CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 août 2025

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margin-left:15.01pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial } .s51DFF5CF { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sE5BF05B1 { width:2.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4F597665 { width:33.22pt; display:inline-block } .sEEEC397 { width:146.09pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block }   SECOND SECTION CASE OF M.A. v. ICELAND (Application no. 59813/19)     JUDGMENT Art 8 • Positive obligations • Private life • Failure to conduct an effective investigation into applicant’s complaints of domestic violence • Delays and administrative confusion leading to the expiry of limitation periods Art 14 (+ Art 3 and Art 8) • Discrimination • Alleged gender-based discrimination in handling of domestic violence cases • Various legislative and policy measures adopted to combat sexual and domestic violence • Insufficient prima facie evidence of structural bias or disproportionate effect capable of shifting the burden of proof to the State   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 26 August 2025   FINAL   26/11/2025   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of M.A. v. Iceland, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Arnfinn Bårdsen , President ,   Saadet Yüksel,   Tim Eicke,   Gediminas Sagatys,   Stéphane Pisani,   Juha Lavapuro , judges ,   Ragnhildur Helgadottir , ad hoc judge , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   59813/19) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Icelandic national, Ms   M.A. (“the applicant”), on 8   November 2019; the decision to give notice to the Icelandic Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the allegations of an ineffective investigation of domestic violence and gender-based discrimination, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed; the withdrawal of Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, the judge elected in respect of Iceland, from the case (Rule   28 of the Rules of Court), and the appointment of Ragnhildur Helgadóttir to sit as ad hoc judge (Article   26 §   4 of the Convention and Rule   29 §   1); the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 8 July 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The case concerns the alleged failure of the Icelandic authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant’s complaints of domestic violence, as well as allegations of gender-based discrimination in the handling of such cases. The applicant complained under Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article   14. THE FACTS 2.     The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Kopavogur. She was represented before the Court by Sigrún Ingibjörg Gísladóttir, a lawyer practising in Reykjavík. 3.     The Government were initially represented by Einar Karl Hallvarðsson, Agent, and subsequently by Fanney Rós Þorsteinsdóttir. 4.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. Alleged violence 5 .     In December 2017 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police against her former boyfriend, H.M.S., concerning two distinct incidents of physical assault allegedly committed in February and July 2016, as well as a threat made against her in May 2017. 6.     The first alleged incident took place at her boyfriend’s residence on 29   February 2016. According to the applicant, during an altercation, he shoved her by applying pressure to her chest and swung her back and forth by alternately pulling and pushing her. The second alleged incident occurred at their joint residence on 4   July 2016. The applicant stated that H.M.S. shoved her in the chest, forced her out of the bathroom and later attempted to take her bag from her. In the course of this altercation, he allegedly shoved her, threw her back and forth and pulled her forward by the bag. 7.     Following both incidents, the applicant sought medical attention, and her injuries were documented. After the February incident, doctors noted a suspected broken toe and requested an X-ray which was not conclusive. Following the July incident, the applicant took photographs of her injuries. 8.     The applicant initially contacted the police in January 2017 but at that time did not wish to file a formal complaint. On 4   May 2017, after learning that she had contacted the police, H.M.S. threatened to send intimate photographs of her to her employer. Police investigation 9.     The central investigation department of the police, which investigates serious violent and sexual offences, conducted an initial assessment before transferring the case to a police station where domestic violence cases are generally handled. On 14   February 2018 a police officer at the station referred the case back to the central investigation department, reasoning that the investigation should be completed where it had begun. In March 2018 the case was discussed, and the alleged offence analysed, at a department meeting before being returned to the police station for investigation. During the course of the subsequent investigation, the relevant prosecutor sent the case back for further investigation on 22   October 2018, 14 February and 28   March 2019. Each time, the prosecutor noted that the case was old and that its investigation should be conducted without delay. 