CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 1 juillet 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sD0489F03 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s2044A09A { margin-left:6.51pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .sAE6FB95D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:32.01pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s1824C086 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:35.3pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s9C3F180D { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:42.4pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sF54F3725 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sDBC81028 { width:4.83pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s65DDED6B { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:42.55pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s7AE800C3 { width:4.28pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s46DB5BA6 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 51757/12 Nirmal Kumar SHARMA against the United Kingdom   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 1   July   2025 as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen, President ,   Saadet Yüksel,   Tim Eicke,   Jovan Ilievski,   Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Juha Lavapuro, judges , and Hasan Bakirci, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 August 2012, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Mr Nirmal Kumar Sharma, is a British national who was born in 1958 and lives in Slough. He was represented before the Court by Teacher Stern LLP, a firm of solicitors based in London. 2.     The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Wickremasinghe of the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Criminal proceedings 4.     On 14 and 15 February 2007 the applicant was convicted of seven counts of procuring the execution of a valuable security by deception, one count of false accounting and one count of doing acts tending and intending to pervert the course of public justice. At the time of his conviction the applicant had been an accounts auditor with his own company, Sharman Associates, for twenty years and a lay magistrate for five. The conviction arose out of a deception upon two of his clients, who had been persuaded to issue cheques for tax liabilities that did not exist. 5.     At trial it appeared that funds derived from third parties had been diverted to offshore accounts in the name of the applicant and members of his family. Although the applicant had never declared income of more than 17,500   British pounds (“GBP”) and denied owning real property, motor vehicles or shares of any kind, the bank accounts associated with or controlled by him were found to contain transactions in excess of GBP   16   million. 6 .     On 23 March 2007 the applicant was sentenced to a total of three years and three months’ imprisonment. The judge said the following: “[a]t the end of this case, Mr Sharma, the short fact is that you were thoroughly dishonest and benefitted as I say to the extent that I have just mentioned. That in itself is bad enough. Bad enough as a man of trust, an accountant, a magistrate – albeit at the very end of the period of dishonesty ....” 7 .     On 21 November 2007 the Court of Appeal quashed one of the seven counts of procuring the execution of a valuable security by deception. The sums derived from the remaining offences amounted to GBP 39,726.52. Confiscation proceedings before the Crown Court 8 .     Sections 72AA(1) and 71(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (“the   1988 Act” – see paragraphs 25-35 below) gave the Crown Court the power to make a confiscation order where a defendant was convicted of at least two qualifying offences. In determining whether the defendant had benefited from his criminal conduct and, if he had, the amount to be recovered, section 72AA(4) of the 1988 Act allowed the court to make certain assumptions (“the   statutory assumptions” – see paragraph 29 below). In particular, any property transferred to the defendant at any time in the six years before his conviction, together with property held by him at the date of conviction and between conviction and the determination of the confiscation proceedings would be assumed to have been obtained by him as a result of his general criminal conduct. The court was not to make the assumptions in relation to any particular property or expenditure if the assumption was shown to be incorrect or would result in serious injustice. 9.     Following the applicant’s conviction, the prosecution commenced confiscation proceedings under section 71(1) of the 1988 Act (see   paragraph   26 below). The judge who had presided over the trial was also to preside over the confiscation proceedings. 10 .     The prosecution alleged that the applicant had benefitted from criminal conduct in the sum of GBP 4,286,085.64, of which GBP   39,726.52 had been derived directly from the offences of which he was convicted. The remainder was the value of property held by the applicant or which had passed through his hands, with no apparent explanation, in the six years prior to the institution of proceedings against him. 11 .     In January 2009 the parties entered into negotiations for settlement. On 26 January 2009, in response to questioning from the judge, counsel for the prosecution provided the Crown Court with the following details of the monetary figures provisionally agreed in the ongoing negotiations: “approximately 3 million, and shares and bank accounts possibly 2.2 million...that is where we have reached.” 