CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 juin 2025

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display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } THIRD SECTION CASE OF D.G. AND S.G. v. SERBIA (Application no. 61347/21)     JUDGMENT   Art 8 • Family life • Domestic courts’ failure to take adequate and timely steps to properly address a child’s continued placement in foster care and to ensure regular contact with his parents • Child’s complete alienation from his parents Art 8 • Family life • Length of the proceedings to divest the parents of their parental rights • Authorities’ lack of prompt response to their requests for more regular contacts with their child, having adversely affected their relationship with him   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 24 June 2025   FINAL   03/11/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of D.G. and S.G. v. Serbia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ioannis Ktistakis , President ,   Peeter Roosma,   Lətif Hüseynov,   Diana Kovatcheva,   Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,   Mateja Đurović,   Canòlic Mingorance Cairat , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   61347/21) against the Republic of Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Serbian nationals, Mr D.G. and Ms S.G. (“the applicants”), on 11 December 2021; the decision to give notice to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the initial and then continued placement of the applicants’ son M. in foster care, the contact between the applicants and M.   after his placement in foster care, and the length of the proceedings to divest the applicants of their parental rights in respect of M.; the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 20 May 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns the immediate temporary placement of the applicants’ son M. in foster care in 2017 and the lack of regular contact between the applicants and M. thereafter, as well as the length of the proceedings to divest the applicants of their parental rights in respect of M. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants were born in 1964 and 1977 respectively and live in A. The applicants were represented by Ms Lekić Vrzić, a lawyer practising in A. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Background to the case 5.     The applicants are the father (D.G.) and the mother (S.G.) of the child M., born in 2014. The applicants have two more children (born in 2001 and 2002) in respect of whom the first applicant was completely divested of his parental rights and the second applicant was partially divested of her parental rights. The children were placed in foster care, all through the A. Social Care Centre (hereinafter “the A. Centre”). The first applicant also has a daughter from another relationship (born in 2013), as does the second applicant (born in 1996). 6.     The first applicant was in pre-trial detention between 1 September 2014 and 6 August 2016, and was serving a prison sentence between 5 December 2016 and 4 August 2020. The second applicant lived with M. and the first applicant’s mother in their family home in the village of O. 7.     The applicants have been receiving a family social allowance since 2012. Placement of M. in foster care 8.     On 16 August 2017 the A. Centre received a telephone call from a person whose identity was kept secret. That person alleged that the applicants’ son, M., who was three years old at the time, had been neglected and spent every day with his grandmother, who was old and had reduced mobility. Staff members from the A. Centre allegedly attempted to contact the second applicant by telephone, but there was no reply. 9 .     At about 3.30 p.m. two staff members from the A. Centre paid a visit to the applicants’ home. Two reports were drawn up on the same day, one prepared by the A. Centre’s special education professional ( defektolog ), and the other by the Centre’s social worker. The reports stated that the A. Centre’s staff members had found M. in the courtyard, sitting on concrete blocks 1.5   metres high and walking barefoot in an area where a lot of sharp objects lay scattered on the ground. In terms of hygiene, his physical appearance (both his clothes and body) had looked neglected, and he had had a laceration below his nose. When asked how he had sustained the injury, M. had replied that he had fallen down the stairs leading to the front door of the house. There was no fence between the courtyard and a public road with steep sides, and there was a crossroads and a bridge nearby, all of which had posed a risk to the child’s safety. The child had told the A. Centre’s staff members that he had been keeping a goat, which had been tethered nearby. The child’s grandmother had been sitting on the ground eating a bun, and she had informed the A. Centre’s staff members that M. had brought it to her. She had then asked M. to bring her some water from the house. When asked who was taking care of whom, the grandmother had answered that M. was taking care of her and that she could not take care of him. The grandmother had informed the A. Centre’s staff members that the child’s mother had been working as a fruit picker. She had also said that she could not take the A. Centre’s staff members to the house, but the child would do it. The A. Centre’s staff members reported that the grandmother had not followed the child or demonstrated that she was providing any form of care for him. They had also visited the house and reported that it had been untidy, dirty, and that there had been no suitable food for the child. The A. Centre’s staff members assessed that the child had been neglected, that he had not been cared for, since he had been left all day with his grandmother, who was unable to look after him, and that his safety had been put at risk. 10.     