10 .     The applicant was questioned at a police station on 3   March 2018, providing details regarding the alleged physical assaults. Additional questioning took place by telephone on 25   May 2018 in relation to the threats and on 3   April 2019 concerning the assaults and her injuries. 11.     In early June 2018 the applicant sent emails to the investigator, expressing concern that the statute of limitations in her case might expire. On 7   June the investigator responded, stating, “I understand your point of view and will proceed with the case as soon as I have an opportunity”, and inquiring whether the applicant had a new telephone number for H.M.S. On 12   June the investigator informed the applicant that attempts to contact H.M.S. had been unsuccessful. Police records indicate that H.M.S. was summoned for questioning on 12 July but failed to appear. A second summons was issued, and H.M.S. was ultimately questioned on 27   August. According to the Government, the email exchanges suggested that the investigator’s summer leave played a part in H.M.S. not being questioned until the end of August. 12.     During questioning, H.M.S. partially admitted to having physical contact with the applicant during the July 2016 incident. He stated that, following an exchange of words, the applicant had begun striking him, at which point he had grasped her arms and pushed her into the living room. He acknowledged that she had sustained bruises on her arms as a result and expressed regret for this. However, he denied the applicant’s description of the incident as set out in her complaint and did not recognise that any altercation had taken place in February 2016. With regard to the threat concerning intimate photographs, he admitted making the threat but asserted that he had never intended to act upon it. 13.     Between 24   October 2018 and 11   March 2019 the police took statements from four witnesses, some of whom were questioned more than once. The witnesses testified to having seen injuries on the applicant following the incidents in February and July 2016, and two of them stated that they had witnessed H.M.S. pushing the applicant against a door in July 2016. Decisions by domestic authorities 14.     On 23   April 2019 the police discontinued the investigation. In relation to the alleged assaults, the police determined that, as H.M.S. had not been questioned until August 2018, the two-year statute of limitations for offences under Article   217 of the General Penal Code (the “GPC”) had expired. The available evidence was not considered sufficient to support prosecution under Article   218b on domestic violence. 15.     The applicant appealed this decision to the State Prosecutor, who upheld the decision regarding the assaults, confirming that they were time ‑ barred since H.M.S. was questioned in relation to the case on 27   August 2018. The limitation period had thus expired when his testimony was taken. The State Prosecutor further found that, while the applicant’s allegations were supported by evidence, Article   218b could not be applied retroactively to the alleged assault of February 2016 and that the July 2016 incident alone did not satisfy the requirement of repeated or serious conduct necessary for Article   218b to apply. However, the State Prosecutor invalidated the police’s decision in respect of the alleged threat and ordered that prosecution be initiated under Article   233 of the GPC. 16.     On 12   November 2019 the police issued an indictment concerning the threat. H.M.S. was convicted of this offence by the Reykjanes District Court on 7   July 2020. The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction on 17   September 2021, noting that the fact that the threat was directed at his former cohabiting partner aggravated the seriousness of the offence. 17.     In August 2021, the National Commissioner of Police, who had served as the chief of the metropolitan police during the investigation of the applicant’s case, publicly apologised to the applicant for the way her case had been handled. In particular, he acknowledged that procedural errors had resulted in the assaults becoming time-barred. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK Domestic legal framework Constitution of the Republic of Iceland 18.     Article   65 provides that everyone shall be equal before the law and enjoy human rights irrespective of, inter alia , sex. The second paragraph states that men and women shall enjoy equal rights in all respects. General Penal Code No. 19/1940 ( Almenn hegningarlög ) Provisions on assault 19.     Article   217 provides: “Any person convicted of assault, providing it is not as serious as is described in Article   218, shall be fined or imprisoned for up to six months, and imprisoned for up to one year if the conduct involved is particularly reprehensible”. 20.     