12 .     Negotiations eventually broke down and the judge was informed on 14   April 2009. In the same hearing counsel for the applicant indicated his intention to apply for the judge to recuse himself on two grounds: he had been informed of provisional figures in the ongoing and now failed negotiations, and he had stated during sentencing that the applicant was “fundamentally dishonest” (see paragraph 6 above). 13.     With regard to the first ground, the judge said: “[I] recall clearly on I think it was the last occasion saying that from my position this is like peering through a fog because I am just not given any information. I do not know anything. I have not seen one single sheet of paper. I just do not know what has been going on behind the scenes.” 14 .     During a case management hearing on 19 June 2009 counsel for the prosecution denied making any submissions that might give grounds for an application for recusal: “It is absolutely true that we showed Your Honour none of the documents that were passing to and from in the negotiation period, and we did indeed keep Your Honour in the dark and there was a reason for that, and Your Honour saw that in a recent defence submission where they were hinting that Your Honour might be disqualified.” 15 .     The applicant did not ultimately make an application for the judge to recuse himself. 16.     Confiscation proceedings took place on 7, 8, 15, 16 and 17   December 2009. The applicant did not give evidence, nor did he call any witnesses; instead, he relied on one hundred and five witness statements. In his own written statements and through the statements of witnesses the applicant sought to explain his bank transactions by his involvement in Hawala (an informal value transfer system based on the performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers, primarily located in the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian subcontinent, operating outside of, or parallel to, traditional banking, financial channels, and remittance systems). 17.     Nevertheless, the judge was satisfied that the shareholdings, real property and bank accounts in the applicant’s name and in the names of his family members and Sharman Associates were held by him. Moreover, the judge found that the closure of certain bank accounts by the applicant had been an attempt to defeat a confiscation hearing. 18 .     On 22 December 2009 the judge ruled that the statutory assumptions (see paragraphs 8 above and 29 below) should apply and made a confiscation order against the applicant in the sum of GBP 4,101,339, being the full amount claimed by the prosecution (see paragraph 10 above) reduced to reflect the diminution in value of residential property by the time of the order. A term of eight years’ imprisonment was set in default of payment. Proceedings before the Court of Appeal 19 .     The applicant was granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that there had been an appearance of bias and that the judge ought to have recused himself; that there was a lack of proportionality between the offences the applicant was convicted of and the offences he was assumed to have committed for the purposes of making the confiscation order; and that by operation of the statutory assumptions the applicant was in effect deemed to be guilty of indictable offences and, as such, the burden should have been on the prosecution to prove those offences to the criminal standard. 20.     The applicant’s appeal was heard together with that of Darren   John   Bagnall ( Bagnall & Anor v R. [2012] EWCA Crim 677). On 18   April 2012 both appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 21 .     On the issue of bias, the Court of Appeal accepted that the judge had been told of the amount of the proposed settlement prior to the hearing (see paragraph   11 above) but found that, since he had forgotten what he had been told by the time of the confiscation proceedings, he had only known that there had a been a suggestion of settlement. This had been known to him in any case and was deemed insufficient to give rise to a “real possibility” of bias or its appearance. As for comments made during sentencing (see paragraph   6 above), the court held that there was no evidence to sustain an accusation of the appearance of bias. 22.     The court further found that it was not disproportionate to require a defendant to establish that monies held in his bank accounts, or accounts connected to him, were from a legitimate and not a criminal source. There was therefore nothing unfair in requiring the applicant to disclose and explain where monies that he held had come from. Furthermore, the judge had been entitled to reject the vast amount of written material relied on by the applicant, which was internally inconsistent. The view the judge had taken of the evidence was therefore neither disproportionate nor unfair. 23.     Finally, the court found there to be no basis for contending that to impose the burden upon the defendant of showing that the source of his property was legitimate was contrary to Article 6 of the Convention. The statutory assumptions were applied not to facilitate a finding of guilt, but rather to assess the amount of the confiscation order. The applicant had been entitled to rebut the assumption that the source of the assets was criminal, on the balance of probabilities, and in Phillips v. the United Kingdom (no.   41087/98, ECHR 2001-VII) the Court had described this as a “principal safeguard”. 