CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 22 juillet 2025

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color:#242424 } .s97B385A0 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#242424 } .s391E78BA { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffffff } .s3DB046A9 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; background-color:#ffffff } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } FOURTH SECTION CASE OF BRADSHAW AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (Application no. 15653/22)   JUDGMENT Art 3 P1 • Free expression of the opinion of the people • Choice of the legislature • Respondent State’s compliance with positive obligation to protect its electorate from hostile interference by Russia in democratic elections • Art   3 P1 might require the State to adopt positive measures to protect integrity of its electoral processes in the event of a real risk that interference from a hostile State would impair the very essence of electors’ rights and deprive them of their effectiveness • No freestanding obligation to investigate arguable claims of a breach of individual rights under Art   3 P1 • Failure to investigate constituting part of the Art   3 P1 positive obligation and antecedent to that of putting in place or updating an effective legal and regulatory framework • Sufficient credible evidence of a significant and ongoing threat by Russia to the United Kingdom’s democratic processes • Despite difficulties in accurately assessing the impact of disinformation campaigns and “influence campaigns”, member States not to remain passive when faced with evidence of a sufficiently established and imminent threat to democracy • Lack of a clear consensus as to specific actions to be taken to counter such threats • Respondent State’s response to the threat of Russian election interference within its wide margin of appreciation • Adoption of legislative and other measures to counter threats by hostile State actors • Possible need for further measures kept under review • Very essence of the applicants’ right not impaired   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 22 July 2025 FINAL   08/12/2025   This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Bradshaw and Others v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Lado Chanturia, President ,   Jolien Schukking,   Faris Vehabović,   Tim Eicke,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Anne Louise Bormann,   András Jakab, judges , and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   15653/22) against the United Kingdom of Great   Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three British nationals, Mr Ben Bradshaw, Ms   Caroline Lucas and Mr Alyn Smith (“the applicants”), on 22 March 2022; the decision to give notice to the United Kingdom Government (“the   Government”) of the complaints concerning Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and to declare inadmissible identical complaints made by two additional applicants; the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants; the comments submitted by the European Information Society Institute,   o.z., which was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section; Having deliberated in private on 6 May and 24 June 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last-mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     According to the applicants, Russia has engaged in widespread and pervasive interference in democratic elections across the Council of Europe and beyond. Its aggressive tactics include weaponising disinformation to undermine democratic institutions, deliberate cyber-attacks against key State entities, including election infrastructure, “hack and leak” operations, and the use of “cyber troops” and “troll farms” to manipulate public discourse and to sow discord between social groups. The applicants contend that despite the existence of credible allegations that Russia sought to interfere in the United Kingdom’s democratic processes, the respondent State neither investigated those allegations nor put in place an effective legal and institutional framework to protect against the risk of such interference. THE FACTS 2.     The applicants, who were born in 1960, 1960 and 1973, respectively, live in London. They were represented by Mr T.W. Short of Leigh Day, a firm of solicitors based in London. 3.     The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr T. Geron of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 5.     In February 2019 the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (“DCMS”) published a report entitled “Disinformation and ‘fake news’” (see paragraphs 37-40 below). A further report by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (“ISC”), entitled “Russia” (see paragraphs 41-51 below), was sent to the Prime Minister in October 2019 and published in July 2020. THE APPLICANTS’ JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION 6 .     The applicants were elected as Members of Parliament (“MPs”) in the general election held on 12 December 2019. The first and second applicants did not stand in the next general election, held on 4 July 2024, and the third applicant lost his seat. 7.     The applicants believed that the DCMS and ISC reports, together with the public response by the Government to the ISC report (see paragraphs   52 ‑ 54 below), provided credible evidence of interference by Russia in the 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence (“the Scottish independence referendum”), the 2016 European Union membership referendum (“the EU referendum”), and the 2019 general election. 8 .     