On the basis of the above-mentioned reports, the A. Centre issued a decision on 16 August 2017, temporarily placing M. in foster care on the same day. The Centre informed the second applicant about its decision the following day. The A. Centre stated that the identity of the child’s father was unknown. The decision stated that M. had no parental care, since the identity of his father was unknown and his mother was not taking proper care of him. The mother had been leaving the child with no adult supervision from morning to evening, for ten hours. Thus, on 16 August 2017 at 2 p.m. two staff members from the A. Centre had found the child and neither his mother nor any other adult had been looking after him. That was sufficient for the A. Centre to issue a measure temporarily placing M. in foster care. The decision on the measure stated that it was to be served on the second applicant, but that instruction was not complied with. 11.     The following day the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the A. Centre’s staff members with the A. public prosecutor, alleging that on 16 August 2017 they had taken her child, M., from the courtyard of the family home, where he had been under the supervision of his paternal grandmother, and had driven him away in a car in an unknown direction. 12 .     On the same day the second applicant submitted a complaint to the Ministry of Labour and Social Politics (hereinafter “the Ministry”), alleging that on the afternoon of 16 August 2017, after she had returned home from her work in an orchard, she had learned from her mother-in-law that at about 3.30 p.m. two persons had arrived in a car and had taken her three-year-old son away with them and driven off in an unknown direction. She had called the police, who had arrived and had contacted the A. Centre, which had informed the police that its staff members had taken M. because he had been playing alone in the courtyard and had placed him in foster care. 13.     On 18 August 2017 the A. Centre corrected its decision of 16 August 2017 to name the father of the child as D.G., the first applicant. The decision was served on the second applicant, but not the first applicant. 14.     On 1 September 2017 the second applicant gave an oral statement to the A. Centre. She repeated what had happened on 16 August 2017 and added that she, together with the police, had searched for the child. She said that when she had been working (doing seasonal agricultural work), M. had been looked after by her mother-in-law, who was capable of caring for him, feeding him and putting him to sleep. The courtyard of their house was fenced, and the door to the fence was locked with a key. Even the stairs leading to the front door of the house were fenced, so that the child could go up and down easily. The second applicant stressed that the A. Centre had her telephone number, but had not contacted her. She also stressed that she had taken good care of the child and that she could call witnesses to prove this. She asked that M. be returned to her, and objected to a guardian being appointed for him. 15.     On the same day the second applicant lodged a written appeal with the Ministry against the decision of 16 August 2017. She stated that the contested decision had been served on her on 18 August 2017. She stressed that the child had never been without supervision, and that there was no evidence to the contrary. She also pointed out that even though the contested decision concerned a temporary measure, the duration of that measure had not been fixed. She also complained that she had had no contact with M. since he had been taken away, and mentioned that the decision on the temporary measure had not been served on the child’s father. 16.     On 12 September 2017 the A. Centre filed its reply to the second applicant’s appeal with the Ministry. It stated that immediately after “the reported neglect [of the child]” it had attempted to call the mother on the telephone, but she had not answered, and therefore the staff members from the A. Centre had gone to the applicants’ family home. There, they had “assessed that the life and safety of the minor child were at serious risk”, and that was the reason why they had taken the child away. M. had been seen by a physician, who had found a wound on his body and head, and during a conversation with M. it had been established that his grandmother had hit him on the head. 17.     On 22 September 2017 the second applicant made submissions to the A. Centre, asking for contact rights with M. She stressed that she had not been provided with any information concerning his whereabouts. She stated that two of her elder children who had also been placed in foster care had visited him and had told her that he had been scared, had cried and was not being fed properly. The second applicant stressed that she had been worried about him and that he had been very attached to her. She further stressed that her appeal against the decision on the temporary measure had not yet been processed, even though three weeks had passed. 18.     On 6 October 2017 the second applicant made further submissions to the A. Centre, stating that she had seen M. that day from 10 a.m. to 11.20 a.m. She had noticed that he had lost weight and had a very pale complexion and dark circles under his eyes. M. had been wearing shoes with no socks, even though it had been quite cold. All the time he had clung to her and cried. She had brought him chocolate milk and crisps and he had consumed both eagerly. The second applicant stressed again that there had been no reason to separate her from the child, and she insisted that he be returned to her. 19.     On 20 October 2017 the second applicant met with M. in the K. Centre for Foster Care and Adoption (hereinafter “the K. Centre”). 20.     On 3 November 2017 the Ministry annulled the decision of 16   August 2017 and remitted the case to the A. Centre for fresh examination. The Ministry concluded that the Centre had carried out an adequate assessment of all relevant circumstances, but had not provided adequate reasons in its decision. The Ministry’s decision was served on the second applicant on 23   November 2017. 