Article   218 provides: “If by a deliberate assault someone causes another person physical injury or health damage and these consequences can be regarded as his or her fault in terms of intention or negligence, the person shall be imprisoned for up to three years, or fined if there are extenuating circumstances. Where serious physical injury or health damage results from an assault or where the offence is particularly dangerous in view of the method, including the implements, used, and also where the assault victim dies as a consequence of the attack, punishment for the offence shall take the form of up to sixteen years’ imprisonment”. Domestic violence provisions 21.     Article   218b, introduced into the GPC by Amending Act no.   23/2016 and in force from 5   April 2016, provides: “Any person who, repeatedly or seriously poses a threat to the life, health or well ‑ being of his or her present or former spouse or cohabiting partner, to his or her descendant or the descendant of his or her present or former spouse or cohabiting partner, to an older person in his or her direct blood-line, or to other persons who live with him or her in the home or are in his or her care, by means of violence, threats, deprivation of freedom, coercion or in another manner, shall be imprisoned for up to six years. A gross violation may be punishable by up to sixteen years’ imprisonment. When the seriousness of the violation is assessed, particular consideration shall be given to whether the injured party suffered major physical injury or damage to his or her health or whether the violation was fatal. Furthermore, consideration shall be given to whether the violation was committed in a particularly painful or injurious manner, whether it lasted a long time or whether the perpetrator grossly abused his or her superior position vis-à-vis the injured party”. 22.     The Explanatory Report to Act No. 23/2016 clarifies that, although Article   218b highlights that domestic violence should not be regarded as a series of isolated incidents but rather as a continuous situation creating a climate of threat and fear, a single incident, if serious enough, can also engage criminal liability under the provision. It further explains that the means by which domestic violence might be committed are not limited to physical violence, threats, deprivation of freedom or coercion, but can also include forms of social, psychological and financial violence. 23.     Article   233 provides that anyone who makes a threat of committing a criminal act designed to cause another person to fear for their life, health or well ‑ being, or that of other persons, shall be fined or imprisoned for up to two years. 24 .     Article   233b provides that anyone who insults or denigrates their spouse or ex-spouse, child or other closely related person, where the offence constitutes gross defamation, shall be imprisoned for up to two years. General provisions 25.     Article   2 provides that where penal legislation is amended between the commission of an offence and the delivery of judgment, the case shall be adjudicated in accordance with the newer legislation with respect to both criminal liability and punishment. However, no punishment may be imposed unless authorised by law at the time the act was committed, nor may a more severe punishment be imposed than that which would have been applicable under the law in force at that time. 26 .     Article   70(3) stipulates that where an offence is committed against a person closely related to the perpetrator and the nature of their relationship is deemed to have aggravated the seriousness of the offence, this shall normally be considered an aggravating factor in determining the punishment. 27.     Article   81 establishes statutory limitation periods: two years for offences carrying a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment, five years for those punishable with up to four years’ imprisonment, ten years for offences punishable with up to ten years’ imprisonment and fifteen years for offences subject to over ten years’ maximum imprisonment. 28 .     Article   82 provides that the initiation of an investigation into a criminal case against a person as a suspect interrupts the statute of limitations. According to the explanatory report to the 1998 amendment, the limitation period is interrupted when a public investigation begins against a specific person as a defendant, which may occur through various means including arrest, custody, search, coercive measures, or questioning on suspicion of a criminal offence. The burden of proof regarding when the limitation period was interrupted rests with the prosecution. Criminal Procedure Act No. 88/2008 29.     The Act contains detailed provisions on criminal investigations and prosecutions. These include the requirements that investigations shall be carried out expeditiously (Article   53), that the police shall investigate when necessary based on knowledge or suspicion of crime regardless of whether a complaint has been received (Article   52), and that the burden of proof regarding guilt lies with the prosecution (Article   108). It also provides that, after receiving the case, the prosecutor may instruct the police to undertake additional investigative measures (Article   57), and that an indictment shall not be issued unless the investigative material is considered sufficient or likely to secure a conviction (Article   145). 30.     