24.     On 27 November 2013 the Crown Court reduced the confiscation order against the applicant to GBP 1,467,951.35 pursuant to section 83 of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 35 below). Relevant legal framework and practice The Criminal Justice Act 1988 25 .     At the relevant time the applicable legislation was the 1988 Act (as amended by the 1993 and 1995 Proceeds of Crime Act). Relevant sections of the 1988 Act (sections 71 and 72AA) have since been repealed and replaced by provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 26 .     Pursuant to sections 72AA(1) and 71(1) of the 1988 Act, where a defendant was convicted of at least two qualifying offences before a Crown Court or Magistrate’s Court and the prosecutor gave written notice declaring that the case was one in which it was appropriate for the provisions of the sections to be applied, the court had to first determine whether the offender had benefited from any relevant criminal conduct. 27.     Under section 71(4) of the 1988 Act, a person benefitted from an offence if he obtained property as a result of or in connection with the conduct and his benefit was the value of the property so obtained. 28 .     Relevant criminal conduct was defined in section 71(1)(d): “In this part of the Act (relevant criminal conduct), in relation to a person convicted of an offence in any proceedings before a court, means (subject to s.72AA(6) below) that offence taken with any other offences of a relevant description which are either (a) offences of which he is convicted in the same proceedings, or (b) offences which the court will be taking into consideration in determining his sentence for the offence in question.” 29 .     Section 72AA(4) provided for the making of three assumptions for the purpose of deciding whether or not a defendant had benefited from his general criminal conduct and calculating his benefit from that conduct. Where the court saw fit, it could, pursuant to section 72AA(3), assume: “(a)     that any property appearing to the court— (i)     to be held by the defendant at the date of conviction or at any time in the period between that date and the determination in question, or (ii)     to have been transferred to him at any time since the beginning of the relevant period, was received by him, at the earliest time when he appears to the court to have held it, as a result of or in connection with the commission of offences to which this Part of this Act applies; (b)     that any expenditure of his since the beginning of the relevant period was met out of payments received by him as a result of or in connection with the commission of offences to which this Part of this Act applies; and (c)     that, for the purposes of valuing any benefit which he had or which he is assumed to have had at any time, he received the benefit free of any other interests in it.” 30 .     The “relevant period” referred to in subsections (a)(ii) and (b) was six   years before proceedings were started against the defendant (section   72AA(7)(b)). 31 .     Pursuant to section 72AA(5), the court should not make any assumptions with respect to property where: “(a)     that assumption, so far as it relates to that property or expenditure, is shown to be incorrect in the defendant’s case; (b)     that assumption, so far as it so relates, is shown to be correct in relation to an offence the defendant’s benefit from which has been the subject of a previous confiscation order; or (c)     the court is satisfied that there would (for any other reason) be a serious risk of injustice in the defendant’s case if the assumption were to be made in relation to that property or expenditure.” 32 .     Section 72AA(6) read as follows: “Where the assumptions specified in sub-section (4) above are made in any case, the offences from which, in accordance with those assumptions, the defendant is assumed to have benefited shall be treated as if they were comprised, for the purposes of this Part of this Act, in the conduct which is to be treated, in that case, as relevant criminal conduct in relation to the defendant.” 33.     When assessing whether a person had benefited from any offence and the amount to be recovered in the case, section 71(7A) required the standard of proof to be that which applied in civil proceedings. 34 .     Pursuant to section 71(1B), where the court decided that the defendant had benefited from the conduct referred to it, it had to calculate the recoverable amount and make a confiscation order requiring him to pay that amount. 35 .     Section 83 permitted the High Court to vary the confiscation order if it was satisfied that the realisable property was inadequate for the payment of any amount remaining to be recovered under the order. Case-law in respect of confiscation HM Advocate and Another v. McIntosh ([2003] 1 AC 1078) 36.     In McIntosh the Scottish High Court of Justiciary sitting as a court of criminal appeal (“the Appeal Court”) had held, by a majority of two to one, that a confiscation procedure similar to that applied in the present case was incompatible with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. In particular, it found that in asking the court to make a confiscation order the prosecutor was in fact asking it to conclude that the defendant had committed a criminal offence, even though there had been no indictment or complaint, and no conviction. As the allegation against the defendant was unspecific and based on no evidence, his need for the presumption of innocence had been all the greater. The operation of the statutory assumptions had therefore offended against the presumption of innocence. 