21.     On 7 November 2017 the second applicant gave an oral statement at the A. police station in connection with her criminal complaint against the A. Centre’s staff members. She explained that there had been no reason to take her child away from his home and not return him to her. She explained that M. had never been without her care, save for those two days when she had left him with his grandmother because she had been at work picking cherries. 22 .     On 15 November 2017 a team from the K. Centre composed of an educator ( pedagog ) and a psychologist drew up a report for the A. Centre on the second applicant’s two meetings with M. As to the meeting of 6 October 2017, the report stated that the second applicant had arrived unprepared, visibly angry at the A. Centre’s staff members for taking M. from her, and for the first ten minutes both she and the child had cried. The second applicant had been telling M. in a dramatic loud voice that he had been kidnapped from her, and that he should indeed cry. The staff members present at the K. Centre at that time had warned the second applicant that the meeting would be terminated unless she controlled her emotions and engaged in positive interaction with the child. The second applicant had accepted the advice and the conversation between her and the child had concentrated on mutual experiences. The child had sat on his mother’s lap all the time, hugged her, touched her face, and laughed with her. The mother had given M. juice and sweets that she had brought with her. The separation had been stressful for M., and he had cried. As to the meeting of 20 October 2017, the report stated that it had gone smoothly. M. had been happy to see his mother, had accepted the contact with her, had sat on her lap all the time, and they had talked about events from their life together and had laughed together. The child had not cried when they had separated and had looked forward to their next meetings with joy. The report stated that there had been a good emotional connection between the second applicant and the child, and that the stressful start to the first contact session had been the result of their separation for a longer period. After each meeting, the second applicant had expressed the need to talk with the K. Centre’s expert team. 23.     On 9 December 2017 the second applicant made submissions to the A. Centre, stating that on 23 November 2017 she had received the Ministry’s decision of 3 November 2017, only after she had come to the A. Centre in person to ask for it. She complained that in the four months since M. had been taken from his home, she had seen him only twice, for one hour each time, and only after she had complained to the police, the public prosecutor, the Ministry and the Ombudsperson. She repeated her allegations that the child had lost weight and seemed to be neglected and under constant stress as a result of being brutally separated from his mother and his home. She had only learned of the alleged facts which had served as the basis for taking the child away from the Ministry’s decision, since these facts had not been mentioned in the A. Centre’s decision of 16 August 2017. She had thus been prevented from effectively participating in the proceedings. The second applicant asked that the medical report mentioned in the Ministry’s decision – in which it was alleged that the child had said that his paternal grandmother had hit him on the head – be served on her, as well as the reports of the A. Centre’s staff members, so that she could submit her comments. She contested the veracity of the facts alleged in those reports, and complained that the A. Centre’s staff members had entered her house without authorisation. She also requested that reports from the K. Centre on her contact sessions with the child, a report on M.’s condition in foster care, and a psychiatric evaluation be commissioned. She further asked that the child’s grandmother be heard as a witness. 24.     On 29 December 2017 the A. Centre issued a fresh decision on M.’s urgent placement in foster care. It stated that on 16 August 2017, after a second telephone call about M. being neglected, the A. Centre’s staff members had paid a visit to the applicants’ house. The decision relied on the above-mentioned reports by the A. Centre, citing the findings in those reports extensively. On the basis of those findings, the A. Centre concluded that it had been necessary to place M. in foster care because his safety, life and development would have been threatened if he had stayed with the second applicant. The decision also stated that the second applicant had given an oral statement, and that on 13 December 2017 the A. Centre had sent a request to the prison where the first applicant was serving his prison sentence in order to obtain a statement from him, but the prison authorities had not replied. 25.     On 22 January 2018 the second applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision, reiterating her previous arguments and adding that the A. Centre had not collected all the relevant evidence. She also complained that there was no time frame as regards M.’s placement in foster care and that she did not have enough contact with him. 26.     On 20 March 2018 the Ministry dismissed the second applicant’s appeal and upheld the A. Centre’s decision of 29 December 2017. It repeated the findings of the above-cited reports and endorsed the A. Centre’s conclusions. The Ministry held that the conditions in which M. had been found had required urgent measures, namely his removal from the applicants’ family and placement in foster care. It did not address the second applicant’s complaint that she did not have enough contact with M. 27.     On 15 May 2018 the second applicant brought an action before the Administrative Court on her own behalf and on behalf of M.   