Article   41 provides that the police shall appoint a legal representative for victims in sexual offence cases upon request, and in all cases where the victim is under eighteen. In cases concerning domestic violence, the police shall also appoint a legal representative when it is considered necessary. Upon the initiation of court proceedings, the legal representative shall be appointed by the court. Act on Restraining Orders and Removal from the Home No.   85/2011 31.     The Act permits the imposition of restraining orders where there is reasonable suspicion of the commission, or the risk of commission, of a criminal offence, or where the perpetrator otherwise disturbs the victim’s peace (Article   4). The perpetrator may also be arrested and removed from the home if there is reasonable suspicion of the commission, or the danger of commission, of certain punishable offences, including sexual and physical violence as well as offences under Articles   233 and 233b and, since its entry into force, Article   218b of the GPC (Article   5). Council of Europe 32.     The Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), in its Baseline Evaluation Report on legislative and other measures giving effect to the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) in the Republic of Iceland, GREVIO/Inf(2022)26, published on 14   November 2022, noted the persistence of gender stereotypes and the continued need to address violence against women in Iceland, while highlighting “the clear commitment” by the Icelandic Government to “combat gender-based violence, to improve the legal status of victims [and] to prioritise the striving for gender equality” (§§ 2-3). It welcomed Iceland’s ranking in 2021, for the twelfth consecutive year, at the top of the Global Gender Gap Index, and commended the Icelandic authorities for the “official anchoring of a gender equality perspective in all areas of governance and policy making” (§   16). 33.     As regards coordinated and comprehensive measures to prevent and combat violence against women, GREVIO noted that “the first action plan on domestic and sexual violence in Iceland [had been] introduced in 2006” and was followed by further action plans on gender-based violence, which focused on combating domestic violence and sexual violence against women and children and aimed to improve the legal status of and facilities for victims. Emphasis was also placed on “strengthening preventive efforts against violence” (§   30). 34 .     As regards the collection of data on violence against women, GREVIO noted that, according to the authorities, statistics on such violence were “not currently compiled in a single location” and that “there [was] no overview available on the extent of the different forms of violence covered by the Istanbul Convention in Iceland”. Nevertheless, the police collected data on domestic violence “disaggregated by sex, age, nationality, type and place of the offence, and relationship of the perpetrator to the victim”. Statistics on sexual and domestic violence, including yearly trends, were published on the police website and updated quarterly. Overall, the police and police prosecutors had “a solid data system in place for recording reported offences of sexual violence and domestic violence”. However, GREVIO regretted that “no data on indictments or convictions [were] being collected or made available publicly” (§§   53-55). 35 .     As regards substantive criminal-law provisions and the initiation of proceedings, GREVIO noted with satisfaction that the Icelandic GPC provides for ex officio initiation of legal proceedings in relation to all of the offences listed in Article   55, paragraph   1, of the Istanbul Convention (§   286). It also noted legislative developments following a 2012 report on the GPC’s conformity with the Convention and remarked that they demonstrated “Iceland’s serious commitment to tackling violence against women and stemming impunity” (§   192). GREVIO observed that, with one exception, the aggravating circumstances contained in Article   46 of the Convention form part of the Icelandic legislation, either in Article   70 of the GPC or as a part of the provisions of the substantive criminal law (§   234). It further welcomed the adoption of the new Article   218b and noted the judicial clarification of the threshold for its application in cases of a single violent incident. It observed, however, that acts of psychological violence occurring between partners who do not share a residence were not covered within its scope, and that its efficiency in terms of protecting against psychological violence remained to be seen (§§   193 and 199). 36 .     As regards the response of law-enforcement agencies, GREVIO welcomed the issuance of protocols for police officers dealing with cases of domestic violence by the National Commissioner for Police “as early as 2005”, with subsequent updates in 2014 and 2018. It was satisfied that these protocols were “comprehensive and provided a model of good practice consistent with the requirements of the Istanbul Convention”, although it noted that their implementation “remain[ed] inconsistent and further effort [was] required in that respect” (§   242). It also noted the State Prosecutor’s issuance, in 2017, of instructions prioritising the investigation of rape cases, cases involving violence against children and violence in close relationships and, in 2018, of instructions requiring the implementation of a standardised and timed investigation plan for such cases (§   251). GREVIO further noted that “following a study conducted in 2013 and 2014, which found that acquittal rates for sexual offences were high in Iceland, an Action Plan on Sexual Offences was passed by the parliament in 2017” with “several measures to improve the situation, in particular aimed at increasing the rate of prosecutions and convictions of perpetrators of sexual offences”. It also provided for “15 new full-time police officer positions ... added to police departments all over the country”, and additional funding to update procedures and investigative equipment (§   250). 