CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 1 juillet 2025

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THE UNITED KINGDOM (Applications nos. 56532/22 and 2 others – see appended list)   JUDGMENT   Art 3 • No risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole which would be irreducible de facto and de jure in event of applicants’ extradition to, and conviction in, the USA • Domestic courts’ failure to engage in first stage of Sanchez-Sanchez v.   the United Kingdom [GC] test • Government’s failure to rebut the presumption, in event of applicants’ conviction on one charge, that the mandatory life sentence would be imposed • Compassionate release review mechanism satisfied second stage of Sanchez-Sanchez test • Review mechanism allowed US authorities “to consider a prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation or any other ground for release based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances” • Imposition of a mandatory life sentence would not be grossly disproportionate in view of the gravity of the offences charged   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 1 July 2025 FINAL   01/10/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Saadet Yüksel,   Tim Eicke,   Jovan Ilievski,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Stéphane Pisani,   Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos.   56532/22, 56889/22 and 3739/23) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three American nationals, Ms   Valerie Perfect Hayes (“the first applicant”), Mrs Jennifer Amnott (“the second applicant”) and Mr   Gary   Blake Reburn (“the third applicant”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table; the decision to give notice to the United Kingdom Government (“the   Government”) of the complaints concerning Article 3 of the Convention; the decision to indicate interim measures to the respondent Government under Rule   39 of the Rules of Court and the fact that these interim measures have been complied with; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 10 June 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The issue in the present case is whether the extradition of the applicants to the United States of America (“US”) would violate Article 3 of the Convention because, if convicted of the charges against them, they would face, inter alia , a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants, who were born in 1980, 1985 and 1963 respectively, are currently detained in prisons in Scotland. The first applicant was represented by Ms J. Berlow-Rahman of Berlow Rahman Hassan Ltd., a firm of solicitors and notaries based in Glasgow. The second applicant was represented by Mr E. Gosney of CSG Legal, a firm of solicitors based in Edinburgh. The third applicant was represented by Ms R. Houston of Houston   Law, a firm of solicitors based in Glasgow. All three applicants have been granted legal aid. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr T. Manley of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.         THE EXTRADITION REQUEST 5.     The US Government requested the applicants’ extradition from the United Kingdom by reference to mutual treaty obligations. The request was governed by the Extradition Act 2003 (see Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 22854/20, § 24, 3 November 2022). 6.     On 21 February 2019 the Scottish Ministers certified that the request was valid and made in the approved way. 7 .     The request was made on the basis of warrants dated 16 January 2019 issued by the District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The warrants “libelled” [gave notice to the applicants of] the following offences: (1)   conspiracy to commit kidnapping involving children; (2) conspiracy to kill witnesses with intent to prevent communication to a federal law enforcement officer; (3) kidnapping; (4)-(8) attempted kidnapping of a child (relating to five children); (9)-(12) attempted killing of witnesses (being the four parents of the five children) with intent to prevent communication to a federal law enforcement officer; and (21)-(24) brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, “to wit” [that is to say], attempted killing of a witness. 8.     Although the warrants originally “libelled” further counts ((13)-(20)), the US Department of Justice subsequently confirmed that if the applicants were to be extradited, it would not proceed on those counts. 9 .     On charge (2) the minimum sentence is life imprisonment. The minimum sentence on each of charges (1) and (4)-(8) is twenty years, and the maximum is life imprisonment. There is no minimum sentence on charges (3) and   (9) ‑ (12). Charge (3) has a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and charges (9)-(12) have a maximum sentence of thirty years imprisonment. Charges (21)-(24) carry a minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.       BACKGROUND TO THE REQUEST 10 .     The allegations against the applicants are as follows. The second applicant and her husband, Frank Amnott, met the first applicant in 2015. The Amnotts were desperate to start a family and the first applicant told them that she had three children who had been “captured” and were in the custody of two Mennonite families in West Virginia. She told the Amnotts that if they helped her to recover her children they could keep one of the Mennonite families’ two other children. The third applicant was the first applicant’s boyfriend. Together the two couples formed a plan which involved carrying out surveillance on the houses of the two Mennonite families; obtaining firearms; achieving armed entry to the two houses; securing the five children; and murdering their four parents by shooting them in the head. 11 .     On 28 July 2018 the first and third applicants travelled with Frank   Amnott from Maryland to Virginia, while the second applicant remained in Maryland. On 29 July 2018 the first applicant, the third applicant and Frank Amnott entered the home of the first Mennonite family while they were at church to familiarise themselves with the layout. They returned after dark, with the third applicant and Frank Amnott carrying firearms, and forced their way inside the house. The father was secured in the basement but the mother managed to escape and call the police. When the police arrived the father was bound in the basement and Frank Amnott was holding him at gunpoint. The first and third applicants managed to escape, and shortly thereafter fled to Scotland with the second applicant. 