The applicants, together with two life peers and a non-profit organisation, sought permission to challenge, by way of judicial review, the Prime Minister’s decision not to, and/or his ongoing failure to, direct an independent investigation into Russian interference with the country’s democratic processes. They argued that in light of the ISC report this failure was in breach of the investigative obligation inherent in Article 3 of Protocol   No. 1 to the Convention. They further challenged what they described as “the absence of an effective legal framework to ensure ‘conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people’ as required by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1”. Finally, they argued that the Prime Minister had failed to act compatibly with his public law duties in failing to establish a public inquiry. Refusal of permission on the papers 9.     On 12 April 2021 the applicants’ application for permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers. The High Court judge noted at the outset that the grounds of challenge touched on core State functions and/or the exercise of State sovereignty. Under conventional principles of judicial review the courts should stand back from interference in such cases save where particular legal rights were engaged. That was not the case here, since none of the applicants’ rights had been breached in any election or referendum. 10.     In respect of the applicants’ first ground, the High Court judge did not consider it arguable that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 required the Prime Minister to undertake an independent investigation. With regard to past events, the imposition of such a duty would engage the courts in a highly politicised and contested exercise. With regard to future events, it was for the Prime Minister and not the courts to decide whether or not an independent investigation was required to ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in forthcoming elections. 11.     For the High Court judge the challenge to the legal framework was a matter of policy on which the court would not adjudicate. 12 .     Finally, the judge did not consider the decision not to establish a public inquiry to be irrational. She based her reasoning on the Prime   Minister’s summary grounds of resistance, which indicated, inter   alia , that Russia’s actions had been the subject of a detailed report by the ISC (see paragraphs 41-51 below), and that wider public policy issues – such as the approach to disinformation and the use of social media – were the subject of ongoing policy development and public consultation. There was no evidence that any Russian activity had had any impact on the effectiveness of the right to vote, or on the outcome of any election. Moreover, a public inquiry did not have investigatory powers of the type that the police and Intelligence Agencies had. Given that the complaint was that there existed little evidence of successful Russian interference because insufficient investigative efforts had been made to collect that evidence, a public inquiry would not be able to fill that gap, if it existed. 13.     The judge reached no conclusive view on the issue of standing, as the matter was “complex”. Renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review 14.     The application for permission was renewed on the Convention rights’ grounds only. It was refused by the High Court on 22   June 2021. 15.     The High Court judge agreed that there was “no basis for the contention that the interference relied on affected the existence or exercise of any person’s right to vote or right to stand as a candidate in an election” and did not consider it arguable that any legal obligation existed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. He gave detailed reasons, by reference to the Court’s case ‑ law, for reaching this conclusion. 16 .     Under the second ground, the applicants had argued that the domestic legal framework was in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 because: There was no legal entity with the legal responsibility to prevent and combat foreign interference in elections; There was no legal obligation for online political advertisements to indicate their source, who had paid for them, and their country of origin; There was no legal requirement for social media companies to cooperate with the Security and Intelligence Agencies where it was suspected that a hostile foreign State may be covertly running a campaign; There was no ban on foreign donations to political parties or election campaigns; There was no obligation on foreign State agents, or others who represented the interests of foreign powers, to register as such in the United Kingdom. 17.     The judge considered these complaints to be an assertion that there had been a failure to legislate, which fell outside the scope of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (see paragraph 19 below). In any event, the judge stated that the complaints were unarguable as Article 3 of Protocol   No.   1 did not give rise to such specific obligations. It did not seek to prescribe the detailed structure or shape of electoral laws, and the Court had gone to significant lengths to emphasise the extent of the States’ margin of appreciation when establishing such laws. Application to Court of Appeal for permission to appeal 18 .     On 27 September 2021 the Court of Appeal refused the applicants’ application for permission to appeal on the basis that their claim had no real prospect of success, and there was no other compelling reason to hear the appeal. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW Legislation The Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) 19 .     Pursuant to section 6(1) of the HRA, it was unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which was incompatible with a Convention right. However, according to section 6(6) an “act” did not include a failure to introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a proposal for legislation, or a failure to make any primary legislation or remedial order. The Inquiries Act 2005 20.     