37 .     Noting the concerns raised by NGOs and women’s organisations over the number of cases concerning sexual violence that did not proceed to prosecution, and how the deployment of more resources to their investigation created “a new bottleneck” in prosecutions (§§   252-53), GREVIO urged the authorities “to significantly reinforce their investigative and prosecutorial capacity and to take immediate measures to ensure a prompt and appropriate response by law-enforcement agencies in all cases of violence against women” (§   259). GREVIO further observed that, as regards domestic violence, “the lack of statistics in respect of interventions, prosecutions and convictions [made] it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the system”. It noted that “numerous concerns were raised by NGOs and women’s organisations in respect of the delays in getting to court, leading to reduced or suspended sentences, and unduly negative approaches to women victims of violence at District Court and Court of Appeal level” (§   263). United Nations 38.     The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in its Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Iceland, adopted at its sixty ‑ third session on 15 February - 4   March 2016 (CEDAW/C/ISL/CO/7-8), noted with concern the increasing number of cases of violence against women and welcomed “the new rules, procedures and risk assessment tool issued by the Reykjavik Metropolitan Police in March 2015 for cases of domestic violence”. It expressed particular concern about “the high number of discontinuances in criminal proceedings on charges of violence against women, in particular rape and sexual violence, by the State Prosecutor and the low number of convictions” and recommended, among other measures, that Iceland incorporate the Istanbul Convention into national legislation to strengthen legal protection for women, including by criminalising online harassment and psychological violence. It further called upon Iceland to enhance efforts to prosecute and convict perpetrators of rape and sexual violence and analyse and address the causes of the high acquittal rates (§§   19 ‑ 20). 39 .     In its Concluding Observations on the Ninth Periodic Report of Iceland, adopted at its eighty-fifth session (8-26   May 2023) (CEDAW/C/ISL/CO/9), the CEDAW Committee noted with appreciation Iceland’s top ranking in the 2022 Global Gender Gap Index and welcomed the progress achieved since the last report, including the criminalisation of digital sexual violence and stalking, increased protection for victims of psychological violence and the definition of rape based on absence of consent. However, it expressed concern over “the high number of criminal proceedings concerning gender-based violence against women, in particular rape and sexual violence, discontinued by the State Prosecutor and the low number of convictions, notwithstanding the adoption and implementation of the action plan concerning sexual offences for the period 2018-2022”. It also highlighted “the lack of disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence against women and girls, including domestic violence”. Among other measures, it recommended addressing the causes of underreporting and high acquittal rates in cases of gender-based violence and ensuring the collection and analysis of data on all such forms of violence (§§   4, 25-26). THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION 40.     The applicant complained that the authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into her allegations of ill-treatment and to provide adequate protection against gender-based violence, in breach of Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention, which read as follows: Article   3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment ...” Article   8 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...” Admissibility 41.     The Government acknowledged that the applicant had exhausted effective remedies in the criminal proceedings by appealing to the State Prosecutor. However, in their view, the applicant had not exhausted domestic civil remedies. As the National Commissioner had publicly admitted mistakes that resulted in the assaults becoming time-barred, she could have lodged a civil claim for damages, which might have led to an award of compensation. The Government also claimed that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded. 42.     The applicant emphasised that her complaint concerned the ineffective criminal investigation and resulting impunity of her alleged attacker, not compensation. In particular, she maintained that pursuing civil claims would not have addressed the State’s failure to effectively investigate and prosecute gender-based violence. 