CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 10 juillet 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9F46BEC9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .sE6546C2D { width:159.78pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block } .s1721E4C5 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 34281/20 UNICOM JIV, S.R.O. against Slovakia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 10   July   2025 as a Committee composed of:   Artūrs Kučs , President ,   Alena Poláčková,   Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   34281/20) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 6 August 2020 by a Slovak limited liability company, UNICOM JIV, s.r.o. (“the applicant company”), which was established in 2007, has its registered office in Košice, and was represented by Mr M. Jacko, a lawyer practising in Bratislava; the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the alleged violation of the principle of legal certainty and the protection of property to the Slovak Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms   M.   Bálintová, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns the applicant company’s complaint that the Constitutional Court’s quashing of a final and binding interlocutory judgment in its favour had violated the principle of legal certainty, and that the decision in question amounted to an interference with its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. 2.     In 2009 the applicant company sued the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (“the defendant”) for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage, on the grounds of official misconduct on the part of one of the Ministry’s agencies during the process to approve production at the company’s meat-processing plant. 3 .     In 2013 the Bratislava I District Court delivered an interlocutory judgment recognising the basis of the claim. However, the actual amount of damages remained to be determined in a final judgment, to be delivered in subsequent proceedings. Following an appeal and a subsequent appeal on points of law by the defendant, the Bratislava Regional Court and the Supreme Court upheld the interlocutory judgment in 2013 and 2014 respectively. 4 .     In 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional complaint by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction, given that, following an extraordinary appeal on points of law lodged by the Prosecutor General on behalf of the defendant, the Supreme Court had in the meantime quashed the lower courts’ decisions (file no. III. ÚS 418/2015). 5 .     On 13 June 2018, after two rounds of proceedings concerning the extraordinary appeal on points of law, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant company’s right to a fair trial – in particular, of the principle of the finality of judgments – and quashed the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the Prosecutor General’s appeal. Referring to the principles set out in the Court’s judgments DRAFT - OVA a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 72493/10, 9   June 2015), COMPCAR, s.r.o. v. Slovakia (no. 25132/13, 9 June 2015) and PSMA, spol. s r.o. v. Slovakia (no. 42533/11, 9 June 2015), the Constitutional Court found that the extraordinary appeal on points of law had been an appeal in disguise, in that it had been lodged mainly on the basis of an alleged error of law. However, it also stated that the legal certainty created by the interlocutory judgment was not of the same quality as that created by a judgment dealing with the entire subject matter of an application and the defendant had exhausted all ordinary remedies before lodging the application for the extraordinary appeal on points of law. Those factors spoke against the applicant company’s constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court further noted that the State’s liability for damages under the State Liability Act constituted a special type of civil-law liability (file no.   III. ÚS 4/2018). 6 .     On 19 October 2018 the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal on points of law lodged by the Prosecutor General. 7.     On 15 January 2019 the defendant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision of 19 October 2018 and the 2013 decisions of the Bratislava I District Court and the Bratislava Regional Court (see paragraph 3 above). On 18 June 2019 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible only in relation to the Bratislava Regional Court’s decision. 8 .     On 30 January 2020 the Constitutional Court found that the defendant’s right to a fair trial, as guaranteed under Article 46 of the Constitution, had been violated by the Bratislava Regional Court’s decision of 2013. The Constitutional Court held that, although the constitutional complaint had not been lodged until two months after the Supreme Court’s decision of 19   October 2018 had been served on the defendant, the relevant two-month time-limit for lodging a constitutional complaint had nevertheless been complied with in relation to the Bratislava Regional Court’s decision of 2013. Noting that an extraordinary appeal on points of law was a remedy that did not have to be exhausted prior to lodging a constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court held that the specific procedural circumstances of the case meant that it was legitimate to calculate the two-month time-limit from the service of the Supreme Court’s decision of 19 October 2018. Neither the Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court had yet examined the merits of the case, because the defendant’s first constitutional complaint had had to be rejected on formal grounds (see paragraph 4 above), and since the defendant had used all available remedies, calculating the two-month time-limit from the Supreme Court’s decision was in line with its right of access to a court. The Constitutional Court further emphasised that a constitutional complaint lodged under Article   127 of the Constitution was a remedy at the direct disposal of all parties to the proceedings and served to protect their fundamental rights. Thus, the scope of the potential protection afforded by the Constitutional Court was broader than in proceedings concerning an extraordinary appeal on points of law. The Constitutional Court found the Bratislava Regional Court’s decision of 2013 to be excessive – negating the very basis and purpose of the right to judicial protection, and therefore incompatible with the guarantees contained in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court quashed the contested decision and remitted the case to the lower court for fresh examination (file no. II. ÚS 145/2019). 9.     It appears from the case file that on 30 January 2024 the Bratislava Regional Court overturned the interlocutory judgment and dismissed the applicant company’s claim for damages. On 27 May 2024 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. 