The Inquiries Act 2005 provided a statutory framework for Government Ministers to order inquiries to be held where events had occurred which caused, or which were capable of causing, public concern. Inquiries were not adversarial in nature; rather, they were an inquisitorial process aimed at establishing the truth. They were usually conducted in public, and the chairman’s report was usually published, although in certain circumstances – for example, where there was a risk to national security – public access and the disclosure of evidence could be restricted and certain material in the report could be withheld from publication. The Elections Act 2022 21 .     Electoral law in the United Kingdom is comprised of primary and secondary legislative material governing elections and referendums. 22 .     Until recently, the Representation of the People Acts 1983 and 2000 (“RPA 1983” and “RPA 2000”) and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (“PPERA”) were the key pieces of primary legislation. Among other things, they provided that any donations made to political parties, recognised third-parties, regulated donees (being members of registered political parties, holders of relevant elective office and members associations subject to controls on the donations and loans that they can accept) and candidates could only be made by United Kingdom-based or otherwise eligible sources. Donations from impermissible sources, including ineligible foreign donations, were prohibited. 23 .     The Elections Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”) received Royal Assent on 28 April 2022. It amended the law about political finance. In particular, it clarified the rules on notional spending and restricted third-party spending to United Kingdom-based entities and eligible overseas electors only. It also increased transparency around third-party campaigning, and introduced a statutory duty for the Electoral Commission to produce guidance on the operation of Part 6 of PPERA, which concerned controls relating to third ‑ party national election campaigns. 24 .     By virtue of section 110 of the RPA 1983 and section 143 of PPERA, printed material produced during an election campaign had to include an imprint providing information about who had produced the material and on behalf of whom they promoted it. Part 6 of the 2022 Act introduced a new requirement for digital campaigning material to display a digital imprint, with the name and address of the promoter of the material or any person on behalf of whom the material was being published (and who was not the promoter). The National Security Act 2023 25 .     The National Security Act 2023 (“the NSA 2023”), which received Royal Assent on 11 July 2023, brought together a suite of new measures to protect the United Kingdom’s national security, the safety of the British public and the United Kingdom’s vital interests from the hostile activities of foreign States. 26 .     More particularly, the NSA 2023 created new offences and accompanying police powers to capture harmful activity around sites that were critical to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom; explicitly criminalised assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out activities in the United Kingdom or overseas where such conduct was prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s safety and interests; established a new offence of sabotage designed to capture State-linked saboteurs who acted in a way that was prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s safety or interests by causing damage, including through cyber-attacks, to assets (including critical infrastructure, electronic systems and information); established a new offence of foreign interference where conduct was intended to have a specified negative effect and certain conditions were satisfied; increased the maximum custodial penalties for certain election-related offences that were carried out for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power; and replaced the existing acts preparatory offence under the Official Secrets Act 1920 with a new offence to ensure that it could effectively target harmful preparatory State threats activity. 27 .     Part 4 of the NSA 2023 introduced a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme to strengthen the resilience of the United Kingdom political system against covert foreign influence and to provide greater assurance around the activities of specified foreign powers or entities. The Online Safety Act 2023 28 .     The Online Safety Act 2023 (“the OSA 2023”), which received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023, established a new regulatory regime holding tech companies accountable to an independent regulator. It addressed misinformation and disinformation where it constituted illegal content or content harmful to children, and set out a list of priority offences reflecting the most serious and prevalent illegal content and activity, against which companies had to take proactive measures. The offence of foreign interference introduced by the NSA 2023 (see paragraph 26 above) was deemed to be a “priority offence”. Regulation and oversight The Election Court 29 .     According to section 120 of the RPA 1983 (see paragraph 22 above), petitions against the outcome of elections, or the outcome of an election campaign, can be brought before the Election Court. Section 157 of the RPA   1983 allows decisions of the Election Court to be appealed to the Court of Appeal on a question of law. The Electoral Commission 30 .     The Electoral Commission is an independent statutory body responsible for overseeing elections and regulating political finance in the United Kingdom. It seeks to promote public confidence in the democratic process and ensure its integrity. It has extensive powers and responsibilities to oversee compliance with electoral law, as well as to issue public reports on the conduct of elections. It was set up under PPERA (see paragraph 22 above) to be independent of Government. It is directly accountable to Parliament. 