43.     As regards the Government’s argument that the applicant could have instituted civil proceedings for damages, the Court notes that civil proceedings would not concern the same subject matter as her application to the Court, which relates to the authorities’ failure to conduct an effective criminal investigation into her allegations of domestic violence. The Court reiterates that effective deterrence against serious attacks on physical and psychological integrity requires efficient criminal-law mechanisms that would ensure adequate protection in that regard (see Vučković v.   Croatia , no.   15798/20, §   41, 12   December 2023, and Volodina v.   Russia , no.   41261/17, §   100, 9   July 2019). The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 44.     The Court considers that this complaint is neither manifestly ill ‑ founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits Submissions by the parties (a)    The applicant 45.     The applicant submitted that the domestic legal framework had failed to afford practical and effective protection of her rights. She asserted that, prior to the entry into force of Article   218b of the General Penal Code (the “GPC”) in 2016, victims of domestic violence had not been adequately protected under Icelandic law, a deficiency identified in the observations of the CEDAW Committee. In her view, equating domestic violence with random physical assaults, particularly in relation to the two-year statute of limitations for offences under Article   217 of the GPC, was incompatible with Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention, as well as with the Istanbul Convention. She emphasised that Article   218b had extended the limitation period to ten years and allowed for viewing incidents as a continuous pattern rather than isolated events, demonstrating that the previous framework had been inadequate. 46.     The applicant disputed the Government’s claim that domestic violence cases were prioritised by the police, pointing to significant delays in her own case. For example, H.M.S. was not questioned until nine months after she filed her complaint and witness statements were not taken until eleven months later. While acknowledging that some time had elapsed between the incidents and her complaint – approximately twenty-two months since the February 2016 incident and seventeen months since the July 2016 incident, she maintained that this made it more crucial to commence an investigation immediately to secure available evidence. She specifically noted her June 2018 email exchange with the investigator expressing concern about the approaching statute of limitations, to which the investigator responded that they would proceed at the earliest opportunity and subsequently took summer leave. The various guidelines and procedures for the expedited handling of such cases, including the State Prosecutor’s Instructions 4/2017 prioritising domestic violence cases, were of little value if they were not effectively implemented in practice. Furthermore, the Government’s decision to increase funding to ensure effective investigations after the investigation in her case further demonstrated that the delays in her proceedings had been unacceptable. 47.     The applicant further maintained that her account was credible and corroborated by additional evidence, including medical records documenting a suspected broken toe after the February 2016 incident and photographs of injuries following the July 2016 assault. Two witnesses had directly observed H.M.S. pushing her against a door during the July 2016 incident, and others had seen her injuries following both assaults. She argued that the police systematically discounted or dismissed victims’ evidence in domestic violence cases, while according undue weight to the denials of the accused, despite H.M.S.’s partial admission to physical contact and his acknowledgment that she sustained bruises. The dismissal of witness testimony as merely “retelling” the victims’ accounts inappropriately diminished crucial evidence in domestic violence cases, where direct witnesses were rare by nature. 48.     The applicant submitted that, although she filed charges in December 2017, an analysis of the applicable legal provisions was not conducted until March 2018, by which time the first physical attack had already become time ‑ barred. While the second attack had not yet been time-barred at that stage, the police nevertheless delayed taking H.M.S.’s statement for several more months, ultimately leading to its time-barring as well. No evaluation took place as to whether the July 2016 violence, together with the subsequent threats, constituted a pattern of repeated abuse, reflecting a failure to properly investigate domestic violence as a continuing pattern rather than as isolated incidents. These delays were particularly serious given that the police were aware that she feared for her safety, having been threatened over her contact with them, and that she maintained regular contact with H.M.S. due to shared custody arrangements. Her account’s credibility was demonstrated by H.M.S.’s subsequent conviction for threats, and the time-barring reflected not mere procedural irregularities but a complete failure to investigate, exposing her to continued risk and preventing her credible allegations from ever reaching court. (b)    The Government 49.     