She reiterated her previous arguments and stressed that her contact rights with M. had not been established in the nine months since he had been taken away from her. 28 .     On 31 October 2018 the Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s action, endorsing the findings of the A. Centre and the Ministry, and without addressing her complaint that she did not have enough contact with M. Proceedings to divest the applicants of their parental rights in respect of M. 29 .     On 22 May 2019 the A. Centre lodged an action against the applicants with the A. Court of First Instance ( Osnovni sud u A. ), seeking the divestment of their parental rights. It was stated that the A. Centre’s team of experts had decided to initiate those proceedings. The action relied on a report of the A. Centre’s social worker of 18 January 2019 which stated that the second applicant had reacted very emotionally to the A. Centre’s decision to place M. in foster care. She had contested the findings of the A. Centre and could not accept that her care of M. had been inadequate, and had said that if the child were returned to her, she would do the same as before. During her first contact session with M. on the premises of the K. Centre, she had reacted intensely, encouraging M. to cry and forcing him to drink chocolate milk that she had brought with her, to the extent that the protection service had had to be summoned. The second contact session between the mother and the child had been more peaceful. The report stated that on several occasions they had invited the mother to come to the A. Centre so that a new plan of contact could be drawn up, but she had not replied, nor had she shown any initiative as regards contacting the A. Centre. She had called the A. Centre once, asking that the child be returned to her because she had ensured “physical conditions for the child” as regards the house. The report further stated that in the past year the mother had not contributed to the child’s maintenance or offered anything for him. When she had been informed that M. had been asking for his toy tractor, she had replied that he could play with it when he came home. The report further stated that the father, who had been in prison since 7   August 2017, had written a letter to the A. Centre enquiring about his other children, but not about M. In addition, he had been treated for alcoholism, had repeatedly ill-treated close relatives, and had sexually abused his other two children. He had shown no interest in M.’s care since his birth, and had completely neglected all his needs. The report concluded that the applicants had no capacity to “improve their potential”, so the complete divestment of both parents’ parental rights would “create conditions to adequately protect the minor M. in accordance with his best interests”. The action further relied on a report drawn up on 29 March 2019 by the A. Centre’s educator, who stated that after the child had been placed in foster care, the mother had reacted fiercely ( burno ) and had no insight into her behaviour which had put the child’s life, health and safety at risk. Since the placement of the child in foster care, the mother had had two contact sessions with him. In the past year she had not responded to the A. Centre’s attempts to make contact with her. On one occasion when she had come to the A. Centre to try to have her family allowance renewed, she had had no intention of asking the A. Centre’s staff members in charge of children’s affairs about M., but by chance, she had encountered the head of Children’s Affairs, who had told her to talk to the case manager. All members of the team had been present for the conversation and the second applicant had said that she had not received any invitation to attend from the A. Centre because the postman had not been delivering mail. When questioned why she herself had not initiated contact with the A. Centre and enquired about the child, she had replied that she had no intention of going to K. to see the child and had requested that the child be brought to her. She had repeated several times that she did not need to go anywhere to see the child. The report stated that the second applicant had verbally expressed a wish to take care of M., but had not shown even minimal motivation to improve her parenting ability. The report characterised the second applicant as a parent who had no capacity to adequately meet the child’s developmental needs (“to offer basic care, ensure safety, make the child feel loved and valued, offer him adequate intellectual and social stimulation, set clear rules and boundaries”, and teach him to adapt his behaviour to socially acceptable norms). The report stated that the second applicant, through inadequate care, had put the child’s life, health and safety at serious risk, and that her lack of care could have had “permanent and profound consequences [for the child] as regards his psychomotor development and his overall functioning in puberty”. As regards the first applicant, the educator expressed the same view as that expressed by the A. Centre’s social worker in the report. The action further relied on a report drawn up on 15 May 2019 by the A. Centre’s psychologist which stated that M. had been conceived as a result of the applicants renewing their relationship when the first applicant had been out of prison. The second applicant had hidden her pregnancy from her elder children and those children had expressed great disappointment that she had renewed her relationship with their father, as that had shown them that she had no understanding of the seriousness of the abuse which he had inflicted on other family members. The children had expressed such feelings and criticism to the second applicant during a visit, and after that she had stopped attending scheduled visits with them, so she had had no contact with her two elder children. The report assessed that