31 .     Under Parts V and VI of PPERA (see paragraph 22 above), the Electoral Commission publishes details of all payments made by political parties and registered third-party campaigners during the regulated period in the run-up to a parliamentary election. It also publishes online donations to political parties above 7,500 British Pounds (GBP). The Counter Disinformation Unit 32 .     The Counter Disinformation Unit (“CDU”), now known as the National Security Online Information Team (“NSOIT”) was set up in 2019 and currently sits within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. It leads the domestic operational and policy response for countering disinformation across Government. It brings together monitoring and analysis capabilities for major elections, key national events and acute information incidents, such as the Russian information operations during the war in Ukraine and Covid 19. It also proactively monitors for harmful narratives that threaten the United Kingdom, and co-ordinates with Government departments to deploy the appropriate response to mis/disinformation. This could involve a direct rebuttal on social media, awareness raising campaigns to promote the facts or, in cases where platforms’ terms of service may have been violated, referring content to the relevant platform for consideration. 33 .     According to a factsheet published by the United Kingdom Government on the CDU, disinformation is defined as the deliberate creation and spreading of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead people, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain. Misinformation, on the other hand, is the inadvertent spread of false information. The “Defending Democracy” Taskforce 34 .     In November 2022 the Government launched its Defending Democracy Taskforce. Its stated aim was to “protect the democratic integrity of the UK” as an “enduring government function with particular focus on foreign interference”. 35.     It works with local councils, police forces and global tech companies to: ensure that electoral processes and infrastructure are secure and resilient; ensure elected officials are protected “at all levels” from physical, cyber, and additional threats; and counter disinformation efforts aimed at “disrupting our national conversation and skewing our democratic processes”. 36 .     The Taskforce works across Government and with Parliament, the United Kingdom intelligence community, the devolved administrations, local authorities, the private sector and civil society with the aim of building resilience across all levels of the United Kingdom’s democratic system. It reports to the National Security Council, which is a Cabinet Committee chaired by the Prime Minister. Domestic reports on the impact of disinformation The final report by the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (“DCMS”) entitled Disinformation and ‘fake news’ 37 .     The DCMS is a cross-party committee of MPs appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and its associated public bodies. 38 .     Over the course of eighteen months it conducted an inquiry on disinformation, covering, inter alia , how individuals’ political choices might be affected and influenced by online information and interference by malign forces in political elections in the United Kingdom. Its report was published in February 2019. 39 .     Under the heading, “Foreign influence in political campaigns”, the report stated: “There has been clear and proven Russian influence in foreign elections, and we highlighted evidence in our Interim Report of such attempts in the EU Referendum.” 40 .     Having specific regard to Russian interference in domestic elections, the report continued: “As we said in our Interim Report, Prime Minister Theresa May accused Russia of meddling in elections, and planting disinformation, in an attempt to ‘weaponise information’ and sow discord in the West. In its response to the Report, the Government stated that, following the nerve agent attack in Salisbury in March 2018, the Government had ‘judged the Russian state promulgated at least 38 false disinformation narratives around this criminal act’. However, the Government made it clear that ‘it has not seen evidence of successful use of disinformation by foreign actors, including Russia, to influence UK democratic processes’. When the Secretary of State was questioned in oral evidence over what constitutes ‘successful’, Rt Hon Jeremy Wright MP, responded: ‘We have seen nothing that persuades us that Russian interference has had a material impact on the way in which people choose to vote in elections. It is not that they have not tried, but we have not seen evidence of that material impact’. It is surely a sufficient matter of concern that the Government has acknowledged that interference has occurred, irrespective of the lack of evidence of impact. The Government should be conducting analysis to understand the extent of Russian targeting of voters during elections. The Government also cannot state definitively that there was ‘no evidence of successful interference’ in our democratic processes, as the term ‘successful’ is impossible to define in retrospect. There is, however, strong evidence that points to hostile state actors influencing democratic processes. Cardiff University and the Digital Forensics Lab of the Atlantic Council have both detailed ways in which the Kremlin attempted to influence attitudes in UK politics. Kremlin-aligned media published significant numbers of unique articles about the EU   referendum. 