37.     However, on 5 February 2001 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on appeal, held unanimously that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention did not apply, since during the confiscation proceedings the accused was not “charged with a criminal offence” but was instead faced with a sentencing procedure in respect of the offence of which he had been convicted. Even if Article 6 § 2 could be said to have applied, the Privy Council held that the assumption involved in the making of the confiscation order was neither unreasonable nor oppressive. R v. Rezvi [2002] UKHL 1 and R v. Benjafield and Others [2002] UKHL 2 38.     In R. v. Rezvi the House of Lords unanimously held that the confiscation scheme under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Lord Steyn, with whom the other Law   Lords agreed, observed: “It is a notorious fact that professional and habitual criminals frequently take steps to conceal their profits from crime. Effective but fair powers of confiscating the proceeds of crime are therefore essential. The provisions of the 1988 Act are aimed at depriving such offenders of the proceeds of their criminal conduct. Its purposes are to punish convicted offenders, to deter the commission of further offences and to reduce the profits available to fund further criminal enterprises. ... It is clear that the 1988 Act was passed in furtherance of a legitimate aim and that the measures are rationally connected with that aim ... The only question is whether the statutory means adopted are wider than is necessary to accomplish the objective. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the means adopted are disproportionate to the objective inasmuch as a persuasive burden is placed on the defendant. The Court of Appeal [2001] 3 WLR 75, 103 carefully considered this argument and ruled: ‘The onus which is placed upon the defendant is not an evidential one but a persuasive one, so that the defendant will be required to discharge the burden of proof: see Lord Hope’s third category of provisions in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex Kebilene , [2000] 2 AC 326, 379. This is therefore a situation where it is necessary carefully to consider whether the public interest in being able to confiscate the ill-gotten gains of criminals justifies the interference with the normal presumption of innocence. While the extent of the interference is substantial, Parliament has clearly made efforts to balance the interest of the defendant against that of the public in the following respects: (a)     It is only after the necessary convictions that any question of confiscation arises. This is of significance, because the trial which results in the conviction or convictions will be one where the usual burden and standard of proof rests upon the prosecution. In addition, a defendant who is convicted of the necessary offence or offences can be taken to be aware that if he committed the offences of which he has been convicted, he would not only be liable to imprisonment or another sentence, but he would also be liable to confiscation proceedings. (b)     The prosecution has the responsibility for initiating the confiscation proceedings unless the court regards them as inappropriate ... (c)     There is also the responsibility placed upon the court not to make a confiscation order when there is a serious risk of injustice. As already indicated, this will involve the court, before it makes a confiscation order, standing back and deciding whether there is a risk of injustice. If the court decides there is, then the confiscation order will not be made. (d)     There is the role of this court on appeal to ensure there is no unfairness. ... [I]n our judgment, if the discretions which are given to the prosecution and the court are properly exercised, the solution which Parliament has adopted is a reasonable and proportionate response to a substantial public interest, and therefore justifiable.’ For my part I think that this reasoning is correct, notably in explaining the role of the court in standing back and deciding whether there is or might be a risk of serious or real injustice and, if there is, or might be, in emphasising that a confiscation order ought not be made. ... In agreement with the unanimous views of the Court of Human Rights in Phillips v   United Kingdom (Application No 41087/98) 5 July 2001 I would hold that Part VI of the 1988 Act is a proportionate response to the problem which it addresses.” 39.     In R. v. Benjafield the House of Lords unanimously held that the equivalent confiscation scheme under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (subsequently considered in Phillips , cited above) was also compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. R v. Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19 40.     