the second applicant’s main priority had been to maintain her relationship with the first applicant, and that the children had been used to achieve that aim. The report also stated that the A. Centre’s staff members had worked with the second applicant to try to foster her capacity to recognise risks to the safety and health of her children as well as their developmental needs. However, the second applicant had not made use of such expert assistance, which led to the conclusion that she did not see the children’s safety and developmental needs as being sufficiently important, and that she did not have sufficient motivation to take care of them. As regards the first applicant, the report stated that he had never made any attempt to maintain contact with the children or provide for them outside his relationship with the second applicant, and that he had been violent towards family members (his mother, the second applicant and their two elder children) over a long period. The report concluded that neither the mother nor the father had the motivation or capacity to adequately care for M., and that it was in his best interests to completely divest the applicants of their parental rights in respect of him. 30.     On 21 June 2019 the second applicant made submissions to the A. Centre, pointing out that even though its decision concerned the temporary placement of M. in foster care, it did not make any reference to the duration or conditions of that placement. She also complained that no steps whatsoever had been taken with a view to returning M. to her care. She enclosed an opinion produced by a court expert in civil engineering which she had commissioned as regards the living conditions in her house and the state of the courtyard. The expert had produced a report including photographs on the basis of a visit which he had made to the house on 14 May 2019, and had concluded that the house was functional and safe, of firm construction and suitable for multiple members of a household to live together. The photographs showed a tidy and well-equipped house, with a separate room for a child, a living room, a bathroom and a kitchen. The second applicant also stated that she had already made all the arrangements to enrol M. in kindergarten in O., and that she also needed a medical certificate for him. She asked the A. Centre to issue a decision stating that there was no longer any need for M.’s placement in foster care, and to take into account that such a young child could easily become alienated from his mother and family. 31.     On 24 June 2019 the applicants submitted a reply to the A. Centre’s action to the A. Court of First Instance (see paragraph   29 above), complaining that they had not received the reports on which the A. Centre relied, and challenging the facts and conclusions presented in the Centre’s action. The second applicant stressed that she had always responded to all of the A. Centre’s proposals when its invitations had been served on her, and that she had asked the centre to serve all invitations on her lawyer as well, but this had never been done. She further stressed that she had used all available remedies against the A. Centre’s decision to place M. in foster care. She explained that on 5 September 2017, together with her lawyer, she had approached the A. Centre to give a statement and make a proposal about the evidence to be presented, which had not been accepted. She had also travelled to K. twice to meet her son, each time for one hour. In the period between 12 March and November 2018, owing to a leg injury and the related therapy, she had not been able to respond to the A. Centre’s invitation. In that connection, the second applicant enclosed medical documentation and stated that she had already submitted the same documentation to the A. Centre, and that she had called the Centre by telephone to inform its staff members that she was not able to come to its premises. As regards her contact with M., she confirmed that she had seen him twice on the premises of the K. Centre. However, she contested the allegations that she had encouraged him to cry, stating that none of the A. Centre’s staff members had been present during her meeting with M., and he had cried because the meeting had been stressful for him, and had asked her to take him home with her. The second applicant contested the A. Centre’s allegations about her lack of motivation to care for M. which were contained in the report of the A. Centre’s educator, and complained that the educator had never had any contact with her. The second applicant also asserted that the A. Centre’s staff members had not taken any steps with a view to returning the child to her, and its conclusion that she had no adequate parenting ability was laconic. As regards her house being appropriate for a child, she submitted the expert’s opinion and asserted that there was grass in the courtyard, a fence between the courtyard and the road, and a door with a lock in the fence, and that the stairs leading to the front door of the house were fenced, so the house and its courtyard were safe for M. The first applicant stressed that even before M.’s birth he had been in either pre-trial detention or prison, and therefore all the conclusions concerning his parenting capacity were arbitrary. He also denied that he had ever sexually abused his children or anyone else, and pointed out that he had never been convicted of such an offence. 32.     On 25 June 2019 the second applicant submitted a request for an interim measure, requesting that the first-instance court regulate her contact rights with M. She stressed that she had seen him only twice since 16 August 2017, despite constantly urging the A. Centre to allow her to see him. She also asked that M. be returned to her. 33 .     