12 .     Frank Amnott has pleaded guilty to charge (2) (see paragraph 7 above). According to the most recent information provided to the Court, on 12 February 2024, he has not yet been sentenced.     LETTER FROM THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DATED 26   OCTOBER 2020 13.     According to this letter, for counts (1) through to (12) (see paragraph   7 above) the sentencing court will have discretion to run the sentences either concurrently or consecutively, whereas on counts (21)-(24) sentences must run consecutively. Thus, the US Department of Justice acknowledged that if the applicants were convicted of every single charge, the minimum possible sentence would be a sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-eight years. 14.     However, according to the US Department of Justice the applicants would have several opportunities to avoid a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. First of all, they would have the opportunity to attack the charges and have some or all of them dismissed. They could also file motions to attack the evidence, the venue and the jurisdiction. Should their cases proceed to trial they could be acquitted on one or all of the charges. 15.     Furthermore, the applicants could plead guilty in exchange for a favourable sentence. Such negotiations occurred in virtually every federal prosecution in the US. Moreover, sentencing judges would have broad discretion to determine the appropriate sentence after a fact-finding process in which the applicants would have an opportunity to offer evidence. The applicants would also have a statutory right to appeal any sentence imposed if it were substantively or procedurally unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. It would even be possible to challenge a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by arguing that it was cruel and unusual under the Eighth   Amendment of the US Constitution (see United States v. Slatten , 865   F.   3d   767 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 16.     If the applicants were sentenced to life imprisonment, and any appeal and/or habeas review was unsuccessful, they would have the following opportunities to reduce their sentence, despite the fact that there was no traditional parole available in the federal system. 17.     First of all, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorised judges, upon a request from the prosecutor, either to reduce a sentence at the moment of imposing it or to reduce a previously imposed sentence to reflect a convicted defendant’s assistance post-sentencing. 18 .     Secondly, there was the possibility of “compassionate release” (see paragraphs 49-52 below). Under this program, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons would consider factors described in Title 18 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”), Section 3553(a) (see paragraph 47 below; see also Sanchez-Sanchez , cited above, §§ 59-62). The First Step Act 2018 allowed for an appeal against the denial of an application for compassionate release by the Bureau of Prisons (for further information about the First Step Act, see Sanchez-Sanchez , cited above, § 60). According to the US Department of Justice, since the implementation of the First Step Act several US courts had ordered the release of prisoners after their requests for compassionate release were denied by the Bureau of Prisons. Furthermore, in the first six months after the First Step Act went into effect, the Bureau of Prisons had granted 150% more of the compassionate release applications filed by prisoners than it had done the previous year. 19.     Thirdly, the applicants could seek executive clemency in the form of a commutation or reduction in sentence (see paragraph 48 below; see also Sanchez-Sanchez , cited above, § 58). Such a request could be filed at any time after they began to serve their sentence, as long as all appeal rights against conviction and sentence had been exhausted. If a request was denied, they could reapply one year from the date of the President’s denial action. There was no limit on the number of times they could apply for commutation. In considering such requests, the Office of the Pardon Attorney would take into account a variety of factors, including expressions of remorse and acceptance of responsibility. 20.     Finally, the letter addressed the question of gross disproportionality. It noted that killing a human to prevent their communication to law enforcement or their testimony at trial was the ultimate perversion of the course of justice, and the US Congress had decided that it should be met with the most severe punishment applicable, regardless of whether the scheme was successful. In this case, it was hard to imagine a more egregious set of facts. The applicants had sought to eliminate the parents of young children as witnesses so they could successfully escape with their children, all of whom were under eight years old and were too young to fight back. The plot was interrupted while it was unfolding, with the father of the first family bound and held at gunpoint, ready to be executed.    THE APPLICANTS’ CHALLENGE TO THEIR EXTRADITION 21.     The applicants sought to challenge their extradition. Although they invoked a number of different grounds, the only ones maintained before the Court are as follows: that their extradition would be incompatible with Article   3 of the Convention because a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on charge (2) (see paragraph 7 above) would be grossly disproportionate for a crime less than murder, and that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be irreducible.    The decision of the Sheriff 22 .     