In R v. Briggs-Price confiscation proceedings under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 had commenced after the defendant was convicted on charges of conspiracy to evade the prohibition on the importation of heroin. Originally, he had also been charged with possession of one kilogram of cannabis with intent to supply, but prior to the trial the court acceded to the prosecution’s request to lay this charge on the file. In doing so, the prosecution made it plain that it intended to pursue confiscation proceedings in relation to trafficking in cannabis. In addition, it was part of the prosecution’s case at trial that the defendant had been brought into the heroin conspiracy because he already had a distribution network for the transportation and distribution of cannabis, and that this same network was to be used for the distribution of heroin. During the confiscation proceedings which followed the defendant’s conviction the statutory assumptions were not made. Instead, the prosecution sought to prove that the defendant had trafficked in cannabis and invited the court to estimate the profit that he must have derived from those offences. In making a confiscation order, the judge indicated that he had “no doubt” the defendant had also been involved in the supply of cannabis. 41.     Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers began by emphasising the exceptional nature of the case: “In confiscation proceedings the prosecution has to satisfy the court that the defendant has benefited from drug trafficking and the extent of such benefit. The normal way of doing this is to prove that the defendant possesses, or has possessed, property and to invite the court to assume that the property in question represents or represented benefit derived from drug trafficking. The Act expressly provides that the court must make this assumption unless it is shown to be incorrect or would involve a serious risk of injustice. 42.     Therefore, in that case the Lordships were not concerned with the operation of the statutory assumptions. Relying, inter alia , on Phillips (cited above), they proceeded on the basis that the operation of the statutory assumptions did not constitute a “new charge” within the meaning of Article   6 § 2 of the Convention, and did not render the confiscation proceedings unfair within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. COMPLAINTS 43.     Under Art 6 § 2 of the Convention the applicant complains that the application to his case of the statutory assumptions contained in section   72AA(4) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 29 above) amounted to the bringing of “new charges” within the autonomous Convention meaning of that term. 44.     The applicant further complains under Art 6 § 1 of the Convention that there has been a violation of his right to a fair hearing because, objectively, there was a real risk of bias such that the confiscation proceedings were not conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal. THE LAW Complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention 45.     The applicant complains that the presumption of innocence has been breached in his case. He invokes Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” The parties’ submissions (a)    The Government 46.     The Government argued that the applicant’s complaint should be declared inadmissible since Article 6 § 2 was not applicable to the confiscation proceedings. Applying the three criteria set out in Engel and   Others v. the Netherlands (8 June 1976, Series A no. 22), the Government observed that under the 1988 Act, as under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, confiscation proceedings were considered to be part of the sentencing procedure and did not involve charging a person with a criminal offence. The Court itself had consistently and frequently accepted that confiscation orders, which were made to deprive a convicted defendant of the benefits of criminal activity, did not amount to a criminal charge and did not engage Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see, for   example, Phillips v. the United Kingdom , no.   41087/98, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII; Grayson and Barnham v. the United Kingdom , nos. 19955/05 and 15085/06, 23   September 2008; and Van Offeren v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 19581/04, 5   July 2005). 47.     The Government argued that this was the case regardless of whether or not the confiscation order was calculated by reference to the specific conviction which triggered the confiscation application. In this regard, the identification of property for which there was no apparent explanation was not an accusation of a criminal offence, and there was no verdict or pronouncement of guilt in respect of any such offence. A confiscation order did not add to the defendant’s criminal record, and there was no sentence or penalty imposed other than that for the offence of which the defendant was convicted. 48.     In Phillips (cited above, § 34), the Court had endorsed this analysis and, in the Government’s view, there was no substance to the applicant’s argument that in his case the confiscation order had amounted to a “new charge” because it was not proportionate to the offence of which he was convicted. Such an approach had no support in the Court’s case-law and would risk emasculating confiscation measures designed to deprive criminals of the proceeds of their crimes and prevent the funding of future criminal activity. (b)    The applicant 49 .     The applicant argued that there should be a relationship of proportionality between the nature and gravity of the index offending (being the offending that led to his conviction) and the offences assumed to have been committed. Absent such a relationship, the application of the statutory assumptions contained in section 72AA(4) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph   29 above) amounted to the bringing of new criminal charges. 