CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 10 juillet 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s819344C9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s6C5BED22 { margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC986E16F { font-family:Arial; color:#ffffff } .s68D1564D { width:34.89pt; display:inline-block } .s28108232 { width:142.78pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 42955/18 Ivans LAVRECKIS against Latvia   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 10   July 2025 as a Committee composed of:   Erik Wennerström , President ,   Raffaele Sabato,   Artūrs Kučs , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   42955/18) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4   September   2018 by a Latvian national, Mr Ivans Lavreckis (“the applicant”), who was born in   1937, lived in Riga, and was represented by Mr R. Kantsons, a lawyer practising in Riga; the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention to the Latvian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, Ms K. Līce, and subsequently Ms   E.L. Vītola; the parties’   observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The case concerns the applicant’s complaint that the State failed to ensure effective protection of his property rights. 2.     On 30 May 2006 the applicant bought an apartment in an auction sale organised by the State in the context of enforcement proceedings against the debtor, A.S., in order to recover the latter’s debts. The apartment was auctioned to the applicant for 13,770 Latvian lati ((LVL) – 19,593   euros (EUR)). By a decision of 29 August 2006, the Latgale Regional Court approved the memorandum of the auction sale and ruled that the property should be registered in the Land Register ( Zemesgrāmata ) in the applicant’s name and that the applicant should be regarded as being in possession of the immovable property. 3.     On 19 September 2006 a certain A.F. brought proceedings against the applicant and A.S., seeking recognition of her property rights to the apartment and registration of those rights in the Land Register. By a decision of 26   July 2012, the domestic courts recognised A.F. as the lawful owner of the apartment, finding that A.F. had bought the apartment from the previous owner, A.S., before the auction sale but had failed to register her property rights in the Land Register. 4.     In the meantime, the bailiff had used the purchase price paid by the applicant for the apartment to cover the debtor’s debts and bailiff’s fees. 5 .     The applicant brought civil proceedings against the bailiff, arguing that she had not acted diligently in disbursing the funds acquired in the auction while other proceedings were still pending. 6 .     By a final decision of 6 June 2018, the domestic courts dismissed that claim and noted that the dispute over the return of the money should be settled between the acquirer, the debt collector and the debtor, as provided for in section   633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law. 7.     Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention, the applicant complained that the State had failed to ensure effective protection of his property rights by allowing a situation in which he had paid the purchase price for the apartment but had neither obtained title to the apartment nor been able to recover the purchase price paid. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 8 .     Section 633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law ( Civilprocesa likums ) provides that, in the event of a successful claim for the return of property which has already been sold, any disputes between the acquirer, the debt collector and the debtor are to be settled by the courts on the basis of a civil claim ( prasības kārtībā ). THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT Preliminary issue 9.     The applicant died on 14 May 2020, after lodging the present application. By a letter of 5 January 2022, the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had died and that his daughter, Ms   Tatjana Starceva, wished to pursue the application in his stead. The applicant’s representative submitted a certificate of inheritance issued by a notary public dated 15 March 2021 declaring the applicant’s daughter his statutory heir. Together with that letter, the applicant’s representative submitted a form of authority dated 30 December 2021 whereby the applicant’s daughter had authorised him to represent her before the Court. 10.     The Government objected, arguing that the applicant’s daughter had not shown any legitimate interest in pursuing the application. At the same time, however, the Government did not dispute her material interest in continuing the proceedings as the sole heir of the applicant. 11.     The Court reiterates that in cases where the applicant has died after the application was lodged, it has accepted that the next of kin or a close family member or heir may, in principle, pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Vaščenkovs v.   Latvia , no.   30795/12, § 27, 15 December 2016, and Brūzītis v.   Latvia (dec.), no.   15028/04, § 45, 26   August 2014, and the case-law cited therein). Moreover, it is not only material interests which the successor of a deceased applicant may pursue by his or her wish to maintain the application. Human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension, and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice is done, even after the applicant’s death (see Malhous v.   the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII). That is why in such cases heirs or close relatives of the applicant are considered to have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application (see Stegić v.   Croatia (dec.), no.   21106/13, §   51, 6 July   2021). 12.     Given that Ms Tatjana Starceva is the late applicant’s next of kin and sole heir, the Court considers that she has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application and therefore has standing to continue the present proceedings in the applicant’s stead. For practical reasons, reference will still be made to the initial applicant throughout the ensuing text. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention 13.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention that the State had failed to ensure effective protection of his property rights. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §§   114 and 126, 20   March 2018), considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1 only. 14.     The Government argued that the applicant had had two domestic remedies at his disposal which he had failed to exhaust before lodging an application with the Court alleging a violation of his rights under Article   1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention. Firstly, they submitted that the applicant should have appealed against the bailiff’s calculation of the amounts to be disbursed following their recovery at the auction. 15.     Secondly, the Government argued that the applicant should have lodged a civil claim against the debtor, A.S., in accordance with section   633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law. They submitted that, by bringing a civil claim against the bailiff, the applicant had sued the wrong defendant (see paragraph 5 above). The Government noted that in the particular circumstances of the case this amounted to an ineffective remedy with no prospects of success in so far as the bailiff had acted in accordance with the law within the framework of enforcement proceedings and could not therefore be held liable for any damage caused to the applicant. They provided examples of the domestic courts’ practice regarding the application of section 633 of the Civil Procedure Law. 16 .     The applicant contended that he had exhausted the most effective domestic remedies available to him and that the remaining remedies provided for by the Government were not effective. He maintained that he was not required to bring a civil claim against the debtor, A.S., in accordance with section   633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law, since he had no relationship with him. In addition, the applicant argued that it would be impossible to recover the funds from A.S., because the latter did not own any property or have any funds. 17.     The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 35   §   1 of the Convention, it may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The general principles as regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies are set out in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos.   17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014). In particular, Article   35 §   1 requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently before the Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law. Where an applicant has failed to comply with those requirements, his or her application should in principle be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies (ibid., § 72, and the references therein). 18.     Nevertheless, the only remedies Article 35 of the Convention requires to be exhausted are those which relate to the breaches alleged and which are, at the same time, available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Scordino v.   Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 142, ECHR 2006-V). 19.     The Court observes that the remedy provided for in section 633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law (see paragraph 8 above) seems to have been introduced precisely to address situations such as the one faced by the applicant in the present case. 20.     It notes the applicant’s argument that bringing a claim against the debtor, A.S., would have been ineffective (see paragraph 16 above). However, the Court reiterates that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust domestic remedies ( see Scoppola v.   Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 70, 17 September 2009). It sees no exceptional circumstances in the present case which could have exempted the applicant from the obligation to avail himself of the remedy provided for in section 633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law. 21.     Moreover, the Court further notes that in the context of the proceedings brought by the applicant against the bailiff (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above), the appellate court and the Supreme Court provided clear guidance to the applicant in their judgments and referred him to the remedy that was the most appropriate in the situation at hand by pointing out that the Civil Procedure Law expressly provided for the protection of the acquirer’s rights in a situation where property acquired at auction had been repossessed. They expressly indicated that any disputes between the acquirer, the debt collector and the debtor were to be resolved in accordance with section 633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law. 22.     It appears that, although it was possible under the applicable domestic law for the applicant to bring a claim against the debtor in accordance with section 633(4) of the Civil Procedure Law – a remedy which the domestic courts had pointed out to the applicant – the applicant made no attempt to bring such a claim. The Court considers that, by failing to bring civil proceedings against the debtor, A.S., the applicant deprived himself of the opportunity to have the substance of his complaint addressed by a competent domestic court. 23.     It follows that the application is inadmissible under Article   35 § 1 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and that it must be rejected pursuant to Article   35 § 4. 24.     In view of the above conclusion, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine the Government’s remaining objections as to the admissibility of the application. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Holds that the applicant’s heir, Ms Tatjana Starceva, may pursue the application in his stead, and dismisses the Government’s objection in that regard; Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 11 September 2025.     Liv Tigerstedt   Erik Wennerström   Deputy Registrar   President