On 2 July 2019 the A. Centre filed submissions in which it explained that on 18 September 2017 the first contact session between the second applicant and M. had been scheduled for 20 September 2017, to take place on the premises of the K. Centre, and the second applicant had agreed to that. The foster carer had taken M. to the Centre, but the second applicant had not appeared. The A. Centre’s staff members had called her on the telephone and she had said that she was at home and would not come to K., and that they should contact her lawyer in relation to any issues concerning M. The A. Centre alleged that on 25 September 2017 its staff members had again called the second applicant on the telephone and had agreed with her that the meeting with M. would take place on 28 September on the premises of the K. Centre. However, the second applicant had not appeared. The A. Centre’s staff members had again contacted her by telephone, and she had said that she had not received a written invitation and that they should have contacted her lawyer. On 29 September 2017 the second applicant had come to the A. Centre at its invitation, and when it had been proposed to her that a schedule should be drawn up to arrange visits with M. over a longer period, she had refused. After that the A. Centre had invited the second applicant, both orally and in writing, to come to its premises with a view to drawing up a schedule for her visits with M., but she had not responded to those invitations. It was also alleged that the second applicant did not take any responsibility for her failures in her care of M., and that she had told the A. Centre’s staff members that in her opinion, she had been right to leave the child with his grandmother because “she [the grandmother] needed someone to take care of her, and not someone to take care of”. She had also said that she would do the same again. The A. Centre pointed out that after M. had been placed in foster care, his grandmother had accidentally set the house on fire. The A. Centre confirmed that the second applicant had come to the A. Centre several times, but each time in connection with the family social allowance. She had approached the service in charge of her children only once, and only because the head of that service had met her in the corridors by chance and had asked her why she had not replied to the invitations sent by the A. Centre. The head of the service had also warned her that her ignoring the A. Centre’s invitations and avoiding cooperation in the case of her children could be used against her in court. In her verbal communication with the A. Centre’s staff members, the second applicant had used abusive language and had shouted, cursed and threatened them, and had accused them of stealing an iron from her house, to the extent that the police had had to be called to intervene. She had once said to the person handling her case “now you will pay with your head”. She had often slammed the doors of the A. Centre’s offices or the entrance door. The submissions concluded by stating that the second applicant had no insight into her behaviour and its consequences for her children, had no stability or consistency, had not respected agreements, could not serve as a model for her children, and was incapable of maintaining a stable relationship with them. The A. Centre contested the second applicant’s allegation that she had not had any contact with the Centre’s educator as being untrue, since the educator had been involved in her case since 2008 and had met both the second applicant and her children on many occasions. As regards the second applicant’s allegations that in the period between 12   March and November 2018 she had not been able to answer the A. Centre’s invitation because of a leg injury and the related therapy, she had never informed the Centre’s staff members of this. On the basis of the above information, the A. Centre suggested that the court dismiss the second applicant’s request for M. to be returned to her. As regards her request for contact with M., the A. Centre stated that its team of experts considered that such contact was not in the child’s best interests. However, it left that matter to the court and stressed that if such contact was allowed, the mother should be prepared for these meetings over a period of at least one month and should come to the A. Centre’s premises once a week, every Tuesday at 9.30 a.m. 34.     On 16 July 2019 the A. Centre drew up a schedule for preparing the second applicant for contact with M. 35.     The first meeting between the second applicant and M. took place on 9 August 2019 on the premises of the K. Centre. 36.     On 13 August 2019 the second applicant made written submissions to the A. Centre, excusing her absence from a meeting scheduled to take place at the Centre on that day because of “a death”. She asked the A. Centre to reschedule the meeting for another day, and stated that in the absence of any information in that regard, she would come to the A. Centre’s premises on 20   August 2019, as previously scheduled. She also asked that the next meeting with M. be scheduled as soon as possible, because at their last meeting on 9   August 2019 she had noticed that he had called his foster carers “Mummy and Daddy”. 37 .     