50 .     The applicant had been convicted of relatively minor fraud against two named persons amounting to less than GBP 40,000 (see paragraph   7 above), whereas the confiscation order made against him was over a hundred times that amount (see paragraph 18 above). In Phillips (cited above), the Court had acknowledged that allegations made about an accused’s character and conduct as part of the sentencing process could engage the presumption of innocence if the accusations were of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new charge. This qualification was surely correct, and in the present case the imposition of a disproportionate confiscation order had amounted to the bringing of a new charge. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 51 .     As expressly stated in the terms of the Article itself, Article 6 §   2 applies where a person is “charged with a criminal offence” (see Allen v.   the   United Kingdom [GC], no. 25424/09, § 95, ECHR 2013). The Court has repeatedly emphasised that this is an autonomous concept and must be interpreted according to the three criteria set out in its case-law, namely the classification of the proceedings in domestic law, their essential nature, and the degree of severity of the potential penalty (see, among many other authorities on the concept of a “criminal charge”, Engel and Others , cited above, § 82, and Phillips , cited above, § 31). A “criminal charge” exists from the moment that an individual is officially notified by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence, or from the point at which his situation has been substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against him (see Simeonovi v.   Bulgaria   [GC], no. 21980/04, §§ 110-111, 12 May 2017, with references therein). 52.     In   Phillips (cited above, §§ 35-36) the Court held that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention was not applicable to the confiscation proceedings brought against the applicant. Whilst it was clear that Article 6 § 2 governed criminal proceedings in their entirety, the right to be presumed innocent under Article   6 § 2 arose only in connection with the particular offence “charged”. Once an accused had properly been proved guilty of that offence, Article   6 §   2 could have no application in relation to allegations made about his character and conduct as part of the sentencing process, unless such accusations were of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new “charge” within the autonomous Convention meaning. 53 .     In determining whether in the course of the confiscation proceedings the applicant had been “charged with a criminal offence”, within the meaning of Article 6 § 2, the Court had regard to the three Engel and Others criteria (see paragraph 51 above). As regards the first criteria, the Court considered it to be “clear” that an application for a confiscation order did not involve any new charge or offence in terms of the criminal law. On the contrary, confiscation orders were part of the sentencing process which followed upon the conviction of the defendant of the criminal offences with which he was charged (see Phillips , cited above, § 32). Turning to the second and third criteria, the Court noted that the purpose of the confiscation procedure was not the conviction or acquittal of the applicant for any other drug-related offence. Although the Crown Court assumed that he had benefited from drug trafficking in the past, this was not reflected in his criminal record. It could not, therefore, be said that he was “charged with a criminal offence”. Instead, the purpose of the procedure had been to enable the national court to assess the amount at which the confiscation order should properly be fixed. This procedure was analogous to the determination by a court of the amount of a fine or the length of a period of imprisonment to be imposed on a properly convicted offender (ibid, §§   33 ‑ 34). 54.     Similarly, in Van Offeren (cited above) the Court treated confiscation proceedings following on from a conviction as part of the sentencing process and therefore as not involving the bringing of any new “charge” within the meaning of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 55 .     In Geerings v. the Netherlands (no. 30810/03, §§ 45-51, 1   March 2007), however, the Court held that the presumption of innocence had been breached in confiscation proceedings in issue in that case. In reaching this conclusion, it distinguished the facts of the case before it from both Phillips and Van Offeren on the basis that the impugned order related to the very crimes of which the applicant had in fact been acquitted, and that he was never shown to be in possession of any assets for whose provenance he could not give an adequate explanation. 56.     More recently, in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy (nos. 47284/16 and 84604/17, §§ 127-141, 19 December 2024), a case decided following the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Nealon and Hallam ([GC], nos.   32483/19 and 35049/19, 11   June 2024), the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention where the domestic courts ordered the confiscation of the first applicant’s assets after the criminal proceedings were discontinued, even though under domestic law a criminal “conviction” was a formal requirement for confiscation. The Court found that, in ordering the confiscation of the first applicant’s assets, the domestic courts imputed criminal liability to him despite the discontinuance of the proceedings and thereby breached his right to be presumed innocent (see Nealon and Hallam , cited above, § 168). (b)    Application of these principles to the present case 57.     