited to the circumstances of those measures alone. The Court also takes note of the applicants’ explanation that they omitted to inform the Court about the subsequent civil proceedings in their application as they considered the subject matter of those proceedings to be different from their complaint before the Court. 50.     In the Court’s view, while it is true that the facts giving rise to the civil proceedings initiated by the applicants against the public authorities were intertwined with those giving rise to the temporary care order, they did not concern the core of the matter underlying the applicants’ complaint under the Convention. The Court therefore does not find that by omitting to provide information about the proceedings in question in their application, the applicants had intended to mislead it. 51.     There is no evidence either capable of leading the Court to consider that the applicants’ application to the Court was aimed, as the Government argued, at pursuing a political agenda. In any event, the Court has previously held that an application motivated by publicity or propaganda does not, by that very fact alone, constitute an abuse of the right of application (see   Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia , no. 798/05, § 65, 15 September 2009). 52.     Against the background described above and bearing in mind the scope of the case as defined in paragraph 44 above, the Court must reject the Government’s objection claiming an abuse of the right of application. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 53.     The applicants, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, complained that the second applicant had been unjustifiably separated from his mother and placed in temporary State care. 54.     Article 8 provides as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility The parties’ arguments 55.     The Government submitted that the State could not be held liable for actions of public health care institutions or their employees who did not exercise state authority. The applicants themselves had acknowledged in their civil action that the hospital did not have any power conferred upon it by law to separate the second applicant from the first applicant. Therefore, the complaints concerning the hospital’s actions fall outside the scope of the Convention ratione personae . 56.     The Government further maintained that the judgment of the Debrecen Court of Appeal of 23 January 2020 (see paragraph 32 above) provided sufficient compensation for the violation of the applicants’ right to family life through the Hungarian authorities’ failure to review the necessity of the second applicant’s continued placement in foster care within the time-limit prescribed by law. In this respect, the applicants can therefore no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 57.     The applicants disagreed. They pointed out that they had indeed been awarded some compensation for the fact that the revision of the care order concerning the second applicant and the implementation of the domestic court decision concerning the first applicant’s older children had been unlawfully delayed. However, they reiterated that the said matter did not form part of their complaint before the Court. The Court’s assessment 58.     The Court reiterates that compatibility ratione personae requires the alleged violation of the Convention to have been committed by a Contracting State or to be in some way attributable to it. In the present case, the applicants complained about the decision of the domestic authorities to take the second applicant into State care and later on confine him into long-term foster care. The impugned decisions have been taken by the relevant national authorities within their jurisdiction. The Government’s argument in this respect must therefore be dismissed. 59.     As regards the applicants’ victim status, the Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article   34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.   36813/97, §§ 179-80, ECHR 2006 ‑ V; Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no.   22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010; and Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no.   26828/06, § 259, ECHR 2012 (extracts). In the present case, the Court notes that the domestic judgment relied on by the Government found a violation of the applicants’ rights on account of the delayed revision of the care order concerning the second applicant between 2 June and 18 December 2014 and the failure to provide the requisite level of child protection services between 2 June and 18   December 2014 (see paragraph 28 above). That judgment did not acknowledge a breach of the applicants’ rights complained of before the Court (see paragraph 47 above). Therefore, this preliminary objection should also be dismissed. 60.     The Court finds that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. They must therefore be decla