The Sheriff of Lothian and Borders handed down its judgment on 30   July 2021. The Sheriff held that the threshold of “grossly disproportionate” was a particularly difficult hurdle for the applicants to surmount (see, for example, Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom , nos. 24027/07 and 4 others, §§ 237-238, 10 April 2012 and Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom , nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07, §   133, 17   January 2012). In his view, on the facts of the case the evidence on excessiveness was fundamentally lacking in quality and quantity to show that the likely sentences, at least on count (2), would be grossly disproportionate. 23 .     In considering the current law on the reducibility of sentences, the Sheriff had regard to the recent case-law of the Court, together with the domestic authorities. He noted that in Trabelsi v. Belgium (no. 140/10, ECHR   2014 (extracts)) the Court had decided that the remedies available under the US federal law of compassionate release and executive clemency did not satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. However, the domestic courts had declined to follow Trabelsi (for further information about the relevant domestic case-law, see Sanchez-Sanchez , cited above, §§   19-23 and 26-56). The Sheriff considered the approach taken by the High Court of England and Wales in Sanchez v. Government of the United States of America ([2020] EWHC 508) (for details of that domestic decision, see Sanchez ‑ Sanchez , cited above, §§ 19-23) and Hafeez v United States   ([2020]   1 WLR) (for details of that domestic decision, see Sanchez ‑ Sanchez , cited above, §§ 48-56; see also Hafeez v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 14198/20, §§ 18-30, 28 March 2023) to be persuasive, although not binding, when dealing with a United Kingdom wide statute. 24.     In assessing reducibility, the Sheriff did not consider relevant the possibility of a reduction in sentence for assistance given, since the Article 3 argument focused on post-sentence reduction for rehabilitation. 25.     However, the US Government had given assurances that compassionate release and executive clemency were features of the US legal system, were exercised in the regulated manner, and were overseen by the judiciary or executive office. The Sheriff accepted that those assurances sufficiently mitigated the relevant risks. Even if the assurances had not been available, he considered that he was bound to follow decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords – in this case, the judgment of the House of Lords in R(Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2008] UKHL 72) (see Sanchez-Sanchez , cited above, §§   26 ‑ 34). Even if he was not bound to follow R(Wellington) , he would in any event have followed the reasoning of the High Court in Sanchez , and found that Trabelsi (cited above) was properly to be regarded as an exceptional case, and did not form part of a clear and constant jurisprudence on the central issue of whether the Court’s Article 3 case-law should apply equally to non-Convention States in extradition cases. 26 .     In relation to compassionate release, he found that the grounds for seeking such release were considerably constrained in legal terms. Nevertheless, they were available de facto and de jure , and the process was a judicial one. Furthermore, repeated applications were possible. He similarly accepted that executive clemency was a process that did not ostensibly involve any consideration of justification on penological grounds, that it had unspecified criteria for awards, that it involved no issue of reasons, that it did not inform a prisoner what he or she had to do to qualify for clemency and under what conditions, and had no procedural safeguards such as judicial review. It was, however, available, there was a structure for such applications, and repeated applications were possible. As such, any sentence of life imprisonment would not be irreducible. The Sheriff accepted that the applicants would face considerable difficulty in obtaining either remedy, but did not consider that fact to be relevant since their difficulty stemmed entirely from the nature of their alleged crimes. Quoting Lord Hoffman in R(Wellington) , he observed that the requirement that the sentence be reducible could not mean that there had to be a real prospect of release for the prisoner in question. If that were the case, the more heinous the crime the stronger the claim would be not to be extradited.    The appeal to the High Court of Justiciary 27.     The applicants were granted permission to appeal and the High Court of Justiciary handed down its judgment on 28 January 2022. 28.     The court noted at the outset that the Sheriff had erred in finding that he was bound by the judgment of the House of Lords in R(Wellington) , since the Scottish courts were generally not bound by judgments of the Supreme Court and House of Lords. The Scottish courts were, however, bound to “take into account” the judgments of this Court in a matter involving Convention rights, and, in a matter which applied across the whole of the United Kingdom, the Scottish courts would regard decisions of the Court of Appeal and High Court in England and Wales as persuasive. 29 .     The court refused the applicants’ appeal. In its view, it was not possible to conclude that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be “grossly disproportionate” for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention, given the extreme gravity of the crimes charged. With regard to reducibility, the Court also agreed broadly with the reasoning of the High Court of England and Wales in the cases of Hafeez and Sanchez (see paragraph 23 above). In Babar Ahmad and Harkins and Edwards (both cited above) this Court had acknowledged that a distinction was to be made between extraditions and removals within Contracting States and those involving non-Contracting Sates. It would therefore require a high level of ill-treatment, including death or torture, to amount to a bar on extradition to States with a long history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Although the judiciaries in Europe might not agree with all aspects of the US penal system, it was not for them to insist upon that system abiding strictly by the Convention standards before granting an order for extradition. The system of compassionate release and executive clemency in the US   criminal justice system was sufficient to meet the requirements of Article   3 in the extradition context, even if it might not be likely that the applicants would be afforded either remedy over time. 30.     