In the present case the impugned confiscation order did not relate to crimes of which the applicant had been acquitted, or in respect of which criminal proceedings had been discontinued (compare Geerings and Episcopo and Bassani , both cited above). Therefore, following Phillips (cited above, § 35), Article 6 § 2 could apply to the confiscation proceedings only if the accusations against the applicant were of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new “charge” against him. 58.     Having regard to the three criteria employed in Phillips to answer this question (see paragraph 53 above), the Court notes that the confiscation proceedings in the present case were also part of the sentencing process which followed the applicant’s conviction of the criminal offences with which he was charged. The purpose of the confiscation proceedings was the same as in Phillips (assessing the amount at which the confiscation order should be fixed), as was the penalty (a confiscation order with a period of imprisonment in default). Nevertheless, it is the applicant’s contention that the lack of proportionality between the confiscation order and the offences of which he was convicted distinguishes the present case from that of Phillips and engages Article   6 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraphs 49-50 above). 59 .     In the Court’s view, this argument is misconceived. In Phillips (cited above, § 35) the Court made it clear that Article 6 § 2 could only apply to confiscation proceedings where the allegations made about the accused’s character and conduct in the course of those proceedings were of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new “charge” within the autonomous Convention meaning of that term. What is relevant, therefore, is the nature and degree of the allegations against the accused’s character and not the amount of the confiscation order or its proportionality to the offence of which the applicant was convicted. 60.     Regardless of any perceived “lack of proportionality” between the confiscation order and the offences of which the applicant was convicted, it remains the case that in the context of the confiscation proceedings allegations that he had engaged in, and benefitted from, criminal conduct other than that of which he had been convicted could not, in and of itself, amount to the bringing of a “new charge” against him. Such allegations were not a “prelude to ‘criminal proceedings’” against him (see Deweer v.   Belgium , 27 February 1980, § 45, Series A no. 35), nor were they an official notification of an allegation that he had committed a criminal offence (see Simeonovi , cited above, § 110). 61.     In the present case, therefore, the Court does not consider that the confiscation proceedings amounted to a “criminal charge” within the autonomous Convention meaning given to that term. According, it finds that Article   6 § 2 was not applicable to the confiscation proceedings. The applicant’s complaints thereunder are therefore incompatible ratione   materiae with the provisions of the Convention and its Protocols within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article   35 § 4 of the Convention. Complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 62.     The applicant further complains that there was a real risk that the judge conducting the confiscation proceedings was biased. First of all, when sentencing the applicant he had referred to his “dishonesty” (see paragraph   6 above); and secondly, he had been told of a proposed settlement figure before the settlement negotiations broke down (see paragraphs 11-14 above). The applicant invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal ...” 63.     Although the applicant expressed an intention to make an application for the judge to recuse himself (see paragraph 12 above), no such application was ever made (see paragraph 15 above). Nonetheless, the applicant was granted permission to appeal on the ground, inter alia , that there had been an appearance of bias and that the judge ought to have recused himself (see paragraph   19 above). The Court of Appeal accepted that the judge had been told of the amount of the proposed settlement prior to the hearing but found that, since he had forgotten what he had been told by the time of the confiscation proceedings, he had only known that there had a been a suggestion of settlement. This had been known to him in any case and was deemed insufficient to give rise to a “real possibility” of bias or its appearance. As for comments made during sentencing, the court held that there was no evidence to sustain an accusation of the appearance of bias (see paragraph   21 above). 64.     In light of the above, the Court concludes that, in the circumstances of this case, the domestic procedure for addressing any concerns about the independence and impartiality of judges functioned properly and, in particular, that the Court of Appeal sufficiently examined the applicant’s complaint and gave adequate reasons for concluding that on the facts of the case there was no “real possibility” of bias or its appearance (see, for example, Pastörs v. Germany , no. 55225/14, §§ 68-69, 3 October 2019). Consequently, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 28 August 2025.     Hasan Bakırcı   Arnfinn Bårdsen   Registrar   President