The Government submitted that investigations into sexual assault and domestic violence had been prioritised by the police and prosecution for decades and were subject to continuous review by the State Prosecutor. They pointed to Instructions 4/2017 expressly prioritising domestic violence cases and Instructions 2/2018 requiring digital investigation plans for such cases. Before the enactment of Article   218b of the GPC in 2016, protection had been provided through Articles   217 and 218 on physical assault and Article   70(3), which prescribed aggravated punishment for offences committed within close relationships. Although psychological violence had not been a punishable offence, the law had still offered protection, which increased significantly after Article   218b came into force with its longer limitation periods and comprehensive approach to domestic violence. 50.     The Government emphasised that investigators were required to establish the truth and give equal weight to evidence supporting both acquittal and conviction, in accordance with Article   70 of the Constitution and Article   6 §   2 of the Convention. While accepting that the burden of proof in domestic violence cases was difficult, the Government rejected the applicant’s claim that it was “almost impossible to fulfil”. The legislative framework allowed for consideration of various types of evidence, including medical certificates concerning psychological effects and accounts of events before and after the alleged incidents. 51 .     While acknowledging an increase in the influx cases during 2017 ‑ 18 and a lack of manpower, the Government maintained that this had been met with organisational changes and increased funding, noting in particular the addition of six full-time positions at the Reykjavík Metropolitan Police Department. This did not, therefore, indicate that sexual and domestic violence cases had not been prioritised. Urgent cases reported immediately after an incident were given priority over those reported later, such as the applicant’s case. The delays were not due to the nature of the offences, nor did they suggest a lack of police prioritisation. Instructions issued by the State Prosecutor placed clear emphasis on expediting proceedings and prioritising such cases. 52.     Turning to the investigation in the applicant’s case, the Government submitted that the level of severity required to engage Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention had not been met. While acknowledging procedural shortcomings, including the almost nine-month delay between the applicant’s statement and the questioning of H.M.S., they maintained that these, although regrettable, did not in themselves breach Convention obligations since the investigation had otherwise been conducted effectively. The applicant had lodged her complaint almost two years after the first alleged assault in February 2016 and fifteen months after the second in July 2016. Although her report did not concern recent offences, it was undisputed that the delay had led to the expiry of the statute of limitations. Nonetheless, all relevant facts had been established within eighteen months of the complaint. Given the time elapsed since the events, the Government maintained that the case had not required higher priority and that they had no information suggesting H.M.S. was aware of the complaint before his questioning. 53.     The first alleged assault had occurred before the enactment of Article   218b of the GPC on 5   April 2016 and, accordingly, Article   217 had applied with its two-year limitation period. Had the applicant obtained an X ‑ ray confirming the suspected toe fracture, the case might have been classified under Article   218, which carried a longer limitation period. The second alleged assault had taken place after Article   218b came into force. However, the Government argued that it had not met the severity threshold for that provision to apply, as Article   218b required either repeated or serious conduct and the July 2016 incident, viewed in isolation, did not satisfy these criteria given the non-retroactivity principle prevented consideration of the February 2016 incident. 54.     The Government emphasised that witness statements had been taken, though belatedly between October 2018 and March 2019, and that they had supported the applicant’s account to the extent that witnesses confirmed seeing injuries and two witnessed H.M.S. pushing the applicant. However, the witnesses could only testify to what the applicant or H.M.S. had told them, and these statements were contradictory. Even if the statements had been collected earlier, the evidence would still have been insufficient to support the applicant’s accusations given H.M.S.’s partial denial: while he admitted physical contact and causing bruises, he disputed the applicant’s characterisation of the events. While acknowledging that H.M.S. should have been questioned sooner, the Government pointed out that the case had not been ignored, as H.M.S. had ultimately been convicted of making threats against the applicant, an offence carrying heavier penalties (up to two years’ imprisonment) than those under Article   217 (up to one year). 