89 Up researchers analysed the most shared of the articles, and identified 261 with a clear anti-EU bias to the reporting. The two main outlets were RT and Sputnik, with video produced by Ruptly. The articles that went most viral had the heaviest anti-EU bias. The social reach of these anti-EU articles published by the Kremlin-owned channels was 134 million potential impressions, in comparison with a total reach of just 33 million and 11 million potential impressions for all content shared from the Vote Leave website and Leave.EU website respectively. The value for a comparable paid social media campaign would be between £1.4 and   4.14   million. ... Ben Nimmo, from the Digital Forensics Lab of the Atlantic Council, has detailed attempts to influence attitudes to the Scottish Referendum, for instance, which included a Russian election observer calling the referendum not in line with international standards, and Twitter accounts calling into question its legitimacy. The behaviour of these accounts, Mr Nimmo argues, is pro-Kremlin, and consistent with the behaviour of accounts known to be run by the so-called ‘troll factory’ in St.   Petersburg, Russia, during the United States 2016 presidential election and beyond. However, it is not possible to determine from open sources whether some or all of the accounts are independent actors, or linked to Russian information operations. ... The Government has been very ready to accept the evidence of Russian activity in the Skripal case, an acceptance justified by the evidence. However, it is reluctant to accept evidence of interference in the 2016 Referendum in the UK. If the Government wishes the public to treat its statements on these important matters of national security and democracy seriously, it must report the position impartially, uninfluenced by the political implications of any such report. In common with other countries, the UK is clearly vulnerable to covert digital influence campaigns and the Government should be conducting analysis to understand the extent of the targeting of voters, by foreign players, during past elections. We ask the Government whether current legislation to protect the electoral process from malign influence is sufficient. Legislation should be in line with the latest technological developments, and should be explicit on the illegal influencing of the democratic process by foreign players. We urge the Government to look into this issue and to respond in its White Paper.” The report by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (“ISC”) entitled “Russia” 41 .     The ISC is a statutory committee that has responsibility for oversight of the United Kingdom Intelligence Community. Its nine Members, who are drawn from both Houses of Parliament, are appointed by the Houses of Parliament, having been nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. 42 .     Throughout 2018 the ISC conducted a major Inquiry which covered various aspects of the Russian threat to the United Kingdom, together with an examination of how the United Kingdom Government had responded. A report was completed on 17 October 2019 and, having already been cleared by the Security and Intelligence Agencies, was sent to the Prime Minister. On 5 November 2019 – the day before Parliament was dissolved ahead of the 2019 election – the Chair of the ISC asked the Prime Minister, in Parliament, if he would make a statement on his refusal to give clearance to the report. In doing so, he referred to a long-standing agreement that the Prime Minister would endeavour to respond to such reports within ten days. In response, he was informed by the Minister for Europe and the Americas that scrutiny of such a sensitive report took time. The report was eventually presented to Parliament and published with redactions (represented by “***”) on 21 July 2020. Although the report was supplemented by an annex, that annex has not yet been published, “in view of the current Russian threat”. 43 .     The report found that: “It is clear that Russia currently poses a significant threat to the UK on a number of fronts – from espionage to interference in democratic processes, and to serious crime. The question is how that has happened – and what the Intelligence Community is now doing to tackle it.” 44 .     In the specific context of interference in democratic processes, the report noted: “The spreading of disinformation (by which we mean the promotion of intentionally false, distorting or distracting narratives) and the running of ‘influence campaigns’ are separate but interlinked subjects. An influence campaign in relation to an election, for example, may use the spreading of disinformation, but may also encompass other tactics such as illicit funding, disruption of electoral mechanics or direct attacks on one of the campaigns (such as ‘hack and leak’). ... In terms of the direct threat to elections, we have been informed that the mechanics of the UK’s voting system are deemed largely sound: the use of a highly dispersed paper-based voting and counting system makes any significant interference difficult, and we understand that GCHQ [Government Communication Headquarters, the United Kingdom’s intelligence, security and cyber Agency] has undertaken a great deal of work to help ensure that the online voter registration system is safe.” 45 .     Nonetheless, the report continued: “The UK is clearly a target for Russia’s disinformation campaigns and political influence operations and must therefore equip itself to counter such efforts. ... ... [W]e note that – as with so many other issues currently – it is the social media companies which hold the key and yet are failing to play their part; DCMS informed us that ***. The Government must now seek to establish a protocol with the social media companies to ensure that they take covert hostile state use of their platforms seriously, and have clear timescales within which they commit to removing such material. Government should ‘name and shame’ those which fail to act. Such a protocol could, usefully, be expanded to encompass the other areas in which action is required from the social media companies, since this issue is not unique to Hostile State Activity. This matter is, in our view, urgent and we expect the Government to report on progress in this area as soon as possible.” 