On 21 August 2019 the second applicant urged the court to adopt a decision on her request for an interim measure. She stated that since 19 July 2019 she had been going to the A. Centre once a week with a view to preparing herself for contact with M. At the meetings at the A. Centre, the discussions had concentrated on the conditions of M.’s placement and what he was being fed, and on asking the second applicant what M. had liked to eat, what toys he had liked to play with, and what she would give him at their first meeting. She had said that he had liked colouring books and riding his bicycle, and that she would give him a bigger bicycle. As to her first meeting with M. on 9 August 2019, the second applicant submitted that M. had come with his foster carers, whom he had called “Mummy and Daddy”. He had said that in their house he had two brothers, and that he would never go home with the second applicant because he had been told so. He had also told her that the day before his “parents” had bought him a new bicycle and he wanted to go home to ride it. He had also said that they had bought him colouring books. The second applicant believed that the A. Centre’s staff members had told the foster carers to buy those toys for M., and had thus interfered with her intention to buy them for him herself. Such conduct on the part of the A. Centre’s staff members had been aimed at completely alienating the child from his biological mother, and had succeeded, since the M. at time five years old, considered his carers his parents, their children his brothers, and their house his home. After that meeting a staff member from the A. Centre had told the second applicant that she no longer had to come to the A. Centre. 38.     On 14 October 2019 the applicants   asked the court to commission expert reports from a child psychologist, a psychologist and a neuropsychiatrist to assess their parenting capacity, whether it was in M.’s best interests to be separated from his parents, whether M.’s placement in foster care benefited his long-term interests, and what type of contact between M. and his parents would be most suitable during the court proceedings. 39.     On 25 November 2019 the A. Court of First Instance commissioned a report from a psychologist. The second applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the expert report in advance. 40 .     On 5 March 2020 the psychologist submitted her report. As regards the first applicant, she considered that his parenting capacity would have to be assessed after his release from prison, where he had undergone treatment for alcoholism. As regards the second applicant, the psychologist concluded that she was a person of lower intellectual capacity who did not suffer from a severe mental illness which might justify divesting her of her parental rights. She suffered from mild depression and heightened anxiety. She had expressed her need to take care of M. and her interest in doing so. As a mother, she was warm and capable of identifying and satisfying M.’s needs. As regards M.’s placement in foster care, the psychologist considered that the A. Centre’s staff members had been justified in placing him in foster care, given the circumstances at that time, in order to prevent potential negative consequences for the child. However, the psychologist considered that the A. Centre had not taken adequate measures to re-establish the relationship between the second applicant and M., which had disrupted the child’s emotional connection with his mother. The psychologist considered that the conditions for M.’s development in foster care were adequate, and that the carers took good care of him. As to the contact between M. and the applicants during the court proceedings, the psychologist considered that, given the age and development of the child and the health and mental state of the mother, and the fact that the child had not seen his mother for a long time, which had caused emotional disturbance, the re-establishment of contact and the relationship between them should be gradual; initially, contact should be supervised, and then it should be unsupervised for shorter intervals, after which time M. and his mother should spend weekends together. The psychologist also recommended that the Centre’s staff members provide counselling for both the mother and the child. 41 .     On 22 May 2020, relying on the psychologist’s assessment, the applicants urged the court to decide on contact between the second applicant and the child, and to dismiss the A. Centre’s action to divest them of their parental rights in respect of M. 42.     On 1 June 2020 the A. Centre informed the court that during the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the second applicant had not once called the Centre to enquire about M. According to the A. Centre’s team of experts, the second applicant’s motivation for having contact with M. was not authentic, and such contact would not be in the child’s best interests. 43.     On 1 July 2020 the applicants urged the court to decide on their contact with M. 44.     On 4 August 2020 the first applicant was released from prison and returned to live with the second applicant in their family home in O. 45 .     On 26 October 2020 the court-appointed psychologist submitted her assessment of the first applicant. She considered that he was of average intellectual capacity and had a personality disorder. In the past he had suffered from alcoholism, but he had undergone treatment for it in prison and had abstained from alcohol since 2016. His parenting capacity had been preserved and he had expressed a clear interest in having contact with M., establishing an emotional relationship with him, and fully taking care of him. The psychologist also considered that the first applicant should be obliged to continue treatment for alcoholism. As regards contact between M. and the applicants, the psychologist repeated her previous opinion and specified three phases of re-establishing contact. She recommended that in the first phase, to last at least two months, the applicants should have supervised contact with M. twice a week in his place of residence, with prior psychological preparation of the child and cooperation with his foster carers. She recommended that in the second phase, to last at least a further two months, the applicants should have unsupervised contact with M. twice a week for two to three hours, in his place of residence. She recommended that in the third phase, the applicants should have unsupervised contact with M. in their house at weekends, until the end of the court proceedings. She also recommended that, since the parents held the A. Centre’s staff members responsible for their lack of contact with M., experts from the K. Centre should supervise and evaluate each phase, and make further re