55.     The Government also addressed the administrative confusion that occurred when the case was transferred between the central investigation department and a police station, with multiple referrals back and forth in February and March 2018. They acknowledged that the investigator’s summer leave had contributed to the delays, as evidenced by the June 2018 email exchanges. However, they maintained that these operational issues, while unfortunate, resulted from resource constraints affecting the police generally rather than any specific reluctance to investigate domestic violence cases. They emphasised that, despite these delays, a comprehensive investigation was ultimately conducted, including questioning of eleven witnesses and consideration of all available evidence. The Court’s assessment (a)    General principles 56.     The Court reiterates that the issue of domestic violence, which can take various forms – ranging from physical assault to sexual, economic, emotional or verbal abuse – transcends the circumstances of an individual case. It is a general problem which affects, to a varying degree, all member States and which does not always surface since it often takes place within personal relationships or closed circuits and affects different family members, although women make up an overwhelming majority of victims. The particular vulnerability of the victims of domestic violence and the need for active State involvement in their protection have been emphasised in a number of international instruments and the Court’s case-law (see Kurt v.   Austria [GC], no.   62903/15, §§   161-62, 15   June 2021, and Opuz v.   Turkey , no.   33401/02, §§   72-86, ECHR 2009). 57.     Since in cases concerning violence inflicted by private parties the distinction between the requirements of Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention is not clear-cut, the Court may examine the applicant’s complaints simultaneously under both provisions. Indeed, both provisions impose an obligation on the State to safeguard an individual’s physical and psychological integrity and, together with Article   2, form a continuum that triggers the State’s duty to provide protection once it has been established that attacks on an individual’s integrity were sufficiently serious to necessitate a response (see Hanovs v.   Latvia , no.   40861/22, §   45, 18   July 2024, with further references, and Vučković v.   Croatia , no.   15798/20, §   54, 12   December 2023). 58 .     The positive obligation of the authorities to protect victims of violence has three key aspects. First, they must establish a legislative and regulatory framework of protection. Second, in certain well-defined circumstances, they are required to respond promptly to reports of domestic violence and take operational measures to protect individuals at risk of ill-treatment. Third, they must conduct an effective investigation into arguable claims concerning each instance of such ill-treatment (see X and Others v.   Bulgaria [GC], no.   22457/16, §   178, 2   February 2021; M.C. v.   Bulgaria , cited above, §   153; and Kurt , cited above, §   165, with further references). 59 .     Regarding the existence of a legal framework, the Court’s case-law and relevant international materials reflect a common understanding that comprehensive legal and other measures are necessary to ensure effective protection for victims of domestic violence. These measures must include, in particular, the criminalisation of acts of violence within the family through effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (see Ž.B. v.   Croatia , no.   47666/13, §§   50-51, 11   July 2017, and Galović v.   Croatia , no.   45512/11, §   114, 31   August 2021). 60.     The procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation involves the duty of the domestic authorities to apply in practice the criminal-law mechanisms established to prohibit and punish conduct contrary to Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention. For an investigation to be effective, it must be prompt and thorough throughout the proceedings. The authorities are required to take all reasonable steps to secure evidence related to the incident, including forensic evidence. Particular diligence is necessary in cases of domestic violence, and the specific nature of such violence must be taken into account (see Tunikova and Others v.   Russia , nos.   55974/16 and 3 others, §   114, 14   December 2021, and Vieru v.   the Republic of Moldova , no.   17106/18, §   81, 19   November 2024). 61.     Nonetheless, the Court reiterates that the procedural obligation is a requirement of means and not of results. There is no absolute right to the prosecution or conviction of a particular person where no culpable failures have occurred in the authorities’ efforts to hold perpetrators accountable. The mere fact that an investigation has yielded limited or inconclusive results does not, in itself, indicate any failing. While the authorities must take all reasonable steps to gather evidence, clarify the circumstances, and conduct a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all rele