10.     Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention, the applicant company complained that the Constitutional Court’s decision of 30 January 2020 to quash the final and binding Bratislava Regional Court’s decision of 2013 had violated the principle of legal certainty and its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 11.     The Government argued that the present case had to be distinguished from the Court’s judgments DRAFT - OVA a.s. ; COMPCAR, s.r.o. ; and PSMA, spol. s r.o. , all cited above. The interlocutory judgment was quashed on the basis of a constitutional complaint, that is, a remedy equally accessible to all parties to the proceedings. It was lodged within the two-month time ‑ limit and after the exhaustion of available remedies. Moreover, the interlocutory judgment was quashed because the interference with the defendant’s right to a fair trial negated the very core of that right. The constitutional complaint represented the ultimate element in the chain of domestic remedies rather than an extraordinary means for reopening judicial proceedings (the Government referred to Slovdan, spol. s   r.o. v. Slovakia [Committee], no.   46341/17, § 30, 12 October 2021). 12.     The applicant company argued that the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 30 January 2020 was incompatible with the principle of legal certainty because, inter alia , the constitutional complaint (i) was lodged out of time by an entity (that is, the State) which lacked standing, and (ii) constituted an appeal in disguise. 13.     The general principles concerning the right not to have a final decision called into question have been summarised in, for example, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland ([GC], no. 26374/18, §   238, 1 December 2020) and Balan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2 ) (no. 49016/10, § 27, 29   November 2022). 14.     The Court agrees with the Government that the present application must be distinguished from the above-cited case ‑ law concerning Slovakia for the following reasons. 15.     The interlocutory judgment was challenged before the supreme judicial instance, namely the Constitutional Court, at the request of one of the parties to the proceedings, on the basis of grounds laid down in the Constitution. As pointed out by the Constitutional Court, a constitutional complaint is a type of remedy that is directly accessible to all parties to the proceedings (see paragraph 8 above). 16.     With regard to compliance with the time-limit, the Court notes that the admission of appeals in the authorities’ favour following the extension, without any valid grounds, of the time-limit for such appeals, may be in contravention of the principle of the finality of judgments (see Magomedov and Others v. Russia , nos.   33636/09 and 9   others, §   87, 28 March 2017). However, the Court considers that the reasons provided by the Constitutional Court in favour of maintaining the time-limit for lodging the constitutional complaint were sufficient in the present case. The defendant properly used the available remedies (contrast ibid . , § 94) and duly lodged an appeal and an ordinary appeal on points of law and challenged the decision dismissing the latter appeal, through its first constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court did not examine the merits of that complaint, as at that time the proceedings were again pending before the lower courts on account of the involvement of the Prosecutor General (see paragraph 4 above). The domestic courts subsequently assessed the admissibility of the extraordinary appeal on points of law on several occasions (see paragraph   5 above). It was not until 19 October 2018, when the Supreme Court finally dismissed the Prosecutor’s General extraordinary appeal on points of law, that the question of whether there would be a new round of proceedings before the lower courts was finally resolved (see paragraph 6 above). As a result, the case de facto returned to the procedural stage of the defendant’s first constitutional complaint. Given those circumstances, the Constitutional Court found that the defendant’s second constitutional complaint had been lodged in time, including in relation to the Bratislava Regional Court’s decision of 2013. 17.     As for the defendant’s standing, the Court observes that, according to the Constitutional Court’s case-law State organs may lodge a constitutional complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution provided they are parties to a private ‑ law dispute on an equal footing with the other parties to the proceedings (see, for example, file no. II. ÚS 19/04). The Court notes in this regard that the Constitutional Court found the dispute to be of a private-law nature (see paragraph 5 above). Moreover, before the Ministry lodged the constitutional complaint, it had exhausted all available remedies (contrast DRAFT - OVA a.s. , cited above, § 85). Therefore, given the specific circumstances of the case, the Court accepts that the defendant, although a State organ, had standing to lodge the constitutional complaint. 18.     The Court further notes that a judgment that has become binding and enforceable is not necessarily final under the Convention. In numerous Contracting States, supreme judicial instances deliver final judgments after lower courts’ judgments have become binding and enforceable. This situation is not in itself incompatible with the principle of legal certainty (see OOO   Link Oil SPB v.   Russia   (dec.), no. 42600/05, 25 June 2009, and compare Slovdan, spol. s r.o. , cited above, § 31). In this connection, it should also be taken into account that the level of legal certainty offered by an interlocutory judgment differs from that offered by a judgment that deals with the entire subject matter of the claim (see paragraph 3 above). 19.     Thus, in the Court’s view, the review carried out by the Constitutional Court was the ultimate element in the chain of domestic remedies at the disposal of the parties rather than an extraordinary means for reopening the judicial proceedings in question. 20.     In so far as the applicant company refers to Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention, the Court notes that this complaint is based on the same facts and grievances as the complaint raised under Article   6   § 1 of the Convention. Having regard to its findings under the latter provision, the Court finds that no separate issue arises under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 21.     In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35   §§   3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 11 September 2025.     Liv Tigerstedt   Artūrs Kučs   Deputy Registrar   President