46 .     By way of a case study, the report considered the EU referendum, since there had been widespread public allegations that Russia had sought to influence it. According to the report: “The impact of any such attempts would be difficult – if not impossible – to assess, and we have not sought to do so. However, it is important to establish whether a hostile state took deliberate action with the aim of influencing a UK democratic process, irrespective of whether it was successful or not. Open source studies have pointed to the preponderance of pro-Brexit or anti-EU   stories on RT and Sputnik, and the use of ‘bots’ and ‘trolls’, as evidence of Russian attempts to influence the process.” 47.     The report also noted the existence of “credible open source commentary” suggesting that Russia undertook influence campaigns in relation to the Scottish independence referendum. 48 .     Concerning the Government’s response to allegations of Russian interference in its democratic processes, the report indicated: “The written evidence provided to us appeared to suggest that [the Government] had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has had a material impact on an election, for example influencing results. ***. ***. This focus on *** indicates that open source material (for example, the studies of attempts to influence the referendum using RT and Sputnik, or social media campaigns referred to earlier) was not fully taken into account. Given that the Committee has previously been informed that open source material is now fully represented in the Government’s understanding of the threat picture, it was surprising to us that in this instance it was not. Whilst it may be true that some issues highlighted in open source did not require the secret investigative capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies or were at the periphery of their remits, the Agencies nonetheless have capabilities which allow them to ‘stand on the shoulders’ of open source coverage: for example, GCHQ might attempt to look behind the suspicious social media accounts which open source analysis has identified to uncover their true operators (and even disrupt their use), or SIS [Secret Intelligence Service, otherwise known as MI6] might specifically task an agent to provide information on the extent and nature of any Russian influence campaigns. However, we have found *** which suggests that ***. ***. (iii)     Lack of retrospective assessment We have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference, ***. This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, where an intelligence community assessment was produced within two months of the vote, with an unclassified summary being made public. Whilst the issues at stake in the EU   referendum campaign are less clear-cut, it is nonetheless the Committee’s view that the UK Intelligence Community should produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum and that an unclassified summary of it be published. ***. Even if the conclusion of any such assessment were that there was minimal interference, this would nonetheless represent a helpful reassurance to the public that the UK’s democratic processes had remained relatively safe.” 49.     The report noted that following the end of the Cold War, the operational effort allocated to countering Russian Hostile State Activity decreased. The report continued: “We fully recognise the very considerable pressures on the Agencies since 9/11, and that they have a finite amount of resource, which they must focus on operational priorities. Nevertheless, reacting to the here and now is inherently inefficient and – in our opinion – until recently, the Government had badly underestimated the Russian threat and the response it required.” 50.     The Intelligence Agencies had informed the ISC that the DCMS had primary responsibility for disinformation campaigns, and that the Electoral Commission (see paragraphs 30-31 above) had responsibility for the overall security of democratic processes. However, the DCMS told the ISC that its function was largely confined to the broad Government policy regarding the use of disinformation rather than an assessment of, or operations against, hostile State campaigns. According to the ISC: “DCMS is a small Whitehall policy department and the Electoral Commission is an arm’s length body; neither is in the central position required to tackle a major hostile state threat to our democracy. Protecting our democratic discourse and processes from hostile foreign interference is a central responsibility of Government, and should be a ministerial priority.” 51 .     The report also considered whether the Intelligence Community had all the powers and tools it needed to counter Russian Hostile State Activity. Under the heading “Protecting democracy” it stated: “The [DCMS] Select Committee has already asked the Government ‘whether current legislation to protect the electoral process from malign interference is sufficient. Legislation should be in line with the latest technological developments’. We note that physical interference in the UK’s democratic processes is less likely given the use of a paper-based system – however, we support the DCMS Select Committee’s calls for the Electoral Commission to be given power to ‘stop someone acting illegally in a campaign if they live outside the UK’. Separately, there is the question of influence over our democratic processes. Questions have been raised over whether electoral law is sufficiently up to date, given ‘the move from physical billboards to online, micro-targeted political campaigning’. We note – and, again, agree with the DCMS Select Committee – that ‘the UK is clearly vulnerable to covert digital influence campaigns’. In this respect, we have already questioned whether the Electoral Commission has sufficient powers to ensure the security of democratic processes where hostile state threats are involved; if it is to tackle foreign interference, then it must be given the necessary legislative powers.” The Government’s public response to the ISC “Russia” report 52 .     