In conclusion, the court noted that: “It may be that in the upcoming case of Sanchez-Sanchez the Grand Chamber of the European Court will follow this new [ Trabelsi ] line rather than the approach in earlier cases. If it does so, and holds that any prospective ill-treatment, in a country which has a long history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, is sufficient to bar extradition, that could have a profound influence on the practical operation of extradition treaties with non-Contracting States. It has the potential to create safe havens for fugitives from justice, who are charged with very serious crimes, including, as here, those perpetrated in their states of origin. That is not an attractive prospect. Application of the mainstream European Court jurisprudence, as illustrated in Kafkaris , Harkins and Edwards and [Babar] Ahmad , may be thought preferable for those parts of the world governed by the rule of law. It attaches considerable importance to the sovereignty principle under which the Convention should not be used as a means of imposing the criminal justice values of contracting States on non-Convention countries. It should require some obvious and serious form of ill-treatment to bar the extradition to a country such as the United States for the crimes of conspiracy to murder parents and to steal their children.” 31.     On 3 March 2022 the court refused to grant the applicants permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.    The Supreme Court 32 .     The applicants subsequently applied to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal. On 16 November 2022 they made further submissions in which they relied on the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Sanchez ‑ Sanchez (cited above), which had been handed down on 3   November 2022. On 8 December 2022 the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal as the applications did not raise an arguable point of law. It noted that “the scheme for compassionate release, as described in the sheriff’s findings, complies with paragraph 96 of the judgment in Sanchez v   Sanchez [ sic ].”      INTERIM MEASURES 33 .     The applicants asked the Court to grant interim measures under Rule   39 of the Rules of Court to prevent their extradition to the US pending the determination of their substantive applications. The Court granted their requests on 13 December 2022, in the cases of the first and second applicants, and on 20 January 2023, in the case of the third applicant.    LETTER FROM THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DATED 3   NOVEMBER 2023 34 .     In this letter the US Attorney for the Western District of Virginia indicated that the applicants would be offered a plea bargain to offences other than the one carrying a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, thereby allowing them to avoid facing this mandatory sentence. Furthermore, they could seek to reduce their sentence by cooperating with law enforcement and providing assistance to ongoing investigative and procedural efforts. 35.     Moreover, under federal law, from the moment of sentencing there would be multiple review mechanisms in place allowing the US authorities to consider the applicants’ progress towards rehabilitation or any other ground for release based on their behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. These review mechanisms would apply even if the applicants were convicted of the offence carrying a mandatory life sentence. 36.     The principal mechanisms would be compassionate release and executive clemency. 37 .     According to the letter, the First Step Act, passed in 2018 (see paragraph 18 above), had effected a paradigm shift in how compassionate release functioned because it had empowered courts to grant compassionate release in response to a defendant’s request. US courts had ordered the release of thousands of defendants after their requests for compassionate release were denied or not addressed in a timely fashion by the Bureau of Prisons. In reviewing those petitions, courts had granted compassionate release based on a range of different circumstances, including health problems, family and childcare issues, or significant changes to preexisting sentencing paradigms. When evaluating these petitions, courts were obligated to consider not only the presence of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, but also the factors set forth in Title 18, U.S.C., § 3553(a) (see paragraph 47 below; see also Sanchez-Sanchez , cited above, § 57), which included the nature of the crime, the defendant’s personal history (including his or her rehabilitative efforts), and the need to satisfy certain penological objectives, such as general and specific deterrence, just punishment, and protection of the community. 38 .     In 2023 the Sentencing Commission amended the existing federal sentencing guidelines, which provided guidance on when compassionate release was appropriate, and formally expanded the circumstances that might qualify as warranting a sentence reduction (see paragraph 51 below). To the extent that a defendant could show one of the circumstances described in the amended guidelines, and could also show that his or her continued or long-term incarceration did not serve the statutorily identified sentencing objectives (as set forth in Title, 18 U.S.C., § 3553(a) – see paragraph 47 below), that defendant would be eligible for a sentence reduction, and the court would be authorised to reduce that defendant’s sentence below any applicable statutorily required minimum. 39.     