In July 2020 the Government published a public response to the ISC   report. It stated that: “The UK’s free and open democracy is one of our nation’s greatest strengths. However, we know that certain states seek to exploit our open system to sow division and undermine trust in our democracy, and those of our allies, through disinformation, cyber-attacks and other methods. We have made clear that any foreign interference in the UK’s Democratic processes is completely unacceptable. It is, and always will be, an absolute priority to protect the UK against foreign interference, whether from Russia or any other state. We have worked with industry, civil society and international partners to implement robust systems to secure our Democratic processes and deter attempts to interfere in it. This work is undertaken with the utmost regard for the freedom of the press, political and parliamentary discourse and freedom of speech. We will always balance the need to secure our Democracy with our duty to uphold our values.” 53 .     The Government acknowledged that it was “almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 General Election through the online amplification of illicitly acquired and leaked Government documents.” The response also referred to “several incidents during the 2019 General Election including distributed denial of service attacks against political parties, and suspicious emails received by candidates.” However, the Government had seen “no evidence of successful interference in the EU   Referendum”. 54 .     The response continued: “Whilst there is no evidence of a broad spectrum Russian campaign against the election, any attempt to interfere in our democratic processes is completely unacceptable. There is an ongoing criminal investigation and it would be inappropriate for us to say anything further at this point. ... The Intelligence and Security Agencies produce and contribute to regular assessments of the threat posed by Hostile State Activity, including around potential interference in UK democratic processes. We keep such assessments under review and, where necessary, update them in response to new intelligence, including during democratic events such as elections and referendums. Where new information emerges, the Government will always consider the most appropriate use of any intelligence it develops or receives, including whether it is appropriate to make this public. Given this long standing approach, a retrospective assessment of the EU Referendum is not necessary.” National Cyber Security Centre (“NCSC”) Annual Review 2023 55.     The NCSC, which is part of Government Communication Headquarters (“GCHQ”, the United Kingdom’s intelligence, security and cyber Agency), was launched in October 2016 to act as a bridge between industry and government, and provide a unified source of advice, guidance and support on cyber security, including the management of cyber security incidents. It works collaboratively with other law enforcement agencies, defence agencies, the United Kingdom’s Intelligence and Security Agencies, and international partners. 56 .     On the issue of election interference, the NCSC said the following in its 2023 annual review: “Russian attempts to manipulate democratic institutions It is no secret that Russia seeks to weaken and divide their adversaries by interfering in elections using mis and dis-information, cyber attacks, and other methods. The UK government assesses that it is almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 general election. In the coming months, with UK and US elections on the horizon we can expect to see the integrity of our systems tested again. Protecting our democratic and electoral processes against foreign interference, whether from Russia or any other state, is and always will be an absolute priority for the NCSC and we will continue to support the government’s critical work in this area. ... Case study: Defending our democracy in a new digital age – at the ballot box and beyond ... With elections on the horizon, including a general election, and with people around the world set to go to the polls from Belgium to the US in the next year, the UK and its allies cannot be complacent to the threat of foreign cyber interference and attempts at influencing our democratic processes. The NCSC is working with our allies around the world to share insights and approaches to help improve collective cyber resilience of global democracy. Defending democracy is a critical part of the NCSC’s mission as it gets to the heart of what it means to keep the UK safe, and to act responsibly, in cyberspace. As part of a cross-government effort, alongside partners in industry, civil society and others, we are working to protect the values at the foundation of our society. Responding to threats Protecting our democracy in cyberspace requires a continuous effort as the cyber threat to the UK’s democratic institutions and processes is significant and comes from many malicious actors. Over the past year, the NCSC has surged its efforts to advise on the smooth running of local elections, political party leadership contests and once‑in‑a‑generation constitutional events such as the Coronation of His Majesty the King. We have supported a range of entities involved in the democratic process with their responses to cyber incidents, ranging from phishing attacks to more sophisticated compromises. And we have provided longer-term guidance for improving resilience, both across supply chains that underpin the functioning of key services and to individuals active in our democra