In addition, the amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines provided that an “unusually long sentence” might constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief where the defendant had served at least ten years of the sentence and there was a change in the law (other than to the sentencing guidelines) that created a “gross disparity” between the defendant’s sentence and the sentence that would be imposed under the changed law. Therefore, in the event there were post-hoc changes to the sentencing laws applicable to the applicants’ conduct, the applicants could petition, under the sentencing guidelines, for a sentence reduction on the basis of the changed law and, among other things, any evidence of rehabilitation. 40 .     Although rehabilitation alone was not a sufficient basis for relief, it routinely formed part of the court’s evaluation of the propriety of an early release in cases where defendants had otherwise shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances (see, for example, Pepper v. United States , 562   U.S. 476, 491 (2011) – quoted in paragraph 53 below). In 2022, district courts identified “rehabilitation” as a basis for granting a compassionate release petition in 9.1% of cases  a higher percentage than in 2020 and 2021 combined. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, being the judicial appellate body that would possess the authority and jurisdiction to review the trial court rulings of the applicants’ compassionate-release petitions, had overturned denials of compassionate release petitions after concluding that the trial court’s review did not fully consider the extent or significance of a defendant’s rehabilitation (see, for example, United States v. Gutierrez , No.   21-7092, 2023 WL 245001, at *3-4 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023) – quoted in paragraphs 57-58 below). Moreover, the district court for the Western District of Virginia, which was the judicial body that would consider any compassionate release petitions from the applicants post-conviction, along with federal courts in neighbouring districts, had routinely recognised defendants’ rehabilitative efforts and relied on that evidence when granting a defendant an early release or sentence reduction, including in cases involving life sentences. The US Department of Justice referred to the following cases: United States v. Hutson , Case No. 1:10-CR-2, Dkt. No. 2021 (W.D.V.A. June 6, 2023) (reducing sentence from 300 months to   210   months because of post-hoc sentencing guidelines changes and the defendant’s rehabilitation); United States v. Tyree , Case No. 3:16-CR-22, Dkt. No. 343 (W.D.V.A. Feb. 11, 2022) (reducing defendants’ sentences from 225 months to 120   months and 360 months to 180 months because of post-hoc statutory changes to sentencing minimums as well as the defendants’ youth at the time of the offence, their minimal prior criminal history, and their rehabilitation while incarcerated); United States v. Salam , Case No. 7:12-CR-73, Dkt. No. 416 (W.D.V.A. Jan. 4, 2022) (reducing defendant’s sentence from 292 months to 235   months because of post-hoc sentencing guidelines changes and the defendant’s rehabilitative efforts while in prison); United States v. Gibson , 570 F. Supp. 3d 346, 356   (E.D.   Va.   2021) (reducing defendant’s life sentence to 600   months in part because of his rehabilitation and community service efforts); United States v. Johnson , 2023 WL 5049267, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug.   8, 2023) (reducing defendant’s two life sentences, plus 790   months, to 420 months after explaining that a ‘defendant’s “record of rehabilitation in the Bureau of Prisons ... is one factor that may weigh in favour of granting compassionate release” and recognizing the defendant’s “exceptional” efforts at rehabilitation – see paragraphs 59-61 below). 41.     Notably, courts were authorised to reduce sentences notwithstanding any statutorily required mandatory-minimum sentences that might apply. Such sentence reductions had been affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. For example, the court had affirmed the trial court’s decision to reduce a defendant’s mandatory minimum 35-year sentence to time served (approximately 17 years) after considering the defendant’s absence of prior criminal history, his significant rehabilitative efforts, and changes to the applicable statutory penalties (see United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 277-78, 285-88 (4th Cir. 2020) – quoted in paragraphs 54-55 below). 42 .     Between October 2019 and October 2022, defendants throughout the US filed 27,789 compassionate release petitions; of those, 4,502 – or 16.2%    were granted. Within the Western District of Virginia, federal courts had adjudicated roughly 682 compassionate release petitions, and granted 81, meaning they had reduced defendants’ sentences in nearly 12% of filed cases. 43 .     If the district court denied the applicants’ motions for compassionate release, they could appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. If the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the application, they could petition the US Supreme Court to review their cases. The applicants’ failure to obtain release on a motion for compassionate release would not prevent them from requesting release again, consistent with the procedures described above, particularly if there were changed circumstances. 44 .     The executive clemency process included an appraisal of several holistic factors bearing on the petitioner’s personal situation and characteristics (see paragraph 48 below). There were myriad examples of defendants having their sentences commuted. For example, on April 28, 2023, President Biden commuted the sentences of thirty-one defendants because they had “demonstrated a commitment to rehabilitation, including by securing employment and advancing their education.” Indeed, since taking office, President Biden had commuted the sentences of at least 106   defendants. Press releases from past administrations (both Democrats and Republicans) highlighting grants of clemency and commutation have similarly described defendants’ post-conviction acts of heroism, “successful rehabilitation,” acceptance of responsibility, work as a “model inmate,” completion of hundreds or thousands of hours of training and educational programming, and service in mentorship roles while incarcerated. If a defendant’s commutation application was denied by the President, the defendant could reapply for commutation one year from the date of the President’s denial action. There was no limit on the number of times an inmate could apply for commutation. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 45.     The relevant legal framework and practice in the United Kingdom is set out in Sanchez-Sanchez (cited above, §§ 24-56). 46.     The relevant legal framework and practice in the US is as follows.         SENTENCING PRINCIPLES 47 .     The core sentencing principles under US law are found in Title 18, U.S.C., § 3553(a): “(a)     Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider— (1)     the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)     the need for the sentence imposed— (A)     to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B)     to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C)     to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D)     to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3)     the kinds of sentences available; (4)     the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— (A)     the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines— (i)     issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and (ii)     that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or (B)     in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); (5)     any pertinent policy statement— (A)     issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and (B)     that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; (6)     the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7)     the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.”       EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 48 .     The basis for commutation of sentence pursuant to Executive Clemency is found in Article 2(II) of the US Constitution, which empowers the President to “grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United   States, except in cases of Impeachment”. Guidance published by the US   Department of Justice reads as follows: “Commutation of sentence is an extraordinary remedy. Appropriate grounds for considering commutation have traditionally included disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age and meritorious service rendered to the Government by the petitioner e.g. cooperation with investigative or prosecutive efforts that has not been adequately rewarded by other official action. A combination of these and/or other equitable factors (such as demonstrated rehabilitation whilst in custody or exigent circumstances unforeseen by the court at the time of sentencing) may also provide a basis for recommending commutation in the context of a particular case.”     COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 49 .     Pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., § 3582(c)(1)(A): “The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that— (1)     in any case— (A)     the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— (i)     extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or (ii)     the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g); and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 50 .     Sentences imposed under section 3559(c) include mandatory life imprisonment. 51 .     The federal sentencing guidelines, which provided guidance on when compassionate release was appropriate, were amended by the Sentencing Commission in 2023 (see paragraph 38 above). The amended § 1B1.13, titled “Reduction in Term of Imprisonment Under 18 U.S.C. §   3582(c)(1)(A) (Policy Statement)”, now reads, insofar as relevant: “(b)     EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS.—Extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof: (1)     MEDICAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEFENDANT.— (A)     The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia. (B)     The defendant is— (i)     suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, (ii)     suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or (iii)     experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover. (C)     The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death. (D)     The defendant presents the following circumstances— (i)     the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing public health emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority; (ii)     due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the defendant is at increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public health emergency described in clause (i); and (iii)     such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner. (2)     AGE OF THE DEFENDANT.—The defendant (A) is at least 65 years old; (B)   is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less. (3)     FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEFENDANT.— (A)     The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or the defendant’s child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition. (B)     The incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner. (C)     The incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent. (D)     The defendant establishes that circumstances similar to those listed in paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) exist involving any other immediate family member or an individual whose relationship with the defendant is similar in kind to that of an immediate family member, when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for such family member or individual. For purposes of this provision, ‘immediate family member’ refers to any of the individuals listed in paragraphs (3)(A) through   (3)(C) as well as a grandchild, grandparent, or sibling of the defendant. (4)     VICTIM OF ABUSE.—The defendant, while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced, was a victim of: (A)     sexual abuse involving a ‘sexual act,’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (including the conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D) regardless of the age of the victim); or (B)     physical ab